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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
CONDITIONING DEMOCRATIZATION: 
EU MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN BALKAN 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
 
The uneven effects of EU membership conditionality on Eastern European reforms 
continue to puzzle the research community. Sometimes, the research focus has been too 
large, considering EU membership conditionality as a policy implemented uniformly 
across policy areas. Other efforts take a too narrow approach by trying to explain the 
effects of EU membership conditionality in single sectors. I suggest studying this 
phenomenon through a set of mid-level theories in a cross-country, cross-sectorial 
approach. I argue that both the intensity of EU membership conditionality and reform 
outcomes are contingent upon the policy sector context; hence, we should take a sectorial 
contextual approach in studying them. Reform outcomes result from the interplay 
between EU’s and domestic leaders’ interests in a particular sectorial reform. I assume 
domestic leaders to be rational, power driven actors. I argue that, since they act in some 
weakly institutionalized political environments such as Eastern European societies, they 
represent the principal actors in the power game. I assume the EU to be a rational actor as 
well; yet, differently from Eastern Europe, the role of individual leaders is less 
distinguishable in the highly institutionalized EU political theatre. In this case, EU 
institutions are the primary political agents. They are interested in maintaining and 
enlarging the Union as a stable democracy. Expanding an earlier argument that views the 
EU as established through consociational practices, I argue that EU membership 
conditionality is a tool to impose institutional reforms in the EU aspirant countries, so 
their institutions can be receptive to the EU consociational practices once they join the 
Union. In these countries, the consociational character of conditionality is more visible, 
since it seeks to impose in aspirant countries the same practices that have brought 
democratic stability in some member states. The EU does not impose consociational 
practices on unified societies, but simply seeks to make their institutions receptive to the 
EU consociational practices. I test these arguments with the cases of institutional reforms 
in postcommunist Albanian and Macedonia. I conclude that, generally, EU membership 
manages to change Eastern European leaders’ interests in institutional reforms, but when 
it cannot, the reforms are almost impossible.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On July 28, 2006 the BBC announced that the Polish President, Lech Kaczynski, “has 
called for EU member states to reintroduce the death penalty.”1 This news, coming only 
a few years after the Sejm, Polish legislative body, abolished the death penalty, 
challenged the Council of Europe’s (CoE) pronouncement that “it is difficult to imagine 
that [the abolitionist trend], as demonstrated by political and legal developments, could be 
reversed” (Krüger 1999; Tarschys 1999).  The irony of this claim rests on the fact that in 
April 2000, only a few years earlier, when announcing the abolition of the death penalty 
by the Sejm, a Justice Ministry’s spokeswoman pronounced that “this symbolic act brings 
us into a group of modern European states” and Poles “are no longer in an infamous 
group of countries such as Albania, Russia or Turkey” (cf. Peshkopia and Imami 2008). 
Even though the CoE has made the abolition of the death penalty in Europe its foremost 
international campaign, it was only after the European Union (EU) made it a condition to 
join the Union in 1998 that some Eastern European countries (EECs) eradicated that 
practice. Domestic observers have been surprised with the unity of Albanian elites in 
defense of the death penalty; yet, strong public support to join the EU forced Albanian 
leaders to reluctantly accept judicial maneuvers that practically abolished the death 
penalty in the country except for crimes committed during times of war (Peshkopia and 
Imami 2008). Differently, neighboring Montenegrins abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes only three days after they declared the country’s independence in June 2006; this 
occurred despite the lukewarm Montenegrin public support for the EU. The new 
Macedonia never instituted the death penalty however, even though the ethnic 
Macedonian dominated government could have used it as a threat to the subversive 
Albanian minority.
2
 
 In August 2000, Macedonian leaders and representatives of the Albanian minority 
in Macedonia gathered in the lakeside city of Ohrid to sign the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (hereafter Ohrid Agreement) deemed to terminate a low-intensity, yet nasty 
ethnic conflict (Janos 2005). The Ohrid Agreement stipulated constitutional reforms that 
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practically transformed Macedonia to a multiethnic country, but also exacerbated fears 
among Macedonians that the country could slip to a federation and, ultimately, partition. 
Meanwhile, Macedonia continues to resist Greek—and for that matter, international 
pressure—to change its name to something different from plain “Republic of 
Macedonia.” In fact, the nation lost a bid to join NATO in April 2007 because of its 
refusal to change its name even though that membership might have reinforced the 
country’s security from domestic and international threats more so than the Ohrid 
Agreement.  
 On November 1, 2009, the EU lifted visa requirements for three Balkan countries, 
namely Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, yet excluded from this policy three other 
countries, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo based on terms that seem to be 
merely technical. The failure to benefit from the first wave of the EU’s visa liberalization 
policy for the Western Balkans came as an embarrassment to the Albanian government 
since Albanian public’s support for EU membership is first and foremost related to their 
need to break out of their six and a half decade long isolation from the West. 
Consequentially, the Albanian government vowed to fulfill EU requirements for 
modernizing its border monitoring legislation, technology, and infrastructure, and clear 
the way to acquire visa liberalization for its citizens. Finally, on November 8, 2010, the 
Ministers of Interior of the European Union adopted the proposal to introduce visa free 
travel for citizens from Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3
 The citizens of these two 
countries began to travel visa-free in the Schengen zone by the end of 2010. 
 Moreover, on December 17, 2005, only a few months before an armed ethnic 
conflict that threatened to rip the country apart, Macedonia acquired the status of EU 
candidate country. On October 14, 2009, the European Commission recommended the 
start of accession negotiations for full membership for the Republic of Macedonia. On 
December 8, 2009, the EU council of ministers postponed granting Macedonia a start date 
for accession negotiations until at least the first half of 2010. On November 9, 2010, the 
European Commission released its first Enlargement Package since the enactment of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. A Press Release by the European Commissioner for Enlargement 
and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, announced the EU Enlargement Package for 
2010. The Commission Conclusion on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stated 
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that the country “continues to sufficiently fulfill the political criteria,” and “[t]he 
Commission reiterates its recommendation that negotiations for accession to the European 
Union should be opened.” However, since starting negotiations required a unanimous 
decision of Member States, the Commission recommended that a “negotiated and 
mutually accepted solution to the name issue under the auspices of the UN is essential.”4 
However, the Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the 
European Union that was released the same day shocked both the Albanian public and 
government when it implicitly rejected its application to become an EU candidate 
country; it stated that “negotiations for accession to the European Union should be 
opened once the country achieved the necessary degree of compliance with membership 
criteria, in particular the Copenhagen political criteria requiring the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing notably democracy and the rule of law.”5  
 The aforementioned vignettes regarding behavioral change in Eastern European 
countries share non-systematic similarities and differences. All of the four countries 
mentioned escaped communism in the period of 1988-1991.
6
 Two of them, Albania and 
Poland, struggled only with democratization issues; Macedonia and Montenegro also 
encountered nation-building problems. All of the nations wanted to join the EU, but only 
Poland has succeeded thus far. However, their behavior presents inconsistencies both in 
terms of compliance and non-compliance with international norms in related policies. 
Exactly when we thought that the Polish society would have normatively embraced the 
abolition of the death penalty, the Polish President called for its reinstatement not only in 
his country, but also the entire European Union. However, Macedonia, while denying 
constitutional rights to a quarter of its population, abolished the death penalty with the 
Constitution that gave birth to the post-Yugoslav republic. Moreover, was there any 
rationale for Albanian governments during almost two decades of democratization and 
institutional reforms, to delay reforms in border control and the immigration system to a 
point that would jeopardize their top electoral promise: to bring the country closer to the 
EU? And last, but not least, how is it possible that Macedonia who only acquired 
independence in 1991 and, during its short history as an independent state went through 
severe domestic and international challenges, succeeded in fulfilling the political criteria 
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while Albania whose sovereignty has not been challenged—neither externally nor 
internally—for the last 66 years, fails to comply with the membership criteria?           
These cases are drawn from both distinct policy areas and the general political 
performance of particular Eastern European countries (EECs). The varying outcomes of 
these processes—as suggested by either the progress of former communist Eastern 
European countries toward EU membership as well as Freedom House’s indexes that 
measure democracy and liberty—suggest several other variables that need to be taken into 
account in order to explain the differences in state behavior. What unifies these cases is 
the attraction of EU membership. Hence, one can legitimately ask: How much, and under 
what conditions can the EU affect democratization and democratic consolidation? What 
are the mechanisms employed by the EU to affect reforms in countries escaping 
authoritarian/dictatorial rule? What causes these mechanisms to succeed, and what makes 
them to fail? What is the interplay between leaders’ power-driven interests, the domestic 
constrains on their preferences, and the international context?  
While the international dimension of democratization is now taken for granted, 
only recently has research in political science begun to consider cases when other 
countries, international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and outspoken individuals could 
affect democratization and consolidation. Currently, while there is a general agreement 
about the relevance of the international environment’s influence on domestic affairs, the 
expanding wave of democratization continues to challenge the research community with 
the complexities of such an influence and its outcomes. National and regional 
idiosyncrasies, historical legacies, demographic compositions, economic developments, 
time framing, and even geographic locations inhibit us from having a general theory of 
democratization and democracy consolidation that would allow us to understand, explain, 
and possibly foresee the democratization dynamics of particular countries and world 
regions. Mid-range theories might provide responses for many looming and newly 
emerging questions. While the democratization research community has been engaged in 
an energetic enterprise to find answers for such questions, this dissertation is an attempt 
to respond to some of them.         
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 An issue of major academic debate is the role of domestic and international actors 
in countries’ democratization and institutional reforms. While early democracy theorists 
downplayed the role of international actors in democratization (see for instance 
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986), it will be difficult today to find any research 
on democratization without references to the effects of the international environment on 
democratization, except for cases when that research has been exclusively dedicated to 
domestic dynamics of democratization (see the edited volume by Peter Nardulli (2008)). 
However, scholars do not always agree on the relevance of international actors on 
domestic affairs, even if they include the international environment as an independent 
variable. Disagreements range from defining mechanisms employed by international 
actors to encourage democratization (Pevehouse 2002; Grugel 1999; Whitehead 1996), to 
the real effects of the international environment on democratization (Scimmelfenning 
2007, 2005; Saideman and Ayres 2007; Kelley 2004a,b). I argue that some of those 
disagreements stem from definitional fallacies, while others reflect inappropriate research 
designs.  
Scholarly attention to democratic reforms have been lopsided toward reforms that 
most openly and dramatically affect freedom and equality, and are popular, hence often 
downplaying the role that other sectorial reforms play in the quality of democracy and 
good governance. Reforms in education, health services, asylum and immigration, public 
administration, and local decentralization have always attracted less interest than 
constitutional, economic, electoral, and judiciary reforms. Such an approach creates 
problems in understanding the role that domestic and international actors play in 
institutional reforms since it leaves out of the picture some significant comparative cases 
where leaders’ political preferences differ from sectors more closely linked with the 
power struggle.  Moreover, studying sectorial reforms separated from wider domestic and 
international contexts has often created a number of methodological problems, some of 
the most acute being the lack of capability to observe the spillover effects of some 
reforms on others and the contextual conditions that would factor into such spillovers. 
Those contextual conditions would also impact the outcome of international assistance to 
democratization. Discussions of the balance between the domestic and international 
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contexts where reforms are taking place, the role of international actors, and the interests 
of domestic actors are needed. 
Many of the problems haunting the literature related to the widening and 
deepening of the European Union appear with research studying democratization, as well 
as EU accession of former communist countries as tool for democratization. Studying 
such political phenomena requires research designs that best fit the study questions 
(Johnson and Reynolds 2008). Following advice from Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 
(2005), research on the Eastern enlargement of the EU needs to expand its comparative 
focus. This suggestion maintains validity even when we study the effects of Eastern 
enlargement policies on EU membership aspiring countries. Indeed, most of these 
policies are intended to affect structural changes in EU membership aspirants from 
Eastern Europe, but they cannot be the only factors that affect these changes. Structural 
contexts that reflect historical and demographic conditions, along with strong individual 
power-driven preferences of new ruling elites in the presence of institutional vacuums, 
might either enhance or constrain their roles. These are variables that should be taken into 
account. Such factors differ across countries. When inserted into the same equation with 
EU membership conditionality, they would help us explain and build some degree of 
confidence in explaining the outcomes of institutional reforms in some of the former 
communist countries that have yet to become EU members.  
However, aside from the social context where Eastern European (EE) reforms 
occur, we have another set of actors, namely EU leaders and institutions. They act in 
response to their structural background as well. This situation calls for an overarching 
theoretical framework that would enable us to follow the same epistemology for building 
an argument that explains the effects of EU membership conditionality on EE institutional 
reforms. I argue that consociational theory serves as a theoretical connection between 
processes of EU internal integration and processes of EU eastward expansion. As a 
research program, consociational theory emerged by the end of the 1960s and owes much 
of its performance and reputation to the work of Arend Lijphart (1969, 1968) as well as a 
number of authors interested in the small Western European countries (Butenschøn 1985; 
Daalder 1989, 1974, 1971; Huyse 1970; Lehmbruch 1974, 1968, 1967; Steiner 1987, 
1974, 1970). While originally its contributors merely wanted to explain the establishment 
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and survival of democracy in some severely fragmented European countries, soon they 
realized the theory could help explain political developments, and also prescribe solutions 
for other deeply divided societies around the world (Chehabi 1980; Dekmeijan 1978; 
Dew 1972; Dix 1980; Lijphart 2004, 1999, 1996a; McGarry and Noel 1989; O’Leary 
1989; Pappalardo 1981, 1979; Tindigarukayo 1989; Tsebelis 1990).  
Contributors to consociational theory claim to have established an elite theory of 
democratization that bears universalistic validity. According to them, while maintaining 
social cohesion in deeply divided societies is difficult due to centrifugal factors that tend 
to destroy the social fabric, elites who are willing to cooperate in order to keep their 
countries together might be able to replace majoritarian practices and institutions with 
consociational ones. The latter represent political arrangements that would accord veto 
power to each of group in the society, allowing them to block the actions of other groups 
that endanger their own interests. These social groups, called segments or pillars, manage 
to waive internal cohesion and delegate power to their representatives such as to enable 
them to conduct negotiations and forge arrangements with representatives of other 
segments. Closed door negotiations and secret-like political deals produce what has come 
to be known as “consociational democracy.” This term has become the epitome of stable 
democracies in deeply divided societies. 
Since the days when consociational literature first emerged, some of its 
contributors have become interested in discovering consociational practices at 
international levels (Lehmbrusch 1974: 92; Lijphart 1974a: 123, 131). Other authors 
(Costa and Magnette 2003; Hix 1999; Gabel 1998; Taylor 1998, 1996, 1991; 
Chryssochou 1994; Steiner 1974: 281-3), including Lijphart himself (1999), have tried to 
see the EU as a “consociational democracy.”  Even though such efforts have attracted 
criticism (Andeweg 2000), I argue that, contingent upon re-conceptualization and, indeed, 
return to its original claims and goals, the consociational research program enables us to 
explain the motivations of EU institutions in conditioning institutional reforms in EU 
aspirants. In order to reach such a goal, some conceptual refinishing of the consociational 
theory is needed, namely we need to resolve the tautological relationship between 
consociationalism as practice—i. e., independent variable in the explanation of 
democratic stability in deeply divided societies—and consociationalism as a definitional 
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category of such a stability. I argue that eliminating the concept of “consociational 
democracy” in favor of “stable democracy” in segmented societies will be practically 
costless. In addition, we gain a priceless theoretical framework that would help us to 
employ the same epistemological, ontological and conceptual framework in explaining 
both the EU internal integration and its eastward enlargement.  
Building on an argument of Costa and Magnette (2003) and equipped with 
consociationalism as an elite theory of democratization, I will analyze EU membership 
conditionality as a set of consociational practices that aim at expanding EU democratic 
stability in EU membership aspiring countries from Eastern Europe. If, as Gabel (1998) 
suggests, EU member states parallel various social segments of a stable democracy, we 
can expand this notion to EU membership aspiring countries. Therefore, both EU and EE 
elites negotiate and employ consociational practices to build institutions and/or reform the 
existing ones in the aspirant countries in a way that would conform to the existing EU 
model and contribute to the democratic stability of the Union rather than undermining it. 
By the same token, EU elites apply consociational practices to preemptively expand 
democratic stability beyond existing EU borders to potential members. These conditions 
reflect the political preferences of EU elites, but differ from one policy area to the other. 
At this point, elites of the different “segments”—i. e., EU and EU membership aspiring 
countries—enter negotiations, and it is expected that the outcome of these negotiations 
would define the pace and quality of institutional reforms in EU membership aspiring 
countries.           
While the proposed analytical framework will help us to understand the EU 
motivations behind EU membership conditionality as well as why EU membership 
conditionality works the way it works, we also need to know why the sectorial reforms in 
these countries produce the outcomes that they produce. In order to explain the varying 
pace and success of different institutional reforms in Eastern Europe, I propose a set of 
mid-level theories that comparatively analyze such reforms in two democratizing 
countries in Southeastern Europe. Since these theories aim at explaining the role of the 
EU and domestic leaders’ quest for attaining and maintaining power, the key variables are 
EU membership conditionality―that is, the set of conditions the EU places upon those 
countries wishing to attain EU membership―and domestic leaders’ interests in 
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conducting a certain sectorial reform. Indeed, EU membership conditionality offers an 
excellent analytical opportunity since most EU conditions focus on distinct institutional 
reforms, thus allowing the emergence of a wide range of comparative cases. Often the 
conditions represent general policy principles, but sometimes they represent specific 
policy preferences of the EU main and/or leading actors. The dynamics of reforms 
become more complex if we take into account ruling elites’ changing political preferences 
regarding different reforms over time and the fact that some reforms openly fall on areas 
perceived as sensitive to countries’ cohesion and security, especially in ethnically divided 
societies.  
I call this model a sectorial contextual approach to democratization; it serves as an 
alternative to the impossibility of a global, and even regional, theory of democratization. 
Theoretical explanation of the effects of EU membership conditionality on institutional 
reforms in EU membership aspirants cannot hold universalistic validity because of the 
very peculiar nature of the EU and its relationship with neighboring EECs. Therefore, a 
sectorial contextual approach will rely on mid-level theories of democratization built on 
an elite approach to democratization and a rational assumption of political actors’ 
motivations. Moreover, ample evidence shows that, often, specific conditions are 
conveyed by the EU to different countries with different intensity and continuity, and 
different countries obey them to various extents. The same conditions may produce 
different policy changes and institutional reforms. I argue that whether or not a country 
has already consolidated its statehood represents a major factor that determines the nature 
and intensity of the EU conditions to be fulfilled by that country in order to come closer 
to achieving EU membership. States at an earlier stage of the state-building process will 
tend to follow EU policy prescriptions compared to states with a longer history of 
independence and statehood.  
 I develop in detail the cases of Albanian and Macedonian institutional reforms. 
These countries share similarities that stem from their ideological affiliation with the 
Soviet Bloc and/or the Soviet style society. Both these countries converged to the 
nationalistic socialist systems, with loosened ties with the Soviet Union. These 
similarities—albeit with different nuances—might serve as a good explanation of these 
countries’ state organization during communism, the reforms that they needed to adapt, 
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and institutions that they needed to build in order to assist them during their transition to 
democracy and its consolidation. For Albania, there was no walk of life that did not need 
reforms, while Macedonia started in 1991 its institution building from scratch as an 
independent state in a process that includes both state-building and democratic 
institutional reforms. From the economic perspective, communism, with disputable 
success, tried to transform these countries from agricultural economies of the pre-WWII 
to Soviet-style mega-industrialized nations, while agriculture varied from totally 
nationalized (Albania) to mostly private (Macedonia).  
          These similarities notwithstanding, these countries have fared differently during 
various periods of their reformation from communist dictatorship and socialist economy 
to pluralism and open market economy. If progress toward EU membership can be held 
as a standard, Macedonia is much closer to the EU than Albania. Macedonia, after having 
negotiated the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in the 
summer of 2001, gained candidate status in 2005, applied for full membership in 2008, 
and was qualified for accession talks in fall 2009, but was denied the accession 
negotiations due to its standing issues with Greece, a EU member country. Macedonia has 
also taken a major step closer to the Union in fall 2009 when it signed a visa liberalization 
agreement with the EU.  
As for the laggard Albania, the EU finally agreed to open negotiations for the 
SAA in January 2006, and the visa liberalization agreement was reached in fall 2010. 
However, the EU failed to offer Albania the status of EU candidate country in fall 2010, 
making its application the first one to have been rejected by the EU thus far. In its opinion 
on Albania's application for membership of the European Union, the European 
Commission explained that  
negotiations for accession to the European Union should  
be opened with Albania once the country has achieved the  
necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria  
and in particular the Copenhagen political criteria requiring  
the stability of institutions guaranteeing notably democracy  
and rule of law.
7
 
11 
 
This statement shows that lack of institutional reforms rather than economic criteria are 
blocking Albania’s closer association with the EU. The purpose of this research is to help 
explain the variety in outcomes of institutional reforms in Albania and Macedonia, and 
thus understand the role that EU membership conditionality, domestic leaders’ political 
preferences, and structural factors play in these reforms. 
          With the collapse of communism, these countries are undertaking reforms in all 
sectors; yet only four of them will be the focus of my attention: the constitution, asylum, 
local decentralization, and judiciary reforms. Different domestic leaders’ preferences in 
sectorial reforms and different EU preferences in each of these reforms will help map out 
the causes of different intensities of EU membership conditionality over the time span of 
the observation, 1991-2010. The very nature of each of these reforms will require 
historical process-tracking.    
 This dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter II offers an overview of 
postsocialist transition and democratization as well as a detailed critical review of 
consociational theory and its potentials as an appropriate framework for explaining the 
effects of EU membership conditionality on EE institutional reforms. Chapter III 
develops my model, which I call a sectorial contextual model because all variables need 
to be analyzed within the context of a given reform, yet these reforms need to be studied 
together in order to account for reform spillovers. Chapters IV-VII provide an empirical 
analysis of four institutional reforms in Albania and Macedonia. Chapter VIII will 
summarize the findings and suggest future research projects.                          
                                                 
1
 Polish leader backs death penalty, BBC, July 28, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
5225406.smt [Visited July 30, 2006]. 
2
 I will refer in this dissertation to “Macedonians” as the Slavic speaking population of the country and to 
“Albanians,” “Serbs,” “Turks,” “Bulgarians,” and “Roma” as the populations that belong to the respective 
ethnic groups. A more appropriate form would have been “Slavo-Macedonians,” “Albanian-Macedonians,” 
“Serb-Macedonians,” “Turk-Macedonians,” “Bulgarian-Macedonians, and “Roma-Macedonians,” but 
“Slavo-Macedonians” sounds offensive for the majority of the Slavic speaking population in the country 
(Lebamoff and Ilievski 2008: 8). Indeed, including the denominator “Macedonian” to all the ethnicities 
would have helped to the perception of Macedonia as an overarching identity of all its ethnic groups. 
However, since Macedonians themselves have decided to opt out of such a solution, I will refer them as 
Macedonians, and to other ethnic groups living in Macedonia as Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Bulgarians, and 
Roma. It is easily perceivable what an insurmountable hurdle such identity politics represent for nation-
building and social cohesion.      
2
 As the European Stability Initiative Report (2002: 5) notes in the case of the Macedonian mix populated 
city of Kičevo [in Albanian Kërçovë], “[t]he majority of urban Macedonians in Kičevo have acquired 
secondary or higher education. Their privileged access to the educational system was the key to 
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participating in the benefits of the socialist economy in which jobs were strictly graded according to 
educational requirements.” 
2
 According to the European Stability Initiative Report (2002: 5) notes, “the exclusion of Albanians from 
the socialist sector and the benefits it offered have forced them to seek out economic strategies, chiefly 
labour migration and small-scale trade, which have left them much better equipped to survive the collapse 
of the socialist system.” 
3
 “Visa free regime for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina: the European Commission welcomes the 
Council’s decision.” November 8, 2010. At 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/548&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en [Visited November 20, 2010]. 
4
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Enlargement Strategy 
and Main Challenges 2010-2011.” European Commission, COM (2010)660 final). At 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2010_en.htm [Visited November 
20, 2010]. “Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy: Press points 
on Enlargement Package.” November 9, 2010. At http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2010_en.htm [Visited November 20, 2010]. 
5
 “Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the European Union.” European 
Commission, COM(2010) 680. Brussels, November 9, 2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2010_en.htm [Visited November 
20, 2010]. See also “Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy: 
Press points on Enlargement Package.”  
6
 Since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the former communist countries have made 
relentless efforts to reform their institutions, economies, and identities; countries residing within the Eastern 
portion of the Cold War political divide decided that it was time for them to shake off the two-century long 
stigma of backwardness correlated with their geographic position versus the developed Northeastern part of 
the continent. Central Europe—a term previously adopted by German philosophers of the counter-
enlightenment (Mitteleuropa) to distinguish “pure and virtuous Germans” from the “corrupted French and 
British”—but later borrowed from Milan Kundera’s political texts of the 1980s by some Eastern European 
societies in search of their identity, aimed at explicitly or implicitly excluding others, especially Russia, in 
order to dramatize the opposition of Central Europe and Eastern Europe, but also all Southeastern European 
countries, “possibly in order to help the West to limit its moral dilemmas” (Antohi 2000: 64-5). As Antohi 
goes on,  
in the name of liberty and justice, another historical injustice was being 
reproduced and reinforced: the double exclusion of those Communist 
countries (and, after 1989, of their postcommunist avatars) that are 
Southeast, not Central European.  
Arguably, the marking out of such geopolitical categories is not an innocent act, since the complex 
notion of Europe “comprises both market categories such as Southeast Europe (the Balkans), East Central 
Europe, Eastern Europe, and unmarked categories, e. g. Northwest Europe, Southwest Europe, West Central 
Europe” (Todorova 2009, cf Antohi 2000: 66). Thus, Europe lost its Eastern part since those “unmarked” 
categories have pushed to otherness the countries of the Balkans and the former Soviet Union (Antohi 2000: 
66).  
 Throughout my school years in my native communist Albania, which coincided with the apex of 
the Albanian nationalist-communism, we were taught that our national hero, Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu, 
who single-handedly held off the Ottomans in the mountains of Albania for 25 years in the Fifteenth 
Century, had practically saved Western civilization from extinction. Glances at the map used to make my 
little brain wonder how that would have been possible; obviously, the Ottomans could have easily 
circumvented the lands of Albania and flanked Christendom from the East rather than South. As I was 
maturing full of doubts about the Albanian nationalist-communist dogma, I began to dismiss those myths as 
Albanian communists’ obsession, only to learn that Croats, Hungarians, Montenegrins, Poles, and Serbs had 
already developed their own mythical obsessions with King Petar, King Hunyadi, Prince Lazar, and King 
Ladislaus respectively. Even later, I would discover that, similar to us Albanians, other Eastern Europeans 
do not identify themselves as Eastern European, not even with the country where they live if they happen to 
be ethnic minorities, but after their ethnicities (see also Roskin 2002). Moreover, we all revile our less-
Western neighbors, and denounce them for their Eastern “barbarity” (Nodia 2002: 205, 2001: 32; Kaplan 
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1994: 149). Yet, my discovery of the Eastern European mental mapping had just begun. After the Albanian 
multiple Iron Curtain fell slightly later than the one imposed on the rest of our fellow Eastern Europeans, I 
had a chance to meet some Romanian colleagues in a conference, only to learn that I was an Easterner 
talking to some Westerners. Confused and ashamed of my ignorance in geography, I opened a map of 
Europe, only to reassure myself of what I knew: Romania was geographically located more East than 
Albania. With the hope that truth would keep all of us free, I made my conversers aware of that fact, only to 
realize that, by then, the Northern Hemisphere was spinning clockwise.     
 In order to save the reader from this postsocialist Dystopia, I will continue throughout this 
Dissertation with the traditional reference to Eastern Europe as the land and societies that inhabit it located 
to the East of the political Iron Curtain, but which still remain within what is geographically known as the 
European continent—the latter defined as the land that stretches from the Ural mountains in the East to the 
Atlantic Ocean in the West. That community of polities comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine, a total of 23 countries. I will refer differently to the region only if that difference rests within a 
quote. Within this region I will distinguish the Balkans as a subregion, often only to narrow down the 
research focus.  
7
 European Commission. “Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the European 
Union,” {SEC(2010) 1335}. Brussels, November 9, 2010. COM(2010) 680. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY, EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIZATION 
AND EU MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
LITERATURE 
 
 
This chapter analyzes three sets of literature. First, it gives a critical assessment of 
consociational theory, points to its pitfalls and highlights the opportunities that it presents 
in conceptualizing the EU as a stable democracy built on consociational practices. The 
theory also helps to explain the EU‘s eastward expansion through conditioning a set of 
policies that can be considered as consociational practices to EU membership aspirants 
from Eastern Europe. Second, the chapter offers a review of Eastern European 
democratization literature with a focus on highlighting the actors and factors defining the 
pace and direction of democratization. Third, it assesses the EU membership 
conditionality literature, its shortcomings and the opportunities it offers for studying EU 
negotiations with the Balkan countries as they reform their institutions in preparation for 
the EU accession. The final goal is to detect theoretical gaps that need to be addressed 
and to reconstruct thus theoretical explanations of how EU membership conditionality 
affects Easter European institutional reforms.       
 
Consociational Theory: Defenders and Critics 
In his article ―Consociational Democracy‖ published in 1969 in World Politics, the Dutch 
social scholar Arend Lijphart promised to provide an elite theory of democratization that 
would shift the explanatory focus from structural factors of pluralist theorists to rational 
choices of ruling elites.
1
 The article was a culmination of scholarly efforts during the late 
1960s to walk away from the structuralism of the 1950s and early 1960s, which claimed 
to find sources of a society‘s regime choice among its socio-economic and cultural 
features (Lipset 1968, 1960, 1959; Lipset and Bendix 1959; Smelser and Lipset ed. 1966), 
and move towards individualist and institutionalist approaches that view policy change as 
a result of elite‘s behavioral change (Connor 1967; Bluhm 1968; Lehmbruch 1975, 1968, 
1967; Lijphart 1969, 1968; Rogowski and Wasserspring 1969; Rothchild 1970). 
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Consociational theory has tried to reconcile on the one hand the simultaneous emergence 
of ―primordialist‖ sentiments where parochial loyalties are able to putatively disrupt 
modern democracies, and on the other a turn from socioeconomic determinism toward 
elite voluntarism.
2
 All in all, consociational theory has been able to displace other elite-
centered concepts and theories that preceded it (Lustik 1997: 97)
3
 and, obviously, became 
a fashionable elite theory of democratization for more than three decades.  
Consociational democracy serves to describe ―government by elite cartel designed 
to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy‖ (Lijphart 
1969: 216). It has been depicted as an effort ―to refine and elaborate Almond‘s typology 
of democracies‖ (Lijphapt 1969: 207). 4  Lijphart suggested a new category for 
democracies that manage to remain stable even in deeply divided societies: consociational 
democracy. This definition simultaneously highlights the stability of these democracies in 
segmented societies and provides a means of achieving such democratic stability.
5
 In 
cases where political parties, interest groups, media, schools, youth and other voluntary 
associations identify with subcultures, the concentration of social interests in the 
subcultural social segments exacerbates political conflict along the lines of segmental 
divisions.  As the consociational argument suggests, in these societies, contending groups, 
after having achieved internal homogenization, rise as pillars upon which elites rest at the 
top. The major novelty proposed by consociationalism is that decision making by these 
elites rely on compromises rather than majority rule. Elites reach out to each other and 
forge agreements and deals that will assure social cohesion. Other authors argue that, in 
order to reconcile incompatible and transitive preferences that characterize deeply divided 
societies, compromise should not serve as an intermediate solution, but as a package deal 
with each social segment wining on some issues and losing on others (Lehmbruch 1974: 
91–2).  
Consociationalist theory has drawn severe criticism. Its critics have pointed to 
both its conceptual, methodological and empirical pitfalls. Brian Barry (1975a) has 
highlighted the tautological character of Lijphart‘s concepts of accommodation and 
consociationalism, offering them both as explanatory variables and descriptive categories, 
while van Schendelen (1984) joins Barry in dissecting the empirical pitfalls of 
consociational theory. In addition, Barry (1975a: 481) points to the tautological 
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relationship between Lijphart‘s claim that consociational democracies are both 
―fragmented but stable democracies and countries with ‗government by elite cartel.‘‖ 
Arguably, this was a shift from consociationalism as an independent variable to 
consociationalism as typology, hence allowing Lijphart‘s typology to substitute for 
Almond‘s one; while Almond‘s typology ruled out ―any ‗fragmented but stable‘ 
democracy,‖ Lijphart‘s typology ruled out any ―fragmented but stable‖ society not ruled 
by ―government by elite cartel‖ (Barry 1975a: 481; see also Lustick 1997: 99-101). Other 
authors have pointed to the degenerating tendency of the theory after continuous additions 
of variables in order to accommodate persisting empirical rejections of its claims 
(Bogaards 1998; Lustick 1997). Yet other critiques have targeted the unclear division 
between the dependent and independent variables, as well as between the theory‘s 
explanatory character and its normative claims.  
Critics have also pointed to the conceptual and definitional problems of 
consociational theory. Critiques range from the lack of definitions for ―democracy‖ and 
―stability‖ to ―plural society‖ and ―segmental cleavages‖ to ―crosscutting cleavages.‖ 
Lijphart‘s (1977: 4) attempts to finally address democracy ― as a synonym of what Dahl 
calls ‗polyarchy‘‖ and not as ―a system of government that fully embodies all democratic 
ideals, but one that approximates them to a reasonable degree‖ have not satisfied his 
critics. They point to the fact that his definition of democracy seems impossible to 
operationalize and has raised questions about the meaning of ―reasonable‖ and 
―democratic ideals‖ (Lustick 1997: 104). Moreover, it is questionable how much of a 
polyarchy a consociational democracy can be when, in the former, competition between 
the elites is, more than anything else, essential, while in a consociation, the opposite is 
essential, namely, intense cooperation (Van Schendelen 1984: 32). As for the concept of 
stability, critics have noted that Lijphart‘s definition of it as a multidimensional concept 
that jointly and independently combines ideas such as system maintenance, civil order, 
legitimacy and effectiveness, are imprecise and make difficult the development of rules 
for distinguishing ―unstable‖ from ―stable‖ cases (Lusrick 1997: 105). Even more 
critiques have been addressed to Lijphart‘s concepts of ―plural societies‖ and ―segmental 
cleavages.‖ Many items on the long list of cleavages that define a segmented society 
characterize almost every society. As one critic (Schendelen 1984:31) asks, ―can one say 
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that some division in not a cleavage and that cleavage is not segmental?‖ (cf. Lustick 
1997: 106). 
 The ―favorable factors‖ have been among the most criticized features of 
consociational theory, and the theoretical and empirical attention paid by consociational 
theorists in addressing such criticism has contributed both in unveiling—and 
exacerbating—the theory‘s logical inconsistencies and its degeneration. The list of 
fourteen favorable conditions—as counted by Bogaards (1998)—has been amended by 
Lijphart in the course of seventeen years, obviously reacting to criticism or trying to 
adjust the theory to new empirical data generated from other countries and continents.
6
 
The favorable factors lack theoretical coherence since they were not deductively acquired 
from the theory, but inductively obtained from empirical tests (Bogaards 1998: 476; 
Steiner 1981b). Other contributors to the theory have also added conditions as they fit 
their case studies, resulting in the ad hoc character of the favorable conditions (Steiner 
1981: 315);
7
 others have noticed the static nature of the favorable conditions and their 
incapacity to affect change in elite behavior (Dix 1980; Bogaards 1998); yet others have 
revealed serious mistakes in the quantified values of these conditions (Bogaards 1998: 
484). Also, the lack of distinction in consociational theory between the favorable factors 
for transition and those for consolidation have generated criticism since the factors that 
impact transition might differ from those that affect consolidation (Rustow 1970: 346, cf. 
Bogaards 1998: 484). Lehmbruch (1975) tries somehow to tackle this issue by defining as 
―genetic conditions‖ those that generate consociational democracy and ―sustaining 
conditions‖ as the ones that are conducive for its maintenance. Lijphart (1985: 119) 
responds to the criticism by pointing out that ―a factor that is favourable for the 
establishment of a consociation will also be a positive condition for its maintenance.‖  
 Consociationalist theorists have never managed to clearly disentangle the 
relationship between the favorable factors as social structures and elite decisions as an 
individualist approach, hence the tension between determinism and voluntarism. As 
Bogaards (1998: 485) notes, consociational theory treats the favorable factors as given, 
fixed parameters of political life, and the relationship between favorable factors and elite 
behavior, with the former affecting the latter (see also O‘Leary 1989; and Dix 1980). 
Here consociational theorists split between the ―orthodox‖ who consider the favorable 
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factors as conditions, and the ―latitudinarians‖ who consider them no more than helpful 
circumstances (Bogaards 1998: 487). Lijphart himself has dismissed the deterministic 
role of conditions as ―helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves 
to account for the success of consociational democracy‖ (Lijphart 1977: 54, cf. Bogaards 
1998). That has prompted Van Schendelen (1984: 114) to scoff: ―the conditions may be 
present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at 
all.‖ Later in his career, Lijphart (1984: 220) was increasingly inclined toward determinist 
factors, turning to other structural variables, namely pluralism, population size and the 
cultural inference of a British heritage.  
 Bogaards (1998: 490) equates consociational theory‘s conflict between 
determinism and voluntarism with the conflict between the empirical and normative value 
of the theory. Indeed, other authors have pointed to dangers that the normative application 
of consociationalism might represent: as Barry‘s (1975b: 395) sarcastic apposite of the 
Irish saying ―Live horse and you‘ll get grass‖ goes, ―[h]ave proportional representation 
and a grand coalition and you‘ll become Swiss or Dutch.‖ Lijphart‘s critics have warned 
against Liphart‘s inclination to focus more on the normative potentials of the theory than 
its explanatory ones (Barry 1975a,b). That, according to Lustick (1997: 108) represents a 
shift from good science to good politics.
8
       
 Consociational theory builds on three types of variables; a sociological variable 
(the division of society into pillars or segments); an institutional variable (a proportional 
electoral system and some protection mechanisms for minorities); and a behavioral 
variable (the inclination of elites to negotiate compromises) (Costa and Magnette 2003). 
Implicitly, consociational practices will apply simultaneously in three different worlds 
and result in the same conclusion for all of them: one of these worlds is run by social 
structures; the other by institutions; the third by elites. This is, indeed, how the 
consociationalist theorists have developed their theory thus far; when elites fail to take 
decisions needed for a stable democracy, consociational theorists search for social 
structures or institutions to explain elites‘ decisions. This is a logical fallacy since it 
searches for structural or institutional determinants in actions of leaders who are assumed 
to be power-driven. One has the choice to remove elites from the explanatory equation 
and rely only on deterministic social structures as necessary and/or sufficient factors; 
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however, consociational theory would then provide nothing new from the existing 
pluralist theories it claims to address; consociationalism was born as an elite theory, and 
only there does its scientific vigor rest.    
             However, in face of such criticism, consociational theory has shown surprising 
resilience and, with disputable success, has even managed to expand its focus to 
international relations, especially as relates to efforts to frame EU governance within a 
consociationalist model (Lijphart 1999; Bogaards 1998; Gabel 1998; Chrysochoou 1994; 
for a critique, see Andeweg 2000: 515). Being initially interested only in how domestic 
factors affect consociationalist solutions for deeply divided societies, around the mid-
1970s, consociational theorists became more aware of the impact of international 
consociationalist models on domestic politics. Some authors became interested in 
demonstrating how stable democracies implement patterns of international decision 
making that could be considered as consociational practice (Lehmbruch 1974:92; Lijphart 
1975: 123, 131). The case is too tempting to resist, and Lijphart (1999) himself has 
explored and endorsed the similitude of the EU with his archetypical consociational 
democracy. The EU was founded by its member countries‘ elites in an effort to promote 
stability and democracy in the war-torn continent; most of its activity continues to be 
conducted behind closed doors, secretly, and with little to no accountability to citizens 
(Hix 1999; Gabel 1998). Bargain style negotiations are the dominant way of taking 
decisions and minorities are empowered by veto in most decision-making activities. Even 
though since the Single European Act in 1987, unanimity as a criteria for decision making 
is no longer required for member states, except in areas of high salience, both the Council 
of Ministers and the European Commission which represent intergovernmentalism and 
supragovernmentalism respectively, continue to decide consensually. Some political 
scholars go as far as to normatively propose consociationalism as a remedy against the 
―democratic deficit‖ of the EU (Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995). 
Although those who offer a consociational interpretation of the EU claim that all 
four of Lijphart‘s consociational characteristics can be discerned, sometimes they 
nominate different consociational features per each of these characteristics. Building a 
strong case in favor of the consociationalist nature of the EU, Gabel (1998) parallels them 
as follows: (1) grand coalitions rest within the European Parliament; EU member states‘ 
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considerable autonomy in some policy areas substitutes for segmental autonomy; (2) 
proportionality—or even overrepresentation of the smaller member countries—in the 
composition of EU institutions; and (3) the continuation of consensual decision making—
even after the introduction of qualified majorities—as mutual veto. Moreover, the EU has 
better prospects for developing consociationalist democracy because it has what most 
segmented societies lack: the European Commission as an integrative entrepreneur. 
Potentially, even the European Parliament can emerge as an integrative entrepreneur 
since, as Gabel (1998: 472) points out, one minor reform that would increase the agenda-
setting power of the European Parliament might also promote cross-cutting cleavages. 
Arguably, the power to initiate legislation might promote transnational coalitions in order 
to lobby the EU agenda. In turn, these movements might successfully attract public 
allegiances, i.e., overarching loyalties (Gabel 1998; see also Chrysochoou 1994). Lijphart 
(1999: 34) himself viewed EU institutions as very close to the model of consociational 
democracy only in the case when the EU is seen as a federal state: the Council substitutes 
for a High Chamber, the Treaty for a ―rigid constitution,‖ and the Commission for a 
―coalition government.‖ Those who oppose that view either dismiss the topic altogether,9 
or point out the originality of the EU and the impossibility of its reduction to some 
variations of the federal model (Costa and Magnette 2003: 9).  
 Another view of the EU is as a new form of consociationalism distinct from both 
the classic federal and unitarian versions, hence promoting it as a general analytical 
framework rather than an item to be incorporated into other paradigms (Costa and 
Magnette 2003). The latter consider the transposition of the consociational model to the 
EU as conceptual overstretching and propose a separate lair for the EU in the existing 
typologies of democracy. These arrangements are determined by the very nature of the 
social segments. In my view, promoting consociational theory as a general analytical 
framework holds significant potential in explaining not only the internal integration of the 
Union but also its negotiations with membership aspirants from Eastern Europe. The 
question is whether practices that brought the EU into being and keep it in business are 
consociational practices; I contend they are. The case of the EU offers a great opportunity 
to observe how elites want to expand the institution model for a stable democracy by 
proposing to other polities much of the same consociational practices applied to their own 
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political system, namely, proposing to the EECs the same consociational practices that 
have helped the Western European countries to establish a stable, democratic EU. The 
purpose remains the same: creating a stable continental democracy out of a segmented 
continental society. Conditions that the EU places upon candidate countries can be seen 
as efforts to homogenize the pillars and strengthen popular attitudes favorable to 
government by grand coalition.  
 
Eastern European Developments in Contemporary Democratization Literature: 
Actors and Factors 
Research about Eastern European democratization has developed along two divergent 
lines. Work conducted during the early and mid-1990s has been an extension of models 
built to explain the Latin American and South Asian experiences. Necessarily, those 
models needed to follow suit with the dominant characteristic of democratization 
literature of the 1980s, that is, its ahistorical approach to transition and democratization. 
Such an approach claimed universality by discounting the contextual background of the 
political transformation process and perceived democratization theories as applicable in 
any world region. Hence, some of the most prominent democratization theorists 
attempted to explain Eastern European democratization by applying theories that have 
been built to explain Latin American transformations in the late 1970s and 1980s 
(Lijphart and Waisman eds. 1996; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Karl and Schmitter 1991; 
Przeworski 1991; Di Palma 1990).  Arguably, the existing theories were well positioned 
for studying democratization since its third wave began from Latin America; adding the 
Eastern European cases would give scholarly efforts a comparative advantage (Bunce 
2003). 
The second approach however, represents the dominant trend among those 
studying Eastern European democratization. The contributors to this literature try to give 
explanations of processes that occur under specific historical conditions and find among 
those conditions potential explanatory variables. Efforts to expand the explanatory power 
of democratization theories have led some authors to highlight the similarities in the 
postsocialist world rooted in the peculiarities of communism. These peculiarities 
represent factors that set democratization in former communist countries apart from 
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democratization in other world regions. For other authors, comparison of nation-building 
in 22 European postsocialist countries with other cases of the third wave of 
democratization would be inappropriate. Arguably, the most useful comparisons are those 
within the universe of the 27 postcommunist and postsoviet countries which share basic 
characteristics but differ in important political details (Bunce 2002). Differences among 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union subregions and differences among individual 
countries explain different postsocialist pathways as they can show whether or not the 
socialist past helps produce a rough consensus about the political and economic successor 
regimes to state socialism.  
The historical background of the region calls for attention to defining peculiarities 
of postsocialist democratization. Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998: 1) categorize these 
conditions as (1) the material legacies, constraints, and sets of habits and cognitive frames 
that are inherited from past socialist regime; (2) a turbulent configuration of new actors 
and new opportunities for action; and (3) the foreseeable new consolidated institutional 
order under which agency is institutionalized and a measure of sustainability (or 
consolidation) of those agency-shaping institutions. Since the authors are able to 
distinguish these phenomena in a time axis, their suggestions can offer an accurate 
explanation of what is happening and expected to happen in the reforming Eastern Europe 
and its subregions. Moreover, Elster, Offe, and Preuss have set the baseline for studying 
institutional reforms in the region. First, they employ the Tabula Rasa notion to describe 
the thorough institutional and authority vacuum that succeeded what they call the 
communist abdication of power (see also Laar 2002).
10
 Second, in the circumstance of 
weak institutions, agency chaos, and lack of authority gravity centers, often deceptive and 
inapplicable Western models rather than autochthonous preparatory work performed by 
the opposition upon the old regime dominated the public scene. Third, the Tabula Rasa 
notion applies to authority alone, not to power, and lack of agency refers to the lack of 
effective institutional and legal parameters, not to the individual actors along with the 
material resources attached to them, their formal and informal ties to other agents, 
political memories, habits, frames, feelings of guilt and pride, loyalties and hostilities, 
fears and hopes (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998: 25-27).  
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Rupnik (2002, 2000, 1999) suggests several factors that affect the pace of 
democratization in former communist countries in CEE: the legacies of communism, that 
is, the nature of the old communist regime and the depth of its imprint on society;
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market and civil society, that is, the willingness of countries to embark upon radical 
economic reforms rather than postponing market reforms and privatization, while 
simultaneously supporting the development of civil society; a tradition of the rule of law 
and the ―Habsburg factor,‖ that is, the influence of the ―Habsburg‖ legal political culture; 
nation-state building and ―homogeneity,‖ that is, the difficulties that democracy faces 
from deeply entrenched fears that democratization might endanger national sovereignty; 
the cultural argument that connects democratization with religion;
12
 and the presence of 
an international environment that would favor democratization. However, even though 
Rupnik‘s model encompasses most of the key variables that would explain differences in 
the pace of democratization between the Central and Eastern part of the continent with 
countries from its Southeastern peninsula, the lack of systematic empirical work leaves 
his theoretical argument untested.  
A critical assessment of Rupnik‘s model with the model suggested by Elster, Offe, 
and Preuss will help to distinguish some relevant contextual elements as prerequisites for 
determining a successful transition from communism to democracy. Most of these 
preconditions have been on the focus of theoretical debate and empirical work, but other 
factors have not attracted the same scholarly attention. This chapter will continue with a 
critical assessment of the existing theoretical explanation of these political phenomena 
deemed to be relevant causal factors affecting democratization and reformation in the 
postsocialist CEE, in an effort to spot theoretical gaps and empirical shortcomings that 
need to be addressed in order to facilitate our understanding of the politics of reformation 
in CEE, and also enable us to explain its causal factors. 
 
The Legacies of Communism 
The Leninist legacy stands as one of the most distinguishable features of a postsocialist 
society; Leninist structures led to similarities among countries and regions otherwise as 
diverse as CEE, Baltic countries, the Balkans, Russia, post-Soviet republics of Central 
Asia, Cuba, China, and Indochina (Peshkopia 2010; Bunce 1999; Fish 1999, 1998a,b). 
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That legacy includes one-(communist) party rule; state-run economies oriented toward 
satisfaction of the population needs rather than consumer wants; little or no private 
property; state monopoly of mass-media, health care, education, transportation, energy, 
retirement funds, housing and other public services; hostility toward the individual, their 
rights and liberties in favor of community-friendly attitudes and policies; distrust of the 
army and high reliance on the secret service to oppress and repress dissent; control over 
internal population movement, and especially travel abroad; inefficient institutions 
characterized by a stifling bureaucracy subordinated to the bureaucratized communist 
party structure; and lack of political legitimacy of the ruling elites caused mainly by sham 
elections that rubber-stamped communist party decisions (Peshkopia 2010, 2008; Bunce 
2002, 2000).  
A significant part of the literature related to postsocialist transformations tries to 
establish causality with the pre-communist history of CEE (Peshkopia 2010; Janos 2005; 
Tismaneanu 2000; Crawford and Lijphart 1997). Rupnik‘s (2002, 2000, 1999) model 
combines variables from the near communist and distant pre-communist history of the 
region. Some authors tend to view that tradition from the political culture perspective 
(Tismaneanu 1995). For others, it is the institutional tradition of the rule of law notion 
instilled by the ―Habsburg‖ factor in some of the Eastern European countries that were 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as opposed to the Tsarist and Ottoman political 
tradition of other countries (Rupnik 2002, 2000, 1999). Still other authors highlight the 
correlation between pre-communist economic development with reform performance in 
postsocialist Eastern Europe (Bunce 2003; Verdery 2000). A careful consideration of all 
these cases would reveal that, since this literature finds a connection between pre-
communist underdevelopment and communist dogmatism during the communist 
monopoly of power, the communist legacy becomes an intervening variable between the 
pre-communist legacy and the pace of postsocialist democratization in CEE. While this 
discourse helps us to understand different sources of various communist traditions, only 
the latter bears significant relevance for understanding and explaining different 
postsocialist pathways.  
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Nation-state building and ethnic “homogeneity”: a literature review 
Findings about the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity in nation-building, social 
cohesion, and democratization remain inconclusive (Gerrits and Wolffram eds. 2005; Fish 
1999; Stavenhagen 1996; Diamond and Platter 1994; Horowitz 1985; Rupnik 2002: 104). 
Rustow (1970), one of the earliest authors among this research corpus, has listed the 
settlement of national and state questions as a prerequisite for successful democratization. 
Nation-building is seen to be related to the legitimacy of the territorial framework of 
democratizing countries, and the latter clearly remains the first prerequisite for a 
democratic transition. Such a legitimacy is related to ethnic identity as a ―supportive 
culture‖ as a prerequisite for every durable form of political system (Berg-Schlosser and 
Mitchell 2000: 9). Twentieth century European history seems to redeem John Stuart 
Mill‘s (1958: 230) position of the impossibility of establishing representative 
governments in ethnically divided societies against Lord Acton‘s (1862: 169) point that 
―diversity preserves liberty.‖13 Even the most optimistic authors note that even though 
cultural homogeneity (or cultural heterogeneity pacified by consociational arrangements 
at the elite level) might not be a prerequisite or condition for democracy, it certainly helps 
(Gerrits and Wolffram 2005). The debate rests, though, on whether or not the antagonism 
between ethnic divisions and democracy is reconcilable; according to Gerrits and 
Wolffram (ibid: 4) who view this issue from a historical perspective, it is (see also 
Newman 1996). 
Kaufman (2003) views ethnic conflict as contingent upon the existence of fears of 
extinction by ethnic groups which are deeply ingrained in myths, politicians who want to 
use them for power interests, and the contextual conditions that would allow them to 
resort to violence. If elites are patient and committed to negotiations and political means, 
ethnic conflict is avoidable. However, from a rationalist perspective, it is very possible 
that elites that are inclined to consocional solutions would be stigmatized as being soft in 
protecting their ethnic groups from an imminent, perceived or socially construed, threat 
from other rival ethnic groups. Such politics would lead to a radicalization of the political 
stage and, potentially, to ethnic conflict (Shoup 2008; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Milne 
1981; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972).
14
 Whether it is a matter of political survival, as a 
rational choice approach suggests, or physical survival as the region‘s history from the 
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last two centuries cautions, political leaders resort to ethnic conflict as one of their most 
viable options for continued political existence.  
However, the relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict can also 
proceed the opposite way. Eastern European democratization showed that, while there are 
cases when nationalism and ethnic conflict undermine democratization, some of the most 
successful democratic experiences in Eastern Europe were not only efforts to change 
regimes but also to build new nations. Bunce (2003) provides the distinction between 
protests against the regime and protests against the state, with popular protest in both the 
Czech lands and Poland targeted towards the regime and the Baltic and Slovene 
demonstrations displayed both liberal and nationalist features. Differences exist though 
between countries in the northern subregion of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Bunce 
(2003) explains these differences with whether the nationalist discourse preceded or 
succeeded regime transformation: the first case explains the Yugoslav wars; the second 
explains the successful stories of secession. Yet, how could the Macedonian and 
Czechoslovakian cases fit into this explanation? In the former, ethnic conflict erupted 
almost one decade after regime change; in the latter, the nationalist discourse introduced 
after regime change resulted in the peaceful division of the country. 
Nodia (2002, 2001) tries to bring identity politics into the equation as a variable. 
The question, suggests Nodia (2002: 205, 2001: 31), is whether an ethnic group looks 
―up‖ or ―down,‖ that is, whether ―the other‖ is perceived to be better or worse than one‘s 
ethnic group. Moreover, another powerful reference concerns whether that ―other‖ is 
within the same country or another country, that is, the ―outbound‖ versus ―inbound‖ 
nationalism. The claim that democracy coincides with capitalism and its discovery by 
Westerners represents the source of a perceived cultural correlation between democracy 
and the West. Eastern European ethnic groups who look down on their fellow citizens 
from other ethnicities consider themselves as Westerners while perceiving the ―others‖ as 
Orientals. As for the role of the outbound nationalism in democratization, Nodia (2002: 
206; 2001: 32) argues, the aversion toward less Westernized neighbors might cause a 
country to introduce at least a minimal form of democracy. In such a case, an increase of 
the mobilizational capacity and a consensual character of nationalism might occur, 
embodied in the rational desire for national liberation from the domination of a backward 
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neighbor. However, nationalism oriented against a more modernized hegemonic 
country—whether or not the nationalists are willing to admit that they are looking up at 
their target— contains a seed of weakness (Ibid). 
It is difficult, though, to reconcile Nodia‘s argument with some of the major 
existing approaches on ethnicity, namely the rationalist approach and the 
culturalist/structuralist approach. Let us consider Nodia‘s argument only in the light of 
these latter views. It will be difficult to sustain Nodia‘s argument as a combination of a 
―look-up/look-down‖ view and ―inbound-outbound‖ perspective, since it will be difficult 
to find an ethnic group that would ―look up‖ to their ethnic rivals. Unless ethnicity-
molding myths echo the racial, cultural, historical, and moral superiority of that ethnic 
group against its ethnic rivals, there is no reason why the group itself should be created or 
even exist in the first place; conceivably, no one would undertake the establishment of a 
culturally and morally inferior ethnicity. From the rationalist perspective, Nodia‘s 
argument is irrelevant: moral and cultural features do not count as motivations in the 
power struggle between individuals or groups.  However, although severe critiques 
mounted against what is called the primordialist approach from authors relying on 
rational choice and culturalist/structuralist approaches, beliefs about ethnicity as 
primordially given continue to persist (Isaacs 1970).
15
 Therefore, as Naarden (2005: 144) 
suggests, assumptions of a connection between ethnic diversity and democracy will 
always remain ―educated guesses‖ since ―it is not possible to prove a direct and causal 
relationship between issues that belong to completely different categories.  
This discussion bodes for caution in considering democratization in ethnically 
divided societies. There is evidence of both the destabilizing effects of ethnicity and 
nationalism and their liberating and enfranchising effects. Most of the aforementioned 
literature tries to build bivariate correlations, hence oversimplifying the social and 
historical conditions of the ethnicity-democracy nexus. Obviously, the effects of 
multiethnicity as an independent variable need to be analyzed in the presence of other 
variables; for instance, the level of social development of the country, combined with 
ethnic heterogeneity, might become a basic factor in establishing and maintaining 
democratic regimes (Berend 2005). 
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It has been argued that countries with statehood problems are more susceptible to 
international influences on their democratization process; in some ethnically divided 
societies, a strong EU presence limits their sovereignty (Noutcheva 2006). In such cases, 
EU conditionality can be more intrusive as it suggests a redefinition of statehood. The 
sovereignty-linked EU demands constitute an additional layer of conditionality distinct 
from the Copenhagen criteria requiring democratic and economic standards. Under such 
conditions, domestic politics hold the key to compliance with sovereignty-sensitive 
conditions. The presence of external actors in domestic authority structures undermines 
political bargaining and has an impact on the way local actors define their interests in the 
politically constrained space. The existence of sovereignty-linked EU conditions, 
however, causes the domestic political community to become very divisive and in some 
cases brings about serious opposition to EU demands. The political fragmentation of 
these societies, in turn, affects the sustainability of compliance decisions and carries the 
risk of non-implementation and even reversal of some reforms when a switch of the 
ruling elites occurs.  
This argument misses two important logical ramifications: first, it downplays the 
capability of EU mechanisms to similarly affect all major sections of those ―semi-
sovereign‖ countries; second, the EU idea itself can serve as a unifying factor for the 
entire society.
16
 If EU membership has become such a powerful attraction for Eastern 
European countries, as we will see in detail below, the EU can easily use that attraction to 
impose consociational behavior upon ethnically and politically divided elites. Moreover, 
it is not clear how much of an additional layer from the Copenhagen criteria sovereignty-
linked EU demands would be; it is easily perceivable that reforms aimed at improving 
socio-economic conditions of marginalized ethnic groups cannot but help improve those 
conditions for the entire society. And finally, a more detailed and perhaps less politically 
correct conceptualization of the nature of EU leverage would help in better understanding 
EU success in taming ethnic conflicts in some Eastern European countries. 
  
Elites and Masses in Democratization    
One of the major challenges that the democratization literature of the 1970 and 1980s 
experienced with the revolutions of the late 1980s in Eastern Europe was mass 
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mobilization. Differently from models suggesting elite pacts, some of the most successful 
transitions in Eastern Europe began with mass mobilization (Mastnak 2005; Bunce 2003; 
Smolar 2002). Mass mobilization forced elites to negotiate, increased the leverage of 
opposition leaders outside the system and reformatory forces within the system, 
radicalized the negotiation agenda, and legitimized promises and subsequent radical 
policies for political and economic transformations (Bunce 2003). However, as that 
literature suggests, since mass mobilization emerged out of the need to overthrow the old 
regime, the vanishing of the former might also mean the curb of mass mobilization 
altogether. Indeed, the rapid demobilization of postsocialist societies returned research 
focus to the role of elites in postcommunist politics—especially during the democracy 
consolidation phase—by pointing to elites‘ ability to prioritize their power-driven 
interests.  
Arguably, the international factor remains one of the most relevant causal factors 
of the Eastern European democratization experience. One of the thorniest issues in EE 
democratization process is the relationship between power-driven elites and international 
actors interested in the region‘s democratization. Some authors assert that the former 
outweighs the latter (Saideman and Ayres 2007; Brusis 2005). However, there also exists 
the view that postcommunist leaders tend to display a tendency to embrace normative 
behavior and position themselves in student-teacher relationships with IOs which they 
aspire to join (Gheciu 2005). This argument rests on the conceptualization of postsocialist 
transition as continuity rather than a revolutionary break with the communist past. In such 
a case, the inter-elite struggle might be less severe due to an inter-elite pact and an 
acceptance of norms of electoral competition and either power sharing or peaceful power 
rotation. However, such results can be achieved only under circumstances of moderate 
elite continuity; in the Soviet Union and Balkans, the high levels of elite continuity have 
undermined democratic reforms (Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski 2002; Reisinger 1997). 
Other authors (Balcerowicz 2002; Laar 2002), being aware of the perils of elite 
competition in periods of ―ordinary politics,‖ call for key reforms during periods of 
―extraordinary politics‖ that immediately succeed regime change. 17  In order to shield 
reformatory elites from electoral backlashes caused by the harshness of radical economic 
reforms, Laar (2002: 79) suggests beginning the postsocialist transformation with 
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political reforms; only a legitimately formed consensus for change achieved through 
accountable democratic structures and free and fair elections could make a country adhere 
to reforms despite the short-term pain they bring.  
While it is not difficult to notice historical differences throughout the socialist and 
postsocialist world, postsocialist societies resist giving up their similarities (Howard 
2003; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose 1995). These 
persisting similarities puzzle us whether we need to begin our research from elites, 
institutions or masses. Such a need to define our ontological approach bears 
epistemological import since it represents our basic assumptions on how society works. It 
also bears methodological ramifications since, in order to assess the effects of the 
international dimension of Eastern European democratization, a sample that includes a 
sufficient number of cases from countries coming from different historical legacies would 
suffice to establish a credible comparative ground even though the similarities among 
Eastern Europeans continue to persist.   
    
The International Dimension of Democratization in the Contemporary Literature 
Most of the democratization literature developed during the 1990s followed and further 
built on Huntington‘s (1991) research question: what are the major causal 
factors/mechanisms that lead to the toppling of authoritarian/dictatorial regimes and 
create opportunities for democratization? A major breakthrough of that literature was a 
renewed emphasis on the international dimension of democratization, an element only 
reluctantly tackled by the democratization literature of the 1980s (Janos 2005: 95; 
Pridham 2000: 286; O‘Donnell and Schmitter 1986; O‘Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead eds. 1986). The literature of the 1990s discussed regime change and 
democratization not only as mere outcomes of domestic causal factors. Theories 
regarding the international environment‘s impact on such events and processes unveiled 
the role of international actors and organizations (IOs) in domestic affairs.  This literature 
reflected the unparalleled and apparent impact of international factors on Eastern 
European democratization (Rupnik 2002, 2000, 1999).  
Traditionally, mainstream literature building on the rational choice assumption has 
dominated studies of IOs‘ impact on domestic politics. Whether from an institutionalist 
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angle such as Gourevitch‘s (1978) second image reversed or from Putnam‘s (1988) two-
level game and Goldstein‘s (1998, 1996) tying-hands approach, this literature assumes 
that leaders pursue a rational quest for attaining and maintaining power. However, 
democratization theorists are divided on the nature of the international actors‘ tools to 
expand and impose their preferences. Thus, Schmitter (1996) maintains that international 
actors enforce democratization by rational, deliberately communicated, demands. 
Developing this argument further, Pevehouse (2002: 519-520) has identified three 
potential causal mechanisms through which IOs can influence regime change: first, 
pressure generated from these IOs in combination with internal forces; second, the 
acceptance of liberalization by certain elite groups; and third, liberalization either through 
hand-tying or socialization of domestic elites. Pridham (2000: 298) points out that this 
enforcement is not deliberately sent to recipient countries, but is a democratic spillover 
from international democratic institutions to democratizing countries. The flow of 
democratic values from democratic to democratizing countries occurs only because, 
through that spillover, democratic countries reassert their democratic identity. 
Whitehead (1996: 5-22) has pinpointed two other mechanisms by which 
democratic principles can be unintentionally transmitted and/or intentionally enforced: 
contagion and control. Democratization through contagion does not imply any 
enforcement; it just leaks through borders within a predefined region. Control might be 
seen in Whitehead‘s (1996:8) metaphor ―as a vaccine,‖ an intentional imposition of 
democratic norms, rules, and principles on democratizing countries by another power; it 
does not exclude military intervention even though this may not necessarily generate the 
best results. Schmitter adds conditionality to these mechanisms: the term implies the 
stipulation of membership preconditions from IOs to countries that aspire to join these 
organizations. Although coercive enforcement is always undesirable, this method creates 
the best incentives for inter-state and intra-state negotiations and bargaining, brings to the 
forefront different domestic actors with different inclinations, sets up compromises, and 
generates what Whitehead (1996:15-22) calls consent and Pridham (2000) calls 
convergence. While Pevehouse‘s mechanisms are perceived to be consecutive steps 
toward regime change and Pridham‘s democratic spillover rests as a causal mechanism 
isolated by other domestic and international factors, contagion, control, consent and 
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conditionality are perceived to work both concomitantly and independently, thus allowing 
their study as both collinear and independent causal mechanisms.  
Schmitter (1996: 30) defines conditionality as ―the deliberate use of coercion―by 
attaching specific conditions to the distribution of benefits to recipient countries―on the 
part of multilateral institutions.‖  Differently from control and contagion which are 
mainly produced by unilateral actors‘ policies, conditionality emerges from multilateral 
international relations, allegedly from international organizations. In contrast to contagion 
and consent, which are results of voluntary actions of democratic states often supported 
by private actors, conditionality explicitly involves coercion backed by IO member 
countries. However, while in Schmitter‘s concept these notions are sharply divided, the 
borderline between them might be less clear. Thus, simply using Whitehead‘s metaphor, 
isn‘t vaccine a weakened bacteria with the mission of artificially inducing physiological 
reaction by producing antibodies, hence, isn‘t control an attempt to impose contagion? 
Furthermore, isn‘t consent an effect that ought to be acquired, hence a dependent rather 
than an independent variable? And finally, isn‘t conditionality a form of control over 
democratizing societies which have consented to take the vaccine despite their initial 
pain?  
The purpose of these questions is to focus only on conditionality. Unless we are 
interested in meticulously probing into seemingly inseparable contagion, control and 
consent, the study of conditionality can help us to uncover the aggregate effects of these 
factors. Increasingly used during the last three decades as a political tool more consistent 
with international norms than direct control, with much sharper expectations than the 
blurry contagion, conditionality continues to generate foreign policies and academic 
research. While such an increasing preference shows a growing consensus that 
conditionality yields results, the controversies that conditionality stirs causes politicians 
to appeal for corrections. As we attempt to unveil its causality, we need to focus on the 
goal of conditionality: changing the political behavior of political actors, be they political 
leaders and/or institutions, according to the wishes of those who dispatch the political 
conditions.  
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From Political Conditionality to EU Membership Conditionality 
Initially, the notion of conditionality was related to attempts made by international 
financial institutions (IFIs) to change the political behavior of developing countries which 
required international financial support in their structural adjustment efforts. The notion 
emerged around the early 1980s from a study of the World Bank that suggested placing 
conditions on African countries for disbursement of financial aid to assist them with the 
implementation of economic liberalization reforms (World Bank 1981). The policy 
reflected consensus among the Bank‘s major donors that economic success depends upon 
open market and liberal economic policies. Moreover, these prescriptions acquired an 
institutional dimension past that decade with the World Bank advocating the need for 
institutional reforms in recipient countries in order for them to successfully implement 
economic reforms, thus emphasizing the need for good governance as a sine qua non for 
economic development (World Bank 1997, 1996, 1992, 1989).  
Scholars of development policies have mainly focused upon whether or not 
foreign financial aid helps promote economic growth and whether conditions placed by 
the IFI have been effective in generating policy change in recipient countries (Spraos 
1986; Bartilow 1997; Santiso 2001; Buliř and Lane 2002; Vreeland 2003). Indeed, with 
mixed empirical results, this literature has often been embedded in ideological arguments 
(see for instance Hibou 2001, 1998; Easterly 2006, 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Bhagwati 2005; 
Sachs 2005). This body of literature is characterized by four different yet related debates: 
first, whether or not conditionality works (Easterly 2006; 2002; Vreeland 2003; Buliř and 
Lane 2002; Stiglitz 2002); second, whether domestic or international factors are the main 
determinants of reform success (Easterly 2006; 2002; Sachs 2005; Buliř and Lane 2002; 
Stiglitz 2002; Santiso 2001); third, how conditionality affects different domestic 
constituencies; and four, whether we can really speak of conditions at all (Hibou 2002; 
Bartilow 1997).  
Much of this problematique haunts EU membership conditionality as well. The 
latter implies the set of conditions imposed by the EU on membership aspiring countries; 
the conditions include stipulations for implementing reforms and pursuing policies in the 
direction prescribed by the EU. Initially, the EU applied membership conditionality in the 
wake of its second expansion which included Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 
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1986. Yet, in these cases, although a statement by the Copenhagen European Council 
warned the new applicants that ―respect for and maintenance of representative democracy 
and human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership in the 
European Communities,‖ 18  little attention was actually given to the democratic 
institutions; the focus instead was on applicants‘ economic performance (Malová and 
Haughton 2002: 103; Smith 2003: 110).  
European identity, democratic status, and respect for human rights were laid out 
initially at the Lisbon European Council of June 1992 as conditions for membership. Yet, 
the European Commission did not further elaborate upon these criteria. Instead, they 
turned their attention to shielding the achievements of the European Community (EC) 
from potential dangers stemming from enlargement (Smith 2003: 112). While in the cases 
of Greece, Spain, and Portugal the EC did not apply membership conditionality 
consistently and political considerations won over its strict imposition (Smith 2003: 110), 
when it came to the latest wave of expansion, however, the European Commission 
insisted that applicant countries had to accept the existing EC system, the acquis 
communautaire, entirely and without opt-outs (Smith 2003: 112). From here, the 
Commission suggested conditional policies toward new applicants mainly to preserve the 
existing achievements of the Union, as well as to ensure its further integration and 
enlargement: ―widening must not be at the expense of deepening. Enlargement must not 
be a dilution of the Community‘s achievements.‖19 
Finally, EU membership conditionality took shape at the EU Copenhagen 
European Council, June 1993. It focused on the economic and institutional adaptations 
that EU membership aspiring countries needed to perform in order to meet the EU 
criteria. Such conditions required the applicants to: (1) build a functioning market 
economy with the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within 
the EU; (2) ensure the stability of institutions established to guarantee democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; and (3) bolster capacity 
to take on obligations of EU membership including adherence to the aims of economic 
and political solutions. Later, the Luxembourg European Council, December 1997 
recognized the strengthening and improvement of the operation of the institutions in the 
aspirant countries as a prerequisite for the enlargement of the Union.
20
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Meanwhile, the European Commission‘s Agenda 2000 aimed at sharpening the 
very general notion of ―stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities‖ by defining a functioning 
democracy as a political entity with: (1) a constitution that must guarantee democratic 
freedoms, such as political pluralism, the freedom of expression, and the freedom of 
religion; (2) independent judicial and constitutional authorities; (3) stable democratic 
institutions permitting public authorities (including police forces, local government, and 
judges) to function properly; (4) the ability to conduct free and fair elections and 
recognize the role of opposition; (5) respect for fundamental rights as expressed in the 
Council of Europe‘s Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (including acceptance of the protocol allowing citizens to take cases to the 
European Court of Human Rights; and (6) respect for minorities, which includes 
adaptation of the Council of Europe‘s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, and Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe‘s 
Parliamentary Assembly.
21
 Meanwhile, the practical implementation and scrutiny of the 
fulfillment of EU conditions were included with the framework of the Accession 
Partnership (AP) of 1998 and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) of 1999.  
EU membership conditionality can be defined as the set of conditions sent from 
the EU to EU membership aspiring countries for implementing reforms and pursuing 
policies in the direction prescribed by the Union. Applied in the Balkans, EU membership 
conditionality serves as a multidimensional and multi-purpose instrument geared toward 
reconciliation, reconstruction and reform; it is regional, sub-regional, bilateral and 
project-specific and relates to economic, political, social and security-related criteria 
(Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). Arguably, these negotiations concern the process of 
preparation for EECs to join the EU and are not about give-and-take, hence CEE 
applicants have little power to argue against EU demands, given that there is a pre-set EU 
agenda on which aid is already conditional. The Accession Partnership presents 
conditions as a package that is difficult to take apart in negotiations (Grabbe 1999: 19). 
The pre-Accession Partnership and pre-Stabilization and Association Process negotiations 
show that CEECs should fulfill some prerequisites in order to be involved in negotiations 
with the EU; they must demonstrate political will toward the reforms. On the other hand, 
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as it has been argued, these programs rest on the assumption that EU accession and EECs‘ 
transition to democracy and market-oriented economy are part of the same process and 
preparation to join the EU is conterminous with overall development goals (Grabbe 1999: 
4). Moreover, the EE elites and public view post-communist transformation as the 
complex process of the ―return to Europe,‖ a concept that weaves together the processes 
of democratization, marketization, and Europeanization (Henderson, ed. 1998; Dimitrova 
2004: 4).  
There are two views of the purpose of EU membership conditionality. The first 
one, called the demand-side viewpoint, tends to see conditionality as mainly concerned 
with minimizing the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically 
burdensome to the existing EU members. These conditions serve to minimize the risks 
and costs of enlargement (Grabbe 1999: 4; 2002). On the one hand, the EU has 
considerable achievements to be protected; on the other, the enlargement discussion 
found itself interlinked with a deepening discussion. As the number of member states 
expands, the fear exists that size will matter: it will be much more difficult to agree to 
extend either the scope of integration (adding new policy areas to the process) or the level 
of integration (such as increasing the use of qualified-majority voting) (Smith 2003: 106-
107).    
The second group of scholars tends to view EU conditions from the supply-side 
approach. For them, EU conditions and the programs attached to them provide material 
support for implementing reforms (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005); shield moderate 
politics from populism and nationalism (Vachudová 2001: 5); strengthen democratic 
forces in the face of authoritarian downturns (Scimmelfennings 2007); and serve as 
instrumental justification for domestic policies that Eastern European leaders need to 
implement to attain their own rational, power-driven goals (Brusis 2005). Its framework 
provides EU membership aspiring Eastern European countries with political and 
economic objectives and guidelines for achieving these objectives. All in all, the 
possibility of membership in the EU has created powerful incentives as transition states 
shape their reforms (Pridham 1994; Smith 1997; Kubicek 2003). 
Recognizing EU membership conditionality as the most powerful instrument 
available to the EU in dealing with candidate and potential candidate countries 
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(Anastasakis 2008; Anastasakis and Bechev 2003), some authors credit an obvious 
asymmetry of interdependence in EU conditionality as an important factor that enables 
the latter to be effective (Knorr 1977: 102; Grabbe 2003; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 
2003a, 2003b: 70; Dimitrova 2004: 8). This asymmetry stems both from the fact that 
EECs consider EU membership their highest foreign policy goal, thus putting the EU in a 
strong position to influence the internal politics of these countries (Kopecký and Mudde 
2000: 532) as well as the generally low public support for enlargement in current EU 
members and candidate countries (Cameron 2003: 30-40). The economic and political 
benefits gained by EE leaders, the lack of equivalent alternatives for post-communist 
EECs, and the weak interest of the EU in eastward political enlargement  make EU 
membership conditionality a particularly powerful tool in the hands of the EU during its 
negotiations for eastward expansion (Brusis 2005: 296; Janos 2005: 118).  There exists 
mistrust among EU member states towards EECs knocking at the EU‘s doors.  
In contrast, Eastern Europeans, captured by the return-to-Europe psyche, perceive 
a link between democratization and accession to the EU (Peshkopia 2008a; Dimitrova 
2004: 3). Whereas EU member states and EECs will both benefit from EU enlargement, 
new members are expected to benefit more, thus putting the latter at a disadvantage in 
bargaining (Moravcsik and Vachudová 2005: 201; 2003: 44). Grabbe (1999: 19) argues 
that, since the negotiations are over the process of EE preparation to join the EU and not 
about give-and-take, EE applicants have little power to argue against EU demands, 
especially given that there is a pre-set EU agenda on which aid is already conditional. In 
addition, the AP presents conditions as a package which is likely to be difficult to 
separate in negotiations. Generally, this literature agrees that such a power asymmetry 
causes strong convergences of EE policies with the EU and also a greater domestic 
convergence toward such policies compared with the current EU member countries 
(Grabbe 2003). 
There is a strong rationale for the Eastern European countries to ask for and/or 
accept Western assistance: the possibility of membership in the EU has created powerful 
incentives as transition states shape their reforms (Pridham 1994; Smith 1997; Kubicek 
2003). The reforms conditioned by the EU shore up democratic standards, improve the 
functioning of the state, and increase aggregate economic welfare (Moravcsik and 
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Vachudova 2005: 199). On the other hand, the fact that the prospect of membership of the 
Balkans into the EU remains distant weakens the strategic effectiveness of EU 
conditionality as an instrument of influence for the EU (Anastasakis 2008; Anastasakis 
and Bechev 2003), especially when combined with the lack of tangible benefits such as 
liberal visa regimes (Ilirjani 2006). By the same token, the EU is increasingly facing the 
dilemma that its instruments do not provide incentives sufficient for reforms (Hoffmann 
2005). However, even when membership is available, purely external leverage may be 
insufficient to bring about the required domestic changes (Flynn and Farrell 1999).  
Critically, a widely shared argument of the Europeanization literature maintains 
that EU conditions are not able to produce convergence in domestic policy structures and 
institutions but rather result in ―domestic adaptation with national color‖ (Dimitrova 
2004: 7; see also Héritier 2001; Risse, Green, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001). Yet this 
argument cannot help to explain why, in some cases, EU conditionality works and has 
been able to elevate EE policies and institutions to levels required by the EU (Peshkopia 
2005a,b,c,d). A plausible answer might be the inaccuracy of considering EU conditions as 
a whole package, without parsing out specific conditions in various sectors. The holistic 
view of EU conditionality bears the dilemma of whether the reform results are the best 
EECs can achieve in situations created by lack of resources and human capabilities or 
whether CEE leaders purposely distort EU standards in order to produce policies that 
would help them to maintain power. 
The often vague EU goals that cite a need for ―increasing capacity‖ or ―improving 
training‖ rather than stating detailed institutional preferences (Grabbe 2001) leave room 
for EE leaders to maneuver and make tradeoffs between their countries‘ development 
agenda, their own rational power-driven preferences, and the priorities imposed by the 
EU. Thus, since ―the EU‘s advice is specifically designed to promote particular aspects of 
governance rather than taking a holistic view of how administration should develop‖ 
(Grabbe 2001: 1023), EE leaders have a wide range of opportunities to negotiate—and 
define—not only the shape of their institutions but also the timing of their reforms, 
resources allocated to them, and their impact on the life of the country. As O‘Dwyer 
(2006: 221) puts it, despite the incentives that stem from significant development aid 
from the EU when EEC comply with EU conditions, ―the practice of regional governance 
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reform in EE has proven much more elastic than the Europeanization hypothesis‘ 
prediction of convergence would suggest.‖ In the case of the Balkans, EU emphasis on 
conditions vary from rigorous assessments of compliance to more adaptable and 
pragmatic assessments for the sake of preserving peace and avoiding security risks, thus 
affecting the consistency of the process (Anastasakis 2008). Moreover, although the 
asymmetry of interdependence allows the EU to set the rules of the game in accession 
conditionality, the candidate countries have an opportunity to temper to some extent the 
impact of the EU‘s influence in the way they implement the acquis (Grabbe 2003: 318).  
The range of that opportunity might be widened by the fact that, as some authors 
have argued, conditionality only works as a carrot, not as a stick, hence, rewards for 
compliance are effective but simple whereas noncompliance with EU conditions causes 
only exclusion from external resources and delay in accession (Schimmelfenning 2007: 
127; 2005: 833; Grabbe 2003: 317). This particular feature of conditionality opens room 
for EE leaders to maneuver within the area between compliance and delays, while 
implementing policies built around their own rational goals. It is already clear that, in the 
condition where accepting carrots is more rewarding than delaying, EE leaders will 
comply with EU conditions. From here stem reforms that have been implemented because 
of the desire to become an EU member rather than from a genuine support for the goals 
themselves (Kopecký and Mudde 2000: 532; Gerskovits 1998). Obviously, we need some 
re-conceptualization of the ―carrot-versus-stick‖ notions, as well as better differentiation 
of what ―carrots‖ and ―sticks‖ are.  
There is much more to EU membership conditionality than the EU simply 
counting how membership aspiring countries have scored in reforms. EU membership 
conditions are unavoidably elastic, consequently creating room for EE leaders to 
maneuver in their accession negotiation with the EU and thereby employ strategies to 
circumvent conditions or water down EU prescriptions, thus performing incomplete 
reforms. One of such strategies is the delay in keeping promises. Accordingly, EE leaders 
might make rhetorical commitments and not live up to them.
22
 Moreover, sometimes 
policy-makers may be slow in implementing EU-inspired reforms if they do not fit well 
with other demands and if they feel that there is time to implement them later (Grabbe 
2001: 1016). Thus, there is a growing gap between word and deed among EU 
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membership applicant countries, which is a source of constant frustration in Brussels 
(Checkel 2000: 7; Grabbe 1999). A careful analysis of the EU-EEC negotiation process 
would help explain these discrepancies from both individualist and institutionalist 
perspectives. Consequently, as Brusis (2005: 298) points out, the explanatory power of 
EU conditionality is limited only to those cases where the EU prescribes determinate 
rules that might then be transposed or rejected by an accession state. Narrowing the 
process of EU-EEC negotiation over accession as merely checking a list of homework 
accomplishments would take the focus off important parts of accession politics‘ dynamic. 
Hence, we must refocus on assessing important institutional reforms that have been left 
outside the conditionality package or have attracted only soft and inconsistent 
recommendations from the EU.  
EU membership conditionality raises uncertainties that affect EU-EECs 
interaction during the process of EECs preparation for EU membership. According to 
Grabbe (2003: 318-23), there are five dimensions of this process: (1) uncertainty about 
the policy agenda that should be undertaken by applicants stemming from the fact that 
tasks have not yet been fully determined for member states either; (2) uncertainty about 
the hierarchy of tasks thus leaving CEECs following EU‘s frequent shifts of priorities; (3) 
uncertainty about timing, stemming from a big gap between the period of reforms and the 
time when EU membership will be acquired; (4) uncertainty about whom to satisfy (the 
latter is characterized by its short term dimension—thus leaves EE leaders guessing who 
are the actual veto players in the EU and what are the priorities they push—and the long 
term dimension—that makes EE leaders puzzled about who will be the next emerging 
veto players and what will be their priorities); and finally (5), there is uncertainty about 
standards and thresholds, this can leave EE leaders puzzled over what counts as meeting 
EU conditions, uncertainty that rises out of the EU‘s blurry and difficult to measure 
definition of progress toward accession. These thresholds, or at least EE leaders‘ 
perception of them, play an important role in reform performance, especially in areas 
where EU‘s and EE leaders‘ interests and rationales clash, but also increase ambiguities 
about EU expectations from EECs. These ambiguities become an area of intense 
negotiations because, on the one hand, it allows the EU, according to the emerging 
communal and/or major actor interests, to tighten or relax certain conditions; on the other 
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hand, it leaves EU membership aspiring countries with ―considerable discretion over their 
implementation policies‖ (Brusis 2005: 298). 
Most of the debate related to EU membership conditionality is over whether or not 
it works. Authors are divided among those who cautiously count conditionality as the 
primary factor that drives policy changes in CEECs (Grabbe 2001, 2003), those who 
admit that membership conditionality works under certain conditions (Schimmelfenning 
2005; Kelley 2004a,b), and those who argue that it is secondary to either domestic 
structure composition or to domestic leaders‘ power calculations (Saideman and Ayres 
2007; O‘Dwyer 2006). On a slightly different note, Malová and Haughton (2002) point 
out cases when reform outcomes are results of domestic politics‘ dynamics, while in other 
cases they are results of pressures from the EU. Elsewhere, I have contributed to the 
argument that the effects of EU membership conditionality are contingent upon a tug-of-
war between domestic, EU, and EU member countries‘ leaders who perceive the 
outcomes of reforms in CEECs as a means to promote their power-driven interests 
(Peshkopia and Imami 2007). Cautioning against the vagueness of the political message 
sent by the EU to the EU membership-seeking Balkan countries, some authors point out 
that conditionality can function successfully only as one element in a well-defined 
relationship with the Balkan states; therefore, it is essential to establish clear links 
between the reform process and its outcome, between conditionality and the objectives it 
is geared toward, including EU accession (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). Usually, this 
research corpus tends to measure the effects of EU membership conditionality against 
accession, thus considering as failures cases when countries have been accepted in the EU 
without fully complying with the conditions imposed upon them. Against such an 
approach, one should heed Dimitrova‘s (2004: 1) warning that the moment of entry [to 
the EU] is only one stop along a long road to transformation for the new members.  
Therefore, the aforementioned categorical evaluations suffer from two major 
problems. First, they overlook the major purpose of EU membership conditionality, that 
is, successful transformation in the CEECs with EU accession only a distinct milestone 
rather than an ultimate end. Second, they lack a scale of measurement and do not account 
for reform progress in cases where EU membership conditionality is absent or the EU 
factor appears only as a set of loose and soft recommendations. In addition, in a typical 
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biased interpretation, authors often downplay or circumvent policy sectors where 
conditions are fulfilled. Hence, most of the literature so far has missed the main question: 
does EU membership conditionality help the EU membership aspiring countries become 
more democratic? In other words, does EU membership conditionality minimize the risk 
of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically burdensome to the 
existing EU members? Does it shield moderate politics from populism and nationalism? 
Does it strengthen democratic forces in the face of authoritarian downturns? At a glance, 
we can see that the ten new EU entrants from Central and Eastern Europe had already 
minimized the risk of becoming politically unstable before their accession, have shielded 
moderate politics from populism and nationalism, and have strengthened democratic 
forces in the face of authoritarian downturns. Yet, the jury is still out as to whether this 
progress is made because of the conditions imposed by the EU, these countries‘ 
willingness to progress in the direction prescribed by the EU even without such a 
prescription, or a combination thereof. Putting the problem in the wider framework of the 
international dimension of democratization, Pridham (2000: 286) questions whether these 
[international] factors might be a dependent variable or not; or perhaps the external 
environment can in its different forms impose a set of confining conditions for internal 
regime change.  
Paralleling Vreeland‘s (2003: 7) assertion that assessing performance of the 
countries involved in IMF programs entails understanding IMF selection of countries to 
participate in such programs, one can ask: why does the EU impose certain conditions 
only upon some of the countries that aspire to its membership and not upon others? Is EU 
membership conditionality an exogenous factor that leads those countries toward 
democracy and economic development, or is the political will of those countries toward 
institutional and economic reforms the factor that encourages the EU to offer them 
membership, hence triggering membership conditionality? It is difficult to distinguish 
whether and to what extent the progress of CEECs toward democratic reform and the 
market economy is a result of their efforts toward democracy and economic development 
or EU membership conditionality. In other words, the EU engages in membership 
conditionality only those countries that manifest willingness to develop in a direction 
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compatible with the EU policy prescription; on the other hand, it has been widely argued 
that Eastern Europe emerged from communism by following the EU model. 
 
Conclusions 
This review of the existing literature on consociational democracy, EE democratization, 
and EU membership conditionality shows the potentials of consociationalism as an 
overarching theoretical framework for explaining both EU internal integration and its 
eastward expansion as a process of expanding its model of stable democracy. The 
exercise also highlighted the actors and factors interplaying in EE democratization 
reforms as well as the role of EU membership conditionality as a democratizing factor in 
EE countries aspiring to join the Union. This review demonstrates on the one hand the 
conjunctures of these sets of literature, and on the other, the conceptual efforts needed to 
make them work together organically. Namely, it showed that we need a 
reconceptualization of consiociational theory as an elite theory of democratization by 
highlighting its explanatory character and discarding its tautologies along with its 
normative claims; we can use this re-conceptualized theory to explain EU eastward 
enlargement as an expansion of the very consociational practices that have molded the 
EU as a stable democracy. We can apply this theoretical framework to explain the 
dynamics of EE institutional reforms as the outcome of a tug-of-war between EU 
conditions and domestic leaders interests to reform institutions in a way that would 
maximize their political benefits. This is the task of the following chapter.   
   
 
                                                          
1
 Lijphart (1969: 207) himself called it a ―research note.‖ 
2
 Ironically, the ―primordialist‖ surge that would undermine the structuralist trend in democratization 
theories of the 1950s and 1960s was a structuralist argument, proposed by the French structural 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his book Old Societies and New States. As such, it is at odds with the 
direction of the new research program, hence elite voluntarism.    
3
 Among them, Lustick mentions Lehmbruch‘s (1967, 1968) ―concordant democracy,‖ Bluhm‘s (1968) 
―contractarian democracy,‖ Val Lorwin‘s (1962) ―vertical democracy,‖ and his later (1969) ―segmented 
pluralism‖ (cf. Lustik 1997).  
4
 As Almond (1956) divided democracies between ―stable democracies‖ and ―immibolist democracies‖ he 
also categorized the former into two sub-classes: one of them comprised countries of the Anglo-American 
system (Great Britain, the United States, and the old Commonwealth); and the other, the stable multi-party 
democracies of the European continent—the Scandinavian [sic] and Low Countries and Switzerland. 
Almond clustered the other European democracies into his ―immobilist democracy‖ category. These 
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categories were defined by simply structuralist-culturalist features; the former focusing on a differentiated 
role structure as related to political aggregation functions in society and exemplified in the aggregative 
nature of some parties in the Scandinavian and Low Countries‘ political system; the latter focusing on 
elements such as society‘s homogeneity and its degree of infusion with secular and traditional elements.  
5
 As we‘ll see later, this is one of the biggest problems with the consociational literature. 
6
 As Van Schendelen (1985) points out, Lijphart‘s early notion of consociational democracy considered 
consociationalism as a specifically Dutch phenomenon (cf. Lustick 1997: 108). 
7
 For instance, Jimmy Tindigarukayo (1989) has added to Lijphart‘s list of favorable factors popular 
legitimacy of the ruling elites, respect for institutional rules and procedures, compromise, trust and good 
will among political leaders. Studying the absence of consociationalism in the Sri Lankan case, Chehabi 
(1980) adds three more factors: militant Sinhala nationalism, economic rivalry, and the constitutional 
framework (cf. Bogaards 1998: 482). Adriano Pappalardo (1981, 1979) adds three more conditions as both 
necessary and sufficient for the establishment of consociational democracy: stability among subcultures, 
elite dominance, and leader-follower relationships.  
8
 Throughout his article, Lustick refers to the Hungarian mathematician and philosopher of science Imre 
Lakatos within two periods of his intellectual activity: early-Lakatos criteria as being more concerned with 
―progressive iterations of testable and increasingly robust explanatory claims with a stable framework of 
presuppositions and definitions; and late-Lakatos criteria as being concerned more with effectiveness in 
meeting the goals, whether personal or political, of leaders of the research program.‖ 
9
 Andeweg 2000: 515), for instance, wraps up his statement on this issue with a single sentence: ―If the 
European Union is a case of consociationalism at all, it cannot be regarded as a consociational democracy.‖ 
10
 Howard (2003: 3) uses the ―tabula rasa‖ notion differently, namely as a tendency to study postsocialist 
transitions by ―ignoring the crucial historical and cultural context of communism.‖  
11
 For a more thorough assessments of different definitions of ―communist legacies‖ see Ekiert and Hanson 
(2003). 
12
 The debate over cultural factors in democratization has already taken ideological—hence simplistic—
dimensions ever since Huntington‘s Clash of Civilizations (1996, 1993), following arguably as much of an 
ideological tradition earlier established by Bernard Lewis (1990)—and so harshly criticized ever since (see 
Said 2001). The cultural argument swings from the geographical coincidence (Mandelbaum 1996) to the 
religious affiliation of population in democratizing countries (Nodia 2002, 2001, Rupnik 2002, 200, 1999). 
In trying to support his ―Estonia-Turkmenistan gap‖ thesis, Nodia (2002: 203, 2001: 29) notes that  
In the former USSR, as elsewhere, democracy has fared better in 
countries that are culturally ―Western‖ than it has in countries that are 
not. If we take  ―the West‖ to coincide with the world of ―Western 
Christianity,‖ then only the Baltics among all the post-Soviet states 
belong to it—and they are the only ones that we can now confidently 
categorize as ―consolidated democracies.‖ Those that belong to Eastern 
Christianity (Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Apostolic 
Armenia) cannot be called democracies in the full sense. Each is either a 
flawed democracy or a relatively mild autocracy. 
This is a position also reverberated by Jacques Rupnik (2002, 2000, 1999). However, Bruno Nardeen 
(2005: 144) criticizes this approach as simple and prejudicial. According to him,  
The selection of Eastern Christianity as the main cause of everything 
that  is presently wrong in the East is only the latest product of a long 
western tradition of prejudiced opinion about this area. As has happened 
often before, one particular element of reality was disproportionally 
enlarged because it had to function as a comprehensive explanation for 
actual and complex developments. 
13
 This position has been reverberated by French liberal sociologist Elie Halévy when, in a lecture delivered 
at Oxford in 1920, he questioned the wisdom of redrawing the map of Europe exclusively on the basis of 
the principle of nationalities. As he pointed out: ―Simple ideas are revolutionary ideas and lead to war‖ (cf. 
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economically powerful groups) that a more moderate government cannot make because the opposition, 
unlike the government, is not in the position of having to compromise with other ethnic groups.‖ 
15
 Stavenhagen (1996: 19-20) critically assesses the primordialist approach as follows:  
According to some scholars […] the ethnic phenomenon is as old as 
humanity itself. From primordial times, the various nomadic or 
agriculturalist people around the world were said to be identified by 
name, language, customs, beliefs and territorial origin. And though 
many have disappeared or become transformed, others persisted over 
the centuries, identified as such from generation to generation. Ethnic 
identity or ethnicity, it is argued, expresses primordial, affective, deeply 
rooted sentiments of the human beings. It is said that the identification 
of the individuals with their group expresses some basic, innate human 
need, similar to that of life in the family. In fact, a number of authors 
refer to ethnicity as a kind of kinship and to the ethnic group as an 
extended kin group. Kinship might be a real bond, based on blood ties, 
when descent from common ancestors can be traced. But usually it is 
fictitious, deriving more from shared beliefs about supposed common 
ancestry. Founding myths and stories are passed on from generation to 
generation and strengthen bonds and identities of those who hold them 
dear.     
16
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CHAPTER III 
A SECTORIAL CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE EFFECTS OF EU 
MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY ON EASTERN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL 
REFORMS 
 
 
I study the dynamics of Eastern European (EE) reforms as an outcome of political actions 
of domestic leaders under the pressure of European Union (EU) membership 
conditionality. These developments suggest the need for a cross-level analysis 
considering EU institutions and EE leaders as the primary actors on the political theatre. 
There exists ample evidence in favor of claims raised by institutionalist authors that the 
highly structured EU imposes strict constraints on its leaders as well as member countries. 
However, a different approach concerning the loosely institutionalized EE decision-
making environment is needed (see for instance the Tabula Rasa argument of Elster, 
Offe, and Preuss (1998)). In these societies, traditionally low regard for institutions and 
the highly voluntaristic political style of communist elites suggest that the main actors in 
reforming postsocialist countries are not institutions but leaders, whom I assume to be 
rational actors with clear power driven interests.  
 Epistemologically, the assumed rationality of the EE leaders derives directly from 
methodological rationality. “Leaders‟ need to attain and maintain power” means that 
reforms which improve their chances to power are more preferred that reforms that do not 
improve their chances to power, and the latter are more preferred than reforms that hurt 
their chances to power. Even though this view simplifies leaders‟ human nature, it can 
serve as a powerful assumption of leaders‟ motivations especially in loosely 
institutionalized societies, under the conditions of scarce domestic norms, and when 
leaders‟ appropriation of certain political behavior as proponed by international 
organizations (IOs) might have not occurred and/or consolidated yet. 
 Assuming EU motives behind policy preferences requires more elaboration since 
the highly institutionalized EU political environment suggests that leaders‟ quest for 
power is always under constant checks and constrains from institutions that are able to set 
their own agenda, and norms that allow little maneuvering. Logical consistency requires 
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us to assume EU leaders as rational as the EE ones. Yet, presumably, the bitter European 
political experience of the twentieth century has made their rational quest for power 
search for other ways of attaining it. Rationally, European leaders reach the conclusion 
that democratic stability would be better for their political careers. Institutions and norms 
were established to achieve and consolidate such a democratic stability, and 
consociational practices are employed to establish and run those institutions.  
 My argument has two elements. First, I elaborate the existing conceptualization of 
the EU as built on consociational practices by claiming that the same practices guide the 
EU eastward enlargement. The new members should be acquainted with these practices 
and prepare to adopt quickly in an institutional setting built and run by such practices. 
The institutions of the EU membership aspiring countries should be shaped in a way that 
they can easily and quickly adjust within the EU institutional setting. Therefore, EU 
membership conditionality can be seen as a set of policies that condition the EU accession 
with the implementation of policies that lead to institutions receptive to EU‟s 
consociational practices. This process is simpler in EU membership aspiring countries 
with unified societies as the domestic homogeneity helps them arise as unified pillars 
within the Union. In this case, the EU simply sets conditions to establish institutions that 
would be able to function in line with the EU consociational practices. 
 However, in EU membership aspiring countries with divided societies, simply 
conditioning the establishment or reforms of national institutions in a way that they are 
receptive to EU consociational practices would not suffice. One of the preconditions to 
the successful application of consociational practices is the existence of societal pillars, 
and a divided society lacks those pillars. Consociational practices would serve the 
mission of unification of such societies to a point that they would emerge as unified 
pillars and ready to contribute to the EU democratic stability. In this case, the EU 
conditions the establishment of institutions that would be receptive to consociational 
practices in two levels: the national level and the EU level. The EU conditions to its 
aspirants with divided societies some of the same practices that have brought democratic 
stability in some of its member countries with divided societies, as well as to the Union 
itself. Therefore, the divided society can emerge as a single pillar and its institutions are 
ready to function according to consociational practices at another level: the EU level.           
 48 
The first part of my argument opens the way to its second part, that is, the 
theorization of the effects of EU membership conditionality on EU membership aspiring 
countries from Eastern Europe. Now that we have defined the nature of EU membership 
conditionality and the EU motivations behind it, and can also build expectations on EE 
leaders‟ policy preferences in each stage of sectorial reforms, we can build expectations 
on reform outcomes. Thus, the second part of my argument consists in building a set of 
hypotheses about the possible sectorial reform outcomes from a combination of different 
possible interests on that reform of both the EU and domestic leaders.   
The EU-EECs negotiations are little more than a process of checking that the 
candidate countries have adopted EU law, chapter by chapter and page by page 
(Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005: 201). EU membership conditionality serves as a 
straightjacket that frames these negotiations. True, the EU has an embedded interest in 
eastward enlargement mainly nurtured by the general belief that it will bring peace and 
stability to the continent. On the other hand, arguably, there is no alternative for EECs 
except to join the EU (Dimitrova 2004: 2). This situation calls for theoretical explanations 
of institutional reforms in EECs that are centered on the dynamics of EU-EECs 
negotiations in the pre- and accession phase, with EU membership conditionality serving 
as a key explanatory variable. I argue that because the asymmetric interdependence in 
EU-EECs relations makes bargaining style negotiations between them difficult, these 
relations are characterized by either a tug-of-war between the EUs‟ and EECs‟ clashing 
priorities. The greater the incentive received by EECs for compliance to EU conditions, 
the easier and faster becomes their socialization with EU normative behavior.  
EU membership conditionality does not apply uniformly over all policy sectors in 
all the countries. Both the EU and domestic leaders share different and varying political 
preferences over reforms in different policy sectors. In addition, it is easily conceivable 
that independent structural factors would influence differently across the institutional 
reforms. Thus, theoretically, the interplay of the causal factors in a certain reform would 
be different from the interplay of the causal factors in another reform. Therefore, I 
propose to analyze the impact of EU membership conditionality on EE institutional 
reform at a mid-theory level, that is, theorizing its effects on EE sectorial reforms. I call 
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this a sectorial contextual approach. It entails the analysis of the EU membership 
conditionality separately in each type of reform and compare the conclusions. 
  Rather than an overarching analysis of EE democratization, the sectorial 
contextual approach considers a series of cases of EE institutional reforms. For the sake 
of simplicity, I evaluate both EU‟s and EE leaders‟ interests in certain sectorial reform as 
positive (+), negative (-), and null (0), thus excluding a wide range of other policy 
potential preferences over the related reform. I am aware of the limitations that such a 
simplistic assumption will impose on the theoretical outlines I intend to suggest. 
Assigning values to EU policy preferences is easier since the latter states openly those 
preferences. However, assigning EE leaders‟ policy preferences is more difficult, and I 
have assigned these values only after a historical contextual interpretation of what rational 
leaders‟ interests in a certain reform would have been during a certain period. A detailed 
empirical elaboration of institutional reform progress in some EECs will provide a much 
better and deeper understanding of the dynamics of such reforms, and from here we can 
obtain a better explanation of policy outcomes during the process of institutional reforms 
in EECs.       
Thus, EE governments undertake reforms mainly because of the domestic need for 
them (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998). Zürn and Checkel (2005) point out that before 
membership can be used as an incentive, a decisive change has already taken place in the 
country. National elites will have initiated reforms prior to EU conditionality and the 
sectorial priority of those reforms will have been determined by domestic needs rather 
than EU conditions. EE governments are more prone to undertake reforms regarding 
issues of major domestic concern despite the level of foreign assistance offered. 
Sometimes elites are proactive in implementing reforms that would bring their institutions 
in line with EU standards (Johnston 2001:488). Yet, presumably, the level of government 
commitment to reforms should allow leaders to maintain power, hence the claim that EECs that 
aspire to EU membership advance reforms even if these reforms are not conditioned by 
international actors, but address major domestic issues (Hypothesis 1).  
In later stages of institutional reforms, especially in cases that represent sectorial 
reforms known in advance to conform to EU models or are conditioned according to 
those models, EU aspirant countries might ask for technical assistance. EE leaders are 
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often constrained by limited resources and knowledge, especially in dealing with specific 
sectorial reforms where technical experience might be needed; also EE governments 
cannot afford the luxury of the one-thing-at-a-time golden rule, but are forced to work 
simultaneously with several different tasks (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998: 19). If EU 
institutions have the same interests as EECs‟, EU assistance to these countries further 
lubricates and legitimizes reforms. Therefore, the implementation of reforms that satisfy 
the interests of both EE and EU leaders provide the best chances for the most successful 
outcomes (Hypothesis 2). This is the ideal case to observe the effects of communist 
legacies on EE reforms when leaders work to mitigate rather than exploit these legacies.         
However, sometimes governments implement reforms that do not have any 
domestic impact but merely satisfy the interests and needs of international actors and 
donors, especially when these reforms are financially backed by the latter and do not 
threaten leaders‟ hold of power. In this case, insofar as domestic governments lack any 
interest in issues deemed to be addressed by these reforms, they remain a la carte, 
become inefficient, and the resulting institutions wind up feckless. The fact that the 
prospect of Balkan membership into the EU remains distant weakens the strategic 
effectiveness of EU conditionality as an instrument of influence for the region, especially 
when combined with the lack of tangible benefits. This line of reasoning suggests that 
reforms undertaken only due to EU pressure, but that neither satisfy nor oppose EE 
leaders’ interests are not viable and institutions built are weak and non-functional 
(Hypothesis 3).  
  Some EU rules appear to be ill-conceived, ill-suited to transitional economies, 
inappropriate for particular countries, and excessively costly for economically and 
politically vulnerable countries. As applicant countries might need to divert funds from 
social programs in order to implement the EU acquis (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005: 
202), painful reforms may result in serious threats to country‟s stability. Economic 
restructuring affects the lives of millions of people who as a result may rise in 
demonstrations, strikes, and riots. Violent protests or regular elections could overthrow 
reformist governments and halt reforms. In such cases, in order to mitigate the pain of 
reforms and pacify contesters, governments might slow down the pace of reforms. Such a 
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deceleration may conflict with EU conditions and also with the geopolitical and security 
interests of some of the major EU actors (Skålner 2005).  
In the final round of negotiations, the EU might also impose some more self-
interested conditions. After having dedicated hard work to achieving the EU acquis, the 
EU forces candidates to accept unfavorable terms for their accession, that is, to sacrifice 
some portion of the benefits stemming from membership over the short and medium term 
(Moravcsik and Vachudová 2005: 202). As Sedelmeier (2005: 237) points out, previous 
enlargement episodes suggest that a lack of flexibility by the EU can cause severe 
problems for the candidate countries and lead to disgruntled new members. Political 
tensions might rise from these clashes, thus jeopardizing reforms. Therefore, we can 
expect EE leaders’ and EU’s opposing interests on reforms to cause political tensions 
and slow the pace of reforms (Hypothesis 4).           
Yet, certain reforms remain outside of the immediate interests of both the EU and 
EE leaders. It is not that they either necessarily oppose these reforms; they are simply 
indifferent toward them. Of course, the 80,000 page communitarian acquis includes 
norms and procedures that cover almost every aspect of EU functioning. Aligning with 
them would require EECs to undertake reforms in all political, governmental, social, and 
economic fields. However, there are cases when implementation of certain reforms might 
not be an urgent priority and/or bring harm to both the EU and CEE leaders. In this case 
we can observe a greater of EE and Brussels bureaucracies, which, unburdened of 
leaders‟ interests, manage to successfully push forward these reforms (Grabbe (2003: 
315).  This is more a case with policy sectors where EU member countries may have 
adopted different models of that specific institutional design, and the EU might not have 
been able to embrace a single model of institutional arrangements related to that policy 
sector. In such cases, the EU may simply emphasize the need for institutional reforms in 
that sectorial policy area but not impose a specific condition that would be either 
prescriptive or have measurable results. In such cases, the EU refers to conditions and 
technical assistance coming from other regional IOs. Hence, reforms that remain beyond 
of the EUs’ immediate prescriptive conditions as well as domestic leaders’ political 
preferences might be either successfully carried out by Brussels and domestic 
bureaucracies, or be conditioned and assisted by other regional IOs (Hypothesis 5).     
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Some domestic reforms might fall outside of the EU interest and are opposed by 
domestic ruling elites. This scenario may involve policy areas that do not directly affect 
political and economic liberalization, human rights as we know them, and issues related 
to domestic and/or regional security and stability. The very technical nature of the issue 
might be the common cause of the lack of EU interest in that reform, while domestic 
leaders might prefer status quo in that sector. The opposition of domestic leaders toward 
such reforms might stem from both the need to hold onto administrative power in that 
particular sector or from the lack of unity among ruling elites for that reform. Sometimes, 
slow progress might occur, but often this may simply represent unsteady efforts to 
respond to the pressure of interest groups rather than to a political will to undertake the 
reform. Reforms that are not within the interest range of the EU and are opposed by EE 
leaders will not proceed, or, if they have already begun, will be halted (Hypothesis 6).   
These hypotheses are compiled in Table 2. The positive interests and outcomes 
are marked with +; negative interests with -, and; the lack of any evident interests by 
foreign and/or domestic agents with 0.  
TABLE 3.1 HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
INTERESTS OF  
EU 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
INTERESTS OF 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS  
 
OUTCOMES 
 
HYPOTHESES 1 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
Good results  
 
HYPOTHESES 2 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Excellent results 
 
HYPOTHESES 3 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
Good but 
uncertain results  
 
HYPOTHESES 4 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
Tensions and  
uncertain results 
 
HYPOTHESES 5 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Uncertain results 
 
HYPOTHESES 6 
 
0 
 
- 
 
No reform 
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The policy dynamics represented in Table 2 are nor the same across policy 
sectors. As we have seen thus far, during two decades, both EU and domestic leaders‟ 
sectorial preferences have changed and policy interests have shifted from hitherto highly 
prioritized sectors to sectors that have been previously neglected. Policy dynamics in each 
of the sectorial reforms can be explained with one or more of the outlined cases. Thus, 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 better explain early constitutional and economic reforms as well as 
their spillover to other sectorial reforms. Also, Hypotheses 2 and 3 might be helpful in 
explaining reforms in the asylum and immigration system, with its early dynamics better 
fitting within that explained by Hypothesis 3, and its later developments explained by 
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 4 helps to explain most of the stages of judiciary and local 
decentralization reforms as well as constitutional reforms that relate to them. Hypothesis 
5 and 6 may help to explain different stages in social assistance, education, and health 
care reforms. 
 
Research Design 
Employing consociationalism to gauge EU interests in Eastern European institutional 
reforms: some conceptual clarifications  
I develop my elite-centered argument on the assumption that elites are divided and their 
competing political preferences lead them to different policy preferences regarding 
institutional reforms. This view is consistent with the foundations of transitology 
literature as established by Rustow (1970), and with some more recent literature on 
democratization that empirically test its hypotheses on EU enlargement and EE transition 
(Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Moravcsik 2000) as opposed to Prewitt and Stone‟s 
(1973) concept of unified elites (see also Finer ed. 1966). Under the conditions of divided 
elites, their preferences will determine the course of reforms. However, there are cases 
when there exists national consensus over the general need for reforms and/or distinct 
sectorial reforms. Usually, I use terms “elites” and “ruling elites” concomitantly.   
I argued in the previous Chapter that consociational theory can serve as an 
overarching approach to explain both the practices that have made the EU a stable 
democracy and the practices that the EU employs in order to expand its model beyond its 
existing borders to the EU aspirants from Eastern Europe. Thus, EU membership 
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conditionality can be considered as a set of consociational practices that aim at 
influencing institutional reforms in the aspirant countries so the resulting institutions can 
be compatible with those of the EU. However, before implementing such a theoretical 
framework for explaining the effects of EU membership conditionality on EE institutional 
reforms, some conceptual clarifications are needed.  
Specifically, we need a separation between what Barry (1975b) calls 
“consociational practices” and the definitional term “consociational democracy,” hence 
eliminating the tautological relationship between the definition of the phenomena and its 
cause.
1
 This implies that we talk about consociational theory but not about consociational 
democracy. Lijphart himself (1969) has equated consociational democracy with stable 
democracy. Lijphart‟s definition of democracy clearly states that it remains an ideal to be 
realized rather than something being experienced. It includes the democratic ideal and, 
implicitly, stability. Therefore, consociational democracy is simply a stable polity 
achieved through consociational practices. If stable democracies promote, as it has been 
professed, crosscutting cleavages that would “depillarize” segmented societies, and thus 
increase potentials for social cohesion even under majoritarian political institutions and 
practices, then we need not utilize the term consociational democracy. I think the cost of 
getting rid of the definitional features of consociationalism, namely “consociational 
democracy,” is practically null compared to the gain of clarity in causality.   
Gabel‟s (1998) argument in favor of the consociationalist character of EU 
democracy helps to reveal two facts: the EU can be persuasively interpreted as a deeply 
divided society; and the EU is a stable polyarchy. Moreover, its leaders have employed 
consociational methods to achieve that level of democratic stability. Yet, during the 
difficult postsocialist transition presents EECs‟ the stability with enormous challenges. 
Some of the difficulties of the democratic transition are generated by the presence of 
strong leaders who compete fiercely for power, weak or absent institutions, deeply 
entrenched habits of mind, cultural legacies, and nation-building problems; this situation 
is very likely to produce instability, if it hasn‟t already. Assuming that EU elites are 
rational actors, we should expect them to assure that such instability does not spill into 
EU member countries. Arguably, EU elites‟ rationale calls for a solution to this problem 
by incorporating these potentially unstable countries into its political body. 
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Obviously, Eastern European societies are interested in democratic stability as 
well; pragmatically, it has been shown to work in the neighboring countries of the West, 
and they will hope that it will work for them as well. For this reason, they assign to their 
rationally-driven leaders the task of negotiating accession into the EU. In these 
negotiations, the EE leaders are in a disadvantaged position. It is very likely that they will 
be required to implement consociational practices in order to address the sources of their 
instability, but these may not be the only practices that the EU will suggest and/or 
condition to them; after all, democratic stability, not the oxymoronic “consociational 
democracy,” is the goal. Whether or not EE leaders implement recommendations coming 
from EU leaders as policy prescriptions during their process of institution building or 
reformation of institutions already in place requires a consideration of their rational 
preferences.  
Consociational practices are, thus, those practices that help forging a stable 
democracy in a severely divided society by establishing governance by grand coalition, 
proportionality in representation, and mutual veto power. The purpose of EU conditions 
in both EECs with unified societies and those with divided societies is to establish 
institutions that would be receptive to the consociational practices that have brought about 
the Union as a stable democracy from a divided regional society. The difference rests 
with the intensity of these conditions: in the second case, EU conditions stretch over some 
areas where EECs with unified societies do not feel much the pressure of conditionality. 
And finally, there are other areas where conditionality is equally severe on both unified 
and divided societies. It should be expected that the EU conditions are more intensive in 
sectors where the application of consociational practices is particularly relevant in 
establishing and maintaining a stable democracy.  
A consociational approach to the rationale of EU membership conditionality 
maintains that, pragmatically, the EU is expected to transfer its own practices to EECs; 
after all, what works for the EU should also work for its candidates. Arguments outlined 
above point to the consociational practices of EU, but no one has argued so far that all the 
EU practices are consociational and, obviously, not all of the EU institutions are built 
upon consociational practices. This claim sends us back to Costa and Magnette‟s (2003: 
6) argument that “the nature of the institutions set up to reach compromises depends on 
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the nature of the segment.” Building such institutions requires negotiations between 
pillars, which in our case means between the EU and EU membership aspiring countries. 
In an elite theory of democratization, “the nature of the segment” reflects in fact elites‟ 
political preferences energized by that particular policy sector. Whether or not reforms in 
a particular institution will require consociational or majority rule practices, that depends 
on the political preferences of both EU and EE elites in that particular policy sector. 
The EU conditions consociational practices to its membership aspirants in two 
levels. The first level is the EU level. That implies the establishing in EECs who aspire to 
EU membership institutions that will be receptive to the EU consociational practices. This 
is a case with countries with mainly unified societies, which are able to provide their 
elites with clear and legitimate mandates to negotiate with the EU during the process of 
EU accession and integration. In other words, building domestic institutions receptive to 
EU consociational practices prepares the EU membership aspiring countries for the 
political life within the EU. The second case implies the EU conditioning consociational 
practices in both domestic and EU level. This is the case of EU membership aspiring 
countries with deeply divided societies. In this case, EU conditions consociational 
practices that would simultaneously establish democratic stability in these countries and 
establish institutions receptive to EU consociational practices. The first step aims at 
molding those countries as “pillars” and unifying them around their elites by providing 
them with a clear and legitimate mandate to negotiate with the EU. The second step is the 
same with other EU membership aspiring countries with unified societies: it implies the 
establishing institutions that will be receptive to the EU consociational practices during 
negotiations of accession and integration.  
 
The empirical test and data    
To test my cases, I develop a process tracing analysis of four institutional reforms in 
Albania and Macedonia. I also analytically consider the case of institutional reforms in 
Bulgaria, and Romania during their process of transition from state socialism to market 
oriented democracies. In the case of Albania and Macedonia, I trace every step of those 
countries‟ institutional reforms, while in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, I only present 
a general assessment of the institutional transformations in these countries by focusing on 
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a comparative view between the pre-Accession and post-Accession development. The 
process tracing analysis will focus on highlighting moments of policy shift and inquire 
about the causal factors of such a change. In the case of analyzing Bulgarian and 
Romanian institutional reforms, much of my conclusion will derive from the analytical 
work of other authors; however, those conclusions will be critically scrutinized in order to 
assure their compatibility with the findings of my process tracing method 
 
The selection of cases: reforms and countries   
Listing institutional reforms necessary for resolving the main issues of political conflict, 
Welsh (1994) come up with the following areas: reform of electoral system; reform of the 
government structure (including issues of decentralization); selection of new political 
elite; development of institutions of interest articulation and interest aggregation (e.g., 
political parties, interest groups); constitution writing; prosecution and purge of 
communist party officials and members of security apparatus; restitution of past 
injustices; and reform of the media sector. However, in order to test my cases, I need to 
consider some institutional reforms that go beyond those mentioned by Welsh. Usually, 
policy sectors with fiercer political competition generate either positive or negative 
preferences by leaders. However, I also analyze cases when domestic leaders might not 
have a specific preference for a particular reform. Only sectors that usually do not 
produce conflict would be outside of the political preferences range of domestic leaders. 
Hence, sectorial reforms that fall outside of those mentioned by Welsh are necessary to 
test as many of the outlined cases as possible.  
 My empirical test will cover only constitutional, local government, judicial, and 
asylum and immigration reforms. These reforms might not be sufficient to test all the 
cases—to test Hypotheses 5 and 6, for instance, an inquiry into heath care and/or 
education systems is needed. However, as long as that particular case holds logical 
consistency, there is no need to discard it, and future research could empirically explore 
their validity.  
         As for the countries themselves, starting with similarities that stem from their 
ideological affiliation with the Soviet Bloc and/or the Soviet style society, both these 
countries converge to the nationalistic socialist system that Tito in Yugoslavia and Hoxha 
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in Albania developed as a tool of legitimacy as a compensation for their breakaway with 
the Soviet Union. Albania came out of severe and isolated communist dictatorships and 
began introducing economic and political reforms by the beginning of 1991. Although out 
of the Soviet orbit since the early 1960s, Albania never abandoned the Soviet-style state 
system. Macedonia is a newly independent state which emerged from the Yugoslav 
breakdown. As such, like Albania, Macedonia comes from a maverick, nationalist 
communism, yet with a more liberal and western-oriented tradition.
2
  
         These similarities might serve as a good explanation of these countries‟ state 
organization during communism and the reforms that they needed in order to adapt and 
build institutions to assist them during the transition to democracy and its consolidation. 
For Albania, there is no walk of life that did not need reforms, while Macedonia had to 
start its institutional building as an independent state from scratch. From the economic 
model perspective, socialism, with disputable success, has tried to transform these 
countries from agrarian economies of the pre-WWII era to Soviet-style mega-
industrialization, while the agriculture sector varied from totally nationalized as was the 
case of Albania to totally private as in Macedonia. However, different ideological 
nuances and geopolitical orientations have not inhibited these countries from 
implementing Soviet style governments and, from this perspective they share more 
institutional similarities than differences. 
         From the institutional perspective, both these countries come from the Ottoman 
tradition as opposed to the Habsburg tradition of the rest of Eastern Europe (Rupnik 
2000).
3
 Thus, even though the Habsburg Empire was not a liberal democracy comparable 
to the British model, neither was it a royal autocracy like the tsarist Russia; rather, it was 
a Rechtsstaat, a state run by the rule of law. Accordingly, that tradition of the rule of law 
has been inherited by some Eastern and Central European countries that succeeded the 
Habsburg Empire (Rupnik 2000: 19). Although Rupnik does not discuss the 
consequences of the Ottoman tradition for institutional building and the establishment of 
the rule of law, his observation suggests that countries that inherit this tradition do not 
share the same view of institutions. Categorizing countries according to this criterion 
might not necessarily be accurate. Albania gained independence in 1912 and has had 
enough time to build its state structure; Macedonia has existed in Yugoslavia first as a 
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Serbian region (1919-1945) and then as a republic (1946-1991), but Yugoslavia itself 
inherited both the Habsburg tradition (Croatia, Slovenia), an Ottoman tradition (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia itself, and Kosovo) as well as a longer tradition of 
independence (Serbia formally since 1868, and Montenegro formally since 1878). 
However, the uniform 45 years long Soviet institutional might be considered enough to 
erase much of the previous institutional traditions in both countries. 
         From the perspective of pre-WWII development and post-communist economic 
reforms,
4
 both countries also share similarities and differences, with the latter prevailing. 
Albania became an Italian colony, while Macedonia was simply the most underdeveloped 
part of Serbia and Yugoslavia itself.
5
 After the collapse of communism, Albania 
embraced a shock-therapy economic reform program, while Macedonia has been 
reluctant to undertake radical reforms and remained laggards, at least until 2001, when it 
began pursuing aggressive economic reforms. 
         Another factor that, according to Rupnik (2000: 20), has defined the success of 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe compared with Southeastern Europe is the ethnic 
homogeneity/heterogeneity of society. Here both countries differ significantly. A highly 
ethnically homogenous society, Albania is composed of 95 percent ethnic Albanians, 3 
percent ethnic Greeks, and 2 percent Vlachs, Roma, Serbs, Macedonians and Bulgarians. 
In the highly heterogeneous Macedonia, the 2002 census showed that ethnic Macedonians 
represented 64.2 percent of the population, ethnic Albanians 25.2 percent, Turkish 3.9 
percent, Roma 2.7 percent, Serbs 1.8 percent and other ethnic minorities 2.2 percent.
6
  
And, finally, there is the international environment factor. Indeed, for this 
research, it represents a key independent variable. There are four international 
organizations which directly affect the region: the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe 
(CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but only 
two of them, the EU and NATO, are able to offer sufficient economic and security 
incentives as to substantially affect reforms in Eastern Europe. This research focuses 
mainly on the EU‟s influence on institutional reforms in EECs. As Grabbe (2001: 1013) 
points out, such an influence goes well beyond its official competencies in current 
member-states; it affects the reform speed, domestic elite adaptation with EU norms and 
the inescapability of EU membership conditionality for countries that aspire to EU 
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membership. The process of EU enlargement toward these countries has developed 
through two different programs: European Agreements for Bulgaria and Romania and the 
Stabilization and Association Process for Albania and Macedonia. However, although 
these countries might receive conditions of different intensity for different sectors, as a 
package, normatively, EU membership conditionality is supposed to indiscriminately 
affect their reforms.  
Table 3-2 compares the selected countries.  
 
Variables 
I consider domestic leaders‟ interests in a reform to be positive when the development of 
a specific reform helps them gain attain and/or maintain power and negative when the 
reforming process might harm their power positions. As my argument states, often leaders 
either undertake reforms or stop them based on power calculations. Some existing 
blueprints can serve as guidelines, though. Generally, we should expect leaders to be 
more oriented during reforms during the revolutionary periods of “extraordinary politics,” 
that is, the initial period of regime change when a broad consensus exists among both the 
political elite and the public on the need for reform. However, the rhythm of reforms 
slows down during period when politics become routinized and which becomes „ordinary 
politics” Balcerowicz (2002). In the former period, swift and sweeping reforms can be 
undertaken without much delay as the large involvement of the public in politics 
overshadows power politics. This is usually a short period, four years in Poland, 16 
months in Albania and less than three years in Macedonia.
7
 Moreover, we should expect 
smooth reforms during the first year or two years after the return to power of a formerly 
deposed party, e.g., a party that has lost power in previous elections, as usually those 
parties scrambles to show a new image to domestic public and international partners. One 
should expect their return to power politics during the second part of their terms. 
However, EU might manage to change leaders incentives to certain sectorial reforms by 
specific “sticks and carrots.” This is the case of the EU visa liberalization agreements 
when the EU managed to change overnight the interests of Albania‟s and Macedonia‟s 
leaders in asylum reforms from neutral to positive.  
61 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.2 ALBANIAN AND MACEDONIAN HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
 
IDEOLOGIC. 
LEGACIES 
 
INSTITUT. 
LEGACIES 
 
HABSBURG VERSUS 
OTTOMAN LEGACIES 
 
 
ECONOMIC LEGACIES 
 
ETHNIC 
HOMOGENIT. 
 
 
INTERNAT. ENVIRONM. 
 
ALBANIA 
 
A Stalinist, 
isolated from the 
rest of the world,  
nationalistic 
communist regime 
 
Has inherited 
institutions totally 
incompatible with 
transition requirements 
 
Gained independence from 
the Ottoman Empire only in 
1912: long lasting Ottoman 
legacy 
 
A totally  nationalized, 
centralized, isolated, and 
backward  economy 
 
Highly homogeneous 
Albanians: 95% 
Greek: 5% 
Vlachs, Roma, Serbs, 
Macedonians and 
Bulgarians: 2% 
 
1) June 19, 1991: Joined 
OSCE;  
2) 1992: Agreement on 
Trade and 
Commercial and 
Economic 
Cooperation with the 
EU; 
3) July 3, 1995: Joined 
the CoE 
4) June 12, 2006: 
Signed the SAA 
5) Spring 2009: Applied 
for EU membership 
MACEDONIA A constitutive 
republic of the 
second 
Yugoslavia; has 
inherited a more 
open attitude 
toward the West 
As a newly 
independent country, 
needed to build 
institutions from  
scratch 
Went out of  the Ottoman 
Empire only in 1912: long 
lasting Ottoman legacy 
The most underdeveloped 
economy among the 
Yugoslav Republics, yet 
with  some freely 
developed economic 
sectors 
Heterogeneous  
Macedonians: 64,2% 
Albanians: 25,2% 
Turkish: 3,9% 
Roma: 2,7% 
Serbs: 1,8% 
Others: 2,2% 
1) October 12, 1995: 
Joined OSCE 
2) November 9, 1995: 
Joined the CoE 
3) September 2001: 
signed the SAA 
4) December 2005: 
official EU candidate 
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Measuring EU interests in Eastern European institutional reforms is easier since the EU 
states its interests in official documents. Indeed, the very release of such documents for specific 
countries shows a positive EU interest in reforms in those countries. Therefore, before the release 
of the Stabilization and Association Programme (SAP) we can generally assign as neutral the EU 
interests in the Albanian and Macedonian institutional reforms. However, the launching of the 
SAP did not mean that the EU became equally interested in all the institutional reforms of both 
countries. In that case, I use documents and historical contextual analysis to map out EU interests 
in specific Albanian and Macedonian institutional reforms. I consider EU interests in a certain 
reform to be positive when EU institutions openly and forcefully condition that reform. By the 
same token, I consider EU interests in a certain reform to be neutral when the EU remains 
ambiguous about the level, shape, and financial support for that reform. The EU is expected to 
oppose a policy/reform if it goes against the prescribed policies designed by the EU; although 
such cases might be extremely rare, instances or elements of different reforms might face EU 
opposition.EU interests are easily traceable through the way it employs EU conditionality and 
allocates funds that support the EU accession. From a rational point of view, it is conceivable 
that the EU would enforce policies that allow EECs to achieve its acquis (interests) and would 
only recommend, but would not condition, policies in areas where it has weak or neutral 
interests. But, of course, the best way to measure EU preference for a specific reform is to heed 
its annual Progress Reports where the European Commission assesses reform progress in the 
candidate or membership aspirants, and outlines “homework” for the coming year.  
I am aware that measuring the EU and EE interests only as positive (+), negative (-), and 
neutral (0) represents an oversimplification of the range that these interests might cover. A 
consociational approach suggests that EU interests in a certain sectorial reforms in a EU 
membership aspiring country is negatively correlated with the existing institutional  capabilities 
of that country to absorb consociational practices of EU internal integration when it joins the EU 
ranks; namely, the less these institutions are able to absorb such consotiational practices, the 
stronger the conditions are. We should expect the conditions to be even stronger in the case when 
domestic institutions need to be receptive to consociational practices both for establishing a 
stable democracy at home and for enabling the EU integration of the country. However, for the 
moment, we lack any scale measure that would help in assessing intermediate interests. I detect 
these intermediate preferences qualitatively, and employ the same methodology to trace 
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preferences in the intermediate range. I admit that, due to the lack of indexes that accurately 
measure actors‟ political preferences in reforms, my categorization of interests might bear a 
certain level of subjectivity that is unavoidable in qualitative research.  
I will measure institutional reform outcomes—the dependent variables—using both 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation method. I will use qualitative measurement wherever 
possible; this includes constitutional and judicial reforms where reform progress has been 
indexed by the American Bar Association. For decentralization reform, Freedom House has 
introduced an index since 2005. However, the only way to measure these reforms before the 
introduction of these indexes is qualitative. In order to fulfill this task, I use reports from the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. Reports of the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities (CLRA) of the Council of Europe are also good source to evaluate the reform 
progress in local decentralization. 
Until now, we lack a quantitative indexation of asylum and immigration reforms in 
Eastern Europe; hence I will assess reform progress in this sector only quantitatively, mainly by 
relying on EU‟s Annual Progress Report. Before the introduction of the Progress Reports, 
UNHCR and IOM have commented about the quality of asylum and immigration protection 
systems in these countries.    
 
Data 
I rely on a large variety of both qualitative and quantitative data. One of the sources is 
interviews, consultations, and opinion exchanges that I have developed with politicians and state 
administrators in countries in the region. My long time experience within Albanian politics and 
my friendship with some Albanian, Kosovar, and Macedonian politicians has facilitated the 
collection of such data. Usually, data collected through such interviews help to assess both 
leaders‟ political preferences and their perceptions about EU preferences. Other data come from 
research developed by domestic and foreign institutions and scholars. A major source of data are 
reports written by EU and other international organizations about the reform process in analyzed 
countries as well as governments‟ statements on related topics.  
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Conclusions 
In this chapter I argued that viewing the EU as a stable democracy brought about by 
consociational practices helps explain not only the internal integration of the Union but also its 
eastward expansion. Arguably, the EU has employed consociational practices to establish a 
stable democracy out of the severely divided continental/regional society of states. Henceforth, 
the EU also expands through conditioning its aspirants to build institutions that would be 
receptive to these practices. In the case of countries with unified societies, institutions‟ 
receptiveness to consociational practices should rest only at the national level, that is, between 
the aspirant countries and the EU. In the cases of severely divided societies, these institutions 
should be receptive to consociational practices both at the domestic and international levels; at 
the domestic level, they would help establish a stable democracy; at the international level, they 
would consociationally help the process of integration of the country with the EU order. 
Moreover, in EU membership aspiring countries with divided societies, consociational practices 
themselves are necessary in order to build such institutions since their existence implies the 
existence of a stable democracy. I call this a consociationalist approach to studying EU 
membership conditionality. 
 EU policies meet varying reactions from domestic leaders, and the combination of 
preferences for a certain institutional reform of the EU and domestic leaders are the key variables 
that explain the reform results. Sometime, some structural independent variables  might interfere, 
but there are mainly actors‟ policy preferences that determine the outcomes. EU preferences are 
represented as its membership conditionality. The question is not whether or not membership 
conditionality works, but under which circumstances it affects policy changes. EU membership 
conditionality is more intensive and consistent in cases when they tend to build institutions 
receptive to consociational practices in institutions affecting both domestic policies and sectors 
that are relevant in the EU integration. The latter affect every country that aspires to join the 
Union; the former affect only those EU aspirants with deeply divided societies. This explains 
why EU does not condition similarly every sectorial reform and every country, hence my 
sectorial contextual approach. Afterward, the political dynamics between the EU and domestic 
leaders‟ political preferences in specific reforms helps to explain their outcome reforms.  
The sectorial contextual approach and the consocionalist approach to the EU eastward 
expansion are intrinsically linked. While the latter explains why the EU condition institutional 
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reforms in the EU, the former explains why institutional reforms develop the way they develop. 
Implicitly, the consociationalist approach to EE eastward enlargement explains the source of EU 
interest in EE institutional reforms as well as the intensity of EU conditions in different sectorial 
reforms, while the sectorial contextual approach helps to explain the outcome of the reforms 
when both domestic and foreign variables are taken into account. The consociationalist approach 
helps us to understand the source of EU conditions and, by understanding the rationale behind 
these conditions, also to evaluate their intensity; the sectorial contextual approach expands our 
understanding and explanation of specific EE institutional reforms by adding to the 
consociational approach domestic leaders‟ political preferences about these reforms and other 
independent structural variables that reflect the social context where a specific reform occurs. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 In practice, that will not be so easy since even Brian Barry (1975b), the most severe critic of that tautology, refers 
to consociationalism both as “consociational practices” and “consociational model” in the definitional sense. 
2
 The similarities and differences among the selected countries and institutional reforms will become even more 
evident in the course of institutional reform process tracing. However, there are several distinct differences even 
among former Yugoslav constitutional units (six republics and two autonomous regions). One of the major 
differences among them is the nature of Macedonian nationalism as a Titoist creation. As the Albanian-Macedonian 
intellectual and politician told me in an interview with him in the summer of 2009, during the Titoist Yugoslavia, all 
the nationalisms were suppressed, with the exception of the Macedonian nationalism. The latter was rather 
encouraged within the same Yugoslav nationalist logic invented by Tito: it would serve as a bulwark against 
Albanian, Bulgarian, and Greek claims over Macedonia.      
3
 Indeed, when Rupnik (2000) develops his discussion of the Habsburg versus the Ottoman factor, he mainly focuses 
on the former while the reader is invited to assume the opposite for the latter. 
4
 For the relevance of such a feature in selecting the countries, see Rupnik (2000).  
5
 The region belonged to the Ottoman Empire and was captured by Serbia during the First Balkan War, 1912, and 
became internationally recognized as its territory with the post-war peace treaties. In the interwar period, it was 
known as Južna Srbija (Southern Serbia) or Stara Srbija (Old Serbia). During World War II (1941-1944), Albanian-
populated western territories of the Vardar Banovina were occupied by the Italian-ruled Albania, while the pro-
German Bulgaria occupied the remainder.  
After World War II, with the reconstitution of the Titoist Yugoslavia as a federal state, the Vardar province 
already established in 1944, became with the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution a republic known as People's Republic of 
Macedonia within the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The name was changed to Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia in the 1963 Constitution of Yugoslavia. 
6
 CIA World Factbook 2007. At https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html  [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
7
 However, in the case of Macedonia, the “extraordinary politics” period served nation building more than 
democratization, and public involvement in countries‟ politics did not represent a large consensus since Albanians of 
Macedonia were left outside of the process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA: 
CONDITIONING CONSOCIATIONAL PRACTICES FOR EU AND DOMESTIC 
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY 
 
 
The case of constitutional reforms in Albania and Macedonia is instructive in 
demonstrating how EU-EEC negotiations can be analyzed as a process of imposing 
consociational practices on two levels. The case of Albania is much simpler than that of 
Macedonia. Although Albanian elites were bitterly divided, the same could not be 
claimed about the Albanian public. Communist rule actually played a major role in 
unifying Albanian society. A unified political thought shaped during a Stalinist-type 
repression, combining Marxism with Albanian folklores, proletarian internationalism with 
local mythology, and dreams of industrialization/ technological progress created a 
surrealist environment where time stalled and everyone found himself equally poor. 
Systematic purges within the Party of Labor, the Albanian communist party, stirred by a 
dictator that was growing fretfully paranoid with age, oppressed communists and 
dissenters alike. The strict system of pashaportizim [residence permit] thwarted any 
demographic movement outside the party‘s control, and, as the pace of industrialization 
slowed after a rupture with China in 1978, population movement practically stalled. Two 
to three generations of Albanians were born and died in the same residential site, and 
perhaps even in the same apartment. Regions were isolated by high mountains and a poor 
international highway system, and the state-run internal transportation system was 
deplorable; the movement of people even within the country was very limited. In 1969, 
the communist regime managed to close all religious institutions without any resistance 
from a population that has never displayed any dedication to religion even in better days. 
Religious practices and institutions were declared illegal in the Constitution of 1976. 
Class division was declared overcome. While minority rights mostly benefiting a tiny 
Greek minority in the south were constitutionally promulgated, its members were equally 
oppressed. The regime of Ramiz Alia, the new authoritarian leader who took power after 
the death of Enver Hoxha in April 1985 continued faithfully on the same course. In sum, 
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on the wake of the last decade of the twentieth century, Albanians found themselves 
equally impoverished and oppressed, equally incapable to revolt, and equally confused 
about what should be done.       
 Different political dynamics were occurring in Macedonia. As by the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s Yugoslavia began to fragment, Macedonian 
national conscience was not fully ripened, even though, arguably, the Macedonian ethnic 
identity was the only one encouraged in communist Yugoslavia (Brunnbauer 2002: 10; 
Palmer and King 1971: 153-74).
1
 The need to finally consolidate an uncertain ethnic 
identity led Macedonian elites to project a potentially independent Macedonia with an 
almost congruent identification of the Macedonian nation with the state (Brunnbauer: 
2002: 10). On the other hand, more than one quarter of the country‘s population, ethnic 
Albanians, were experiencing a difficult and slow, but steady awakening, albeit many 
Albanian elites had moved to Kosovo where the ethnic group has been enjoying political 
and cultural autonomy since 1968 (Lebamoff and Ilievski 2008: 10). Both ethnies, 
Macedonians and Albanians, lived side by side yet totally separated.
2
 Most Macedonians 
worked in state jobs
3
 while ethnic discrimination kept Albanians out of such employment 
and pushed them to private business.
4
 Albanians were discriminated against in education, 
political participation, administrative employment, and cultural life (Lebamoff and 
Ilievski 2008). 
The deep political mistrust among the elites in both Albanian and Macedonia led 
to a perception of constitutional reforms as efforts to establish institutional settings that 
would allow the dominant group to wield maximum power and benefits. However, while 
in Albania the power struggle was between opposing political groups of the same 
ethnicity, in Macedonia there were the ethnic majority and minority who struggled, the 
former for ―the eternal rights of the Macedonians,‖5 and the latter for the state-
constitutive rights of the Albanians in Macedonia. This may explain why, although 
Albanian political debates over constitutional reform were often heated, they did not lead 
to armed struggle as was the case of Macedonia. However, while Albanian constitutional 
reform was not the source of distrust and violent protests among contending parties, as a 
political topic it contributed to the simmering political climate of the country. 
Constitutional arrangements were perceived to assist in establishing a system of check-
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and-balances between the parties. Thus, the EU role in stabilizing Albania after the 1997 
crisis focused intensely on the approval of a new constitution. The approval of the 1998 
Constitution shows how the political will of dominating elites, combined with EU support 
for the process led to successful reforms even under strong domestic opposition.  
In Macedonia, constitutional reform implies concepts such as nationality/ethnicity, 
stateness, majority/minority, citizenship, state symbols, and even literary metaphors. 
Issues such as to whom belongs the country, whom should be considered majority and 
minority and under what circumstances, the official language of the country, what 
state/national/ethnic symbols should be used needed to be addressed in constitutional 
arrangements. Since these issues often had to do or were perceived to be related to the 
very existence of an ethnic group, and since fear of extinction has been a major element 
in formulating political responses to social processes in some ethnically divided societies 
(Kaufman 2001), constitutional reform in Macedonia was ―won‖ through armed struggle 
and the enormous diplomatic efforts of the EU, US, and OSCE.       
 This chapter revisits constitutional reforms in Albania and Macedonia. The 
purpose is to highlight the coincidence of both domestic and international factors, and 
whether policy outcome, that is, the sectorial reform produced by their interplay, 
corroborates my argument. In Albania, a unified society, the EU has had only a peripheral 
involvement and, in that case, we can barely speak of real conditionality. Since Albanian 
society is a unified society, there was no need to condition a constitution that would 
transform Albanian society as a unified ―segment‖ for its further negotiation with the 
Union. All what was needed was a constitution that would facilitate the receptiveness of 
the consociational practices during the accession process and the further integration in the 
case of an eventual membership in the Union. On the other hand, the omnipresence of the 
EU in the entire Macedonian constitutional reform and its firm condition to reach an 
agreement between the Macedonians and Albanians, as well as during the process of 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, shows that the EU need to impact the 
establishment of institutions that would be receptive to consociational practices in two 
levels: in the domestic level, such institutions would produce a stable democracy; in the 
regional level, their receptiveness to EU consociational practices would facilitate the 
negotiations of Macedonia with the EU and also the further integration of the country 
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with EU institutions. The analysis of this process is especially important since, as we will 
see during the empirical discussion, constitutional reforms in both countries, particularly 
Macedonia, were keys to the establishment of other institutional reforms. After the 
successful completion of constitutional restructuring in Albania and Macedonia, these 
reforms became causal factors in sectorial reform.    
 
The EU and Albanian Constitutional Reform
6
                                                                                                       
The wave of democracy sweeping the Eastern Europe during the late 1980‘s did not 
extend to Albania which still had a communist constitution that propagated the 
unchallenged rule of the Partia e Punës (PP) [the Labor Party]. The communist rule did 
not recognize any separation of powers nor checks-and-balances. Hence, the Albanian 
constitution was intended to bolster and legitimize the communist rule rather than 
establish a constitutional republican political system.  
By the early 1990‘s however, the democratic wave finally arrived in Albania as 
evidenced by the Democratic Revolution of December 1990 and the ensuing first pluralist 
elections at the beginning of 1991. The major issue that the first pluralist Kuvend 
(Albanian legislative body) had to tackle was constitutional reform. In an attempt to 
reflect the changing Eastern European political context, the former communist PP who 
emerged as the major victor of the March 1991 elections, had its own project for a new 
constitution. PP‘s interest lay in the approval of a constitution that would allow it to 
control the democratization and liberalization process. The opposing Partia Demokratike 
(PD) [Democratic Party] viewed this agenda not only as a Communist effort to 
manipulate, and ultimately benefit from democratization, but as a way to block serious 
and deep reform. A political battle ensued in the Kuvend during the period of April-June 
1991and resulted in a political victory for the PD. That success can be attributed to a free 
fall of PP, general strikes that paralyzed the life of the country in May-June, and violent 
clashes between angry anti-government demonstrators and security forces. However, with 
the resignation of Fatos Nano‘s PP government on June 7, the reluctance of the party to 
reform itself, the lack of the necessary parliamentary votes for PD to form its own 
government, and the lack of preparation by both parties to enter into new elections, both 
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parties decided to enter into a governing coalition called Qeveria e Stabilitetit 
[Government of Stability].  
Besides establishing a coalition government, the two parties agreed to 
constitutional reform. Immediately after the inauguration of the new government, PP 
entered into a period of internal restructuring that began with its transformation into 
Partia Socialiste (PS) [the Socialist Party] during the First Congress in June, 1991. The 
PD, in political offensive, offered the option of a mini-constitution, a temporary 
constitutional package titled Major Constitutional Provisions. PS had no choice but to 
accepting co-leadership in the country‘s constitutional reform. There were two reasons for 
the PS‘ consent. First, its political power at the time was rapidly eroding; and second, a 
new generation of socialist reformers became increasingly aware of the need for a new 
constitution. Conclusively, the reform was successful, and the Major Constitutional 
Provisions seemed to balance immediate and expected needs. The document provided the 
foundation for the Albanian transition toward democratic reforms in other sectors. This 
process occurred completely without attention by or pressure from any international actor. 
It simply represented the power struggle between domestic actors. PD‘s proposal was 
aimed at taking the political initiative from the PS as well as consolidating some of its 
recent major political achievements such as political pluralism, multiparty elections, 
citizens‘ right for private property, restitution of religious institutions, and guaranties of 
fundamental human freedoms. This case supports my claim that when domestic actors 
support a reform but the international actors are indifferent toward it, the domestic power 
game may still lead to successful reforms.  
The 1991 consensus over the Major Constitutional provisions resulted in an 
overwhelming victory for the PD in the March 1992 elections. During the remainder of 
the year, PD used its two-thirds majority in the Kuvend to make some constitutional 
amendments aimed at consolidating its increasingly authoritarian rule. Sali Berisha, the 
former Chairman of the PD, was elected President of Albania in April 1992 and 
supported constitutional changes that would enable him to maintain control of the party, 
the judiciary, and the powerful Shërbim Informativ Kombëtar (ShIK) [National 
Intelligence Service].
7
 The PD‘s attempt in 1994 to gain popular support in a referendum 
for a new constitution, thus circumventing the Kuvend—where it had already lost its two-
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third majority due to two splits—met aggressive resistance from the opposition. Indeed, 
the referendum became a means for both the ruling coalition and the opposition to settle 
scores. Thus, rather than debating the proposed constitutional draft, political discussion 
was littered with the PD government‘s accusations that the ex-communist PS members 
had criminal pasts and the opposition‘s accusations that the ruling government had 
cooperated with the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic by allowing the violation of 
the UN embargo against Yugoslavia along the Albanian-Yugoslav border.  
The opposition had asserted more than once that it wanted to compromise in the 
Kuvend for a new constitution, and that the PD needed revisions in order to guarantee the 
democratic future of the country. Moreover, the opposition also voiced the need to 
consult the draft with Albania‘s international partners. Instead, Berisha made the success 
of the referendum its personal political battle. Albanian ruling elite was not interested in 
passing a wide accepted constitution, but only one that fit its power calculations. In 
contrast, the opposition, driven by the same rationale, was interested in preventing 
Berisha from having a constitution that would significantly increase president‘s 
prerogatives. In the end, both sides saw the referendum more as a mid-term test for 
Berisha‘s rule than as a national effort to pass a constitution. The opposition managed to 
prevail with a narrow ―No‖ vote in the referendum. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
ruling elite was not really interested in passing a constitution (compromise as a viable 
vehicle toward the reform was rejected) but in having a mid-term test of the electoral 
weight of both sides. This negative interest led to the failure of the constitutional reform.  
The referenda outcome was a message to the Albanian ruling elites that any 
efforts to pass a new constitution could not succeed without a compromise with its 
political adversaries, a political enterprise that he was not ready to undertake.
8
 Moreover, 
the referenda failure turned the PD focus in the preparation for the national elections of 
May 1996. During the period 1995-1996, a lack of interest in reforms and, especially, the 
constitutional reform removed the issue from the Albanian political discourse, and no 
efforts to constitutional reforms were recorded during that period.       
The Albanian institutional weakness led to an utter failure of democracy during its 
first postcommunist transitory period, 1992-1997, and a collapse of the state in February 
1997. Angry protesters who have lost their savings in Ponzi schemes investments looted 
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military barracks and burned state institutions when the government froze the activity of 
these companies. The political crisis ended with an intra-party agreement in March 9, and 
the establishment of the Government of National Reconciliation with the specific task of 
restoring order and preparing the country for the new elections. The afterward efforts to 
restore order and public institutions included the establishment of a constitution. The 
foreign actors who were interested in the stability of the country believed that the newly 
invigorated constitutional reform process could serve as a means to create cooperation 
between parties that were involved in violent struggles that had contributed to the demise 
of the nation. Since the EU was in the forefront of international assistance to reorganize 
the Albanian state, it embraced the issue of a new constitution as one of the pillars on 
which the new state ought to be found. At that point, the Albanian constitutional reform 
became not just a matter of domestic politics, but also an international one.  
The June 1997 election brought to power a center-left coalition led by the PS and 
Fatos Nano, who was released from prison in early March only to return as Prime 
Minister. One of the first tasks of the new government was the promulgation of a 
Constitution. Its drafting began with a special decision of the Kuvend in September 1997, 
but the work of the Commission for Drafting the Project-Constitution only began in early 
1998 and concluded in October of the same year. The Commission was in fact an inter-
party and inter-institutional committee co-chaired by a majority representative, Minister 
for Legislative Reform, Arben Imami, and Sabri Godo, Chairman of the Partia 
Republikane (PR) [the Republican Party], a minor partner of the opposition coalition. On 
November 28, 1998, Albanian‘s Independence Day anniversary, a referendum was called 
to approve the Constitution. The PS-led governing coalition had a clear political interest 
in approving the new constitution; it wanted to succeed where the PD had failed. 
Moreover, the PS clearly viewed the process of modern constitution building as a way to 
gain political legitimacy from international actors who distrusted their ex-communist 
legacy.
9
  The PS, however, needed the support of the international community in order to 
institute such a process. The US and EU supported constitutional reform, with the full 
participation of the domestic political spectrum seen as necessary for re-establishing 
political stability in the region. In January 1997, on the eve of the Albanian state collapse, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had called ―upon the government 
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and the opposition parties [in Albania] to end the political crisis in the country‖ and stated 
that ―a new constitution should be prepared and adopted. All parties represented in 
parliament should be properly involved.‖ 
The Albanian constitutional reform of 1997-1998 occurred as a result of a tight 
cooperation at a political and technical level between the European troika—the EU, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of 
Europe
10—with the EU holding the political leverage to condition constitutional reform 
while the two other organizations assisted with technical expertise. Domestic actors were 
interested in a constitution that would fit the idiosyncratic domestic context. The bitter 
experience with a powerful president compelled the Albanian elites to envisage a 
constitution with more power concentrated into the hands of a more controllable prime 
minister. In addition, the principle of qualified majority underpinned several articles in 
order to enforce compromise among political actors for important decisions that affect 
political aspects that go beyond everyday governance.  For example, the constitutional 
provision the ensured the election of the president with three-fifth of the Kuvend‘s votes. 
International actors were able and eager to offer assistance as long as framed within 
already well developed Western constitutionalism. In January and July 1998, a Three 
Parliamentary Delegation (the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament) visited the Albanian 
capital, Tirana. In both occasions, the delegation stressed the need of drafting and 
approving the Constitution as an additional means of achieving political stability. 
Western European financial and technical assistance to the Albanian process of 
Constitution drafting was funneled through two channels: first, the Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) assisted with legal technicalities 
during the drafting process;
11
 second, OSCE established the infrastructure for 
communicating with the public and other domestic and foreign associations interested in 
the process. Such assistance was given by the OSCE-established Administrative Center 
for Assistance Coordination and Public Participation (ACACPP) in Tirana, which was 
financially supported by a US Government fund granted to the OSCE for that purpose. 
Furthermore, direct financial and technical support was given by the EU and the German, 
Japanese, and Norwegian governments.
12
 From the institutional EU-Albania relations 
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viewpoint, the EU influence on the Albanian constitution drafting and approval cannot be 
considered as a typical exercise of EU membership conditionality policy since formal 
conditions to Albania emerged only after the EU-Western Balkans Summit of Zagreb, 
November 2000 when the Stabilization and Association Program for the Western Balkans 
was launched and Albania accepted the invitation to join. However, knowing the 
persistent desire of the Albanian public and elites to join the EU, as well as the strong 
pro-American feelings among Albanians, it is easily perceivable that both the EU and US 
could have wielded major influence on political developments in the country even 
without formal EU membership conditionality. 
Mr. Arben Imami, the former Co-Chair of the Commission for Drafting the 
Project-Constitution and Minister for Legislative Reform and Relationship with 
Kuvend—with whom I have co-authored and published several articles on this topic (see 
for instance Peshkopia and Imami 2008; Peshkopia and Imami 2007), has told me that the 
EU never applied any pressure on the Albanian government to approve the Constitution. 
EU concerns rested on whether the Constitution would meet the widely accepted 
democratic, EU-style criteria. Interpreted according to my model, the EU was interested 
in having a partner ―segment‖ or ―pillar‖ which would be receptive to consociational 
intervention. In case the EU and Albania ever decided to negotiate unification into a 
common ―society,‖ the EU needed to make sure that the negotiating ―pillar‖ was 
―playing‖ by the same rules as the EU, and that the Union was not importing problems 
from the newly partnered segments, but was exporting stability through their 
membership. The Albanian willingness to abide by the rules of the game explains why the 
need for the EU to politically interfere in the process never emerged and EU assistance 
consisted only of the tacit commissioning of the issue to the Council of Europe.          
However, this is not to say that the domestic elites forgot their power-oriented 
interests. The political will leading to approval of the 1998 Constitution occurred because 
the 1997 crisis produced an overwhelming anti-PD majority. After eight years of faltering 
center-left coalition rule characterized by continuous crisis within the leading PS, the 
center-left coalition suffered an electoral defeat in the general elections of 2005 to the PD 
led by Sali Berisha. The latter became Prime Minister of the new ruling center-right 
coalition. The egocentric personality of Mr. Berisha led him into conflicts with the 
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country‘s President Alfred Moisiu. With Mr. Alfred Moisiu‘s mandate coming to an end 
in spring 2008, and having failed to gather the constitutionally stipulated three-fifth 
majority for electing a new President, PD had two options: find a compromise with PS on 
a candidate that would be acceptable to both sides, or dissolve Kuvend and enter into new 
elections.  
Berisha‘s long lasting enmity with Fatos Nano came to an end as Mr. Nano 
resigned from the leadership of PS after the electoral defeat of 2005. With the mayor of 
the capital city Tirana, Edi Rama, in the helm, the PS began a restructuration process to 
appeal to younger voters. Although Rama‘s charisma, he had poor connections with the 
PS structures, and his election as the Chairman of the Party thrust him in a power struggle 
with the party‘s establishment. In order to establish himself as the undisputed leader, he 
needed new elections. A parliamentary crisis over the election of the new president would 
have been a golden opportunity. However, several PS representatives who were known as 
supporters of Mr. Nano broke ranks and voted for the PD‘s candidate Bamir Topi. As the 
election of Topi killed the chances for new elections, Rama became preparations for the 
regular elections of 2009. He needed institutional prerogatives that would consolidate his 
power within both the party and the leftist electorate. That meant the marginalization of 
Ilir Meta, a former PS prime minister who split from the party in 2000 to form Lëvizja 
Socialiste për Integrim (LSI) [Socialist Movement for Integration].        
The combination of Rama‘s and Berisha‘s interests led to the last development in 
Albania‘s third constitutional reform. In a Spring 2008 session, the Kuvend approved with 
the united votes of parliamentarians from both the PD and PS (115 votes out of 140 
representatives) some constitutional amendments which changed the method for electing 
the legislature and president, the procedures for a confidence vote for the prime minister, 
shortened the mandate for the general prosecutor from seven to five years, and changed 
the electoral system from a corrected majoritarian system to a regional proportional one. 
These were obviously important changes since, especially the first, affected the two most 
powerful institutions of the country. These changes drew much criticism from some 
political parties as well as from a loose movement of concerned citizens, intellectuals, and 
semi-independent media. They were proposed only few weeks earlier by a junior 
representative of the ruling PD who had no public credentials for such a political action. 
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The draft was immediately discussed in the Parliamentary Commission of Law, and 
presented for approval to the plenary session by both the Democratic Party in power and 
the main opposition party, the Socialist Party. The mysterious draft which was discussed 
neither in the Commission of Law and Parliament nor with relevant international actors 
was easily approved, in spite of fierce opposition from the Levizja Socialiste për Integrim 
(LSI) [Socialist Movement for Integration] and some isolated representatives from the 
majority.  
The constitutional change of the electoral system concerned an old problem of 
Albanian politics; the Constitution of 1998 laid out the principle of a mixed electoral 
system, a two-ballot contest, with one vote for the candidate, and the other for the party. 
That system was systematically abused by the competing political parties, leading to 
distortions of the voter‘s will and rendering their votes unequal. As noted by the OCSE‘s 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODHIR) in its Final Report 
on Albania‘s national elections of 2005, the strategies conducted by some parties 
―undermined the constitutional objective of proportionality ‗to the closest possible extent‘ 
of the electoral system, which remains open to abuse and should be reformed in an 
inclusive manner.‖13 As the Report went on, ―the legal framework does not ensure that 
the Constitution‘s stated objective can be realized, i.e. to achieve a parliament composed 
on the principle of proportional representation.‖14 The Report also specifically 
recommended that ―[t]he Electoral Code should be amended to ensure that the objective 
of proportionality to the closest possible extent in Article 64.2 of the Constitution can be 
realised more effectively.‖15 The constitutional amendment that introduced the regional 
proportional electoral system, Law Nr. 9904, April 21, 2008, was also perceived as 
helpful in indirectly reducing informal electoral donations and aggressive electoral 
campaigns.
16
 A major negative ramification of the amendments was the practical 
expansion of the electoral barrage from 3% to 25%.  
 Reform of the Electoral Code became a constitutional issue and not simply a 
technical issue for two primary reasons. First, the PD, as the governing majority party, 
bore the brunt of the responsibility of working with the EU. They were therefore 
interested in reaching a consensus with the PS and other opposition parties on the 
approval of a new Electoral Code to show their fundamental commitment to improving 
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election standards, thus likely ensuring country‘s progress towards EU membership.  
Second, the PS sought to eliminate or perhaps marginalize through legal means, its 
disobedient ally, LSI. While Sali Berisha, Prime Minister and Chairman of the PD, 
remained neutral about the clashes between PS and LSI, his eagerness to institute the 
reform is evidenced by his public declaration that the majority party would agree with any 
proposals submitted by the opposition parties, especially those coming from the PS, the 
largest opposition party. Even if the quarrels within the opposition camp did not concern 
the PD, supporting any agreement among them could do no harm. Moreover, Premier 
Berisha was feeling threatened by the growth of the Partia Demokristiane (PDK) 
[Christian Democratic Party], a small electoral force, but a growing parliamentary faction 
as it served as a refuge for renegade representatives from both sides. The same electoral 
system that would have benefited Rama would have benefited Berisha as well.   
 The reduction of the number of parliamentarian votes needed to elect the President 
of the Republic from three fifth to a simple majority was not the result of any EU 
pressure. Rather, Albanian elites were interested in the constitutional changes. The PS 
Chairman Edi Rama, pressed for the reform in order to achieve two objectives: first, he 
needed to address the political circumstances that made him irrelevant in the 2008 
presidential election when renegade PS parliamentarians helped the Chief of the PD 
parliamentary faction, Bamir Topi, to be elected president; and second, he cleared the 
way to presidency for the former PS Chairman Fatos Nano who was trying to emerge as a 
rival within the Party while also nurturing Presidential dreams. Nano‘s potential 
emergence as a contestant in the next presidential election of 2014 could create problems 
for the PS both if it were by then a majority or minority force. The PS leader‘s best 
interest was to avoid the difficult process of the election of the President. Both Berisha 
and Rama preferred a winner-takes-it-all political game, with the majority having all the 
needed powers to rule during their terms, and the opposition free from any responsibility.   
Moreover, for the majority, more important than specific provisions was the fact 
of an agreement per se.
17
 Agreement with the opposition on such fundamental issues as 
constitutional reform created a consensual political climate which served each domestic 
and international political entity. It fulfilled the continuous EU demands for normalization 
of government-opposition relations, and undermined harmful reaction by the opposition. 
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That was particularly needed after the fatal explosion in munitions demolition factory in 
Gërdec, near the country‘s capital of Tirana.18 The massive blast claimed the lives of 26 
persons and caused enormous material damage in the surrounding villages. The attack 
was launched as a reaction against corruption by the Prime Minister Berisha and members 
of his family.  
 One of the amendments defines the conditions under which a confidence vote can 
be undertaken. It stipulated that a confidence motion against the prime minister could be 
held only if those who proposed the motion offered in advance the name of a new 
candidate Prime Minister. That would have been difficult even during the 2005-2009 
political terms since the ideological diversity of the political adversaries of Mr. Berisha 
could be easily united against him, yet not support another leader. Apparently, this was 
the PS‘s payback to the concessions of the PD, which in turn would serve the PS proper 
in the case that it won the election.  
 The most important feature of this constitutional reform was the overcoming of an 
alleged old enmity between Chairmen Berisha and Rama—indeed, Rama had always 
positioned himself with the radical anti-Berisha wing as opposed to the former PS leader 
Fatos Nano, especially in the case of the PS-PD agreement of 2002 nick-named ―Nano-
Berisha.‖ The 2008 agreement on the constitutional amendments interested the EU who—
despite its officials being caught-off-guard officials—was pleased at the level of 
cooperation between the Albanian political parties. The changes were reached based 
solely on the rational interests of domestic leaders. The next day, the OSCE 
Representative in Tirana, Ambassador Robert Bosch considered the reform as a visible 
step toward the OSCE/ODHIR recommendations of 2005.
19
 Helmut Lohan, the EU 
Representative of the EC in Tirana, declared that the EC would analyze the constitutional 
changes, but most important was the fact that the majority of the Albanian lawmakers 
were united behind these changes.
20
 
  
A consociationalist interpretation of Albanian constitutional reform 
The Albanian Constitutional reform represents a one-level conditioning of consociational 
practices from the EU, that is, the establishment of institutions receptive to consociational 
practices. While these institutions would help maintain domestic social cohesion, their 
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main goal is to facilitate country‘s accession negotiation as well as its integration with EU 
institutions after the accession. Conditioning a constitution that would be and create 
domestic institutions receptive to the EU consociational practices would assure that the 
domestic power struggle will happen within these institutions, thus preventing elite 
divisions from spilling over the rest of society. However, our empirical analysis showed 
that in the last round of the constitutional reform in 2008, the Albanian elites have been 
willing to compromise on constitutional reforms. Moreover, the current state of the 
Albanian society shows that deep political divisions at the elite level do not reflect the 
state of the Albanian society which is, indeed, unified around the idea of the nation-state. 
Contemporary authors point to the religious harmony in Albania, but sometimes 
overemphasize the North-South divisions. Such views reflect their familiarity with 
Albanian society through old textbooks and travelers‘ memoires from periods before 
WWII, more so than knowledge of the contemporary state of Albania. Expressions such 
as ―Ghegs‖ for Northern Albanians and ―Tosks‖ for Southern Albanians are almost 
unknown for generations born during the communist era.
21
  
The unified Albanian society already resembles a pillar within the European 
society of states; hence, EU conditions are directed toward addressing certain elites‘ 
political behavior in a manner whereby they institute reforms that conform to current EU 
consociational practices. This explanation is validated by the Copenhagen European 
Council, December 2002, the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, June 16, 
2003, and the Declaration of the EU-Western Balkan Summit, Thessaloniki, June 21, 
2003 which recognized Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro ―as potential candidates.‖22 As Albanian 
elites have the willingness to compromise among them, there has been no need for the EU 
to condition consociational practices, but only watch and endorse the process which has 
been technically assisted by the CoE‘s Venice Commission. 
Although the EU officials did not seem excited with the political style of the April 
2008 constitutional reform,
23
 the EU had to accept it since it did not threatened the 
receptiveness of Albanian institutions to the EU consociational practices. While the 
constitutional amendments reflected and served the power struggle, they contributed to 
neither good governance and better functioning of the institutions, nor their undermining. 
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They only created a set of rules to conduct the power struggle, governance and 
opposition. Under such conditions, the EU interest on that reform was neutral, and the EU 
officials supported it by an evasive, yet meaningful, rhetoric.   
 
A sectorial context interpretation of the Albanian constitutional reform 
The case of the constitutional reform process in Albania leads to the conclusion that its 
positive results during 1991-1992 and 1992-1994 stem from the joint positive interests of 
domestic actors albeit the absence of any condition imposed from foreign actors. From 
1991 to 1998, all of the Albanian governments had been interested in crafting a new 
constitution, although many reforms had been stalled because of the lack of an 
overarching constitutional framework. PD‘s failure to pass a constitution through a 
referendum does not reflect the rejection by the opposition parties and the majority of 
voters of the idea of a constitution, but rather the rejection of the PD‘s rule. Hence, 
because of deep divisions among the two main political parties, the interests of the main 
opposing actors regarding approving a new constitution did not converge. In 1997, for the 
Socialist- Centrist coalition, drafting and passing approved a constitution turned out to be 
a political issue: what Democrats failed to do during their 5 year rule, they could now do. 
Additionally, the EU, having introduced in June 1997 the principle of membership 
conditionality for the CEECs, heavily supported the process of constitution approval. In 
this case, both EU and the Albanian ruling elites had positive interests. A revival of the 
interests of the new majority that emerged from the June 1997 elections combined with 
the increasing role of some international actors facilitated the process of constitutional 
reform, in spite of deep divisions between opposition groups in government. And finally, 
from April 2008 on, constitutional changes were undertaken by unified domestic elites 
based solely on power oriented considerations without any regard for EU opinions, and 
perhaps with sufficient information that EU representatives would not object to such 
changes.
24
  
The empirical case of the Albanian constitutional reform helps to confirm the 
hypothesis that the best scenario for instituting such reforms are those where either the 
interests of both domestic elites and the EU concord or where the interests of domestic 
elites meet indifference from the EU. While it might look as a self-evident hypothesis, the 
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 TABLE 4.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION  
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‘ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
 1991 
 
Period of ―extraordinary politics.‖    
 
0 
 
+ 
 
Good results and positive spillovers on other reforms. The approval of the 
Major Constitutional Provisions happened through a pact of domestic 
elites who were interested in some transitory constitutional arrangement, 
yet without any input from any international actor.     
 
1992 
 
The beginning of ―ordinary politics‖  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
Good results. The elites were divided since the opposition did not want 
only amendments of the Major Constitutional Provisions but a new 
constitution. However, the PD controlled the sufficient two-third of votes 
in Kuvend for the amendments. No international presence and/or assistance 
in the process. 
 
 1994 
 
The constitution referendum 
 
0 
 
-- 
 
No reform. The elites were divided. On the one hand, the ruling elites was 
interested in passing the constitution in a referendum, and the opposition 
asking for its passing in Kuvend as stipulated by the Major Constitutional 
Provisions. No international presence and/or assistance in the process. 
 
1995-1997 
 
Period of political instability 
 
0 
 
0 
 
No reform. As both the government and opposition realized the 
impossibility of passing a new constitution, they lost interest in a 
constitutional reform and focused in other political priorities. No 
international presence and/or assistance in the process. 
 
1998 
 
Restoration of state and order 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Excellent results and positive spillovers on other reforms. The new 
Constitution was passed since the majority of the elites, namely the ruling 
elites, managed to gain popular support in the process. Strong 
international/EU support for the reform.  
     
2008  
Constitution amendments 
0 + Swift reform, but fierce critiques from some elites. However, since an 
overwhelming majority of the elites supported the reform, it garnered 
legitimacy, and was rhetorically accepted by the EU officials. While it 
undermined some consociational practices (qualified majority as a form of 
mutual veto) it strengthened some others (established a proportional 
electoral system). 
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careful analysis of this case has two major implications for the future of this research: 
first, it might help to at least diminish and, at most, partially devaluate claims that EECs 
do not possess enough expertise and human capital to conduct reforms. As a wry 
anonymous observer noted, the April 2008 constitutional changes were agreed and passed 
during only-two-days of cellphone text exchanges between majority leaders and the 
opposition. However, the constitutional amendments were enough to radically transform 
some of the major principles of the 1998 Constitution such as the electoral system and the 
presidential election system, the first one aimed at correcting representation issues while 
still allowing constituencies the chance to address their respective representative; the 
second aimed at forcing agreement among parties electing an encompassing President. 
Table 4.1 charts the Albanian constitutional reform as affected by both the EU‘s 
and domestic leaders‘ political preferences toward the reform. 
 
Imposing Two-Level Consociational Practices: The EU and Macedonian 
Constitutional Reform 
While Albanian constitutional reform focused on the transition from Stalinism to 
pluralism, the constitutional reform in Macedonia had the massive undertaking of 
building a nation-state centered on Macedonian ethnicity. We can understand better that 
phase of the Macedonian constitutional reform as propelled by constitutional nationalism. 
This concept refers to ―a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of 
one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state,‖ which envisions a 
state where sovereignty resides with a particular ethic group, and where only the members 
of that privileged ethnic group ―can decide fundamental questions of state form and 
identity.‖25 Moreover, the struggle for constitutional arrangements in Macedonia was 
plagued not simply by hostility between the two contending ethnic groups, the 
Macedonians and the Albanians, but also with mutual racist feelings aimed at questioning 
the very legitimacy of their opponent as a real ethnic group or autochthonous population 
on that land. Interethnic discussions in Macedonia center around political, demographic, 
historic and mythological topics. Thus, the view of the Albanians was (and continues to 
be) that the very concept of Macedonia as a political entity is a Titoist invention of the 
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Second Yugoslavia emerging after WWII which was intended to weaken Serbia within 
Yugoslavia, yet not allow the society of the newly established Yugoslav Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia develop any Bulgarian, Greek or, to a lesser extent, Albanian 
identity. According to the ideologists of Albanian nationalism in Macedonia, the 
Macedonian ethnicity was created to justify the existence of the Republic of Macedonia 
within Yugoslavia. As a consequence, while all the other nationalisms were oppressed in 
the Titoist Yugoslavia, Macedonian nationalism was tolerated and even encouraged.
26
 
Macedonians, in turn, argue against a solid historical presence of the Albanians in that 
territory, thus attributing the current presence either to waves of migration from Kosovo 
during the Yugoslav era or to Albanian high birth rates (Daskalovski 2006). 
 The entire constitutional discourse in Macedonia develops around ethnicity, and 
the constitutional developments in Macedonia mainly concern interethnic relations. Thus, 
studying Macedonia‘s constitutional reform is tantamount to studying the Albano-
Macedonian ethnic conflict that has been haunting the country even since its conception. 
Debates over the national anthem, national flag, official language, local decentralization 
and to whom the country belongs that have been either non-existent or very low profile in 
most of the rest of Eastern Europe are components of the daily lexicon in Macedonian 
politics. Some of them were resolved only through armed conflict and multifold 
international diplomacy.
27
 Therefore, the constitutional reform process in Macedonia is 
probably the best case study of the effects of EU membership conditionality. First, the 
interests of both domestic and international leaders are clearly observed and assessed; 
Albanians could expand their political influence through constitutional change; 
Macedonians preferred the status quo; and EU leaders sought to prevent war, learning a 
lesson from Bosnia and Kosovo (Ragaru 2007: 5). Second, both the EU‘s sticks and 
carrots were transparent and easily distinguished.  
 Studying the Macedonian crisis is tantamount to studying the dynamics of the 
affairs of political elites within each of the major ethnic groups. The cohesion of 
Macedonian elites ranged from being united around the Communist League of Macedonia 
which was perceived as caring and affirming of Macedonian national interests in the 
wake of independence, to deep disagreements regarding the country‘s ethnic identity in 
the late 2000s, to the confusion on how to tackle the domestic Albanian-centered crisis as 
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well as the international crisis with Greece. The Albanian elites moved from a peripheral 
role granted to by the Macedonian majority during the process of independence,
28
 to a 
mostly unified elite during the heydays of the Partia Demokratike e Shqiptarëve (PDSh) 
[Democratic Party of the Albanians], 1998-2001, to an increasingly fragmented elite ever 
since (Lili 2009; Sejdiaj 1998).  
 
Macedonian Constitutional Reform in Paper and Practice: Dodging the Bullet or Baiting 
it? 
The Macedonian crisis reemerged as the Yugoslav crisis unfolded. Parallel to their efforts 
to keep the Yugoslav Federation together, the Macedonian elites were preparing for any 
potential independent Macedonia, and making sure that the new state would belong to 
Macedonians.
29
 Titoist Yugoslavia was continuously negotiated among and shaped by the 
unified communist elites with arrangements and structures that, arguably, offered 
symbolic satisfaction to the various ethnic groups in the newly constituted state 
(Schöpflin 1993: 188). However, in 1989, the Macedonian communist elite changed the 
Titoist constitute of the Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia, claiming the new 
state for the ―Macedonian people‖ instead of ―a state of the Macedonian people and 
Albanian and Turkish Minorities‖ as referred to in the 1974 constitution.30 However, 
rather than contributing to the foundation of a Macedonian dominated ethnic nation, the 
act served as a red flag to Macedonia‘s main minority group, the Albanians, who saw the 
declaration as an ominous sign that their very existence might be at stake. 
Simultaneously, the 1989 constitution pushed Albanians to a position of rejecting 
everything that was considered by Macedonians as a cornerstone of their new nation-
state: the country‘s history, language, flag, and autochthony. The only element of the 
emerging Macedonian identity that was not openly challenged by the Albanians was its 
name. While they had not any high regard for the name or recognized its legitimacy, the 
Albanians did not want to share a common cause with Greece, a longtime political rival 
of their motherland Albania in the Balkans.   
 During the period 1989-1991, both the Macedonian public and its leaders were too 
busy to heed the Albanian grievances. While the Macedonian public was swept by the 
collective nationalist hysteria, the Macedonian elites were simultaneously preparing the 
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institutional framework of the new country and scrambling to keep together Yugoslavia 
(Daskalovski 2006; Zimmermann 1999). The effect of this nationalistic tide can be easily 
detected in the radicalization of the rhetoric. Thus, in October 1990, while a statement on 
state and legal relations within Yugoslavia issued by the Executive Council of the 
Republican Assembly considered Macedonia as ―the national state of the Macedonian 
nation founded on the sovereignty of the nation,‖ it still defined Macedonia as a 
democratic state of its citizens.
31
  
Macedonian elites‘ turn to constitutional nationalism began in the summer of 
1989. On July 19, Sobranie (the legislative body), passed several constitutional 
amendments. Amendment LVI (16) clearly states that ―The Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia is the state of the Macedonian people, based on the sovereignty of people as 
well as the working class, of workingmen and the self-administering democratic 
community of workers and citizens, of the Macedonian people as well as other members 
of nations and nationalities who live in it.‖ This amendment did remove the words ―as 
well as its Albanian and Turkish nationalities‖ which appeared in the version approved in 
1974. This change, aimed at defining to whom the state belongs, downgraded the status of 
Albanians from a constitutive nationality to an unnamed minority. The new course was 
clarified by the Communist League of Macedonia ideologist Svetomir Shkakik‘: 
―Macedonia is to be defined as a state, and the only bearer of this statehood should be the 
Macedonian nation. That is why the new definition excludes the sovereignty of the 
nationalities in Macedonia‖ (cf. Daskalovski 2006: 37). As Daskalovski (Ibid) notes, by 
changing the constitutional amendments, and thus preserving Macedonian interests 
against any potential manipulations by minorities, Macedonian communist elites showed 
that they cared about the interests of the Macedonian people. 
The new constitution of Macedonia promulgated by the Sobranie November 1, 
1991, took one step further in consolidating the Macedonian constitutional nationalism. 
The Preamble of the new constitution stated that ―Macedonia is established as a national 
state of the Macedonian people providing full citizens‘ equality and permanent 
cohabitation of the Macedonian people with … [the] nationalities living in the republic of 
Macedonia.‖32 Aside from dropping citizens‘ sovereignty, the implementation of the 
Yugoslav notions of ―nation‖ for Macedonians and ―nationality‖ for the others clearly 
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asserted to whom the new country belonged. Moreover, Article 7 of the new Constitution 
declared the Macedonian language in the Cyrillic script as the official language of the 
Republic of Macedonia. Article 19 mentioned specifically the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church while no other religious community was referred to. Other provisions such as 
Article 8 (the use of languages by nationalities), Article 48 (the right of nationalities to 
establish cultural associations and public education in their mother language at certain 
levels of education), and Article 45 (the right for private education at all levels except the 
primary one) ensured that the Constitution would apply the concept of nation-state for 
Macedonians and state-nation for other ethnic groups.  
Arguably, this hybrid application of such concepts delivered to Albanians that 
they could not see themselves as constituent elements in the state formation process. 
Their rights were substantially reduced in comparison to the 1974 Constitution. The new 
Constitution introduced the concept of ―majority requirement‖ in the official use of the 
languages of nationalities, thus limiting application of the Albanian language only to 
municipalities where Albanians were majority, and practically abolishing its usage at a 
national level. The group rights to political representation for nations nationalities 
enshrined in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution were abolished only for nationalities (Marko 
2004: 698), and strengthened for the Macedonia nation/ethnic group.     
The Albanians of Macedonia complained that the legislative process for the new 
Constitution both in Commissions and on the floor of the Sobranie was characterized by 
unproductive debates.
33
 Finally, the Constitution passed on November 17, 1991. Yet, 
rather than clearing the way for a stable functioning society and resolving accumulated 
problems, the Constitution itself was problematic. None of the proposals offered by the 
Albanian parliamentarians were approved, an obliteration of the Albanian factor. In turn, 
the Albanian parliamentarians did not vote for the Constitution.     
Daskalovski (2006) has given a very detailed picture of Macedonian elites‘ 
behavior throughout that process. By the late 1980s, those who held a political and 
intellectual monopoly over the local communist organization, the Communist League of 
Macedonia, pressured by various groups, movements, and associations that emphasized 
elements of Macedonian ethnos and culture. The groups were pointing to the alleged 
violation of minority rights of Macedonians in Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria. The role of 
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the Orthodox Church in political affairs surfaced for the first time, and the building of a 
colossal Orthodox cathedral in the center of the country‘s capital, Skopje, became the 
symbol of national renaissance and ethnic pride for population at large and the communist 
elite endorsing the project. Aegean Macedonians and their descendents who had lived as a 
minority in Greece, but fled their villages during the Greek civil war in 1949, began to 
become vocal in demanding that the Greek government allow them to return to their 
properties. The International Reunion of Child Refugees of Aegean Macedonians staged 
massive demonstrations in and outside the country. The Macedonian communist elite who 
also managed to persuade the Yugoslav government to pressure Greece into recognizing 
its Macedonian minority (Danforth 1995: 134-137).  
As the political and social life of the country liberalized, the newly founded 
political parties and citizen associations were becoming increasingly radical. First, the 
Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action that emerged from the Macedonian Writers 
Union, and then Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija–Demokratska 
Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo (VMRO-DPMNE) Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Macedonian Party for Macedonian Unity sought 
to capitalize on both the rights of Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece and the status of 
Macedonia within Yugoslavia. The communist elites responded sympathetically, trying to 
insure their political survival on the republican political stage and secure the position of 
Macedonia in the uncertain federal future. Thus, while on the one hand the Macedonian 
elites molded the citizen movement unleashed by political liberalization to their political 
needs, ―tolerating critique as long as it did not directely threatened party interests,‖ on the 
other hand, they ―made use of the growing Macedonian pluralistic society to legitimize 
and magnify the Macedonian public support for their position in the federal level debates‖ 
(Daskalovski 2006: 28). As Maleska (1998: 159) notes, ―the Macedonian party elite 
estimated that it would inevitably carry victory in [sic] multiparty elections‖ (cf. 
Daskalovski 2006: 28).            
 The entire process of Macedonian transition from the Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the independent 
Republic of Macedonia was conducted without any input from the large Albanian 
minority in the country.
34
 During the Yugoslav period, Albanians of Macedonia felt 
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severely oppressed and isolated. While during the 1970s and 1980s the Albanians of 
Kosova were enjoying the large autonomy guaranteed by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, 
the Albanians of Macedonia enjoyed only minimal national rights. Any political dissent 
was oppressed ruthlessly, and during the 1980s, many Albanian activists in Macedonia 
suffered long periods of imprisonment under charges of ―irredentism and separatism.‖ 
Many members of the young elite moved to Kosovo where they could better develop their 
intellectual and professional interests; intellectual life amidst Albanians in Macedonia 
died. Practicing Islam became the only intellectual outlet for a large Albanian youth.  
Thus, the underdevelopment of political structures among the Albanians in 
Macedonia found their elites unprepared, unorganized, inexperienced, and slow to 
respond to the Constitutional transformation of Macedonia. The Albanian resistance to 
the Macedonian nation-state at the expense of their national rights consisted of boycotts 
of the referendum for independence on September 8, 1991, the parliamentary vote for the 
new Constitution on November 17, 1991, the promulgation of the new Constitution in 
Sobranie, January 6, 1992,  to the more radical act of unilaterally declaring the ―Albanian 
Autonomous Republic of Illirida‖ in the western part of Macedonia where Albanians 
dominate. However, except for the ―formal‖ act, the latter did not influence any further 
political action and diminished as Albanian political efforts focused on domestic reforms 
in education and public administration. However, when in spring 1991 then Macedonian 
President Kiro Gligorov succeeded in his efforts to build a ―government of experts‖ 
representing all parliamentary parties, the Albanians participated. As it has been noted, 
the exit options in the early 1990s looked dreadful for the Albanians of Macedonia: 
Kosovo was under Milosevic and Albania was preoccupied with recovery from its severe 
communist experience;
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 ―with the costs of repression too high for Macedonians, and the 
price of exit too great for Albanians, peace was maintained by Macedonian and Albanian 
elites mutually adjusting the terms of their partnerships‖ (Hislope 2005).  
Hence, the early years of the new Macedonia witnessed the paradoxical 
experience where elites became somewhat unified by fears of a foreign power, even 
though they disagreed on almost all domestic issues. During that period, all the major 
international actors had been reluctant to recognize the rancor of the Albanians in 
Macedonia. In 1991, the US foreign policy was being reconstructed along with the 
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dwindling preoccupation with its previous archrival, USSR, only to end up to the 
isolationism of the early Clinton administration caused by the events of October 1992 in 
Mogadishu. As for the EU, it member countries were divided: German interests favored 
independent Croatia and Slovenia as well as the need to show consistency with the 
already recognized newly independent former Soviet republics; the French and British 
caution reflected their historic alliance with Yugoslavia and Serbia. However, in an 
attempt to unify its policies toward the failing Yugoslavia, the EU created in August 1991 
the Arbitration Commission on the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, or, the Badinter 
Commission headed by the French lawyer Robert Badinter. While a respected 
constitutionalist, he had little knowledge of international law, ethnic conflict, and the 
Balkans. In Opinion No. 6 (on Macedonia), the Commission recommended that ―the 
European Community accept the request of the Republic of Macedonia for recognition, 
holding that the Republic had given the necessary guarantees to respect human rights and 
international peace and security.‖ However, ―the EC was initially reluctant to accept the 
recommendations in this opinion, due to the Macedonia naming dispute.‖36  
 ―Working within the system‖ remained the most viable option for Albanian 
elites,
37
 and the entire focus of the Albanian political struggle was to carve an Albanian 
presence in institutions where it was weak, and strengthen its role in institutions where 
their influence has been traditionally denied, i.e., police, army, public administration and 
local government. As a result, Albanians increased participation in the judiciary system, 
education, police, and army,
38
 increased visibility in the parliamentary struggle, and 
increased assertiveness of their political representatives. Indeed, the latter became the real 
focus of the political battle where the 1991 Constitution was seriously challenged.  
That challenge began in December 1994 when the Albanian dominated municipal 
councils of Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar established the Albanian language Universiteti i 
Tetovës (UT) [University of Tetovo]. The university became a political issue that 
outstripped its educational relevance and brought Macedonian police and protesting 
Albanians face to face. As police destroyed one of the UT facilities in the village of 
Reçica outside Tetovo, crowds of angry demonstrators confronted the police. The 
resulting fire left one demonstrator dead and dozens of others wounded; the Rector of the 
UT Fadil Sulejmani was arrested and later sentenced to jail time. The year 1995 saw 
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struggle between Albanian politicians who claimed that Albanians have the constitutional 
right for a private university in their own language (Article 45), and Macedonian officials 
who considered the University to be illegal. Moreover, following the ―parallel system‖ 
model of their brethren in the occupied Kosovo, the Albanians decided to conduct 
lectures at UT although all acknowledged that, as it was, the university was not achieving 
academic standards (Sejdiaj 1998). The UT reopened in November 1995 tolerated by 
weary Macedonian authorities (Daskalovski 2006; Marko 2004). 
 The other major showdown was in Gostivar and Tetovo. Candidates from the 
newly formed Democratic Party of the Albanians won votes from some of the most 
important regions in Macedonia dominated by Albanians. PDSh was formed by the 
unification of a former radical faction of the mainstream Partia për Prosperitet 
Demokratik (PPD) [Party for Democratic Prosperity] who splintered in 1994 with Partia 
Demokratike Popullore (PDP) [Democratic People Party], an already existing small 
Albanian party. Soon, the more radical stances and rhetoric of PDSh attracted Albanian 
voters and, with electoral success in local elections, its newly elected officials challenged 
government authority. The Albanian dominated city councils of Gostivar and Tetovo 
decided to put the Albanian and Turkish flags on their city halls‘ facades. After two 
months, the Constitutional Court declared the action as unconstitutional and demanded 
their immediate removal. A law adopted by Sobranie on July 7, 1997, on the use of 
national symbols followed suit with a May 1997 ruling of the Constitutional Court 
allowing for the use of such symbols only in private. Parliamentary debates in Sobranie 
which lasted into the late hours of the day revealed the divisions between Albanians and 
Macedonians were on the issue. On July 9, around 3.00 am, only a few hours after the 
new law was passed, police forces entered the city of Gostivar and removed the Albanian 
and Turkish flags from the city hall. In the morning, an angry Albanian crowd protested 
the removal of their flag and, responding to Mr. Osmani‘s appeal ―to protect their flag 
with their blood,‖39 confronted the Macedonian dominated police forces. The ensuing riot 
resulted in two fatalities, 30 people injured (among them nine police personnel) and 320 
people detained (Sejdiaj 1998: 271). Police also took control of entries to the city and 
reinforced their presence on the city streets and squares. The Mayor of Gostivar, Rufi 
Osmani and the President of the City Council were detained and, later, arrested. Charges 
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were also brought against the Mayor of Tetovo, Alajdin Demiri and the President of the 
City Council, Bedri Rexhepi. 
 In sum, the strategy of the Albanian elites in Macedonia worked. During the 
period 1990-2000, their participation in public administration increased fivefold 
(Lebamoff and Ilievski 2008: 15). Embroidered, Albanians continued to contest all the 
pillars on which the Macedonian nation-state was built: the Constitution, education laws, 
local self-government, public displays of national minority symbols, and ethnic make-up 
of the police, army and administration (Daskalovski 2006: 58). On the political stage, 
they continued to boycott parliamentary activities, national referendums and population 
censuses.
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 A number of Albanian-Macedonian professionals who were developing their 
career in Kosovo during the 1970s and 1980s returned to the country only to have ―found 
themselves locked up in an uneasy face-to-face with the Macedonians (Ragaru 2007: 6). 
They brought with them a stronger national conscience, political will, and intellectual 
credibility. Their increasing influence among the Albanian masses helped them to keep 
the Albanians mobilized through major popular demonstrations, projects of political 
autonomy, and sheer threats to resort to violence if necessary in order to achieve Albanian 
aspirations.
41
  
The confused and indecisive Macedonian response to Albanian demands, as well 
as radicalization of the Albanian political elite, increased confidence among Albanians 
that strong response would force Macedonian elites to compromise. Indeed, as the events 
of the UT and Gostivar demonstrated, the Macedonian elites were indeed reluctantly 
willing to negotiate, but only after the situation was already radicalized (Marko 2004). 
The disjointed and belated Macedonian elites‘ responses to the emerging crises, the 
reshaping of Albanian elites‘ rational calculations, and changes in the regional political 
environment led to the violent conflict of the early 2000s. As a United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) survey held at the eve of the Macedonia‘s interethnic 
violence in 2001 indicated, 60% of Albanian male respondents (age 18-24) and 16.4% of 
Macedonian males of the same age group found violence an acceptable political approach 
(cf. Lebamoff and Ilievski 2008: 13).  
While ―working within the system‖ was the practiced policy, Albanian politicians 
always retained the option of working-outside-the-system. Following the violent the 
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reaction of the Macedonian government against the unilateral decision of Albanians to 
open the UT, many Albanian parliamentarians in the Sobranie walked out of the plenary. 
However, while PDP members returned later, others refused to return. Their leader, 
Arbën Xhaferi, threatened: ―if Skopje does not heed our demands, we will build our 
institutions‖ (Sejdiaj 1998: 62). There were already signs that many Albanians of 
Macedonia were no longer willing to accept the status quo, and Albanian elites warned 
both Macedonian leaders and officials of European international organizations of the 
simmering situation.
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 One of the most worrisome events was, of course, the so called 
―weapons affair,‖ but violent clashes between Albanians and Macedonian security forces 
in Debar, Ladorishta, Ljuboteni, Radolishta, and Bit-Pazar, as well as bombs in Priljep, 
Kumanovo, and Skopje could also have served as alarm bells.
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 Yet, both Macedonian 
elites and officials of European organizations ignored the warnings and continued to see 
Macedonia as the ―oasis of peace‖ in the troublesome Balkans. 
 The results of the October-November 1998 elections brought to the fore the most 
radical fractions among both Macedonians and Albanians. The nationalistic Macedonian 
VMRO-DPMNE of Lupče Georgievski and the radical Albanian PDSh of Arbën Xhaferi 
forged a governing coalition that began to show surprising courage in tackling issues 
related to the improving the plight of Albanians. The coalition tacitly functioned as in a 
federal state, with the highest official in each of the Ministries (Ministers or Vice 
Ministers) practically serving as the Minister for the specific policy area in the respective 
territories (see also Brunnbauer 2002: note 16). The VMRO-DPA coalition tried to 
resolve many of country‘s lingering problems, while supporting economic reforms that 
affect all citizens. However the coalition frequently ruptured as both sides slipped into 
nationalistic rhetoric to maintain political legitimacy with their respective voters. Perhaps 
the gravest crisis between VMRO-DPMNE and PDSh occurred when Kosovar refugees 
entered Macedonia in spring 1999 in order to escape the ethnic terror that Miloševič 
unleashed on the eve of the NATO bombardment of Yugoslav military units and 
facilities. While the coalition survived the crisis due to the short duration of the Kosovo 
War and the return of Kosovar refugees, the real threats to the coalition were emerging in 
the mountains that separate Macedonia and Kosovo during the second half of 1999 
through the end of 2000.                 
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In fall 2000, presumably small groups of ethnic Albanian guerrillas began to 
engage Macedonian special police troops in the outskirts of Tetovo, the capital of 
Albanian habited territories in Macedonia. As Rusi (2004) who more than anyone else has 
probed into the history of Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare (UÇK) [National Liberation 
Army] notes, its early origins remain something of an enigma. Initially the guerrilla 
movement was simply an unknown number of small, largely uncoordinated gangs 
composed mainly of former fighters of Kosovo‘s UÇK from both Kosovo and 
Macedonia.
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 Yet, by spring 2001, these groups became unified under the military 
command of Gëzim Ostreni and political leadership of Ali Ahmeti. Soon, UÇK found 
large support among the disgruntled Albanian youth in Macedonia and a vast military 
arsenal in Kosovo and Albania.
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 The public began to learn more about UÇK after they 
attacked on January 23, 2001 a police station in Tearce, Tetovo region (Rusi 2004).  
Many commentators, overlooking the domestic factors that caused the 
Macedonian conflict, tend to see it as imported from abroad. Some consider it as an 
aggression from Kosovo, and others view it more as a spillover from battles fought by 
ethnic Albanians in Southern Serbia. However, Ilievski (2007: 6), a Macedonian author, 
gives this more complex and accurate explanation: 
[W]ithout weapons smuggled from Albania in 1997 and 
from Kosovo in 1999, without organizational and logistical 
support from Kosovo, and without unrestricted crossing of 
the Macedonia-Kosovo border, the armed conflict of 2001 
could not have occurred. Nevertheless, once the conflict 
began, organizational and logistical support from Kosovo 
alone would not have achieved the effect it did if ethnic 
Albanians within Macedonia had not joined the insurgency 
as well. 
Initially, the group‘s goals and organizational structure were vague, but later they 
became consolidated along with their military might. UÇK began by declaring that they 
would target ―the uniform of the Macedonian occupier until the Albanian people are 
freed.‖ However, a few months later, contradicting messages began to air.46 Perhaps 
Communiqué No. 4 which followed an attack in Tearce showed that, by then, UÇK was 
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becoming unified and its political goals streamlined. The Communiqué pointed out that, 
―[s]o far, the Albanians in Macedonia, have sought our rights through dialogue in a 
constitutional and peaceful way‖ but ―[o]ur demands have been ignored.‖ Outlining 
UÇK‘s ultimate goal, the Communiqué stated that ―[UÇK] will fight until Macedonia 
constitutionally becomes a Macedonian-Albanian – or Albanian Macedonian – state,‖ and 
concluded: ―we are in favour of preserving Macedonia‘s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. We respect NATO‘s interests in Macedonia and especially those of the USA.‖ 
Although by the end of winter 2000-2001 the Macedonian authorities announced 
the defeat of the rebels (Daskalovski 2006), in Spring 2001 the guerrillas swept the 
western part of the country. By mid-summer 2001, they took control of most of the 
Albanian inhabited territories including Aračinova [Haraçinë], putting most of the 
Macedonian central institutions and industries around the capital within range of their 
mortars and surrounding Skopje [Shkup].
47
 At that point, as the Albanian guerrillas 
established a permanent presence in almost all the relevant sites with a majority of 
Albanian population.
48
  
Paradoxically, Albanian elites‘ strategy of combining ―working within the system‘ 
with threats to opt out of the system and explore more radical options provided mixed 
signals to the public. On the one hand, the expansion of Albanian rights during VMRO-
PDSh coalition rule demonstrated that Macedonian elites were not unified, confused 
about how to advance the nation-state, and could conceivably compromise under certain 
conditions. On the other hand, the nationalistic and often radical rhetoric of the Albanian 
representatives in government signaled that Albanians of Macedonia were not really 
interested in a unified state (Ragaru 2007: 2). The same can be claimed for the 
Macedonian elites: the need for social peace during harsh periods of economic austerity, a 
long-lasting standoff with Greece about the country‘s official name, and the country‘s bid 
for EU membership compelled the nationalistic VMRO-DPMNE to pacify Albanians 
with some concessions. While certainly VMRO-DPMNE had not shirked its commitment 
to promoting Macedonia as the nation-state of the Macedonian people, its concessions 
toward Albanians were read by both Albanians and political opponents of Macedonians 
as signs of weakness.      
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The international reaction to the Macedonian crisis was remarkably swift, 
determined, and organized. Initially, the sudden appearance and growth of UÇK came as 
an embarrassment for Macedonia‘s international partners who had believed that the 
country had already established sustainable interethnic relations and, consequentially, 
political stability (Mincheva 2005). What is now commonly known as international 
community, was indeed a politico-diplomatic concert of the EU, US, NATO and OSCE, 
with each of the actors performing various parts of a strategy that combined 
consociational practices and ―carrot-and-stick‖ approaches to different actors. Thus, the 
EU‘s effectiveness rested on the seductive offer of EU membership that concerned almost 
equally both ethnic groups. However, US and NATO effectiveness was based mainly on 
their capability of credibly bashing Albanians; indeed, the US‘ pivotal political and 
military role in NATO attacks against Serbian forces during the Kosovo conflict has 
ensured obedience to the US and NATO from the Albanian guerrillas.
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 Both the EU and 
NATO were seducing Macedonian elites with membership as a ―carrot,‖ and the 
membership refusal as a ―stick.‖ And finally, the OSCE, trying to find a role for itself, 
offered diplomatic and logistic assistance through its office in Skopje.  
Specifically, the EU ―carrots‖ sweetened for Macedonians when on April 9, 2001, 
as the crisis was exacerbating, the Union invited Macedonia to sign the Association and 
Stabilization Agreement even though the country was not close to fulfilling any criteria in 
both stability and associative capabilities. The US ―sticks‖ were rattled against Albanian 
fighters. The Executive Order 13219, June 26, 2001 that ordered ―the blocking of 
property and interests in property,‖ and ―the prohibition of the making or receiving by a 
United States person of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services‖ for a 
list of names with UÇK‘s most prominent political leaders and military commanders as 
well as some well-known Kosovar political and public figures.
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 As Ash reveals from his 
November 2001 interview with the leader of UÇK Ali Ahmeti, the latter was mindful of 
the existence of the Geneva Convention and the Tribunal of Hague.
51
    
The EU took over a leading role in resolving the conflict. As the PDSh leader 
Arbën Xhaferi stated, troops and weapons did not stop violence; yet violence was stopped 
by ―the hope provided by the EU that it would intervene in starting political negotiations‖ 
(cf. Daskalovski 2006: 107). On March 19, 2001, the EU foreign ministers agreed on a 
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package of measures that would provide assistance to Macedonia, including assistance on 
border control and the promotion of interethnic relations. At the European Council of 
Stockholm, March 23-24, 2001, the EU sent supportive messages to Macedonian leaders 
and warning notes to Albanian leaders both in Macedonia and in Kosovo.  To President 
Trajkovski and the FYROM government, the EU affirmed its ―solidarity‖ and urged them 
―to continue to respond with restraint.‖ The EU asserted its support for ―the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of FYROM and the inviolability of borders in conformity with 
OSCE principles.‖52 They also stated their determination to pursue collective and 
individual efforts in close cooperation with NATO to help the authorities cope with the 
present situation. Most importantly, the EU noted that ―effective internal political reforms 
and consolidation of a true multiethnic society are indispensable.‖53  
Waging ―the stick,‖ the Union reaffirmed strongly that ―there is no future in our 
Europe for those who follow the path of intolerance, nationalism and violence,‖ that ―the 
Union will not give assistance to those who take this course,‖ and that it ―will only 
support those who choose clearly peace, democracy reconciliation and regional 
cooperation.‖ Offering ―the carrot,‖ the Council iterated that, as previously agreed during 
the EU-Western Balkan Summit of Zagreb, November 24, 2004, Macedonia ―will be the 
first state of the region to be linked to the European Union through the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement which will be signed on 9 April.‖  
Financial pledges ensued as to ensure the sweetness of ―the carrots‖: the EU 
pledged to Macedonia a financial package of 40 million Euros through its Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program for the 
Western Balkans; some 50 million Euros in macro-financial grants and loans were 
promised by IMF, conditional to a standby agreement between the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and Macedonia. On April 5, the Union granted the country the status of most 
favored nation; and on April 9, Macedonia became the first country included in the so-
called Stabilization and Association zone to sign the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with the EU (Daskalovski 2006: 108). Meanwhile, EU employed ―sticks‖ as 
well, both during negotiations to reach an agreement for a political solution and during 
political debates over the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. While at the beginning 
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of the conflict Western governments firmly criticized UÇK, they also recognized the need 
for a political solution to the problematic status of Albanians in Macedonia.  
 The EU ―carrot and stick‖ approach continued even after the signing of the Ohrid 
Agreement. To assist Macedonia in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, the 
Union opened in 2001 the Office of the EU High Representative.
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 Since implementation 
the implementation has met fierce resistance by both the Macedonian public and 
segments of its elite, every legal and institutional change required a mixture of 
international pressure and ―carrots‖ (Ragaru 2007: 9). Thus, in the fall of 2001, the EU 
used a ―hard stick‖ against Macedonian authorities who refused to pass required 
constitutional amendments. Then EU High Representative Alain Le Roy succeeded to 
postpone until March 2002 a donor conference that was initially scheduled for October 
2001, with the hopes that Macedonians would pass the constitutional amendments and the 
belated Law on Local Self-Government. The constitutional package finally passed on 
November 16, 2001, amidst fierce parliamentary debates over many topics that were 
previously agreed upon in the Ohrid Agreement. The Law on Local Self-Government 
passed in January 2002 (Ragaru 2007: 10).
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 NATO‘s role stemmed from its military presence in the neighboring Kosovo. The 
alliance sought to prevent the destabilization of Kosovo. NATO‘s Secretary General, 
George Robinson, was often criticized by Macedonian government who believed the 
NATO forces under the KFOR mission in Kosovo were not doing enough to control the 
border between the two countries. The Alliance strengthened its involvement in the crisis 
by appointing a special representative in the country, the German Ambassador Hans-
Joerg Eiff and a political envoy, Pieter Feith. It also sent military assistance to the 
Macedonian government, and NATO‘s US General Joseph Ralson asked the US Congress 
for additional troops for the KFOR mission in Kosovo as an extension of the NATO 
mission in Macedonia. Even though NATO member countries wanted to avoid another 
open-ended, expensive peacekeeping mission like those in Kosovo and Bosnia, the 
Alliance responded positively to President Tajkovski‘s request to demilitarize UÇK under 
the condition that political factions in Sobranie signed a peace agreement. It took more 
than two months for all the NATO conditions to be fulfilled, and the alliance decided on 
August 21
st
 to deploy some 3100 troops in order to observe UÇK‘s disarmament.56 
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Concurring with the EU and NATO positions, the US emphasized the need to 
address ―the legitimate concerns of minorities.‖ On March 23, President George W. Bush 
released a statement, asserting that ―[t]he United States joins its allies and the United 
Nations in strongly condemning the violence perpetrated by a small group of extremists 
determined to destabilize the democratic, multi-ethnic Government of Macedonia,‖ and 
that  ―[t]he United States and its allies have a longstanding commitment to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia.‖57 President Bush expressed support 
for ―NATO's effort to assess Macedonia's immediate security needs,‖ and pledged 
military and technical assistance to the Macedonian Government. Later, in a meeting in 
the White House with President Trajkovski, President Bush also pledged $10 million for 
the newly established multilingual Southeast European University in Tetovo. On April 
12, the Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Skopje to express the US‘ support for the 
country‘s territorial integrity and the need to find a political solution to the crisis. 
Moreover, even though in his June tour to Europe President Bush had dismissed the 
possibility of US personnel participating in a NATO force that would observe the 
disarmament of UÇK, 500 US troops eventually joined the NATO Essential Harvest 
mission.  
Compared to the EU and NATO, OSCE had a logistic ―advantage‖ in dealing with 
the Macedonian crisis. Since September 1992, OSCE had the Spillover Monitor Mission 
to Skopje, and OCSE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel had 
been very active in negotiating solutions to Albanian grievances with Macedonian 
authorities. The Mission deserves credit for closely following the crisis on the ground and 
reporting human rights abuses by both sides. On March 21, 2001, the OCSE Chairman-in-
Office, Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana appointed the US diplomat Robert 
Frowick as his Personal Representative. Ambassador Frowick became very active in his 
efforts to hold direct talks between the government and UÇK. As the Macedonian 
partners in government rejected his invitations, Frowick organize talks between their 
Albanian government partners and UÇK, hence applying a strategy that has worked in the 
Southern Serbian conflict (Daskalovski 2006: 113). His attempts resulted in the Prizren 
Declaration, May 22, between PDSh, PPD, and UÇK, which, being denounced and 
doomed notwithstanding, opened the way to the political solution of the crisis. 
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The peaceful withdrawal of the UÇK from Aračinovo was a clear signal that its 
leaders accepted negotiation. UÇK agreed to a settlement that would satisfy the Prizren 
Declaration. After intense  negotiation, the four main Macedonian and Albanian political 
parties, VMRO-DPMNE, Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija (SDSM) 
[Socialdemocratic Union of Macedonia], DPA and PPD met in Ohrid, less than 10 miles 
from the Albanian border, to agree for a political end of to the ethnic hostilities. On 
August 8, 2001, after eleven hours of intense negotiations under the mediation of EU 
special envoy François Léotard and the special US envoy to Macedonia James Pardew, an 
agreement for constitutional changes that would improve the status of Albanians in the 
country known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement (hereafter Ohrid Agreement) was 
reached. It was signed by the Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski, Prime Minister 
Branko Cervenkovski, Sobranie Member and PDSH Chairman Arben Xhaferi, and 
Sobranie Member and PPD Chairman Imer Imeri. 
 It is clear that an agreement between the Macedonian majority and Albanian 
minority would have been impossible without the presence of international actors. 
Arguably, the Ohrid Agreement, achieved under the strong pressure and carrot-and-stick 
approach of an international concert of the EU, NATO, OSCE and the US, saved 
Macedonia from the brink of a full-scale civil war (Marko 2004/5; Daskalovski 2006; 
Schneckener 2002). In this case, the ―carrot‖ was dangled by the EU in the shape of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Macedonia, whereas the ―stick‖ was the 
threat potential of international indictments for both rebels and government officials in 
the Hague Tribunal. The difficulties involved in reaching and signing the Agreement 
were clear indicators of the difficult road in the implementation phase.      
The Ohrid Agreement consists of eight topics. Under Topic 1, Basic Principles 
include prohibition of use of violence in pursuit of political aims; preservation of 
territorial integrity and the unitary character of the state; preservation of the multi-ethnic 
character of Macedonia‘s society; constitutionally guaranteed democratic accountability; 
development of local self-government to encourage participation and promotion of 
respect for the identity of communities. Topic 2 regulates the cessation of hostilities. 
Topic 3 specifies the development of a decentralized government, including a revised 
Law on Local Self-Government in order to devolve powers in the areas of public services, 
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urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, 
local finances, education, social welfare, and health care; a provision for revising the 
boundaries of municipalities after completion of a new census; and a provision that 
foresees the selection of the local heads of police by municipal councils in order to make 
police responsive to the needs and interests of local population. Topic 4 regulates non-
discrimination and equitable representation of communities in all central and local public 
bodies with the affirmative duty to correct present imbalances, in particular in the police. 
It provides a double majority vote for the election of one-third of the Constitutional Court 
judges, the Ombudsman, and three members of the Judicial Council. The double majority 
vote (the Badinter Principle) means that while the representatives of parliament represent 
a majority of the voters, they must also represent a majority of the minority populations 
not typically represented. Topic 5 stipulates the application of the double majority vote 
system for certain constitutional amendments, the proposed Law on Local Self-
Government, and for laws which affect culture, use of language, education, personal 
documentation, use of symbols, local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and the 
boundaries of municipalities. Topic 6 regulates the use of languages in education and 
public bodies. The most important elements are further guarantees for mother tongue 
instruction in primary and secondary education and university level education in 
languages spoken by at least 20% of the population of Macedonia—that is, in fact, only 
Albanian. Moreover, affirmative action was to be continued in in state universities until 
equitable representation was achieved. Topic 7 provides for the use of emblems of 
communities together with the emblem of Macedonia in front of local public buildings if 
the community serves as a majority population in the municipality. And, finally, Topic 8 
provides guidelines for timely implementation of the Agreement. 
 The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement represented a major challenge for all 
signatories. First, it was a challenge for Macedonian politicians who had to operate in a 
climate of open public hostility toward the Agreement. A 2003 UNDP-Kapital Center for 
Developmental Research survey revealed strong resistance to the implementation of the 
Ohrid Agreement from the Macedonian public, satisfactory support by Albanians, and 
only lukewarm acceptance by other minorities (TABLE 4.2). Secondly, the Agreement‘s 
implementation presented major legitimacy challenges for Albanian parties in the 
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governing coalition, PDSh and PPD. Although their leaders were signatories to the 
Agreement, it was already well known that only the military pressure wielded by UÇK 
managed to shake the status quo politics in Macedonia.
58
 PDSh and PPD were left to fight 
a difficult political where every slide backwards would be easily perceived as 
incompetence at best and treason at worst. Under the unbearable weight of such a 
challenge, Arbën Xhaferi and Menduh Thaçi (PDSh) and ex-prime minister Georgieski 
(VMRO-DPMNE) launched a direct assault on the Ohrid Agreement, declaring it ―dead‖ 
and calling for the country to be partitioned. At its annual congress in July 2003, the 
PDSh demanded further constitutional changes which would eliminate the Ohrid 
compromise, including a bicameral parliament, an Albanian vice-president, ‗consensual 
democracy‘ to allow a fuller veto power, and the right to self-determination.59 As for the 
international community, their challenge consisted of maintaining coherence in the face 
of Balkan political tricks, lack of commitment by the signatories to the agreements, and 
the absence of reliable domestic partners. 
TABLE 4.2 RESULTS FROM THE 2003 UNPD AND KAPITAL SURVEY 
 
Question: Do you support/not support the Ohrid Agreement? 
  
Ethnic Background 
 
Total 
 
Macedonian 
 
Albanian 
 
Other 
 
 
Col % 
 
Col% 
 
Col% 
 
Col% 
 
1 
 
Strongly support  
 
5.7 
 
68.1 
  
20.5 
 
2 
 
Support somewhat 
 
32.3 
 
23.5 
 
28.3 
 
30.1 
 
3 
 
Somewhat not support 
 
17.2 
 
1.6 
 
20.8 
 
13.8 
 
4 
 
Do not support al all 
 
37.9 
 
1.2 
 
22.6 
 
28.9 
 
5 
 
Refuse 
 
0.4 
  
1.9 
 
0.4 
 
6 
 
DK 
 
6.5 
 
5.6 
 
7.5 
 
6.3 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Kapital – Center for Development 
Research (2003).  
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Marko (2004) recognizes that the Ohrid Agreement has led to considerable 
improvements in equitable representation of Albanian Macedonians in public bodies as 
well as increased enrollment of minority students. Reportedly,  
the number of Albanian Macedonians paid from the state 
budget increased from 11.65% in 2002 to 14.54% in 
December 2004. In the health organizations, not paid by the 
state budget, the increase was from 5.72% to 7.34%. Much 
more impressive are the results in the security forces where 
the numbers of Albanian Macedonians between 2001 and 
2004 increased in the Ministry of the Interior from 3.6% to 
13.31%, the Criminal Police from 3.9% to 10.37% and in 
the armed forces from 2.25% to 10.18% (Marko 2004/5: 
11). 
However, while Marko (2004: note 50) praises these advances and credits the 
improvement on the introduction of community policing and a system of mixed police-
patrols in Albanian-Macedonian territories, other authors have pointed out the increasing 
ethnic clientelism in public administration appointments (Lili 2009; Lebamoff and 
Ilievski 2008; ESI Macedonia Security Project 2002).
60
  
Marko (2004) reports better success in implementing the Agreement in education: 
For pupils who are part of the Albanian and Turkish 
communities,  the education process in kindergarten groups 
and primary schools is carried out in their mother tongue. In 
secondary education the education process is performed in 
Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish, whereby Macedonian 
Albanian pupils can receive instruction in Albanian in six 
municipalities and the City of Skopje. Now,  18.57% of 
Albanian pupils receive secondary education in their mother 
tongue. As far as university enrolment is concerned, due to 
the establishment of two new universities, the figures show 
a tremendous increase. The number of Albanian 
Macedonian undergraduate and graduate students in 1992 
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was 2.23%, and this jumped to 15.5% in 2004-5. The 
number of Turkish students, however, increased only 
slightly from 0.65% to 1.34%, but the share of Serbs 
actually dropped from 3.19% to 1.52%.  
When the already delayed constitutional changes entered into the parliamentary 
agenda in Autumn 2001, it became clear that constitutional reform in Macedonia had 
become a zero-sum game (Brunnmauer 2002; Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 17). 
Macedonian leaders perceived Albanian gains as detrimental to the status of Macedonians 
and therefore maneuvered to limit their gains. There were two major issues that emerged: 
the new preamble of the Constitution, and the relationship of the religious communities 
with the state and each other. The drafted preamble referred to ―the citizens of the 
Republic of Macedonia,‖ thus avoiding any specific reference to distinct ethnic groups.61 
However, when the draft-preamble was leaked to the public, it unleashed anger among 
the Macedonian masses, intellectuals, politicians and the media who strongly opposed the 
fact that the preamble did not nominally mention the Macedonian people. Macedonians 
have always quarreled with Albanians over the point that Macedonia was the only 
motherland they had, while the Albanians already had a motherland, Albania proper. Now 
Macedonians saw the deletion of their name from the preamble as a sign that they were 
losing their country, the only country that recognized them as a people. Albanian political 
parties avoided the topic of negotiation fearing that it would lead to an unraveling of the 
original agreement, but two Macedonian opposition parties, Democratic Alternative and 
the ―Real‖ VMRO as well as politicians from VMRO-DPMNE opposed the new 
Preamble which according to them extinguished the historic development of the 
Macedonian state (cf. Brunnbauer 2002: 11).  
International actors became involved once again. The EU's special representative 
in Macedonia François Léotard asked for help from the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) in an attempt to bolster the 
constitutional.
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 President Trajkovski, in turn, asked the US President George W. Bush to 
facilitate a compromise. Yet, there were the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
and EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana who 
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negotiated the Preamble that later was passed by the Sobranie. The approved Preamble 
states: 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian 
people, as well as those citizens who live within the borders 
of the Republic of Macedonia and are members of the 
Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the 
Serbian people, the Roma people and of other peoples, take 
on themselves the responsibility for the present and the 
future of their fatherland (cf. Brunnbauer 2002: 11).     
The second contested issue arising from the 1991 Constitution was the special 
relationship that it created between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the 
Macedonian state. A new Article 19 was therefore drafted as a result of the Ohrid 
Agreement.
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 Although the problem seemed to be resolved by simply mentioning the 
Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia and the Catholic Church, the very fact that 
these religious groups gained an equal status with the hitherto privileged Macedonian 
Orthodox Church provoked criticism by the latter. Instead, the Church argued that ―it 
should be granted special status at least in Macedonia, since it was not recognized by 
other Orthodox Churches‖ (Brunnbauer 2002: 11). Consequentially, an amendment was 
made with the words ―as well as‖ between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the 
other religious institutions, in order to make it stand out and address the concerns of the 
Church and the ethnic Macedonian Orthodox majority (Ilievski 2007: 22).   
The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, especially the projected 
constitutional amendments, showed how far apart Macedonians and Albanians still 
distrust each other. The process also revealed that for Macedonia to be a stable 
democracy it would require assistance from its international sponsors to either force 
negotiation and compromise or condition and enforce consociational practices.  
 
A Consociational interpretation of the Macedonian crisis and its aftermath          
A consociational explanatory model would suggest that the Macedonian ethnic conflict 
erupted because both Albanian and Macedonian elites lost cohesion.
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 The fact that 
among Albanians, public support for UÇK was not automatic (Raganu 2007: 8), and that 
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Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim (BDI) [Democratic Union for Integration] founded 
from its legacy after the Ohrid Agreement never managed to incorporate the entire 
Albanian electorate shows the split that existed among Albanian elites. As Rusi (2004) 
reveals, among the interviewed UÇK members, there were consistently critical of 
Albanian politicians in Macedonia. When Ali Ahmeti talks to foreigners these days, he 
bluntly describes Albanian politicians as ―looking after their own interests‖ (Ibid.). Other 
members of the former UÇK continue to be openly critical of the PDSh. When the 
Government of National Unity was established on May 8, 2001, the Vice President of the 
Parliament Ilijaz Halimi from the PDSh was accused by PPD sources of insisting that the 
PPD publicly distance itself from the UÇK as a condition for joining the new coalition. 
On March 20th while still in opposition, the Partia Demokratike Popullore (PDP) 
[Democratic People Party] signed a joint statement with the DPA, calling on the UÇK to 
lay down their arms (cf. Rusi 2004). Even now, nine years after the conflict, the split 
remains deep and, occasionally, the political debate among Albanian politicians and their 
partisan supporters degenerate into sheer violence (Lili 2009). 
The Macedonian elites were divided as well. Premier Lubče Georgievski and the 
Minister of Interior Ljube Boškovski supported a military solution to the crisis while 
President Boris Trajkovski and Branko Cervenkovski‘s SDSM called for compromise and 
negotiation. A major crisis occurred on May 22, 2001 when, under the brokerage of the 
OCSE envoy Robert Frowick, an American diplomat, leaders of PDSh and PPD met with 
UÇK leaders in the Kosovo city of Prizren. Frowick had been involved in long and 
difficult negotiations with UÇK following a request from President Trajkovski. With 
VMRO-DPMNE and Primer Georgievski rejecting direct talks with UÇK, the latter 
signed the plan only with the Albanian government partners.  
The document produced by the meeting, titled ―Declaration of the Albanian 
Leaders from Macedonia Regarding the Peace and Reformation Process in the Republic 
of Macedonia,‖ was signed by Ali Ahmeti, the political representative of the UÇK as well 
as Imer Imeri and Arbën Xhaferi, the leaders of the PPD and PDSh respectively. It stated 
that that the various Albanian leaders, mindful of an historic juncture in Macedonia, 
agreed to act in the national interest toward a common goal: reform of the state to create a 
democracy for all citizens and national communities. The consensus among Albanian 
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leaders was to be based upon a number of shared principles: support for the territorial 
integrity and multi-ethnic character of Macedonia; a rejection of ―ethnic territorial‖ 
solutions to Macedonia‘s problems and a recognition that ethnically-based separatism 
would damage the citizens of Macedonia as well as threaten peace in the region; a 
recognition that there could be no military solution to the problems facing the Republic of 
Macedonia; a commitment to transforming the Republic of Macedonia by means of closer 
European and Atlantic integration; and finally, a willingness to accept the US and EU as 
facilitators to resolve internal problems (cf. Rusi 2004: 8). Moreover, the signatories also 
pledged to work together for a set of specific reforms. These included a review of 
amendments to the constitution of Macedonia, unrestricted use of the Albanian language 
as one of the country‘s official languages, proportional ethnic presence in the institutions 
of the state, enhancement of the authority of local government, complete secularization of 
the constitution and state, and the introduction of mechanisms to ensure a consensual 
resolution of issues of national interest involving ethnic rights (Ibid). 
However, Frowick‘s plan faltered when the Prizren Declaration was made public. 
Key representatives of the international community were also opposed, most notably 
Mark Dickinson, then the British Ambassador to Macedonia, who at the time was also 
representing the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policies, 
Javier Solana. Even though private EU sources considered the plan ―very very good, and 
in line with the international community‖ (Daskalovski 2006), wrong timing and lack of 
coordination doomed it. A storm of Macedonian and international criticism rose against 
Ambassador Frowick, OSCE, the US, and the Albanian leaders. The daily paper Nova 
Makedonija, for example, ran a headline announcing ―Xhaferi and Imeri sign a document 
betraying Macedonia.‖ President Trajkovski added: ―These meetings are unacceptable 
and run against the government and their own [the PPD and DPA] commitment not to 
negotiate with terrorists.‖ The PDSh and PPD were urged by Macedonian political parties 
to renounce the signatures of their leaders. Robert Frowick was instructed to leave the 
country in disgrace. The rejection of the Prizren Declaration as a basis for talks obstructed 
the discussion process between political parties that President Trajkovski had overseen.  
The Prizren negotiations caused a major crisis within the governing coalition, and 
it took long and tense negotiations between EU High Representative Javier Solana, senior 
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US diplomat James Swigert, and President Trajkovski to finally persuade the Macedonian 
and Albanian partners in the coalition to agree on May 29 to resume political dialogue. A 
June 2001 meeting with Solana and Swigert concluded with an agreement. EU diplomatic 
pressure grew since Macedonian party leaders were expected to report their political 
progress to the EU General Affairs Council to be held on June 25 (Daskalovski 2006: 
104). By that time, it appears that others reached the conclusion that nothing could be 
resolved if the UÇK were excluded from the negotiating process. Even Prime Minister 
Georgievski later acknowledged that some of the conditions set by Prizren would have to 
be met, when he said in a television interview ―it is probable that we will have to drop the 
preamble to the Constitution, or announce a second constituent nation. It is likely that we 
will have to announce a second official language‖ (cf. Rusi 2004: 9).                
By the very end of the 1990s and early 2000s, feelings of political and economic 
frustration combined with euphoria over the Albanian triumph in Kosovo resulted in an 
Albanian population in Macedonia growing increasingly angry and impatient. Despite 
their expanding role in the affairs of the country, Albanians in Macedonia found 
themselves the only Albanian entity in the Balkan that was disenfranchised. Radicalized 
Albanians who returned from the Kosovo War found themselves alienated from a 
political system built on a dual ethnicity-partisanship criteria of participation (Ragaru 
2007). By then, Albanian political elites had lost much of their representative legitimacy 
and large sections of the Albanian population were searching for other voices to represent 
them. As Ragaru (2007: 8) argues, awareness of such a cleavage between Albanian 
political elites and their voters is extremely important in understanding post-Ohrid 
political and social dynamics.  
Macedonian elites lost legitimacy as well. Several times, Macedonian politicians 
were forced under the pressure of massive and violent Macedonian crowds who viewed 
closed doors negotiations as secret deals to ―sell over the country‖ (Daskalovski 2006). 
For instance, negotiations between the coalition partners that began on June 25 broke up 
the next day due to angry Macedonian demonstrations in Skopje. A month later, masses 
of angry Macedonian protesters demonstrated in Skopje against what they perceived as a 
―constant Western support to Albanian Militants‖ (Daskalovski 2006).        
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The Ohrid Agreement aimed to introduce consociational practices and restore 
such practices where disrupted. The Agreement was designed in such a way that would 
ultimately result in a peaceful yet separate cohabitation among the different ethnic 
groups. While on the one hand the principle of equitable representation in state 
institutions would expose state employees to individuals of different ethnic backgrounds, 
local decentralization reforms and higher education reforms would likely result in 
increasing the distance between ethnicities (Ragaru 2007). However, democratic stability, 
not ethnic harmony, was EU‘s ultimate goal. The Ohrid Agreement was designed to 
ensure that the elites were unified on the issues concerning EU-Macedonian negotiation. 
For example, the intention of the dual majority principle (Badinter Principle) was to 
simultaneously enforce consociational practices on each ethnic group/pillar of society. 
With that principle, the EU could be confident that both Macedonians and Albanian elites 
would enter negotiations with the EU equipped with unified proposals.  
Some of the modifications of the constitutional amendments that occurred during 
parliamentary debates strengthened the multiethnic emphasis of Macedonia, hence 
bringing to the process some additional consociational practices. First, concerning the 
symbolism of the Preamble, the Ohrid Agreement stipulated the replacement of concepts 
in the 1991 Constitution which Marko (2004) considered to be a mixture of nation-state 
and state-nation concepts with solely a state-nation concept by no longer referring to a 
Macedonian nation and other ethnic groups, but only to citizens. The agreed Preamble 
now states: ―Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as 
the citizens that live within its borders, who are part of the Albanian people, Turkish 
people, Vlach people, Serb people, Roma people, the Bosniak people, and others ... have 
decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state‖ 
(Amendment IV of the constitution, cf. Marko 2004: 9).
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 The EU accepted this 
modification: the multiethnic constitutional design is a consociational practice.  
 The implementation of the Ohrid Agreement navigates between the Scylla of 
federalization and the Charybdis of centralization and therefore affects major intra-ethnic 
issues. However, it seems that the EU has found this tension compatible with 
consociational practices since, apparently, another country, namely Italy, has resolved the 
issue through devolution rather than federalization. People close to Ali Ahmeti have told 
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me what Timothy Garton Ash reveals in his article: generally, the Albanian elites were 
interested only in expanding Albanian rights within a unified Macedonia.
66
 As several 
Albanian politicians in Macedonia have told me in time and again, in the case of a 
partition, Albanians would have been the ultimate losers and they therefore needed to 
better consolidate demographically and politically in order to become better positioned 
for the politics of partition. Simply speaking, Albanian nationalists did not want to secede 
from Macedonia and leave behind two of their historical cities, namely Skopje (in 
Albanian Shkup) and Bitola (in Albanian Manastir). While this attitude of the Albanian 
leaders seem to avoid ethnic clashes until, arguably, Albanians might become a majority 
in Macedonia due to their high birth rate, it also gain some time for peace as emerging 
crosscutting cleavages might mitigate ethnic divisions.     
 This nationalistic platform is reflected in the implementation of the Ohrid 
Agreement.   One of the most contested interethnic issues in Macedonia has been the use 
of other languages besides the Macedonian language in education and administration. The 
new regulations enabled the use of more communities‘ languages; in local self-
government the 50% threshold was reduced to 20% and the same threshold was 
introduced for state administration operating in both local and central level for persons 
who live in such municipalities with a 20% share of a community. Although Albanian can 
now be used again in parliamentary sessions, this does not mean that Albanian has 
become an official national language like Macedonian. Their demographic map is clear, 
and they want to consolidate their political authority over the territories where they 
maintain a significant presence. This makes political struggle necessary in order to redraw 
the municipal boundaries to include Albanian Macedonian villages in order for the 
community to reach the 20% threshold. Following such a policy, Albanians were able to 
reassert their historical presence in the capital city of Skopje, which, as will be discussed 
in the next Chapter, become bilingual by adding to its municipality neighboring Albanian 
inhabited suburbs. Appendix B shows the demographic dynamics in Macedonia since the 
1981 census.  
 With the practical loss of control over some of the most productive and 
economically active administrative-territorial units in the country such as the Albanian 
habited municipalities of the Northwest, obviously the Macedonian elites viewed it futile 
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to resist constitutional changes regarding language and the use of national symbols. Thus, 
the constitutional amendments regarding education in the languages of communities, 
Article 48(3), and Article 48(1) regarding the use of the flags, were passed with minor 
changes. 
 As Marko (2004: 10) points out, the most important elements of group rights 
according to the model of consociational democracy were the provisions for equitable 
representation and the double majority vote system in parliament instead of a simple 
majority. Article 8 of the Constitution guaranteed equitable representation of citizens in 
public bodies at all levels and in all areas of public life as one of the fundamental values 
of the constitutional order and in Article 77(2) insofar as the Public Attorney has to 
safeguard this principle. Yet equitable representation on the basis of the double majority 
vote system is also foreseen for the composition of the Security Council, the Judicial 
Council and the Constitutional Court. Sobranie was entitled to establish a Committee for 
Intercommunity Relations composed of seven Macedonian and Albanian members each 
and five member each from the Turk, Vlach, Romanie and two other communities. The 
double majority vote system is also foreseen according to Article 114(5) for laws 
regarding local self-government, i.e. the laws on local self-government, local finances, 
local elections, boundaries of municipalities, and the city of Skopje. Article 69(2) 
enumerates subject matters such as culture, use of languages, education, personal 
documentation, and use of symbols which affect ethnic identities and for which again a 
double majority vote is foreseen (Ibid). However, 
although (or because) representatives of the communities 
are regularly elected into parliament due to the ethnically 
split party system and interethnic government coalitions are 
formed on a regular basis in actual practice, the OFA and 
respective constitutional amendments did not include a 
system of constitutionally fixed seats for ethnic groups in 
parliament or posts in the government connected with a 
system of veto powers for specific groups. This is in marked 
contrast to the constitutions of Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ibid).  
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Hence, the consociational arrangements foreseen by the Ohrid Agreement are 
much weaker and do not impose restrictions on individual  rights such as the right to 
stand as a candidate (as in the Bosnian Constitution) which excludes from membership to 
certain high political position in the country anyone who is not a Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosniaks (Ibid). However, under the conditions discussed above, this posed no problem 
to Albanians since their claim rests only over the municipalities where they represent or 
aspire to represent a majority or substantial minority. Marko criticizes Daskalovski for 
missing the point when he considers the changes to the constitution as reflecting an 
―ethnification‖ of the Macedonian constitution and advancement of a political identity 
best described as ―millet‖ or ―ethnic‖ Macedonia which ―does not support just solutions 
to problems in multiethnic societies‖ insofar as only ―liberal nation building guarantees a 
culture of protection of national minorities.‖ According to Marko (2004: 11),  
exactly this ―liberal nation building with the protection of 
national minorities‖ ended up in the spiral of intensification 
of ethnic tensions analysed in the first chapter, since the 
main political problem was and still is that Albanian 
Macedonians do not consider themselves a ‗national 
minority‘, but want to be an ‗equal partner‘ in the state and 
nation-building process. 
An account of Albanians‘ achievements as they are stated in the Ohrid Agreement 
and the ensuing constitutional reform shows that EU consociational practices and the 
compromises that forged them came as close as it could to a more stable democracy. 
First, the changes insist that all ethnic communities have formal equality as state and 
nation-building forces, as reflected in the language of the Preamble, thus making 
Macedonia a multiethnic, not bi-national state of Slav and Albanian Macedonians.
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Second, the changes result in equitable representation for all groups in the civil service, 
particularly Albanian Macedonians, but not full veto power, in parliamentary decisions. 
In this respect, Marko (2004: 12) notes, the double majority vote system is a much 
weaker mechanism than comparable provisions regarding veto powers in the constitutions 
of other ex-Yugoslav republics. However, I have argued that, as a consociational practice, 
the Badinter Principle aimed at forcing unity within social segments themselves. In the 
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circumstance of erosion of legitimacy of elites, the double majority principle would 
assure that different subgroups within the social segments unify around the decisions 
taken by their elites. Third, the lowering to 20 percent of the threshold needed for using a 
certain language in public administration and the judiciary reflected, a European ―best 
practice‖ established by the Advisory Committee under the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities (Marko 2004). Even though the new language 
provisions did not give the Albanian language ―full equality,‖ it served the purpose of 
redrawing administrative borders in a way that would assert the Albanian presence. 
Fourth, while some authors (see Marko 2004: 12) deplore the rejection of the Albanians‘ 
aspirations for territorial autonomy or federalization of the country, and that the 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement has ghettoized the country along ethnic lines, 
that ghettoization might have served the elites very well. Generally speaking, the Ohrid 
Agreement is a powerful tool for ethnic elites to strengthen their grip on respective social 
segments/pillars. 
The application of EU membership conditionality to Macedonia represents the 
case of Macedonia building institutions that would be compatible with consociational 
practices in two levels. The first level is the national level: the Ohrid Agreement and the 
ensuing constitutional reform intended to implement consociational practices needed to 
pacify the ongoing ethnic conflict, and transform Macedonia to a stable democracy. As 
the historical process tracing made clear, not only is Macedonian society deeply divided, 
but each of the segments/pillars is also deeply split within itself. First, the analysis shows 
that the situation escalated to conflict because of the radicalization of the Albanian 
political elite. There is no clear evidence that Albanian leaders radicalized the masses; 
yet, the shift of mass sympathy in the course of the 1990s from PPD to PDSh to UÇK as 
well as the electoral performance and resilience of the more moderate PDSh show that the 
Albanian segment in Macedonia is divided. Every time that a more radical Albanian 
movement appears, the political support of the majority of the Albanians seems to shift to 
that movement. However, as long as Albanian leaders continued working within the 
system to carve an Albanian space within Macedonian society, their political discord and 
rivalries did not threaten the existence of the country. That happened only when the UÇK 
struggle appeared to lead to a possible forceful division of Macedonia. As long as 
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Albanian elites were unified, Macedonian democratic stability appeared to be sustainable; 
once rifts appeared among Albanians, however, they echoed similar rifts among 
Macedonians. By the same token, Macedonian elites are also divided; their divisions 
concern not only how to tackle the Albanian minority, but also how to respond to the 
country‘s name crisis with Greece.68 Constitutional reforms following some 
consociational practices would help to unify Macedonian elites as well.  
 Moreover, rifts among Albanian elites reflected the frustration among Albanians 
regarding their social status in Macedonian society. The division between elites from 
different ethnic backgrounds reflects deep ethnic divisions within Macedonian society. 
The rifts within each ethnic group would make agreement between ethnic groups 
impossible because political deals can be easily interpreted as treason by elite segments 
left outside of the proceedings. But unified ethnic elites operating under frameworks such 
as the Ohrid Agreement and institutional settings such as the amended Constitution would 
give ethnic elites the opportunity to negotiate co-existence with other elites. The Ohrid 
Agreement and the Constitution serves now as unifying grounds for the country‘s elites. 
 The second level is the international level, that is, the EU-Macedonia level. In 
order to facilitate the integration of Macedonia with the EU institution, the Union needs 
to negotiate with a unified Macedonian segment/pillar that is receptive of the EU 
consociational practices. This need would have not been an issue had Macedonia not 
aspired to the EU membership, and institutions receptive to consociational practices only 
for guaranteeing domestic stability would have been enough. However, in the 
Macedonian case, institutions receptive to consociational practices do not only serve 
domestic stability but also the convergence of the Macedonian stability to a unified 
segment/pillar. The amended Macedonian Constitution offered a chance to satisfy both of 
these needs. The preservation of the unitary character of the Macedonian state on the one 
hand, and the conversion of Macedonia from a nation-state to a multiethnic country on 
the other, was a compromise that did not leave everyone totally satisfied, as a real 
compromise should. Since elites‘ ability to compromise is a consociational practice, the 
EU has been able to conditioned institutions receptive to consociational practices.      
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A sectorial contextual interpretation of the Macedonian constitutional reform 
The dynamics of the EU-Macedonian negotiations fit my proposed model. During the 
period 1989-1991, the Macedonian communist elites were hoping for the best (i. e., the 
maintenance of Yugoslavia), but preparing for the worst (i. e., the collapse of Yugoslavia 
and the consequential independence of Macedonia), they introduced constitutional 
arrangements that would help them to emerge as caring for the Macedonian people, 
enabling them to succeed politically. Albanian elites in Macedonia were weak, 
unprepared, institutionally debilitated, and unwilling to go beyond threats. Meanwhile, 
the EU was pleased with the Macedonian stability, and never pushed the Macedonian 
government for changes beyond slogans related to minority rights—while also rebuking 
Albanians for threatening the stability of the country.
69
 With the political will of 
Macedonian elites and the lack of interest from the EU, the former employed the majority 
principle to perform constitutional arrangements perceived as paramount to establishing 
the Macedonian national-state. However, while the 2001 conflict persuaded the EU about 
the need for constitutional reforms, the ruling Macedonian elites resisted. At that point, 
the EU became highly interested in constitutional reforms in Macedonia, but only after 
the Albanian and Macedonian elites compromised can we say that also the ruling elites of 
Macedonia became positively interested in the reform.  After difficult negotiations that 
involved the ―carrots‖ of SAA and the ―sticks‖ of potential dismemberment of 
Macedonian politicians as well as ―carrots‖ of constitutional changes and ―sticks‖ of 
being placed on the US‘ ban list and Hague Tribunal for Albanian fighters, an agreement 
was finally reached and constitutional reform proceeded successfully.
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 However, the sectorial contextual interpretation of the Macedonian constitutional 
reform suggests that in ethnically divided societies a constitutional reform is not always a 
good progress toward democratization unless it builds institutions receptive to 
consociational practices. While elites might pass a constitutional reform, it might not 
necessarily be considered as ―good progress.‖ Only constitutional reforms that establish 
institutions compatible to consociational practices can be considered as a ―good 
progress.‖ In a divided society, swift constitutional reforms without the support of the 
most relevant societal pillars might lead to destabilization rather than democratic stability. 
 Table 4-3 summarizes the dynamics of Macedonian constitutional reform.     
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 TABLE 4.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN MACEDONIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION 
EU 
LEADERS‘  
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‘ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1989 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Swift reform and spillovers on other reforms. The 
Constitution of the Yugoslav Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia was approved in order to strengthen the 
position of the Macedonians both within their Republic 
and within Yugoslavia. Yet, they did not concern the 
status of other ethnic groups. These changes happened 
without any input from international actors.  
 
1991 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Swift reform and spillovers on other institutional 
reforms. The goal of the 1991 Constitution was the 
creation of a state that would serve as a nation-state to 
the Macedonians and a state of the citizens to other 
minorities. The ruling (Macedonian) elites supported the 
reform, but the Albanian minority opposed it. There is no 
evidence about any international interests and/or 
involvement in that reform. 
 
2001 
 
  
+ 
 
-- 
 
No reform. The country slipped into ethnic conflict and, 
obviously, the EU and other international actors became 
increasingly interested in a constitutional reform that 
would implement consociational practices to bring about 
democratic stability. Yet, the Macedonian ruling elites 
were reluctant to undertake such reforms. Finally, the 
reform was agreed with the Ohrid Agreement.  
 
2003 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Good progress and spillovers on other institutional 
reforms (local decentralization, judiciary, security forces, 
public administration, and education). This is the case 
when both the EU and domestic ruling elites converged 
to positive preferences for the reform. 
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Conclusions 
This purpose of this chapter was to empirically demonstrate how the EU employs membership 
conditionality to help its aspirant countries from the Balkans to conduct institutional reforms that 
would produce institutions receptive to the EU consociational practices. In a unified society such 
as Albania, the main goal is to establish institutions that would be receptive to the EU 
consociational practices during the foreseeable process of the internal integration of the country 
with the EU institutions. In this case, the purpose is not to unify the segment/pillar but to 
acquaint and enable it to operate with consociational practices. In the case of Macedonia, the 
conditioning of constitutional reforms implies the establishment of a constitution that would 
serve both the purpose of creating the unified segment/pillar and the enabling of this brownand 
processes. In this case, the consociational practices affect institutional behavior in two levels. At 
the national level, consociational practices guarantee democratic stability and social cohesion; at 
the international/EU level, these practices help the integration of Macedonia in the EU without 
threatening the EU democratic stability. 
      
 
                                                          
1
 Interview with Arbën Xhaferi, a Member of Sobranie and former Chairman of the Democratic Party of the 
Albanians in Macedonia. As Mr. Xhaferri states: 
Macedonia was founded as an independent republic to resolve the Balkan 
context of that territory between the Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and, inescapably, 
Albanians. To escape the ethnic, geopolitical, and geostrategic frictions, first was 
created Yugoslavia I. Then in Yugoslavia II, that friction-generated territory was 
transformed in the Republic of Macedonia. Now the state was created; what was 
needed was the nation. In that formation process, J. B. Tito elaborated the 
strategy of the Slavo-Macedonian mechanism. While all other nationalisms in 
Tito Yugoslavia were suppressed and oppressed, the Macedonian nationalism 
was the only one that was encouraged. The cultivation of Macedonian 
nationalism, without repercussions and other hurdles, created among the 
Macedonians unrealistic and megalomaniacal aspirations which stifled the 
development of other peoples, especially the Albanians. Such stifling is 
manifested in all the realms of life: employment, culture, education, etc. During 
the 1980s came the prohibition of the Albanian topology, the naming of the 
Albanian babies with Albanian names, the elimination of classes when the 
lessons were conducted only in Albanian and the creation of mix ethnicity 
classes in only Macedonian language. 
2
 See for instance interviews with citizens of Macedonia conducted by Lebamoff and Ilievski (2008). 
3
 As the European Stability Initiative Report (2002: 5) notes in the case of the Macedonian mix populated city of 
Kičevo [in Albanian Kërçovë], ―[t]he majority of urban Macedonians in Kičevo have acquired secondary or higher 
education. Their privileged access to the education system was the key to participating in the benefits of the socialist 
economy, in which jobs were strictly graded according to educational requirements.‖ 
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4
 According to the European Stability Initiative Report (2002: 5) notes, ―the exclusion of Albanians from the 
socialist sector and the benefits it offered have forced them to seek out economic strategies, chiefly labour migration 
and small-scale trade, which have left them much better equipped to survive the collapse of the socialist system.‖ 
5
 A verse from the national anthem of Macedonia. 
6
 Entire paragraphs of this section are borrowed from a paper that I have co-authored with Arben Imami (Peshkopia 
and Imami 2007). 
7
 While the Major Constitutional Provisions stipulated the non-partisanship of the President of Albania, the 
constitutional amendments provided only a President who was not a Chairperson of any party. With Mr. Eduart 
Selami as his puppet Chairman of the PD, Mr. Berisha kept full control of his party.   
8
 The Albanian viewers were accustomed of watching Berisha asserting on his tightly controlled national TV that his 
enemies‘ reason of existence was for him to defeat them. 
9
 During the presentation of his Government program on July 28 1997, the Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano 
stated: ―The necessity of the constitutional reform through its drafting and its approval both in Kuvend and by a 
referendum lies on the widely accepted fact that changes of 1992 were retrograding while its latter amendments did 
not manage to be framed into an organic totality. The necessity of this cornerstone is linked with reform success in 
other institutions, with the establishment of an independent judicial system, the implementation of an efficient 
decentralization of the local governance, and the approval of stabile electoral laws that guarantee free and fair 
elections (The Archive of Kuvend; translated by R.P.). 
10
 Typical for the EE institutional reforms is the involvement of more than one international actor. Often, besides the 
EU, other IOs play role in the sectorial development, with the CoE, OSCE, and some UN agencies among the most 
involved IOs. Among the state actors, the US plays a very important role especially in the Balkans since the lack of 
the democratic stability in the region might destabilize Kosovo, a country where the US has invested much of its 
international credibility.     
11
 See ―Reply to Recommendation 1312 (1997), Doc. 8139, Honouring of obligations and commitments by 
Albania,‖ (The Committee of Ministers, Adopted on 4 June 1998 at the 634th Meeting of the Ministers‘ Deputies).  
12
 Arben Imami, ―Report in Kuvend on the Albanian Constitutional Draft,‖ (Archive of the Kuvend, November 
1998).  
13
 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, ―Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections,  
3 July 2005: Final Report,‖ Warsaw, November 7, 2005, p. 1. 
14
 Ibid, p. 5. 
15
 Ibid, p. 25. 
16
 With the party as an impersonal candidate but also as the only possible donation recipient, there were less 
incentives for cronies of specific candidates to donate to the party headquarters. Moreover, candidates from 
proportional lists have less incentives to individually attack candidates of other parties‘ lists since that would hardly 
benefit them. And finally, the impact of gangs in violating Albanian electoral process is related to the tribal loyalty 
of the clan to its member who happen to run for office. If the candidate is located in a ―safe‖ place in the list, gang 
support for him would be redundant; but if he is not located in a ―safe‖ position, gang violence might not be enough 
to shore him up to electoral victory. 
17
 This was suggested as a revision of our common paper (Peshkopia and Imami 2007) by Mr. Imami who, during 
the process of Constitutional amendments was Premier Berisha‘s Director of the Cabinet [Chief of Staff].  
18
 See ―Tragjedia e Gërdecit, rritet numri i viktimave‖ [The Tragedy of Gërdec, Increases the Number of Victims]. 
Shekulli, March 16, 2008; ―Tragjedia e Gërdecit: Arrestohen drejtori i MEICO dhe pronari i firmës‖ [The Tragedy 
of Gërdec: Arrested the Director of MEICO and the Owner of the Company]. 24 Orë, March 17, 2008.  
19
 Adi Shkëmbi, ―OSBE dhe KE: Dakort me ndryshimet Kushtetuese [OSCE and EC: We Agree with the 
Constitutional Amendments], Panorama (April 23, 2008). 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 For such references, for instance, see Roskin (2002) and Brown (2000).  
22
 See ―EU-Western Balkans Summit – Declaration.‖ 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thes
saloniki_summit_en.htm [Accessed September 28, 2010]. As the Declaration states: 
The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the 
Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within the European 
Union. The ongoing enlargement and the signing of the Treaty of Athens in April 
2003 inspire and encourage the countries of the Western Balkans to follow the 
same successful path. Preparation for integration into European structures and 
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ultimate membership into the European Union, through adoption of European 
standards, is now the big challenge ahead. The Croatian application for EU 
membership is currently under examination by the Commission. The speed of 
movement ahead lies in the hands of the countries of the region. 
For the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, go to 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thes
saloniki_agenda_en.htm [Accessed September 28, 2010].  
23
 Interview with Mr. Arben Imami, by that time Albania‘s Prime Minister Chief of Staff. 
24
 According to an anonymous source from the PD fraction in Kuvend. 
25
 For the notion of constitutional nationalism and the case of Macedonia, see Robert M. Hayden. (1992: 655-6). 
26
 Interview with Arbën Xhaferi, former Chairman of the Democratic Party of the Albanians and member of the 
Parliament of Macedonia.  
27
 In the first draft I wrote that phrase in the form of ―the Macedonian case.‖ Later, after an interview with Arbën 
Xhaferi of the Democratic Party of the Albanians, I realize that such an expression would presume the patronage of 
the Slavic population on the case. Thus, I though it more appropriate to avoid that grammatical form unless I have to 
refer explicitly to other author‘s usage of the ―Slavo-Macedonian‖ form.  However, I had to learn the full lesson yet 
when I have been told by my Macedonian friend that the expression Slavo-Macedonian is insulting to them, and the 
expression Macedonian is the only appropriate way to address them. It was summer 2009, the time when the openly-
declared Slavic origin of the Macedonians (a position defended mainly by the political left) was under attacks and 
the right-wing version of the ancient Macedonian ascendancy of the contemporary Macedonians was progressing 
slowly but surely, in a typical Balkan mythological way. Politics involved too, since the Macedonians needed to 
confront Greece who had blocked the country‘s NATO membership that April in a contention over the mane of the 
country.      
28
 During my efforts to empirically trace the constitutional reform in Macedonia, and, consequentially, the local 
decentralization reform, I refer in several instances to data and their interpretation from Daskalovski‘s book Walking 
on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 1989-2004. Language‘s lack of clarity notwithstanding, 
Daskalovski‘s book is a valuable resource of data and a look on the conflict from within, indeed, too much from 
within. Even through Daskalovski tries to take a more balanced position, for him, ethnic inequalities in Macedonia 
were only ―perceived.‖ In a section that spans from page 114 to page 130, Daskalovski wonders about the ―paradox‖ 
that, while EU, NATO and US diplomats and politicians were harshly criticizing UÇK, they were asking the 
Macedonian government to show proportionality in its response to the crisis, and were also urging constitutional 
changes in the country. He overemphasizes the security concerns over international involvement in Macedonia, but 
is not able to see that those security concerns were threatening the very existence of Macedonia. In tune with the 
Macedonian mood, Daskalovski misses no chance to point to security threats coming to his country from Kosovo, 
hence echoing Macedonian official position that, while it was nothing wrong with the Constitution of 1991 and the 
nation-state, the Macedonian conflict was imported from Kosovo. In spite of immense evidence that Daskalovski 
himself offers, and that clearly show that the only reason why Macedonia today still exists is the international 
intervention to prevent its dissolution by brokering an agreement, Daskalovski seems inclined to share the 
Macedonian official view and the ubiquitous conviction that, as Mr. Xhaferi has pointed out in an interview with the 
author, what happened was ―an international conspiracy where Albanians were only an instrument.‖ As Mr. Xhaferi 
comments the constitutional amendments spurn from the Ohrid Agreement 
There are attempts in Macedonia to offer Albanians unemployable rights. The 
Constitution and laws provide unrestricted laws, but only verbally. It was built so 
as to create psychological leverage during the implementation process as well as 
during the negotiations, with the Macedonian part lacking negotiation will. This 
sort of perpetual intransigence negatively influenced the agreement as well as 
demonstrated the lack of willingness to implement it. As such, this Agreement 
incarnated the end of war by correcting some Articles that justified inequality, 
namely the ethnocentric concept of state built on a multiethnic social 
environment. Hence, when the consensus for the concept of state to represent the 
multiethnic reality of Macedonia was achieved, that reflection was not an 
optimal one due to the conviction of Macedonian negotiators that the war an 
international conspiracy where Albanians were only an instrument. The 
obstructions to the implementation of the Agreement come only from 
Macedonians. Now (2009) after eight years, not only the topics of the Agreement 
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concerning the representation of diversities in the concept of state are not 
implemented, but such agreements have been annulated or modified, i. e., the 
official application of the Albanian language, the adequate representation, 
decentralization, territorial organization, the official application of the flag, the 
agreement for the status of former warriors in the conflict of 2001,  the amnesty 
for all the participant in that conflict, except for cases that would eventually be 
proceeded by the Hague Tribunal as well as meeting the deadline for the 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, that is, year 2004 (translated from 
Albanian by R. P).            
Moreover, following Daskalovski‘s course of the conflict, one reads only for government‘s military 
success; then, all of the sudden, the rebels take Aračinovo and, practically, began the siege of the capital. 
Daskalovski justifies government‘s moderate use of force with international pleas for restrain. However, UÇK 
leaders have told me that the Macedonian government spared no military resources to achieve an impossible victory. 
On the contrary, UÇK fighters stated that they were constrained in use of violence since much of the combat 
unraveled in Albanian heavy populated territories. As my source went on, the reason for this nature of our struggle 
was that we wanted to liberate our territories from Macedonians, not occupy their territories.    
29
 As Lebamoff and Ilievski (2008: 8) point out  
[t]here is evidence that newly independent Republic of Macedonia  
was constructed in a manner that protects Macedonian ethno-national  
identity. While ethnic Albanians have kin states of Albania and Kosovo,  
the Republic of Macedonia is considered as critical to the protection  
and nurturance of the Macedonian ethno-nation by ethnic Macedonians.  
Yet Albanian Macedonians were fearful of repression and second-class  
citizen status if the new state remained defined in Macedonian ethno- 
nationalist terms, particularly since they were (at Macedonian independence  
in 1991, and today) underrepresented in public employment, higher  
education, the sciences, the military and law enforcement, and white- 
collar professions. 
30
 Lebamoff and Ilievski (2008: 37); see also Daskalovski (2006) 
31
 Borba, October 17, 1990, p. 4, cited from Hayden (1992). 
32
 Hayden (1992),  p. 659. 
33
 Interview with Arbën Xhaferi. 
34
 Lebamoff and Ilievski (2008: 15) cite the former Deputy Prime Minister Vasil Tupurkovski recounting in an 
interview, ―Macedonian political elites did not accept the idea of reaching an ‗historical agreement with our ethnic 
Albanians.‘‖  
35
 Cited from Lebamoff and Ilievski (2008: 13). In a conversation with the Deputy Chairman of Sobranie and 
Chairman of PDP Abdurraman Aliti in 1995, he offered a very similar explanation for the reason of the Albanians‘ 
participation in the Macedonian political system. He added the Albanian fear that an unstable Macedonia would 
have been an attractive lure for the militaristic Serbia; and also emphasized his confidence that participating in the 
system would be better to improve the position of the Albanians in the Macedonian society. The events to come 
proved him right.  
36
 Opinion No. 6 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (1992) 31 ILM 1507 
37
 ―Me punue brenda sistemit‖ [working within the system] was the literally nomination of the Albanian politics in 
Macedonia during the 1990s.   
38
 According to Marko (2004), the number of Albanian judges increased from 1.7% of the total judges in 1991 to 
8.7% in 1996; the number of Albanian Macedonian students increased from  the share of 6.4% that they had at the 
University of Prishtina in 1991, to 15.7% in the Macedonian universities in the academic year 1997-1998.  In an 
interview with the Albanian Deputy Minister of Education of Macedonia Hasan Jashari in summer 1995, he revealed 
that the number of the Albanian high schools have increased from five to nineteen (Sejdiaj 1998: 214).  
39
 Cited from Daskalovski (2006: 73). 
40
 Albanians boycotted the Referendum for Independence held on September 8, 1991, as well as the population 
censuses of 1992 and 1994.   
41
 For instance, on March 31, 1992, up to 40,000 Albanians demonstrated in the Macedonian capital Skopje, asking 
the international community not to recognize Macedonia as an independent country ―until the state grants 
Macedonian Albanians the right to autonomy in regions and villages where ethnic Albanians make up the majority‖ 
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(Daskalovski 2006: 68); moreover, at a December 1992 press conference, one of the leaders of the PPD-NDP 
alliance Muhamed Halili warned that, if Macedonian elites do not change policy, the Albanians will seek to achieve 
their ends ―through acts of civil disobedience (cf. Daskalovski 2006: 69); as for the Albanian project of political 
autonomy, I have already mentioned their symbolic act of declaration of independence in an unrecognized 
referendum in January 1992, as well as the formal act of the declaration of the Albanian Autonomous Republic of 
Ilirida in the Southwestern Macedonian city of Struga, April 1992.       
42
 When, during my conversations with Mr. Abdurraman Aliti in the period 1994-1996, he was listing to me the long 
list of Albanian complains, I was asking him whether or not they had a chance to explain this situation to the 
Macedonian elites and foreign officials, he used to assert: ―many times.‖ The same answer of the same question has 
been given to me during my current exchange and interview with Mr. Arbën Xhaferri.  
43
 The ―weapons affair‖ is one of the murkiest spots in Macedonia‘s recent history, and a deep scar in the interethnic 
relations in the post-Yugoslav Macedonia. In late September 1993, nine Albanians, including the then Macedonia‘s 
Vice-Minister of Defense Hysen Haskaj and Vice Minister of Health Imer Imeri, both from PPD, were arrested; in 
January of the next year, the Secretary General of PPD Mitat Emini was added to the list of arrests, all of them 
charged with conspiracy to organize armed gangs. The passionate involvement of the Albanian government in 
accusing Mr. Emini as a betrayer of the Albanian cause, and its officials‘ involvement in restructuring, and 
consequentially splitting PPD, continues to remain a mystery for those who were attentively following the 
Macedonian developments in the early 1990s. A trial was staged against them in 1994, and a Macedonian dominated 
Court found all of them guilty, and sentenced them with jail time ranging from five to eight years. In an interview 
with Mr. Emini several years after he served one year jail time, Fiqiri Sejdiaj cites Mr. Emini to maintain that the so 
called armed gangs were in fact self-organized Albanian villagers in the border of Macedonia with the then Serbian 
occupied Kosova who were trying to defend themselves against incursions of Arkan-led and Sheshel-led Serbian 
paramilitaries who were in the business of terrorizing and looting Albanian villages throughout Kosova and, 
apparently, Northwest Macedonia as well (Sejdiaj 1998: 91-108). 
 Moreover, reportedly, in June 1992, the Macedonian police discovered in the Albanian inhabited village of 
Radolishta on the Ohrid Lake, near the border with Albania, ―a cache full with illegal weapons, explosives, 
ammunitions, and paramilitary uniforms‖ (Daskalovski 2006: 68). 
 On July 22, 1998, three bombs exploded in three different Macedonian cities: Skopje, Kumanovo, and 
Priljep. Kosovo Liberation Army claimed responsibility for all the three explosions which caused only material 
damages (Daskalovski 2006: 74).     
44
 Sometimes, authors refer to the mysterious term ―foreign mercenaries‖ as members of UÇK; yet, during my 
frequent contacts with political and military leaders of both KLA and UÇK, they have credibly dismissed any 
involvement of foreign fighters in the Albanian insurgency in both Kosovo and Macedonia.     
45
 There is a widespread tendency to consider the Macedonian crisis as a spillover of the Kosovo war (Lebamoff and 
Ilievski 2008; Ilievski 2007; Ragaru 2007;  Daskalovski 2006; Micheva 2005; Brunnbauer 2002; ESI 2002; 
Schneckener 2002) along with the recognition that the way it was built, the Macedonian stability could not last long. 
However, the emphasis on what Mincheva (2005) calls ―the emergence of a transborder non-state actor‖ (ETMS) as 
a causal factor of the Macedonian conflict might be misleading. As the historical analysis in this Chapter shows, the 
Albanian ETMS is more an effect than a cause of the conflict; the long list of complains among the Albanians in 
Macedonia over at least a decade of the Macedonian independence and the reluctance of the Macedonians to 
recognize them as a constitutive part of the country bred frustrations that occasionally burst in demonstrations and 
open public defiance to the Macedonian dominated government. ETMS might not be a ―useful unit of analysis,‖ as 
Mincheva claims, if it tries to shift too much of a causality on the external factors.      
46
These messages  ranged from ―we don‘t want to endanger Macedonia‘s stability and integrity, but we will fight a 
guerrilla war until we have won our basic rights, until we are accepted as equal people in Macedonia‖ to statements 
asserting that UÇK was fighting for an ―independent, separate Albanian state of Western Macedonia‖ (Ilievski 2007: 
7). 
47
 Time Magazine (October or November 2002). 
48
 Timothy Garton Ash considers the Albanian guerrilla in Macedonia as an ―astonishingly successful seven-month 
campaign.‖ See Ash, Timothy Garton. ―Is There a Good Terrorist?‖ The New York Review of Books November 29, 
2001. At http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/nov/29/is-there-a-good-terrorist . [Accessed November 13, 
2010].  
49
 By early June 2001, UÇK took control of the Albanian inhabited village of Aračino that overview the country‘s 
capital Skopje. While the move did not represent any major military success since the village lacked any presence of 
security forces, it represented a major psychological and public relation success for UÇK: in matter of months, its 
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units managed to reach the gates of the capital, and also put some of the country‘s main industries within the range 
of their mortars. Government‘s military efforts to recapture the village failed after meeting fierce resistance. On June 
11, an EU and US brokered ceasefire was announced, but violated on June 22 as government troops pushed to gain 
the village. Their unsuccessful military operation ended again as the Chief of EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy Javier Solana brokered another ceasefire. On June 25, the US personnel of the KFOR observed the 
withdrawal of Albanian fighters from Arachino. When several months later I asked one of the political leaders of 
UÇK about the reasons of their withdrawal from Arachino, he told me that in no way the Albanian fighters would 
oppose US demands. Denying any leverage of Solana brokerage, he told me: ―Some high ranking US militaries 
came to us and asked us to leave the village because our presence was interfering with their mission in Kosovo. 
Although Arachino is besides the highway that connects Skopje with Prishtina, we could not understand how our 
presence in Arachino was interfering with NATO operations in Kosovo, but we did not want even remotely of being 
accused as disturbing NATO after all the help that they have given to Albanians of Kosovo.‖   
50
 See ―Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International 
Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans.‖ At http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13219. [Accessed 
November 13, 2010].  
51
 Timothy Garton Ash. ―Is There a Good Terrorist?‖ 
52
 ―Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council, 23-24 March 2001.‖ At 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.%20ann-r1.en1.html. [Accessed 
November 13, 2010]. 
53
 My emphasis. 
54
 In the period between November 2005 and December 2009, the Mission of the European Union acted as a single 
representation of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers of the European Union stemming from the 
double function of Ambassador Erwan Fouéré—being both European Union Special Representative and Head of the 
Delegation of the European Commission. With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the 
EU was represented in Macedonia by the Delegation of the European Union, as foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The EU High Representatives ever since the establishment of the Office have been as follows: Alain le Roy 
(October 29, 2001-October 30, 2002), Alexis Brouhns (November 1, 2002-January 31, 2004), 
Soren Jessen-Petersen (February 1,2004-August 31, 2004), Michael Sahlin (September 1, 2004-October 30, 
2005) and Erwan Fouéré (November 1, 2005-...) acted in turn as EU representatives. E. Fouéré was appointed 
both head of the Delegation of the European Commission and EUSR, following the fusion of the former Office for 
the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement with the EC Delegation (Raganu 2007: note 12).  
55
 As (Ragaru 2007: 10) reveal 
Amnesty for the former insurgents13 and refugee returns were amongst the 
issues that provoked heated controversies in the months following the end of the 
infighting. Despite President Boris Trajkovski‘s (VMRO-DPMNE) firm 
commitment to the Ohrid process, political tensions remained high until the 
September 2002 parliamentary elections that saw the victory of the (more 
moderate) Social-Democratic Alliance (SDSM) and the formation of a coalition 
in which the Albanians were represented by the Union for Democratic 
Integration (DUI), an Albanian party initiated in June 2002 byformer NLA chief, 
Ali Ahmeti. With some of Macedonia‘s most flamboyant nationalists out of 
office - former Interior minister, Ljube Boškovski, former Prime Minister, 
Ljubčo Georgievski -, [sic] the implementation of the Ohrid Accords [sic] went 
smoother.....at least until decentralization and redistricting were put on the 
agenda in 2003-2004. 
56
 Donald G. McNeil Jr., ―NATO Conditionally Approves Troops for Macedonia.‖ New York Times, August 22, 
2001. 
57
 George W. Bush (2003). ―Statement on the Situation in Macedonia,‖ March 23. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=45952 [Accessed October 1, 2009]. 
58
 Timothy Garton Ash. ―Is There a Good Terrorist?‖ 
59
 The International Crisis Group (2003). ―Macedonia: No Room for Complacency.‖ Europe Report N°149, October 
23. 
60
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secondly, all ethnic groups including the majority population are recognized as 
(equal) communities by designating them peoples. Nevertheless, the preamble 
has returned to the concept of group equality without, however, giving the 
nation-state concept priority. In comparison to the constitutions of other ex-
Yugoslav republics such as Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which all give preference to the respective majority nation(s), this new mix in the 
preamble of the Macedonian Constitution can indeed be called the formula for a 
‗multiethnic‘ state and society requiring the development of multiple identities. 
With this new formula the term ―Macedonia‖ is no longer exclusively connected 
to Slav Macedonians and hence allows for the development of a feeling of 
belonging to this state and its society for the other ethnic communities too. This 
will also facilitate the chance to overcome the exclusive ethnonational identities 
which dominate in particular among members of the Albanian Macedonian  
community (‗auto-ghettoization‘) and to develop the required multiple identity 
both with the ethnic community and the state. 
66
 Timothy Garton Ash. ―Is There a Good Terrorist?‖ 
67
 However, in particular Turks are put under pressure to assimilate into the Albanian Macedonian community where 
the Albanian Macedonian are in the majority. See International Crisis Group (ICG)(ed.), ―Macedonia: No Room For 
Complacency‖, ICG Europe Report no. 149, October 2003, 23, at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/49_macedonia_no_room_for_complacency.pdf [Accessed 
October 3, 2010]; (cf. Marko 2004/5: note 53]. 
68
 Taleski, Misko (2010). ―Macedonia‘s Thorny Path to the EU.‖ SETimes.com,  
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/09/16/feature-02 [Accessed 
October 5, 2010]. 
69
 According to interviews with Abdurraman Aliti and Arbën Xhaferi. 
70
 An rational interpretation of ―sticks and carrots‖ would help to see leaders‘ preferences adjusted accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Ridvan Peshkopia 2011 
 
 
124 
 
CHAPTER V 
LOCAL DECENTRALIZATION REFORM 
 
 
The different mechanisms employed by the EU to transmit consociational practices to 
countries undergoing democratization can be better understood through a comparison of 
local decentralization reforms in Albania and Macedonia. In a unified society such as 
Albania, the involvement of the EU in that sectorial reform was minor. However, two 
other regional organizations, the CoE and OSCE stepped in to assist the Albanian 
government with the technicalities of reform. As for Macedonia, local decentralization 
reform represented the core of the Ohrid Agreement and was one of the most important 
consociational practices designed to maintain social cohesion. However, although the 
country conducted groundbreaking decentralization reform due to the implementation of 
the Agreement, it still lags far behind Albania. While both countries started with different 
local government systems, between 1992 and 2002 these systems became remarkably 
similar. Since that time, they have moved at different rates.  
An historical analysis of the reform process reveals that some of the problems 
related to fiscal decentralization continue to linger in Macedonia as well as Albania. This 
chapter shows that, while Albania follows a typical Eastern European path toward local 
decentralization, the case of Macedonian decentralization reform involves more complex 
dynamics since policy choices and implementation reflect the peculiar Macedonian social 
context, that is, the seemingly impossible task of decentralizing local government while 
consolidating a unitary nation-state out of a society deeply divided along ethnic lines.    
 While the motivations of political actors involved the Albanian and Macedonian 
decentralization are different and producing distinct policy outcomes, it is necessary to 
outline some similarities that will add context. The most important similarity between the 
Albanian and Macedonian decentralization reforms—one which they share with other 
EECs—is the debate between deconcentration and decentralization policies. Referring to 
Illner (1998; 1997), deconcentration is understood as a process whereby government 
functions are shifted downward within the hierarchical system of state bureaucracy, 
without weakening the vertical hierarchy of the system; deconcentration units remain 
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vertically subordinated to central authorities. According to the same authors, 
decentralization means the devolution of functions of the state to autonomous territorial 
governments that can act without consultation with central governments. Decentralization 
can be interpreted based on two competing philosophies of state: a communitarian, 
conservative approach would see local government as deriving from a central authority 
and enjoying as much autonomy as granted by the central government; and the 
individualist, liberal tradition that views local government as primary and the central 
government as its derivative simply to resolve the dilemmas of collective action among 
local communities (Illner 1998: 9).  
Difficulties with EE decentralization reforms consist of the incompatibility 
between the Eastern European communitarian view of the state and their aspiration to 
implement Western European, individualist models of governance. According to the 
liberal model, local government promotes citizen participation in governance; is more 
responsive to their concerns and more able to find acceptable solutions to their problems; 
offers a counterweight to an authoritarian state (Illner 1998: 9; Baldersheim et al 1996: 4); 
and is most effective in delivering services to meet local needs (Illner 1998: 9; Goldsmith 
1992). As for functions that might fall outside of a strict individualist approach or reflect 
a communitarian culture of governance, decentralization provides opportunities for the 
development of a new elite (Illner 1998: 9; Baldersheim et al. 1996: 4), creates a sense of 
place or community (Illner 1998: 9; Goldsmith 1992), and is an element of ―civil society‖ 
or a bridge linking civil society to the central state (Illner 1998: 9). A communitarian 
approach, thus, would consider local decentralization as a gift that central government 
offers to local communities at its own expense. Arguably,  
Political actors perceive the reform of regional-level 
administration as more relevant to the distribution of 
political power than was the local reform, and it became, 
therefore, intensely disputed—conflicts have led eventually 
to a political stalemate that blocked further progress (Illner 
1998: 25). 
Further elaborated, such a reluctance of the central government to relinquish its 
grip on local issues satisfies several needs: the need to maintain control of economic and 
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political development during the still volatile postsocialist transformation; the need to 
control the distribution of scarce resources during transition periods of recession or crisis; 
the need to control, and possibly level social differences among territorial units in order to 
prevent the marginalization of some regions and the resulting social and political tensions 
that would endanger social cohesion and stability; and the need to formulate policies 
aimed at maintaining national integration in a general atmosphere of societal 
fragmentation, resulting from structural reforms (Illner 1998: 26; Elander 1995).  
 As Illner (1998: 10) points out, three sets of socio-political contextual factors 
influence territorial reforms: (1) the political, administrative, and psychological legacies 
of the communist era; (2) the prevailing expectations toward decentralization; and (3) the 
political context of the reforms. As we have already discussed in Chapter 2, Illner‘s first 
and third factors are also elements of my argument, while Illner‘s second factor can be 
easily merged with either. Thus, while euphoric expectations concerning democratization 
prevailed in the early postsocialist EE, Illner (Ibid.) also points to ―a popular distrust of 
institutions, of any political representation, and of formal procedures; as well as 
unwillingness of citizens to get involved in public matters and to hold public office.‖ The 
source of such feelings can easily be traced to the political experiences during 
communism of citizens in general and the local government in particular.
1
 They are also 
embedded in the political context of reforms since the latter can affect people‘s 
expectations of distinct reforms.
2
    
 The political, administrative, and psychological legacies of the communist era 
include low expectations of local government and a general view that it is merely an 
extension of the central government (Bird, Ebel, and Wallich 1996). Under the principles 
of ―democratic centralism‖ and ―homogenous state authority,‖ both secured under 
communist party hegemony, local officials were simply party officials who merely 
implemented local administrative functions of minor political and economic relevance. 
Some authors (Illner 1998, 1993; Coulson 1995; Elander 1995) have pointed to the 
differences between the official ideological model of territorial government in communist 
regimes and its practical application, highlighting the leverage wielded by major state-run 
economic enterprises. The enormous financial resources and employment capacities of 
these enterprises often made them the effective power center in the territories where they 
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exercised their activity, hence mounting another challenge to the local government 
besides the communist party‘s ideological centralism (Illner 1992). Moreover, referring 
mainly to the most developed and, ostensibly, liberal communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe, some authors claim that local governance was far from static since reform 
attempts had been undertaken in some of these countries as early as 1961 in 
Czechoslovakia, 1973-1975 in Poland, and 1984 in Hungary. These reforms contributed 
to the centralization of the territorial structure of public administration (Illner 1998: 13). 
Other attempts to introduce modest elements of decentralization and democratization 
touched the fundamentals of the system. Efforts to reform the atrophied local governance 
in these countries were under way by the late 1980s when the collapse of communist 
regimes brought to an end the old local government system and cleared the path for local 
decentralization reforms. However, one should keep in mind that decentralization efforts 
during communist regimes were not equally spread throughout the region.    
The legacies of communism in Albania and Macedonia present similarities and 
differences both in quantity and quality. Albania‘s local government was a typical 
Stalinist one: an elected assembly, called Këshilli Popullor [People Council]; an 
executive committee elected by Këshilli called Komiteti Ekzekutiv [Executive 
Committee]; a council chairman for lower tiers called Kryetari i Këshillit [Chairman of 
the Council]; and a council chairman for higher tiers called Kryetari i Komitetit Ekzekutiv 
[Chairman of the Executive Committee]. Of course, Partia e Punës (PP) [Labor‘s Party, 
the Albanian communist party] had its own officials in all of these territorial structures, 
but hardly anyone saw local government as being anything different than a party 
extension in local administrative affairs. Thus, whether it was Sekretari i Partisë [Party 
Secretary] or Kryetari i Këshillit/Kryetari i Komitetit, the person who ran local affairs, the 
authority often rested with the personality of that particular official rather than written 
codes. As for Macedonia, the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 practically turned that 
country into a federation of municipalities where local taxes generated resources for each 
level of political administration: federal, republican, regional, and municipal. For 
instance, due to some special taxes, the municipality was able to pay salaries even for 
military personnel dislocated in its territory. Arguably, this was Tito‘s policy to affect the 
transformation of the Yugoslav republics into national-states.
3
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The poor Albanian economy and PP‘s vigilance any potential rival in exercising 
power left no room for economic enterprises to influence local government activity. In 
fact, in the Albanian predominantly agrarian economy, few enterprises were large enough 
to affect local policies. Yet, in the Yugoslav Macedonia where economic enterprises were 
the direct fiscal source for local units—and through them, of the entire administrative 
hierarchy—the intermingling of the economic sector and local administration was more 
obvious and effective. This explains why Albanians in Albania and those in Macedonia 
initially had different expectations from their local governments. In Albania, the voices in 
favor of local decentralization had been relatively weak until October 2000 when Edi 
Rama from Partia Socialiste (PS) [Socialist Party] became the first socialist major of the 
capital city of Tirana since the introduction of pluralism. He vigorously opened up the 
debate over local decentralization. In contrast, Macedonian authorities hoped that 
substantial local autonomy would serve Albanian demands for federalism.  
As for pre-communist legacies, my interviews with politicians from Albania and 
Macedonia revealed that hardly any of them had any recollections of pre-WWII local 
administration systems. During this era, Albanian society was organized into communes 
where it was difficult to find any literate person, and officials were appointed from the 
Ministria e Brendëshme (MB) [Ministry of Interior]. The situation was similar in 
Macedonia. Yet, since the Macedonian territory was considered simply as the southern 
region of Serbia, communal officials were imported from Serbia whose main goal was to 
promote Serbian consciousness and nationalism. Since in both countries two to three 
generations were born after the pre-communist period, hardly anyone was able to assess 
whether such a system was able to work.             
    As for the political-context-of-reform factor, a deeper elaboration is needed. 
Arguing that political considerations prevailed over principles such as efficiency, 
representation, and promotion of local values, Illner (1998: 17) points out: 
Expediency was an important factor in the implementation 
of the reforms: the need to build a new system of territorial 
administration in the postcommunist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe was viewed as a political task that could 
not be postponed—a delay would have had a negative 
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impact on economic and political components of the 
transformation.  
True, this was the case of the initial reforms in most of Eastern Europe, however, the 
momentum of territorial reform was lost with the exhaustion of most of the post-
revolutionary enthusiasm. By 1998, time was no longer on the side of decentralization. 
The local government system produced in Albania by the Law on the Organization and 
Functioning of the Local Government and the Law on the Elections of Local 
Government, July 1992 established local government which, being structurally different 
from those of the communist era, provided little more services than the communist 
councils.  
Moreover, to make things worse, destitute as it was, the country entered into a 
difficult period of economic restructuring through a shock-therapy strategy that brought 
the entire economy to an immediate standstill. Land distribution even turned out to be 
counterproductive in face of an impoverished and demoralized peasantry who were more 
interested in migrating than cultivating the land. As for Macedonia, elites‘ interests in 
decentralization seem to be different than those of Eastern European countries with 
established sovereignty and statehood. Rather than taking advantage of the already 
decentralized local government, Macedonians centralized the governance as an assertion 
of sovereignty and nation-state building (Selami and Risteska 2009). Until 2005, the local 
government in Macedonia reflected the Macedonian concern that any kind of 
decentralization would nourish further demands by Albanians for autonomy, 
federalization and, ultimately, secession. Statehood issues and uncertainties that the new 
Macedonia faced in a hostile Balkan environment led to an emphasis on independence 
rather than democratization and government efficiency. The fervor for establishing the 
Macedonianess of the new country prevented any momentum for decentralization in the 
first place.           
Thus, while local decentralization reforms should have taken into consideration 
principles of efficiency and good governance, the Eastern European decentralization 
reforms proved to serve symbolic politics. As a consequence, local government 
restructuring mirrored structural changes in Eastern European societies, but with little 
practical applicability. As Illner (1998: 17) argues, political concerns were of primary 
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importance while administrative and economic concerns were secondary. Thus, we can 
look for answers in the political context of the reforms. This context in Albania reflects 
the tug-of-war between central and local governments over competences to design and 
implement policies related to local issues. Such a tug-of-war is almost inexistent when the 
same party controls the central government and the most economically productive local 
units, but becomes acute when power is divided. For Macedonia, that tug-of-war was an 
intrinsic part of the ethnic clashes between the Macedonian dominated central 
government and the Albanian dominated local government in the western part of the 
country, a region with a large population and some of the wealthiest municipalities in the 
country.      
 
 
The Politics of Local Decentralization in Albania: Denying Yourself What You 
Don’t Want Your Rival to Have 
Albania inherited a Soviet style local government established only to implement 
centralized government policies and control the population, with no input in or access to 
the decision-making process (Rhodio and Van Cauwenberghe 2006: 1-2). Although 
during the first years of transition the focus was mainly on reforms related to building 
central institutions, a number of laws and by-laws defining the responsibilities of local 
governments were approved (Hoxha 2002: 6).  
The first attempt to reform the local government was made on July 1992 with the 
Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Local Government and the Law on the 
Elections of Local Government. Both assigned considerable political autonomy to local 
authorities, some services in favor of local communities, and greater administrative and 
financial autonomy. These laws enshrined the principle of local self-governance as one of 
the basic goals and principles of local governance in Albania.
4
 Yet the process was frozen 
when Partia Demokratike (PD) [Democratic Party], who held a parliamentary majority 
and controlled the government, lost ground to the PS in the local elections of July 26, 
1992. Moreover, although the law asserted the autonomy of the local government, it did 
not provide the authority and necessary instruments for its exercise. A local authority 
controlled by the opposition that could develop policies, raise and use funds, and employ 
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people independently of the central government was against the concept of the strictly 
centralized governance carried out that time by the PD.  
The PD‘s overwhelming victory in the local elections of October 1996 might have 
been a golden opportunity for the Albanian decentralization reform. However, the 
crumbling of the financial Ponzi schemes that flourished during the PD‘s rule, between 
1992-1996, as well as skewed political representation in the legislature and local 
governments generated by the May 1996 rigged parliamentary elections stirred popular 
unrest, massive riots, and armed conflict throughout the nation.  
The Socialist-Centrist coalition that emerged after the elections of June 1997 had 
to work with the PD controlled local government; therefore, there was no pressure for the 
central government to undertake decentralization reforms. Yet, the Council of Europe 
began to pressure the Albanian government to ratify the European Charter of Local Self 
Government (ECLSG) as an obligation of membership. The Albanian ratification of 
ECLSG in November 1999 was followed by incremental steps toward reforms related to 
financial decentralization undertaken during the same year. These reforms included the 
establishment of block-grants by the central government and the permission to select 
sectors of administrative expenditures; the transferring to the local government of 
revenues locally collected by property taxation as well as the responsibility of collecting 
and administering these tax proceeds; the lifting of public expenditure limits; and the 
permission to transfer into future years unexpended revenues of local budgets and block-
grants. 
In November 1998, a new constitution was passed first by the parliament and later 
by a referendum. Regarding local autonomy, Article 108 of the new constitution followed 
the 1994 version by also accepting the principle of local self-government. In December 
2000, the government adopted the Strategjinë Kombëtare për Decentralizim dhe 
Autonomi Vendore [National Strategy for Decentralisation and Local Autonomy],
5
 a 
document that defines a long term reform of the local government decentralization 
process. The document included a decentralization schedule, resources, and specified the 
role and involvement of key actors. The strategy was the guideline for decentralization 
reform and served as a reference document for reforms in other sectors that affected the 
decentralization process. From this point of view, the strategy could stimulate a wider 
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array of reforms involving decentralization of health and education policies, public 
works, police, and the fiscal system. The document anticipated a process that would take 
several years.
6
 Moreover, in 2000, the parliament passed Law No. 8652 On the 
Organisation and Functioning of Local Government (hereinafter the 2000 Law) and a 
number of other laws that concluded the legislative process of establishing democratic 
local government in Albania (Rhodio and Van Cauwenberghe 2006: 2). 
Thus, the December 1998-July 2000 period witnessed intensive political and 
legislative activity toward local government and decentralization reform.
7
 This process 
was affected by the approaching October 2000 local elections and the expectations that 
the ruling PS-led government coalition would win these elections. Indeed, ever since 
socialists assumed power in the summer of 1997, they were able to restore public order in 
most regions of the country, maintain 6-8 percent annual growth rates, and reduce 
inflation to below 4 percent annually. These successes and the weak PD opposition 
strengthened the PS‘ confidence that they would achieve victory in the local elections. 
Amidst high expectations stemming from the mayoral candidacy of then Minister of 
Culture Edi Rama, the PS passed in Kuvend a special law that would govern the Tirana 
municipality. Indeed, during 1999-2000, the PS-led coalition was preparing a 
decentralization framework that would serve its members once they assumed office.     
         The legislative framework that underpinned the 1999-2000 decentralization reform 
helped the country to comply with nineteen ECLSG articles, eleven of which were core 
articles. Yet, since the 2000 Law was implemented in two phases, January 2001 and 
January 2002, it took two years before Albanian legislation became compatible with 
paragraph 9.3 of the ECLSG related to local finances. Moreover, some topics have only 
partially fulfilled the ECLSG‘s standards;8 the Albanian legislation has yet to align with 
the ECLSG on issues related to the control of the central government over the local 
administration.
9
  
         Although the constitutional and legislative bases of Albanian local government 
conform to a great extent to the norms established by the Council of Europe and to best 
practices in Western Europe, the actual practices of local administration are beset with 
difficulties. A number of laws, passed before the constitutional guarantees of local 
autonomy and the 2000 Law, are not in harmony with the principles of local self-
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government. Laws that have led to conflicts between central and local governments 
include the law establishing construction police, the law on urban planning which sets up 
national planning agencies, as well as urban planning agencies, and the law on 
prefectures. 
         As in other Eastern European countries, a deconcentration process occurred in 
Albania, paralleling thus the country‘s decentralization process. A number of ministries 
established their offices—called directories—in many of the prefectures. These offices 
were directly subordinate to the central government. In a duplication of efforts, 
municipalities created their own offices for the same public services. Regional councils, 
composed of municipality council delegates, also established departments that covered 
the same areas. And finally, prefects developed their own duplicative administrative units 
to cover public health, agriculture, and education. Such a proliferation demonstrates the 
competition over competences between the central government and local government. On 
the one hand, the central government distrusted local government administrative 
capabilities as well as their desire to continue controlling the allocation of resources; on 
the other, local government was being increasingly aware of its potential role in local 
administration. One explanation shared by both central and local governments was that 
power holders from all parties rewarded political supporters with public offices.     
         The key problem of Albanian decentralization was financial decentralization. Due to 
limited tax collection capabilities, most municipalities relied on national financial 
resources that, for example, between 1998 and 2000 covered 93-96 percent of their total 
revenues. These figures remained unchanged during 2001 because the newly elected local 
authorities could not implement the new Law on Organization and Functioning of the 
Local Government.
10
 During this period, local governments were unable to anticipate the 
receipt of any federal grants since the central government had implemented only ad hoc 
procedures. The central government had steadily increased the ration of unconditioned 
grants compared to the conditioned ones. However, the looming 1/3 to 2/3 ratio in favor 
of conditioned grants demonstrated the continuing mistrust of the central government 
toward the administrative capabilities of local governments, as well as its inclination to 
control the orientation of government grants. The PS‘ efforts to decentralize local 
government peaked on the eve of the 2000 local elections, coming to a standstill in 2002 
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due to the fact that the PS dominated government sought to politically control the 
investments of local governments.  
Financial decentralization was not the only reform that stalled; the transfer of 
utility companies from central government management to local administration as well as 
the reassignment of property evaluation and registration responsibilities from central to 
local governments were also suspended. The result was that many PS-controlled 
municipalities in southern Albania received as much as 15 times more government grants 
that some PD controlled municipalities in the northern part of the country. Upon taking 
office in August 2005, the PD government instituted a policy to balance that 
misdistribution by increasing the financial support to the northern municipalities and 
distributing unconditioned grants directly to local authorities. Thus, by narrowing the gap 
of 15 to1 ratio to a 10 to 6 ratio, the PD has endeavored to satisfy its own constituents in 
Northern Albania.
11
  
          It is worth noting that the intensive legislative drafting process for the local 
decentralization reforms of December 1998-July 2000 occurred during a period when the 
parliamentary majority belonged to a socialist-centrist coalition led by the PS, while local 
power in the majority of municipalities belonged to the opposition PD. On the other hand, 
although financial decentralization progressed during 2000-2002 when both the central 
government and most local municipalities were controlled by the Socialist Party, the 
reform did not meet ECLSG standards. Sources within the Albanian government during 
this period have revealed to me that the slow pace of decentralization resulted from the 
power struggle within the ruling PS between the Prime Minister Ilir Meta and PS 
Chairman Fatos Nano. In that struggle, the prime minister was able to reward mayors for 
their support and punish those who backed Mr. Nano.
12
 Decentralization reform therefore 
practically came to a standstill in last three years of PS government rule, 2002-2005.   
         Upon reclaiming power in 2005, the PD undertook efforts to increase the 
disbursement of unconditioned grants for civil work projects and pledged to transfer 
water utility management to local administrations. The PD undertook these actions to 
show that now it favored decentralization, thus enhancing its prospects for winning the 
upcoming fall 2006 local elections. But, such a pro-decentralization stance may also have 
been taken because it was in the rational interest of the party to unburden itself of the 
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cumbersome and costly task of managing local utilities and services. As the Albanian 
Prime Minister Sali Berisha reiterated in the Conference for the Donors‘ Activity 
Coordination in Decentralization and Local Government held in Tirana on May 2006, the 
retention of centralized health and education services ―would bring only the relentless 
decrease of the service quality, of teaching and health care.‖13 In that conference, Mr. 
Berisha laid out his government‘s plan for decentralization: the transfer of the water 
utility service to local government, the expansion of local fiscal autonomy, the increase of 
government grants, the transfer of state owned properties, and the transfer of health and 
education services to local authorities.
14
  
However, four years after that pledge, state owned and centrally controlled 
companies continue to run water and sewer utilities, and local officials from the 
opposition PS are still forcefully demanding their transfer to local governments, as stated 
by law.
15
 The 2009 Freedom House‘s Report on Nations in Transit Rankings and Average 
Score notes that decentralization remains one of the main challenges facing local 
government in Albania. The Report goes on to note that the National Decentralization 
Strategy aims at completing the institutional framework for the transfer of responsibilities 
for local taxes, water pipes, and sewers to municipalities as well as loans to local 
government in order to facilitate the capital investments necessary for better services. 
Local authorities have opposed the way the government plans to transfer the water and 
sewers enterprises to local government since it includes only the transfer of bonds but not 
the management of the companies who run these services. These companies are projected 
to remain under the authority of the central government.
16
 
In 2006, management of the small-business tax was fully transferred to local 
government, and in one year, collections increased significantly. This achievement was 
reversed a little more than a year later when, on January 1, 2008, the government cut the 
fiscal burden of this tax in half, causing an immediate drop in the amount of taxes that 
local governments could collect. One interpretation of this setback might be that that the 
government‘s policy of delegating collection of national-level taxes to local government 
was not coordinated and there was no increase in capacities for achieving better fiscal 
administration at the local level.
17
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However, decentralization reform since the PD‘s victory in the June 2005 general 
elections has been plagued by political conflict between the PD, whose chairman is 
Albania‘s prime minister, and the PS, whose chairman is the mayor of Tirana. Thus, the 
PD‘s enthusiastic electoral promise in 2005 to reverse the ratio of conditioned versus 
unconditioned grants to favor the latter began to be implemented more slowly than was 
expected. The PD‘s feared that the major beneficiary of such a policy would be the PS 
controlled municipality of Tirana. However, the PD-PS conflict peaked in spring 2006 as 
the construction police, part of the executive branch, halted the construction of a traffic 
bypass that had begun in 2005 financed by the municipality. The country‘s central 
institutions – including the Tirana District Court who ruled in favor of the construction 
police – were divided in that debate. Thus, Këshilli i Rregullimit të Territorit [Territorial 
Adjustment Council] claimed that serious infringements of urban planning rules had 
occurred during construction of the flyover (Rhodio and Van Cauwenberghe 2006: 8). 
Meanwhile, the ombudsman and the high state audit ruled that no consistent irregularities 
had been noted in municipality projects regarding public works. Giovanni Di Stasi, the 
then President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (CLRA), criticized the 
central authorities during a visit to Albania in January 2006 and stated that ―the powers of 
the construction police and the composition and functioning of the Territorial Adjustment 
Councils do not conform to the provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, and this creates a lot of misunderstanding and confusion.‖18 On July 2006 
the Zogu i Zi bypass was completely demolished by the Construction Police. 
On February 18, 2007, PS‘ Chairman Edi Rama was re-elected Mayor of the 
capital city and the PS also gained control of other important municipalities in the 
country. Perhaps because the electoral fervor was soon forgotten or the government was 
focused on other political priorities (i. e., the construction of Tirana-Morina highway), the 
political climate following local elections shifted to cooperation. Jurisdiction over the 
inspectorate of the construction police, whose office is responsible for verifying that 
projects go through proper licensing procedures, was transferred to local governments. In 
addition, during that year, legal and institutional measures were taken to transfer 
responsibilities related to the value added tax, local taxation, water supply, and sanitation 
from the central government to municipalities.
19
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 However, such a détente came to an end with the approach of the summer 2009 
parliamentary elections. In April 2009, the Kuvend established an investigative 
commission to look into building permissions issued by the Municipality of Tirana. No 
parliamentarian from the opposition agreed to sit on the commission, and it continued to 
work only with parliamentarians from the ruling coalition. Also, during the same spring, 
the Kuvend approved a proposal to reduce local governments‘ fiscal share of small 
business taxes from 30 percent to 10 percent. These changes in the fiscal system of the 
country also limited local government ability to impose tariffs on trade and services, 
thereby reducing local income from tariffs by 90 percent. The central government has not 
yet undertaken measures to compensate local government budgets for these losses.
20
 
Later that year, on November 15, local representatives initiated a round of protests 
regarding the subject of financial autonomy, accusing the government of cutting local 
budgets as a way to balance the impact of the global economic crisis on the state budget. 
They asked for concrete actions, warning that they would otherwise use all democratic 
forms of protest to force the government to find an appropriate solution. In addition, local 
and central governments continued to clash over the transfer of water supply and sewage 
systems as evidenced by related judicial proceeding initiated by the municipalities of 
Tirana and Himara against the central government in 2008. In February 2009, the 
Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an attempt by the central government to 
take over responsibilities from local authorities on issues involving administration of the 
territory.
21
 
In early 2009, Kuvend passed changes to the Law on Legalization, Urbanization 
and Integration of Unlicensed Buildings that would transfer responsibilities of local 
government to the state run Agjensia për Legalizim, Urbanizim dhe Integrim të Zonave të 
Ndërtimeve Informale (ALUIZNI) [Agency for Legalization, Urbanization, and 
Integration of Informal Buildings]. The changes were brought before the Constitutional 
Court by PS parliamentarians and the Court declared the amendments unconstitutional. 
However, in May 2009, the government passed a Council of Ministers‘ Decision which 
foresaw that local governments would not execute their responsibilities on time and thus 
mandated that these duties should be transferred to the ALUIZNI. The decision 
challenged the earlier Court ruling as well as constitutional principles which clearly 
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emphasized that the distribution of power may not be altered by a simple majority law or 
by a subordinate legal act. The government was found to overstep its responsibilities 
regarding local government.
22
 
The conflict even became physical when at the beginning of November 2009 a 
dispute took place in downtown Tirana between the construction inspectorate of the 
municipality and the state police, ending in violent clashes. The conflict arose over a 
decision by the government to halt construction of the city center plan approved by the 
Territorial Control Council of Albania in 2004 and later approved by the Territorial 
Control Council of Tirana in October 2008 after an international competitive bidding 
process. The government demolished the construction site, stating that it would build a 
public park on the area that had been designated for private investment. One of the 
investors affected by the government‘s action was a stockholder of Vizion Plus, a TV 
media outlet known for its criticism of the government.
23
 
Since becoming Prime Minister in 2005, one major concern of PD chairman Sali 
Berisha, has been to regain control of the Tirana municipality. PD had controlled the 
municipality of Tirana from summer 1991 to October 2000 when lost it to Edi Rama. 
Ever since, PD has lost every mayoral electoral race in the capital city even though 
Premier Berisha has endorsed some of the most popular politicians from his party. PD‘s 
failure to regain the Tirana municipality has had negative repercussions for the 
decentralization process in the country. Ever since it took the control of the central 
government, PD has expanded the range of local government responsibilities, while 
continuing to control most of the local taxes and even narrowing opportunities for 
expansion of local fiscal capabilities.  
Opposition complaints against the government‘s efforts to reduce the fiscal base 
of local governments received some international recognition when a Report of the OSCE 
Presence in Tirana claimed that ―[t]he 2009 amendments to the Law on Local Taxes 
appear to conflict with the Law on the Organization and Functioning of Local 
Government that grants local government the right to establish fees in connection with the 
cost of service provision.‖24 Another view maintains that the Law on Loans to Local 
Government, adopted by a unanimous vote of the Kuvend in February 2008, will 
eventually enable municipalities to increase long-term local investments. However, the 
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ministry of finance has yet to complete the implementing legal acts.
25
 The 2009 
parliamentary election has also had a deleterious impact on the performance and reform 
of local government in Albania as it has resulted in a number of diminished local 
responsibilities, budget cuts, and polarization of the country‘s political life to such an 
extent that a number of municipal councils faced difficulties in approving their budgets 
for several months.
26
 
On April 10, 2010, Bledar Çuçi, a former secretary general of the Ministry of 
Local Government and Decentralization and the current spokesperson for Shoqata për 
Autonomi Vendore (ShAV) [Association for Local Autonomy], an organization that 
represents elected local officials from the PS, appealed to the government to stop 
blocking foreign funding for development projects in municipalities administered by PS 
officials.
27
This statement was released after the Representative for the World Bank in 
Albania, Camille Nuamah, complained that the Albanian Ministry of Interior in charge of 
implementing one component of the Land Administration Project (LAMP) ―has not 
awarded any civil works contracts, despite consistent efforts and support by the World 
Bank during its supervision of the project.‖28 LAMP is the largest and perhaps most 
complex project the bank has financed in Albania; a US$56 million (with US$35 million 
coming from the World Bank) venture involving three ministries—justice, public works 
and interior—and 10 municipalities—Berat, Durrës, Elbasan, Fier, Gjirokastër, Kamëz, 
Korçë, Lushnjë, Shkodër and Vlorë. This project is also co-financed by the Swedish 
International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Japanese 
government, and has three distinct, but related components. PS‘ complaints against the 
government imply that eight of the ten municipalities which are administered by PS 
mayors have not received the untapped LAMP awards.  
 By the end of 2010, the political struggle between PS mayors and the PD 
government erupted over two hotly contended issues. First, the PS appealed to the 
government to withdraw a bill from Kuvend regarding changes in the current law on local 
taxes that, according to the mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama, ―seeks to shift on the local 
government the burden of government corruption with the newly introduced cash 
registers.‖29 In Rama‘s views, the government was trying to take the municipalities 
administrated by mayors of the opposition party hostage on the eve of the spring 2011 
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local elections. In addition, the ShAV called upon the government to discuss items related 
to local government in the 2011 state budget before the parliamentary procedures for its 
approval.
30
 Second, the government attacked the new urban plan of the capital city. The 
new plan was drawn by a French studio selected from an international competition 
organized and financed by the municipality of Tirana in 2008. Even though the Tirana 
Territorial Adjustment Council approved the new plan in the same year, in November 
2010 the Government threatened to reject it, claiming that it does not satisfy all the needs 
of the capital.
31
        
The political struggle between the PD dominated central government and the PS 
dominated local governments has also attracted criticism from international observers 
noting that ―a less politicized dialogue is needed among central and local government in 
order to foster a clearer framework.‖32 One of these observers, the Head of the OSCE 
Presence in Albania, Robert Bosch assesses the current state of local decentralization in 
Albania as follows:   
The process [of local decentralization] itself often appears 
disjointed and lacking in transparency as the Government‘s 
approach currently lacks clarity regarding the desired 
structure of local and regional government. The provision of 
financial resources to local government has not kept pace 
with their expanded scope of responsibility and authorities 
for public service provision. New legislation in areas such 
as territorial planning, construction inspection and water 
supplies further challenged the principles of local decision 
making. The role of  local government associations as 
advocates for common local interests also needs to be 
strengthened in order for them to achieve their considerable 
potential. The distributions of funds to the local authorities 
is also often less objective, meaning municipalities ruled by 
majors of the opposition are less favoured especially with 
regard to the so-called competitive grants which are 
allocated in competition on top of the standard grants.
33
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 In 2005, Freedom House introduced the Nation in Transit Rating and Average 
Scores, a ranking of local government democracy for countries in transition.
34
 Ranging 
from 1 to 7, the score reflects the nation‘s level of local decentralization, with 1 denoting 
the highest possible level of local democracy and 7 denoting its total absence.
35
 Table 5-1 
displays the scores assigned to Albanian local democratic governance.  
 
TABLE 5.1 THE LEVEL OF ALBANIAN LOCAL DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
1999-
2000 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.25 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.00 
Source: Freedom House, 2010  
  
The scores in Table 5-1 generally fit the observations of this empirical analysis for 
the period 2004-2009 (the years indicate the release of the score, thus they reflect 
developments of the previous year). As in other cases, the PD returned to power with the 
promise of reforms. The 2006 Report, which indeed reflects progress during 2005, shows 
that PD-led government‘s policy of increasing local governments‘ competences, as well 
as its tax basis, significantly improved the level of decentralization in the country. 
However, my account reveals nothing that would cause the level of decentralization in 
Albania to move from 2.75 to 3.00. Therefore, I have interpreted the reform progress of 
that time simply as ―reform halts‖ rather than ―reform reverses.‖        
 
A consociational interpretation of EU motivations over the Albanian decentralization 
reform 
Albania is a unified society. Thus, consociational practices are needed only to build 
institutions that would be receptive to EU consociational practices during the country‘s 
accession negotiations with the EU and its subsequent integration with EU institutions 
and processes. A local government built by consociational practices and receptive to them 
can be a powerful instrument for maintaining social cohesion in a deeply divided society. 
However, such local governance might be unnecessary in a unified society. The case of 
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the EU shows that it may be unnecessary even in a deeply divided society (in this case, 
the society of EU member states) if that society applies consociational practices to other 
institutions and policy areas. EU member countries utilize different local government 
systems and the EU has not included any local governance model in its Copenhagen 
criteria or Agenda 2000; nor does the EU usually assess in its annual progress reports a 
country‘s state of local decentralization or offer specific recommendations regarding the 
topic. Indeed, there exists no agreement about how much decentralization is right for a 
country. Some scholars argue that a model of decentralization that may be appropriate for 
a federal state such as Russia, with its large territory and population diversity, may be 
inappropriate for small countries such as Albania (Sewell and Wallich 1996: 252).      
The 2010 Commission Opinion on Albania‘s application for EU membership does 
not refer to decentralization reforms in its rejection of the Albanian application.
36
 Nor do 
the recommendations for mid-term development towards opening accession negotiations 
mention local decentralization.
37
 Again, quoting OSCE‘s Robert Bosch, ―the 
government‘s approach currently lacks clarity regarding the desired structure of local and 
regional government.‖ Yet, the EC neither recommends one nor seems to possess a 
strategy for the rest of the EU; local government models and levels of decentralization of 
EU member countries widely vary. Thus, as Grabbe has pointed out, although the EU has 
advocated greater decentralization and regional development in CEECs, it has no clear 
model of regionalism to present.
38
 If we go back to Gabel‘s description of the EU as a 
―consociational democracy,‖ we can easily distinguish that the model of local governance 
and the level of local decentralization play a role neither in establishing the EU as a stable 
democracy nor its maintenance as such. Local decentralization is not usually a 
consociational practice, hence, in the case of Albania, discussion is absent from EU 
membership conditionality.     
 
A sectorial interpretation of Albanian decentralization reform 
The Albanian local decentralization relies mainly on the political will of domestic leaders. 
The CoE can pressure governments to sign the ECLSG, but cannot do much about its 
implementation. However, as a CLRA report notes, a very positive feature of Albanian 
politics is that every political party, whether ruling or opposition, and all key 
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administration and civil society actors, unanimously agree that decentralization and the 
creation of an effective system of local government are to be given the highest priority 
(Rhodio and Van Cauwenberghe 2006: 5). However, the political parties do not always 
agree on how to tackle these problems and to what extent the territorial structural reform 
needs to be taken. One of the major difficulties in achieving the necessary consensus is 
the high level of distrust between the two main political parties, the PS and the PD. One 
of the byproducts of this mistrust has been a series of attempts by the ruling coalition to 
control local government. Yet, ostensibly, Albanian government‘s interests in controlling 
local government seem to have been undermined by the poor results these efforts have 
produced during the last 16 years, the growing pressure from local officials demanding 
more decentralization, and different NGOs focused on local development (Hoxha 2002: 
5).  
From 1992 to present, Albanian leaders‘ interests in decentralization have shifted 
from positive to neutral to negative. In 1992, the positive interest of the PD in 
decentralization resulted with the first local government reform after communism.
39
 After 
local elections of July 1992, however, the reform stalled until 1996. The PD‘s interest in 
decentralization turned negative as it could increase the autonomy of the predominantly 
PS local governments. The Albanian elites also dropped decentralization as a priority 
from 1996-1998 as the country was facing other, more acute problems. Decentralization 
reform advanced in 1998-2000. The PS led ruling coalition wanted to display to domestic 
and international audiences that their communist past was over, and that they had 
embraced the rules of democracy governance efficiency. However, the PS‘ internal power 
struggle brought decentralization reform to a halt. The reform revived in 2006 as the PD 
took control of the government after its electoral success in the summer of 2005. On the 
one hand, the PD wanted to demonstrate that it had abandoned its previously authoritarian 
ruling style; on the other, the PD was hoping that its candidates would win the fall 2006 
local elections. The PS‘ electoral takeover of local governments in some of the most 
economically productive municipalities curbed the PD‘s interest in expanding local 
autonomy. Ever since, decentralization reform has either stalled or, in some areas, even 
reversed. Table 5-2 summarizes these findings. 
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TABLE 5.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIAN LOCAL DECENTRALIZATION REFORM 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION 
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‘ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1992 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The reform created a considerable degree of political autonomy to local 
authorities, some services in favor of local communities, and wider administrative and financial 
autonomy. These laws enshrined the principle of local self-governance as one of the basic goals 
and principles of local governance in Albania      
 
1992-1996 
  
0 
 
-- 
 
No reform. The PS‘ electoral success in the 1992 local elections doomed any deepening of 
decentralization reform by the PD led central government. 
 
1996-1998 
  
0 
 
0 
 
No reform. Political destabilization put local decentralization out of the political agenda. 
 
1998-2000 
 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The legislative framework underpinning decentralization reform helped the 
country to comply with 19 ECLSG articles, 11 of which are core articles. Yet, Albanian legislation 
still remains at odds with ECLSG on issues related to the administrative control of the central 
government over local administration. 
 
2000-2005 
  
0 
 
-- 
 
Reform halts. Some local decentralization legislation were passed, but most of the measures 
undertaken were follow-ups of the 1998-1999 policies rather than a sign of any positive political 
will. 
 
2006 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. This represents the PD‘s first year in power during which time the party tried to 
implement some of its electoral promises and hoped to expand its electoral base for the upcoming 
local elections. 
 
2007-2009 
  
0 
 
-- 
 
Reform halts. The PS‘ electoral success in the local elections of Fall 2006 curbed the PD‘s 
interest in expanding local decentralization.  
 
2010 
  
0 
 
-- 
 
Reform halts. Some changes in tax law can be interpreted as a setback for local decentralization 
reform. The difficult victory of the PD in the 2009 general elections has decreased PD officials‘ 
confidence in achieving victory in local elections scheduled for spring 2011. 
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Conditioning Consociational Practices in Local Governance: The Case of the 
Macedonia 
For Macedonia to become the multiethnic state agreed up in Ohrid, reforms were required 
in at least three major areas: ethnic representation in state jobs, including the security 
forces and the army; the improvement of ethnic, and especially Albanian, public 
education; and a deep decentralization reform that should guarantee responsibilities to 
municipalities without devolving into a federal system. Therefore, analysis of the local 
decentralization reform in Macedonia implies first and foremost an examination of the 
dynamics of ethnic politics in the country. However, since the problematique of the rest 
of the Eastern European democratic reform haunts Macedonia as well, one can easily 
imagine the challenges faced by country‘s decentralization reform. Macedonian leaders 
have oscillated from strong support for the reform to dragging their feet, while Albanian 
political leaders are eager to exploit such reluctance in their political rhetoric, and EU 
wants to see the Ohrid Agreement fulfilled as a guarantee of peace and stability in the 
country. Thus, we can test both elements of my argument, i.e., explain how the EU 
continues to insist in exporting consociational practices to Macedonia in order to ensure 
its cohesion as a possible unified pillar in accession negotiations; and, how the 
combination of different preferences among the main actors, including domestic actors, 
lead to policy outcomes.    
 
Macedonian decentralization reform 
Macedonia initially inherited 36 municipalities from the Yugoslav system which 
consisted of the country‘s major cities and their surroundings. The 1996 Law on 
Territorial Organization
40
 increased the number of these municipalities to 123, plus the 
large municipality Skopje, the nation‘s capital. Pre-existing municipalities in some local 
administrative units were thus split into smaller units ―with no essential prerogatives and 
no intermediary level between them and the central government.‖41 During this period, 
the Macedonian political process was sharply divided along both political and ethnic 
lines. The central government had little access to Albanian dominated municipalities. 
Moreover, the country‘s local governance remained monopolized by the largest ethnic 
party in particular territorial units. As a result, the local authorities proved inefficient, 
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with limited capacity to address the needs of local communities not only in terms of 
ethnic grievances, but also in terms of local social, economic or infrastructure 
development.
42
 
The causes for the delays in Macedonia‘s local government reform rest on 
attempts by the central government to reduce the political influence of the Albanian 
minority. While the collective and individual rights of Albanians in Macedonia had been 
significantly expanded since independence, Albanians continued to consider such 
progress insufficient.
43
 Macedonian leaders‘ interests in delaying major decentralization 
reform mirrored the widespread fear among the Macedonian population that 
decentralization might lead to federalization and subsequently the autonomy of territories 
predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians (Marko 2004: 13). Arguably, for most 
Macedonians, local decentralization  
is not a matter of territory or more abstract constitutional 
arrangement. The unitary state established after the break of 
the SFR of Yugoslavia is at the core of the very identity of 
the Macedonian nation and is perceived as a major 
guarantee for its survival. Namely, the fear for autonomy in 
Albanian populated areas has prevented a deeper and 
meaningful decentralization throughout the entire period 
since the establishment of the republic.
44
 
One must keep in mind that 1991-1999 was a period of economic and political 
stagnation. This slow and gradual reformation of Macedonia has been affected by a 
complicated nation-building process as much as by the lack of will of leaders of the 
ruling, former-communist Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija [Socialdemocratic 
Union of Macedonia] (SDSM) to institute such reforms. During much of the 1990s, the 
country marked little progress in any reform program. However, Macedonia signed the 
European Charter of Self-Government in 1996 and ratified it in 1997. Indeed, these 
milestones can be considered as the initial steps necessary for a decentralized, local 
government system. Yet it took two more years for the VMRO-DPMNE government to 
finally include in 1999 some measures for decentralizing the local government within the 
country‘s Strategy for Reforming the Public Administration. In order to implement these 
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policies a working team was created within the Ministerstvo za Lokalna Samouprava 
(MLS) [Ministry of Local Self-Government] in March 1999. Meanwhile, a government 
report for LSG activity during the period of 1996-2000 was deemed adequate to serve as 
a backup document for decentralization reform.
45
  
         Despite these minor developments, Macedonian ruling elites showed little interest in 
the decentralization process during 1991-2001. Meanwhile, the EU, trying to avoid 
another conflict in the Balkans, praised Macedonia as an ―oasis of peace,‖ and remained 
committed to maintaining political stability in the country. Perceiving local 
decentralization as a risk to the country‘s stability, the EU preferred the latter rather than 
the former. Hence, the EU interests in local decentralization during the period 1991-2001 
were neutral.  
 The Ohrid Agreement did not relieve Macedonian fears related to what they 
perceived as the hidden agenda of Albanians. Macedonians, therefore, continued to see 
the Agreement as a straightjacket that needed to be circumvented in order to maintain the 
pre-Ohrid Macedonia, yet not endanger their prospects for EU membership. Fears that 
adhering to the Ohrid Agreement may endanger the existence of the Macedonia for 
Macedonian people and, even worse, imperil the state‘s further existence, have had a 
major impact on discussions related to implementing local decentralization policies as 
foreseen by the Ohrid Agreement. Similar to constitutional reforms, both Macedonians 
and Albanians seemed to regard devolution of power to the local governments as a zero-
sum game where one gained control over communities at the expense of the other 
(Brunnbauer 2002: 16; Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 17). Macedonians fear the 
so-called Albanian hidden agenda in local decentralization, which implies that, once the 
Albanians take control of a decentralized local power in the areas where they are the 
majority, they will develop centrifugal tendencies and eventually secede. Moreover, they 
also fear that the Macedonian identity will be threatened in the Albanian dominated areas 
(Brunnbauer 2002: 16; Loomis, Davis and Broughton 2001: 17).  
A clear confirmation of these fears happened when, in Fall 2001, the Minister for 
Local Government in the National Unity Government, Faik Arslani, an Albanian from 
PDSH, submitted to Sobranie a bill for a new law on local self-government. Reportedly, 
the bill was drafted with the assistance of experts from CoE. While the draft proposed 
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wide-ranging responsibilities for local communities in education and health care, it 
alarmed the Macedonian parliamentarians as Article 61 provided the opportunity for 
communities to merge and create common administrations (Balalovska, Silj, and Zucconi 
2002: 74; Brunnbauer 2002: 16). In spite of the real intentions of its writers and 
proponents, the proposal could be easily interpreted as an attempt to merge Albanian 
dominated municipalities in the Northwestern and Western part of the country. 
Macedonians were also concerned that the state‘s authority in Albanian dominated areas 
would be further weakened if devolution went too far. Moreover, the opponents of 
Arslani‘s proposition pointed to the hostile attitudes of Albanians toward formal 
institutions in Albania and Kosovo, hence alluding that Albanians in Macedonia would 
display the same hostile behavior.  
Both of the main Macedonian parties opposed the original version of the bill and 
suggested amendments, thus resulting in the postponement of an international donor 
conference. Albanian parties began to boycott parliamentary sessions and threatened to 
continue as long as Macedonian parties did not withdraw their amendments to the original 
draft. Only after intense and painstaking international mediation, mainly by then Chief of 
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, was it possible to reach a 
compromise. As Mr. Arslani explained in the parliamentary debate over the conciliatory 
bill, instead of common administration, now the bill allowed for the establishment of 
common administrative bodies among the municipalities.
46
  
The Law on Local Self-Government passed in January 2002 amidst squabbles 
over who would have access to the lucrative state Health Fund. Moreover; although the 
Law expanded municipal capacities, it gave little direction for implementation. The 
transfer of a dozen functions performed by the central government to local governments 
still lacked a mechanism or schedule. In the key health care sector, certain responsibilities 
and funds have actually been turned back to the centralized Health Fund while 
municipalities retain only the administration of primary health care services (Marko 2004; 
International Crisis Group 2003: 17). According to the proposed amendments, the local 
administration director would be appointed by the mayor and not the municipality 
council.
47
 In order to adopt three additional laws to regulate this sphere as well as the 
needed changes to some eighty other laws, the deadline for implementation was 
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prolonged to the end of 2003. It was finally passed by an almost unanimous vote on 
January 25, 2002 (Ibid).
48
 Reportedly, [t]he US Department of State welcomed the 
agreement on the Law on Local Self-Government reached by the political leaders in 
Macedonia.
49
   
 Article 22 of the new Law on Local Self-Government enumerates a list of twelve 
activities transferred to local government;
50
 but it did not include or schedule how and 
when to transfer these powers. In addition, two more laws were required according to the 
Ohrid Agreement: a law on local finance and a law on municipal boundaries. A meeting 
of the Ohrid signatories in December extended all the decentralization deadlines until the 
end of 2003, thus undermining the goal for harmonization of laws that would make 
implementation of the new Law on Local Self-Government possible. Finally, the 
completion of the transfer of responsibilities was postponed until after local elections in 
late 2004 (Marko 2004: 14).  
The process of implementation of local decentralization as stipulated by the Ohrid 
Agreement met objective and subjective hurdles. First, the slow pace of decentralization 
reflected the need to resolve all questions of financing and boundaries before transferring 
responsibilities (Marko 2004/5: 14).
51
 Another source of delay was the IMF insistence 
that municipalities be barred from assuming debt and that they should be consolidated 
into more economically viable units.
52
 A criteria of good governance required that, as 
Minister of Local Self Government Aleksandar Gestakovski highlighted, virtually all 
questions of financing and boundaries be resolved before any substantial transfer of 
responsibilities (International Crisis Group 2003: 18). However, Annex B of the Ohrid 
Agreement stipulated that the law on local finance should have been adopted by the 
middle of the 2002—that was, the end of the parliamentary term—and the law on 
municipal boundaries by the end of 2002. Taking into account the much delayed census 
results, the parties then largely recognized that the law on municipal boundaries had 
priority over the law on local finance. However, as International Crisis Group (2004: 18) 
pointed out, the government could transfer powers that require little money to select 
municipalities as it continues to work on the complexities of full decentralization. 
Moreover, reportedly, some mayors have expressed strong willingness to cooperate over 
projects such as water treatment plants. Keeping in mind that municipal cooperation is 
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freely permitted in the Law on Local Self-Government, and with active international 
support this could help reduce tensions and stimulate further local activism, it can be 
concluded that the government‘s continues to display centralizing tendencies (Ibid).  
Obviously, such a clash of a good governance principles and the political 
stipulations of the Ohrid Agreement allowed room for political maneuvering, Prime 
Minister Crvenkovski tried to represent the process as a zero-sum game (Marko 2004; 
UNDP 2004: 83). The Albanian leaders had their own difficulties: reportedly, Ahmeti‘s 
―blasé attitude‖ toward the reform reflected his problems with the Albanian mayors 
elected in 2000 from the rival PDSh party (International Crisis Group 2004: 17). Pressed 
about the slow pace, a frustrated Minister of Local Self-Government Aleksandar Gestakovski 
predicted that decentralization would take ―ten to fifteen years to complete‖ (Ibid). As for the 
international actors, a total of 23 foreign government agencies, international organizations 
and NGOs were separately working on Macedonian decentralization with little 
coordination among them (Marko 2004: 17). 
 The operational program for decentralization that the government began to 
implement in 2003 listed 38 laws needed to complete the transfer of power from central 
to local governments, in addition to 12 other laws on related matters such as fiscal 
decentralization, territorial restructuring, local elections and citizen participation. A 
mixed group of officials and experts began working to reduce the number of 
municipalities from 123 to between 60 and 67. With the Council of Europe‘s assistance, 
the Ministry of Local Self-Government developed five main criteria for eliminating 
municipalities related to size, economic resources, adequate municipal property, 
infrastructure, and natural and geographic conditions. The minister cited a sixth criterion 
which was not registered in the government document: specific historical and cultural 
features, a blatant attempt to preserve certain ethnically distinct municipalities (Marko 
2004: 15; International Crisis Group 2003: 20).  
 Moreover, these criteria fueled political rivalries as each ethnic group tried to 
maximize its benefits. Reportedly, a BDI representative frankly explained:  
We want to maximize the number of municipalities where 
Albanians make up 20% of the population (and thereby 
make Albanian an official language) and we want to bring 
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Albanians into connection with the urban center. The 
Macedonians wanted the opposite, namely, to preserve 
Macedonian urban control, keeping Albanians in rural areas, 
and minimizing the number of 20% Albanian 
municipalities‖ (Marko 2004: 15; International Crisis Group 
2003: 20).  
However, both Albanian and Macedonian locally elected officials from small 
municipalities feared consolidation since many stood no chance of being elected in larger 
territorial units. 
 In February 2004, the ruling coalition began to discuss municipal border revisions 
during closed door meetings between the three partners of the ruling coalition, SDSM, 
BDI, and Liberalno-Demokratska Partija (LDP) [Liberal Democratic Party]. Reports 
were regularly leaked to the press, revealing that key municipalities such as Struga, 
Skopje, and Kičevo had become the topic of hot political debate (Marko 2004/5: 15). The 
redistricting efforts sparked public protests as it was perceived as an attempt to destroy 
the unitary character of the country and disregard local interests and traditional 
regionalisms. Thus, the Skopje-based Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) 
criticized the process for being developed without broad public debate on the new 
territorial boundaries of the municipalities; consultations with local officials within the 
Zadniča na Ediničite na Lokalna Samouprava (ZELS) [Association of Local Self-
Government]; and consideration of the concerns of foreign and domestic experts. The 
process was also criticized for not taking into consideration the will of the people, 
ignoring in particular the expressed objections of 41 municipalities for redrawing the 
district boundaries. Moreover, the process was considered in violation of Article 3, 
Section 2 of the Ohrid Agreement which proclaims that ―the revision of the municipal 
boundaries will be effectuated by the local and national authorities with international 
participation.‖ Finally, CRPM stated that the process put Macedonia at odds with its 
international commitments since the country had signed and ratified the European Charter 
of Local Self Government which states that ―changes in local authority boundaries shall 
not be made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by 
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means of a referendum where this is permitted by statute‖ (Article 5) (Daskalovski 2006: 
209).
53
  
These objections came from the ethnic Macedonian public and organizations 
which promoted Macedonian dominance; their argument often stressed technical matters 
and good governance instead of addressing the underlying fears of Macedonians that the 
new divisions would create an administrative territory controlled by Albanians which 
stretched uninterrupted throughout the western territories of the country.
54
 Although the 
draft left about 55 percent of the existing local units unchanged, the Macedonian public 
was concerned about two different, yet interconnected, ramifications of the proposed bill. 
The first was related to good governance and the fear that some ethnic categories, namely 
Macedonians, would be denied access to public resources in cities where Albanians 
became majority, a concern supported by events occurring in the Albanian dominated 
cities of Tetovo and Gostivar where, after 1991, most Macedonians lost their jobs in the 
public sector with the Albanian takeover of after local governments.
55
 Some Albanian 
municipalities have also expressed fears that if large Albanian villages such as Zajas and 
Velešta join Kičevo and Struga respectively, they will remain underdeveloped and lack 
access to public resources (ESI 2002). The second major ramification of the proposed bill 
according to Macedonians was the potential of erosion of Macedonianness in the new 
Albanian controlled municipalities as well as in Skopje. Some argued that municipal 
services in the Albanian language would waste municipal resources. Others claimed that 
the bill jeopardized the symbolic meaning of Skopje, and the capital of the Macedonian 
nation would lose its Macedonian identity (Daskalovski 2006: 213).                       
 On July 15, 2004, the draft bill was presented in Sobranie‘s floor and was passed 
on August 11
th
 with only the votes of the ruling coalition. However, before the law was 
passed, it met fierce resistance from the opposition party VMRO-DPMNE. The latter 
partnered with Svetski Makedonski Kongres (SMK) [World Macedonia Congress], a 
diaspora organization who had organized a 20,000 participant protest in Skopje on July 
27. From February of that year, SMK had begun to collect signatures for a referendum, 
but had managed to collect during the first six months of the initiative only 80,000 of the 
150,000 signatures required (Daskalovski 2006: 213; Marko 2004: 15). Also, on the local 
level, while there had been protests and a series of referenda in 41 municipalities across 
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ethnic lines, those were ignored by the government coalition (Daskalovski 2006: 214; 
Marko 2004: 15). However, after the VMRO-DPMNE allied with the SKM initiative, 
their grassroots campaign increased citizen participation. As a result, by the August 23 
deadline, the movement had collected 180,454 signatures, more than what was needed, 
causing President Trajkovski to declare a referendum vote on November 7, 2004 (Marko 
2004: 15).
56
  
 Although poll data showed support for the referendum across ethnic lines, the 
overwhelming ethnic gap in such support—73.9 percent of Macedonians and only 7.8 
percent of Albanians—shows the gulf between Macedonian and Albanian perceptions of 
decentralization reform.
57
 The entire referendum propaganda was built on the 
dichotomous fear that the Macedonians would either lose their country or their bid for EU 
membership. The opponents of the referendum argued that a vote ―for‖ would jeopardize 
country‘s membership in the EU and NATO. The proponents of the referendum 
campaigned that Macedonia would not ―lose‖ the EU  since a vote ―for‖ should not be 
considered against the Ohrid Agreement or the EU and NATO membership, but only 
against shady political maneuvers of self-serving groups during the reform drafting 
process (OSCE/ODIHR 2005: 14, 47). Moreover, they accused the government of 
national treason, bowing to ethnic Albanian demands and gerrymandering (International 
Crisis Group 2005: 3). However, while their explicit claims seemed to concern the 
political tactics employed, their campaign language suggested simply a return to the law 
of 1996 with no alternative proposals for decentralization (Marko 2004: 16). Local 
Macedonian officials, such as the mayor of Struga, rejected the law and proclaimed that the 
city would declare independence ―following the example of Monaco, Andorra or San 
Marino‖ (Ibid).  
 Given the legal stipulation of the 50 percent threshold for the referendum to be 
valid, the government decided to undermine the referendum by using a demobilization 
strategy, appealing to people that it was ―not worth an answer‖ (Daskalovski 2006: 215). 
The ruling coalition defended the reform as an obligation to the Ohrid Agreement, and 
then President Crvenkovski argued that decentralization was the most important part of 
the Ohrid Agreement (Marko 2004: 16). Ali Ahmeti of BDI, the Albanian partner of the 
ruling coalition stated in an Open Letter: Shall we participate in the referendum, thus 
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becoming a stumbling block for our country's integration into the European Union, or 
shall we vote for Europe by ignoring the referendum? Shall we vote for the future or the 
past‖ (International Crisis Group 2005: 3).  
Support came also from the EU. The President of the European Commission 
Romani Prodi addressed Sobranie, and waved the EU carrot by linking the referenda 
results with the country‘s future in the EU by stating: ―Europe is here, at the reach of your 
hands [...] However, the decision depends on you […] to say whether you want Europe‖ 
(Ibid: 4).   
 Two events affected the outcome of the referendum: first, with only two weeks 
from the referendum day, rumors circulated related the presence of uniformed men in the 
Albanian-habited village of Kondovo in the hills northwest of Skopje. As public and 
media tensions mounted concerning the group's origins and motives, it became clear that 
the group was a ragtag mix of 50 men from Kosovo‘s UÇK, Macedonia‘s UÇK, Albanian 
fighters from the Albanian-habited southern Serbian region of Preševo, and unemployed 
villagers. They threatened violence if the referendum passed. Second, on November 4, 
2004, the US announced that it would recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name 
―The Republic of Macedonia.‖ That was a surprising decision since international 
arbitration on the name issue still continues under UN auspices. The US explained that 
although it recognized the name ―Macedonia,‖ it still supported the UN process 
(International Crisis Group: note 21). The EU reacted quietly in support of the US 
position, sparking Greece‘s outrage and threats to block Macedonia's accession unless the 
name issue was resolved. However, the very next day, Greek Premier Kostas Karamanlis 
assured fellow members in the EU summit in Brussels that Greece would not block 
Macedonian membership negotiations over the issue, but emphasized that the issue must 
be resolved before Macedonia could actually join the EU. The US action was greeted 
with great enthusiasm in Macedonia and gave President Crvenkovksi the chance to 
celebrate and reinforce the government‘s message in a speech at a ―victory party‖ 
celebrated on the eve of the referendum on Skopje‘s main square (International Crisis 
Group 2005; Marko 2004).  
 To the surprise of even those who opposed the referendum, the 26.58% voter 
turnout was lower than anyone expected, thus making invalid 94.01% of votes ―for.‖ 
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Scholarly efforts to find domestic reasons for the referendum‘s failure have emphasized 
the split in VMRO-DPMNE, the main opposition party (Marko 2004; International Crisis 
Group 2005). From the Albanian camp, keeping voters away from the polls was much 
easier since the referendum itself was perceived as an effort of the Macedonians to stall 
the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Although PDSh initially declared that it 
would ask its voters to vote ―for‖ in the referendum as a protest against the slow 
implementation of the agreement, finally it boycotted the referendum. Arguably, 
Gruevski‘s VMRO-DPMNE saw the referendum as an opportunity to weaken the 
government‘s legitimacy and consolidate its image as tougher in defending the 
Macedonianess of the country. Even though he never spoke against the Ohrid Agreement, 
Gruevski campaigned against the government.  
One interpretation is that the VMRO-DPMNE effort fell short, in large part 
because the party failed to provide an attractive alternative vision, and that simply striking 
a contrarian pose, something of a hallmark of Gruevski's leadership, failed to motivate 
voters (Ibid).  This may not be a sufficient explanation, however, given the strong ethnic 
alignment of the country‘s electorate and the strong role that emotions play in people‘s 
political behavior in ethnically divided societies. However, it seems much more plausible 
to find the causes of the referendum‘s failure with international actors, namely the ―carrot 
and stick‖ policy of the EU and overwhelming enthusiasm generated by the US‘ 
recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name. As Marko (2004: 17) reports, polls 
published by the International Republican Institute (IRI)  revealed that between June 2003 
and April 2005, between 93-97 percent of respondents showed overwhelming support for 
Macedonia becoming a member of the EU. On the other hand, the US‘ support to the 
constitutional name of the country, against the wishes of a NATO ally, Greece, helped to 
sooth the Macedonian public‘s frustrations with US policies in the Balkans and 
Macedonia proper as they were perceived by Macedonians to be pro Albanian. I will 
discuss this issue in more detail in the next subsection.  
 The referendum led to the postponement of local elections previously slated for 
2004. Those elections were eventually held in March 2005 and won by the parties of the 
governing coalition: the SDSM won 37 mayors and BDI 21. From the opposition camp, 
 
 
156 
 
VMRO-DPMNE placed 21 mayors and the newly formed VMRO-NP only 3, whereas the 
PDSh-PDP coalition won 2 mayoral seats.  
The referendum‘s failure and the initiation of Macedonian decentralization reform 
increased citizens‘ acceptance of local decentralization. Whereas in 2003 almost the same 
share of Macedonians and Albanian Macedonians found the decentralization process 
―acceptable,‖ namely 53.0% and 58.9% respectively, in 2004; just before the referendum, 
these figures increased slightly to 59.5% and 63.7%. In 2005, after the local elections, 
support rose to 73.7% and 81.2% (Marko 2004/5). Asked whether ―the new law on 
territorial organization will improve the relations in your municipality,‖ as many as 
75.7% of Macedonians responded that they would stay the same or improve in 
comparison to 78.4% of the Albanians (Ibid). A major sign of a growing mutual 
confidence between the Macedonians and Albanians was the appointment in June 2007 of 
an Albanian Minister of Self-Government after successful negotiations between the ruling 
VMRO-DPMNE and PDP to bring the latter into the ruling coalition. 
The implementation of the new Law on Local Self-Government has allowed 
municipalities since 2006 to raise funds from their own-revenue sources, government 
grants, and loans. According to the new law, municipalities are responsible for setting tax 
rates and municipal fees on property. In addition to these revenues, the law on financing 
the local self-government units permits grants to municipalities from the central budget, 
and also allows municipalities to borrow from capital markets, if approved by the 
ministry of finance.  
By 2007, only half of municipalities fulfilled the criteria for entering into the 
second phase of fiscal decentralization.
58
 Another 17 of the 85 municipalities entered into 
this second phase in July 2008, bringing the total to 59. The 22 municipalities not 
permitted to enter the second phase of fiscal decentralization were those still burdened by 
sizable debts, whose activities were blocked by legal proceedings related to arrears.
59
 As 
a solution, the ministry of finance began the implementation of an EU-funded project to 
assist municipalities with public-finance management, especially those municipalities that 
have not met the financial criteria for entering the second phase of fiscal 
decentralization.
60
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In 2008, internal audit units were established in 28 municipalities, and during 
2009 in 10 additional municipalities, but no program budgeting was introduced by the 
local government units. In 2009, Zaednicata na Edinicite na Lokalna Samouprava na 
Republika Makedonija (ZELS) [Association of the Units of Local Self-Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia] demanded from the government that the 3 percent of value added 
tax (VAT) allocated to municipalities be raised to 6 percent, while the personal income 
tax allocated to municipalities be raised from 3 to 30 percent. The government indicated 
willingness to gradually, until 2012, increase the percentage of VAT allocations to the 
municipalities from 3 to 4 percent but refused to change the percentage allocation of 
personal income tax. Upon demands by ZELS, the government agreed to change the law 
on minerals regarding the distribution of profits from mining concessions so that 78 
percent are allocated to municipalities. More importantly, the government agreed to 
transfer oversight of land to be used for construction of buildings, and factories from the 
central to the local authorities, and is considering legal options for implementation.61 
Table 5-3 displays the local democracy score of Macedonia according to the 
Freedom Houses‘ Nation in Transit annual reports.   
 
TABLE 5.3 THE LEVEL OF MACEDONIAN LOCAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
 
 
99-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 
Source: Freedom House, 2010.  
 
As the table show, the failure of the 2004 referendum opened the way to the 
implementation of the 2004 Law on Local Self-Government, reflected in the score 
improvement from 4.00 to 3.75. Ever since, the progress has been slow and insufficient to 
bring about any score improvement.  
    
A consociational interpretation of Macedonian decentralization reform 
What sets apart the Macedonian decentralization reform from the same reform in any 
other unitary country in Eastern Europe is that, in Macedonia, local decentralization was 
seen not simply as a matter of good governance but as a political issue between the two 
main contending ethnic communities, the Macedonians and the Albanians. Therefore, the 
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EU had to condition this reform as a set of consociational practices. The most important 
of these practices is the application of minority languages as official languages in local 
units where they are spoken by at least 20 percent of the population. However, the rest of 
the Macedonian decentralization reform resembles other EE decentralization reforms, 
with conflicts between the local and central government over responsibilities and taxes 
that crosscut partisan and ethnic lines.  
 Local decentralization reform was seen as a key element of the Ohrid Agreement 
in three focus areas: decentralization of responsibilities in public services and fiscal 
policies (paragraph 3.1); the redrawing of local unit borders (paragraph 3.2); and the 
appointment of local police chiefs by local governments from a list proposed by the 
minister of interior (paragraph 3.3).
62
 Even though Paragraph 3.3 remains a stipulation 
unique to the Macedonian case, its implementation seems to have been smooth.
63
  
 Thus, the implementation of Paragraph 3.1 resembles those of decentralization 
reforms in other EE countries. It is characterized by a struggle over responsibilities, a 
mutual distrust between the central and national governments, and scarce human and 
financial capacities by the local government.
64
 This is a reform area beyond EU concerns 
for both Macedonia and other EE countries. The implementation of Paragraph 3.2 
typically calls for the application of consociational practices. As the paragraph has been 
formulated, decentralization reform cannot be achieved through majority rule. Its 
implementation resulted with the creation of Albanian majorities in the towns of Kičevo 
and Struga as well as a 20 percent Albanian populace in Skopje and some other rural 
municipalities. On a larger scale, the latter implied that the language used by ethnic 
minorities in the municipality serve as an official language. Such a policy has been 
crucial for achieving peace and stability in Macedonia. It also entails proportional 
representation as a consociational practice, namely, the increase in the number of 
municipalities administered by ethnic minorities, reflecting these minorities‘ proportional 
share of local power. The redrawing of municipalities‘ borders increased the number of 
Albanian mayors in the March 2005 elections to 23, that is, 27 percent of the 85 
municipalities. Meanwhile, the 20 percent requirement for implementing a second 
language as an official language at the local level replaced the majority requirement for 
the official status of minority languages at the local level. 
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 Thus, the EU‘s strong support for Paragraph 3.2 of the Ohrid Agreement 
regarding Macedonian decentralization reform, as well as its almost indifference to the 
issues stipulated in Paragraph 3.1, are understandable. The EU recommendations to 
Macedonia in the Conclusions of the Commission Communication ―Enlargement Strategy 
and Main Challenges 2010-2011,‖ mention ―constructive cooperation‖ between coalition 
members and emphasized the need for ―more dialog […] on issues concerning inter-
ethnic relations.‖.65 
 These issues are interconnected: cooperation between coalition partners implies 
the cooperation of partners from different ethnic groups. The fact that the European 
Commission included recommendations for financial decentralization suggests that it 
connects the entire local decentralization process with the country‘s social cohesion. 
However, these conclusions came after the Commission recommended in November 2009 
that the European Council open accession negotiations with Macedonia. Such soft 
language is quite different from Mr. Prodi‘s vigorous appeal to Sobranie to reject the 
referendum on the law on local self-government.  
The following conclusions can be drawn: (1) the EU envisaged decentralization 
reform as an instrument to achieve democratic stability; (2) while the EU displayed 
interest in furthering Macedonian decentralization reform, it openly used the stick/carrot 
instrument when the issue of referendum emerged. The redrawing of municipality borders 
and implementation of minority languages as official languages at the local level are 
consociational practices applied during the Macedonian decentralization reform process, 
and are ones that the EU has conditioned. 
 Macedonia is a deeply divided society and the EU is expected to condition 
consociational practices in two levels; domestic and EU. In the case of Macedonian 
decentralization reform, the conditioning of consociational practices addressed only those 
policy aspects that were relevant for mitigating ethnic conflict. The lessening of ethnic 
tensions would eventually help Macedonia emerge as a single segment/pillar and allow it 
to negotiate consociational practices at the EU level. The EU is no longer conditioning 
local decentralization in Macedonia because the practices have managed to bring 
democratic stability. What is left from local decentralization reforms in Macedonia are 
policies that do not directly affect democratic stability. Yet, the EU does not possess, nor 
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provide guidance regarding a specific model and/or preferred level of decentralization. 
The very mentioning of local decentralization in the European Commission 
recommendations to Macedonia may reflect the EU‘s looming concerns over potential 
ethnic conflict in Macedonia, but might also simply be a residue of previous language 
used to assess reform development in the country. 
 
A sectorial contextual interpretation of the Macedonian decentralization reform 
We have thus mapped out the EU‘s interests in Macedonian decentralization reform. 
Earlier in this section we have analyzed Macedonian ruling elites‘ preferences regarding 
decentralization. To reiterate, until 1996, Macedonian ruling elites were not interested in 
decentralization reform. As discussed in a previous chapter, the former communists who 
won the elections in 1990 and 1994 had little interest in showing any rupture with the 
past. Their main concern was the consolidation of independence and national sovereignty; 
a decentralized local government was perceived as threatening both to the unitary 
character of Macedonia and its territorial unity. During the same period, the EU was 
interested in defusing any potential ethnic conflict in the Balkans, and Macedonian 
stability was perceived as more important than human rights and good governance. EU 
officials have often been either indifferent or critical to Albanian complaints about their 
lack of national rights.
66
 A combination of the EU‘s neutral interest and Macedonian 
ruling elites‘ negative interest in local decentralization reform explains the absence of 
progress in that sector until 1995. 
 Two events changed Macedonian elites‘ interest in local decentralization reform 
in 1995: Greece lifted the embargo on the country; and the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Accord. Both 
these events increased confidence among Macedonian elites that the country‘s 
independence was assured and that they could therefore focus on domestic reforms to 
increase governance efficiency. The result was the 1996 law on territorial organization. 
Although the Law was a major leap forward as it substantially changed the local 
government system in the country, it still reflected the central government‘s fear of a 
widely decentralized local government; therefore, local government‘s responsibilities on 
public services and fundraising capabilities were extremely limited. Indeed, the 1996 law 
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concerned deconcentration more so than decentralization. There is no evidence that the 
EU displayed any special interest in Macedonian local decentralization reform during that 
period, and it appears that the reform was solely guided by domestic leaders‘ interests. 
 The local decentralization reform stalled until 1998 when VMRO-DPMNE won 
the elections and PDSh emerged as the largest Albanian party. The new government 
decided in 1999 to draft the strategy for reforming the public administration and included 
measures to improve local government‘s efficiency. But the exacerbation of ethnic 
tensions in the period 2000-2001 interrupted this project. However, it should be noted that 
the government continued to slowly progress with these reforms although it focused more 
on public administration reform than local decentralization. Again, there is no indication 
of any EU interests in the matter and the issue continued to rest with domestic elites. 
During the year of crisis, 2001, the EU‘s interest in Macedonian decentralization reform 
increased while Macedonian ruling elites remained adamant against deepening 
decentralization. However, an increased military pressure from UÇK and an effective 
―carrot and stick‖ policy from the EU, NATO and the US brought about the Ohrid 
Agreement and the 2004 Law on Local Self-Government.   
 Subsequent policy measures have reflected the gradual implementation of the 
2004 Law more than a substantial deepening of local decentralization in Macedonia. 
However, while these efforts show the government‘s commitment to implementing the 
2004 Law, Freedom House‘s 3.75 score for local democratic governance in Macedonia 
(despite its possible inaccuracies) shows that the country has a long way to go in 
expanding and deepening local decentralization. Currently, the EU‘s interest in 
Macedonian local decentralization has diminished, although the nation‘s central 
government remains committed to the process. The Macedonian fears over the country‘s 
federalization continue to negatively impact the local decentralization process in 
Macedonia, but that is not the only cause. Another impediment to progress might be the 
lack of human capacity to implement the financial decentralization package in some rural 
and underdeveloped municipalities, especially the Albanian municipalities. . 
 Table 5-4 charts the reforms over time as well as their outcomes. 
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 TABLE 5.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN MACEDONIAN LOCAL DECENTRALIZATION REFORM 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION 
  
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‘ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1989-1995 
  
0 
 
__ 
 
No reform. During this period, Macedonian ruling elites were 
interested in promoting country‘s independence and national 
sovereignty rather than democracy and good governance.      
 
1996) 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The end of the Greek embargo and the Dayton 
Accord alleviated some Macedonian existential fears, and helped 
the government to focus on reforms promoting democracy and 
good governance.  
 
1997-2000 
 
  
0 
 
__ 
 
No reform. Reform stalled as leaders of the VMRO-PDSh 
coalition focused more on deconcentration than decentralization.  
 
Jan-Jul 
2001 
  
+ 
 
__ 
 
No reform. The reluctance of Macedonian elites to expand 
Albanian political rights led to an Albanian armed rebellion and 
strong pressures from the EU and other international actors to 
undertake reforms that would improve Albanians‘ position in the 
life of the country.  
 
Aug 2001- 
-Nov 2004 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. Local decentralization reform succeeds albeit 
strong domestic opposition. 
     
2005-2010 
 
 0 0 Slow progress. This segment of the Macedonian decentralization 
reform is characterized by the implementation of the 2004 
reform; yet, country‘s elite has been more focus on other policy 
priorities with stronger impact on country‘s progress toward EU 
membership. 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
Conclusions 
In the case of decentralization reforms, the EU exercised membership conditionality 
unevenly and inconsistently. EU membership conditionality aims at enforcing 
consociational practices in deeply divided societies such as Macedonia, but remains 
absent in united societies such as Albania. As my argument states, the EU recommends 
consociational practices in order to enable its membership aspirants to build institutions 
that lead to stable democracies. Thus, institutions in united societies who inspire to EU 
membership are asked to appropriate consociational practices that can improve 
democratic stability on only one level, the EU one, while institutions in divided societies 
are encouraged to appropriate consociational practices that can improve democratic 
stability at both domestic and EU levels. The lack of a unified EU decentralization model 
suggests that such a model plays no role in achieving and maintaining the EU democratic 
stability; hence there is no reason why the EU should condition it to EU membership 
aspiring countries. In the case of Macedonia, the EU conditioned local decentralization 
specifically so that Macedonia could emerge as a unified segment/pillar in the society of 
European states. However, not all of the Macedonian decentralization reforms required 
consociational practices and the EU has been very active only in conditioning 
consociational practices within the framework of local decentralization. 
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and Functioning of the Local Governing, Nr. 8652, 31 July 2000; Law on Territorial and Administrative 
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CHAPTER VI 
JUDICIAL REFORMS 
 
 
Let us begin with two observations about the judicial reforms in Albania and Macedonia. 
As one author (Taseski 2010) notes,  
Establishing the rule of law, for Macedonia is not just part 
of the process of successful transition, but as a candidate for 
full membership in the European Union is a crucial 
requirement for the country to fulfill the political criteria 
[...] However Macedonia badly failed on the assessment 
from the European Commission. Although the progress 
report in 2008 stated that the country has progressed in 
adopting new legislation and changes in the judicial system, 
yet it concluded that the judicial branch is not independent 
and efficient. 
 Meanwhile, the European Commission‘s Communication on Albania 2010 
Progress Report points out that  
Serious concerns remain on the overall functioning, the 
efficiency and independence of the judicial. There is a lack 
of transparency in the appointment, promotion, transfer and 
evaluation of judges and there are considerable weaknesses 
in the inspection system of the judicial. The cases of 
nonrespect of Constitutional Court decisions by government 
in recent years and the politicization of the vote on the 
President's Constitutional and High Court appointments are 
of concern as they challenge fundamental principles such as 
the independence of the judicial and the respect for the rule 
of law.
1
 
 These two quotes bring us to one of the most contentious political reforms in 
Eastern Europe, judicial reform. Why do Eastern European countries (EECs) experience 
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such difficulties in conducting judicial reforms when those processes comprise vital 
components of the Copenhagen criteria and are the focus of direct and bold conditionality 
from the EU? Before answering this question, a brief look at the very nature of judicial 
reform is needed. 
 Carothers (2006: 7-8) outlines three types of reforms that together can be 
interpreted as an integrated judicial reform. Type one reforms involve the strengthening 
of law-related institutions, usually to make them more competent, efficient, and 
accountable. These reforms include increased training and salaries for judges and court 
staff, and improving the dissemination of judicial decisions. Targets of type one reforms 
include the police, prosecutors, public defenders, and prison administrators. Efforts to 
toughen ethics codes and professional standards for lawyers, revitalize legal education, 
broaden access to courts, and establish alternative dispute resolution mechanisms also 
figure into many of these reform packages. Type two reforms include strengthening 
legislatures, tax administrations, and local governments. Type three reforms aim at the 
deeper goal of increasing government‘s compliance with the law. As Carothers goes on 
A key step is achieving genuine judicial independence. 
Some of the above measures foster this goal, especially 
better salaries and revised selection procedures for judges. 
But the most crucial changes lie elsewhere. Above all, 
government officials must refrain from interfering with 
judicial decision making and accept the judicial as an 
independent authority. They must give up the habit of 
placing themselves above the law […] The success of type 
three reform, however, depends less on technical or 
institutional measures than on enlightened leadership and 
sweeping changes in the values and attitudes of those in 
power.  
 One can claim with confidence that EECs have successfully resolved problems 
with type two reforms. A number of regional and global IOs, foreign governmental 
agencies and actors, international and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and even individual foreign and domestic experts have offered Eastern European (EE) 
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governments abundant technical expertise to draft laws and build judicial institutions and 
practices compatible with the best models in advanced democracies. As for type two 
reforms, Carothers (2006: 4) rightly points out that ―the primary obstacles to such reform 
are not technical or financial, but political and human,‖ and that ―[r]ule-of-law reform 
will succeed only if it gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled 
by the law.‖ Type one reforms appear to be more complex; they imply the need for 
human capital to implement such reforms and keep judicial institutions functioning. 
While my research concerns Carothers‘ type three reforms, a more careful analysis in 
needed to eliminate alternative explanations resting on structural factors mentioned under 
type one reforms.  
 One question arises, though: If the judicial practices are not traditional 
consociational practices that have helped to establish the EU as a stable democracy, why 
does the EU so forcefully require its membership aspiring countries to establish 
independent, impartial and efficient judiciaries? I argue that judicial systems represents 
some of the most powerful and efficient instruments for guaranteeing the maintenance of 
these consociational practices by all pillars. First, there can be no democracy without the 
rule of law; second, contracts need to be enforced for the market economy to operate; and 
third, the communitarian acquis must be implemented and, if necessary, enforced by the 
tribunals.
2
 Since the EU lacks ―federal‖ criminal and administrative courts, only separate 
national judicial systems functioning along similar judicial and administrative principles 
would make possible equal treatments of cases throughout the Union.
3
 By guaranteeing 
stable democracies in their societies, these judicial systems make it possible for each of 
the EU member countries to exist as a united segment/pillar entitled and able to negotiate 
consociational practices with other pillar-states.  
The rule of law is a prerequisite of the Copenhagen criteria that EECs need to 
fulfill in order to join the Union. In turn, the fulfillment of all the three Copenhagen 
criteria requires the establishment of the rule of law and an independent, impartial, 
competent and efficient judicial system that guarantees such a rule of law. The European 
Commission‘s Agenda 2000 succinctly sets ―independent judicial and constitutional 
authorities‖ as one of the components of the ―stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.‖  
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On the other hand, the EE ruling elites tend to view the judiciary as the 
government‘s backyard. Several factors explain this behavior, but I argue that the need to 
employ the judiciary as an ally in power struggle is the most plausible explanation. In 
unified societies, the ruling elites tend to benefit the control of the judiciary against their 
political apposition, but in ethnically divided societies a ethnically controlled judiciary 
serves an ethnic group to the expense of others. However, there are political 
circumstances where domestic leaders‘ interest favor reforms toward independent, 
impartial and efficient judiciary system. Several factors impact such preference change, 
and EU membership conditionality is one of them. Combined, EU‘s and domestic 
leaders‘ interests in judiciary reform explain its outcomes. 
 
Albanian Judicial Reform 
The collapse of communism left Albania with a totally politicized judicial system which 
primarily served as an instrument of the proletariat dictatorship. There was a total lack of 
judicial independence and due process of law. Moreover, private property abrogation and 
state monopoly on economy and trade under the former system made trade and civil 
codes irrelevant. The communist penal code was repressive and the entire penal system 
was accusative, that is, both prosecutor and judge were protectors of state interests, 
leaving the indicted stripped of legal defense rights.  
In 1990, under the influence of democratic revolutions throughout Eastern Europe, 
the Albanian communist regime undertook the first steps for transforming its judicial 
system. Thus, for the first time after 25 years, the Ministry of Justice and the Bar 
institution were reinstated.       The first pluralist Kuvend that emerged from elections in 
March 1991 had to primarily address constitutional issues. As a result of insufficient time 
for a full-fledged constitution drafting and approval process, as well as the inability of 
domestic actors to develop a compromise on a new constitution within a reasonable time 
limit, in April 1991, the Kuvend approved a package of 44 constitutional laws, the Major 
Constitutional Provisions, which constituted a provisional Constitution. While the Major 
Constitutional Provisions lacked constitutional arrangements for the judicial sphere, the 
abrogation of the old communist Constitution which forbade freedom of speech, citizens‘ 
association, peaceful protest, religion, movement and private property served as a major 
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political achievement, a dramatic improvement of the legal and judicial conditions in the 
country. Moreover, due to a political compromise, the composition of the High Court 
became more balanced with appointments from both of the major political groups, former 
communists and anticommunists. As the OSCE Report on Legal Sector Reform, 2004, 
points out, although the creation, organization, and activity of the courts and the judicial 
sector in general were left as they had been with the Constitution of 1976—except for 
segments inconsistent with the new constitutional structure—intensive work was 
conducted during 1991-1992 to restructure this sector.
4
 
In spring 1992, Albania held its second multiparty elections which resulted in a 
landslide victory for the PD and its allies. The new PD-led government used its 2/3 
parliamentary majority to introduce judicial reforms. The process began with revising the 
existing Major Constitutional Provisions on the judiciary. First, the Kuvend passed Law 
No. 7596, April 29, 1992, which defined the shape of the judicial system and established 
for the first time in Albania the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Justice, a 
mixed judicial/executive body which supervises the lower courts.
5
 Second, Law No. 
7574, June 24, 1992 On the Organization of the Judiciary. Evaluating this portion of the 
judicial reform, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (hereafter the 
Venice Commission), released in December 2005 an Opinion on the Albanian Law on the 
Organization of the Judicial, noting that ―the transitional Constitution of Albania 
provides in general for a reasonable constitutional basis for the significant reforms to the 
judicial system which have been established over the past four years.‖6 However, the 
general overview of the Commission on the 1992-1995 reform was more critical as it 
pointed to the setbacks caused by the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary by 
abrogating articles promulgating rights and duties of the magistrates stated in a prior 
ordinary Law on the Status of Magistrates.
7
 
The 1992 judicial reform was driven by domestic actors‘ interests to establish a 
functional judicial system in the new political and institutional context of postsocialist 
Albania. However, while domestic elites‘ interest in this reform was positive, assistance 
from international actors has been insignificant and their interests can be considered 
neutral. Also, there is no evidence that would show any EU involvement either in 
providing technical assistance or recommending policies. In spite of OSCE criticism, the 
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overall progress of judicial reforms during this period can be considered satisfactory and 
was even recognized by the OSCE as such. As an OSCE report notes, many of the 
elements created at this time continue in a somewhat modified form under the 
Constitution that became effective on November 28, 1998.
8
 
Foreign assistance to the Albanian government related to judicial reform began in 
1992— soon after the amendments to the Major Constitutional Provisions—through the 
Council of Europe‘s (CoE) programs as well as the joint CoE and European Commission‘s 
Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) program. 
Since 1993, the EU has provided funding for legal system reform and has co-operated with 
the CoE on its first joint program which was completed in June 1995. This program 
concentrated on drafting the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure and also included 
intensive training for magistrates and other judicial staff. We can distinguish during that 
period a growing positive interest of both the EU and the CoE in Albanian judicial reform. 
Witnesses of Albanian political developments during this period explain that the interests of 
the EU and CoE rests with encouraging political stability in a country that inherited a total 
absence of legislative and institutional frameworks to support reforms.
9
 
However, as we saw with other reforms, the positive interest on reforms by the 
Albanian ruling elites during the ‗extraordinary politics‖ period of 1991-early 1992 turned 
negative with the shift to ―ordinary politics‖ of 1992-1994. The main concern of the ruling 
Partia Demokratike (PD) [Democratic Party] became the consolidation of power through a 
combination of nepotism and intimidation of the adversaries.
10
 Thus, the shelving of judicial 
reforms during this period parallels the lack and even reversal of some other reforms, and 
was caused by the rising authoritarianism of the PD in power and its inclination toward 
centralized rule. The Venice Commission delegation‘s Opinion views the 1992 Law on 
Organization of the Judicial as a step backwards in establishing judicial independence from 
politics. First, the Opinion pointed to the fact that ―questions of judicial qualification, 
appointment, transfer and discipline be left unregulated by either the Constitution or an Act 
of Parliament.
11
 Second, it criticized the fact that, in reality,  
only some legislative action has since been taken, with the 
result that there is at present only piecemeal provision in the 
ordinary laws (adopted by Parliament) in force in Albania for 
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rights and duties of judges in the exercise of their judicial 
functions, or for their qualification for office, or the grounds 
and manner in which they may be appointed, transferred or 
dismissed.
12
   
The Opinion of the Venice Commission reached its conclusion based on the most 
important piece of legislation of the Albanian judicial reform from 1992 to 1994, namely the 
1992 Law on Organization of the Judiciary. It concluded that ―the Commission wishes to 
record that it has been unable to satisfy itself that judges in Albania feel themselves free to 
arrive at their decisions without fear of negative consequences for their professional life.‖13 
These remarks made clear that Albanian judicial reform during the period of 1992-1994 
stalled and, in some aspects, even suffered setbacks. 
A reply to the Venice Commission‘s Opinion by then Albania‘s Minister of 
Justice Hektor Frashëri unveiled the existing tensions between the CoE and the Albanian 
government. As Minister Frashëri noted in his reply, ―it is incorrect to consider that to date 
no legislative action is in hand, or that no enactment of the Albanian parliament is in force in 
Albania [sic] for defining the rights and duties of judges, their training, etc.‖14 Furthermore, 
defending his government‘s position, Mr. Frashëri continued on his counterattack by 
noting that he considers ―incorrect the conclusion drawn in the third paragraph of item "e" 
that the relevant chapter of the Constitutional Law No. 7561 of 29 April 1992 does not 
specify the grounds for removal of district and appeal court judges, and that there is no other 
applicable statutory provision in this regard.‖15 
The PD‘s failure to pass its constitution through a referendum, the persistent 
critiques from the CoE and the EU about the pace and direction of the country‘s 
institutional reforms, and the PD‘s need to overcome the referenda failure by securing 
Albania‘s membership in the CoE—thus scoring a foreign policy success—drove the 
government toward judicial reform. The year 1995 became a period of intensive 
legislative activity related to judicial reform as Kuvendi passed the Penal Code, January 
1995; the Code of Penal Procedure, March 1995, and the Military Penal Code, September 
1995. In 1996, under the auspice of the CoE, the School of Magistrates for training and 
retraining judges and prosecutors was opened in Tirana while the government prepared 
the Law on the Office of the Judicial Budget. 
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In addition, in spring 1995, upon the request of Albanian authorities, a second 
joint program for judicial system reform was established with the EU and the CoE. The 
program comprised a series of specific projects including: (1) assistance to the Ministry 
of Justice for drafting an organic law as well as the bylaws needed for its implementation; 
(2) the establishment of the State Office for Publications; (3) the creation of the School of 
Magistrates for training and improving the professional capabilities of judges; (4) support 
for the Office of the Bailiff; (5) prison reform, including the establishment of a training 
academy for prison personnel; (6) reform of the police academy; improvement of 
administrative law, including assistance to make Albanian legislation compatible with the 
European standards; (7) assistance to draft a new constitution; and (8) reorganization of 
the Office of the Public Prosecutor. The success of the codification reform of 1995 stems 
from the positive interests of both Albanian and international actors, namely the EU and 
CoE, in the reform process. Generally, the Codes approved in 1995 continue to be used.  
After acquiring CoE membership, the zeal of the DP government to pursue further 
judicial reform diminished. The government continued its highly criticized policy of 
replacing old judges inherited from communism with poorly trained PD militants who 
had primarily acquired knowledge of judicial procedures through intensive six-month 
courses. While the replacement of many old judges and prosecutors might have been 
necessary, the politicized manner in which the PD conducted the process jeopardized 
judicial independence and spurred reactions from opposition groups.
16
 
         Meanwhile, the Second Joint Programme confronted difficulties in full 
implementation. After the rigged election of May 1996, the pace of implementation 
slowed considerably due especially to the reconfiguration of country‘s political theatre. 
The political instability distracted leaders‘ attention from reforms as the ruling elites 
shifted their attention and resources to other political priorities. Political unrest and armed 
civil conflict between February and July 1997 led to a freezing of all PHARE activities in 
Albania until August of same year.
17
  
There were lessons learned from the Albanian crisis of 1997 and the incapacity of 
the judicial to help prevent it. First, a successfully reformed judicial system would have 
helped the establishment of an independent, stable constitutional court which could have 
resolved conflicts between institutions. Second, an efficient penal system would have 
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prevented the illegal financial pyramidal schemes by dealing with the problem in its 
origins. Indeed, the judiciary‘s incapacity to arbitrate between the contending political 
fractions, ensure the safety of financial transactions, and guarantee that contracts were 
respected was a major cause of the 1997 crisis in Albania. Analysis of this segment of 
judicial reforms in Albania demonstrates that reforms, and the lack thereof, reflected the 
different levels of Albanian ruling elites‘ interest in controlling the judiciary. It also 
clearly shows that, without domestic willingness to develop reforms, such efforts are 
doomed.  
After the general elections of June 1997, the Socialist-Centrist coalition led by the 
victorious PS initially demonstrated a willingness to work toward judicial reform. After 
having fought a difficult political battle during its five years of opposition, the new ruling 
coalition wanted to garner international support. The PS‘ political struggle as an 
opposition group has always been hampered by its Stalinist legacy. Therefore, most of the 
international partners of Albania continued to view the party‘s return to power 
skeptically. The PS decided to use its newly won majority in Kuvend to demonstrate to 
domestic and international audiences that it had abandoned its Stalinist legacy and was 
ready to embrace and play according to the rules of a pluralist society. Their desire to 
follow such a path, born by the party‘s need to redeem their thoroughly tarnished image, 
created enormous opportunities to resume reform processes that were stalled after their 
initial launching in 1992-1992.  
Initially, the coalition was successful. As a report of the World Bank noted, ―[t]he 
situation did improve dramatically […] during the course of 1998. Albania‘s brand new 
Constitution of November 1998 provides clear foundation for judicial independence and 
the new law on Judicial Organization gives further legislative basis of this 
independence.‖18 During the summer of 1997, the government resumed its collaboration 
with the CoE and EU. In January 1998, Albania signed an agreement with the European 
Commission and the CoE and began to implement the Action Plan for legal and judicial 
reforms. The European Commission‘s and CoE‘s assistance to Albania was coordinated 
by the Joint Programme, and the Albanian government committed itself to cooperation 
with the Programme. Since 1998, annual conferences have been held to assess progress 
with the Action Plan. 
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Important milestones of the institutional, legal, and judicial reforms during 1999-
2001 included the establishment of the Office of Ombudsman, the State Advocate, the 
Office for the Budget of the Judicial System, and the State Office for Publications. 
Kuvend also passed a number of laws related to judicial reform such as the organic laws 
of the High Court, Constitutional Court, High Council of Justice, Ministry of Justice and 
the Office of the Bailiff. In the same wave, with the initiative of the Albanian 
government, Kuvend made some significant improvements to the Penal and Civil Codes 
in order to combat some newly emerging criminal activities in the economic sector as 
well as cybercrime and organized crime. The Standing Rules of the Minister of Justice for 
the Judicial Administration marked the beginning of reforms in judicial administration.  
The years 1998-2001 was a period of successful and fruitful collaboration 
between domestic and foreign actors, and the coalescence of these actors‘ interests 
brought further progress. Judicial administration and judge‘s careers emerged as reform 
priorities. The government program for 2002 stated that ―the judicial reform would also 
consist in drafting and approving of a precise system of recruitment, career, stipend and 
protection.‖19 After 2001, however, especially after the 2001 PS-led coalition‘s victory 
through criticized elections, the country began to slip into a deep political crisis. The PS 
as well as other minor parties of the coalition became trapped in internal power struggles, 
and the ruling coalition lost its political initiative and vision. This crisis led to a 
cohabitation of government with organized crime, contraband, human smuggling and 
trafficking, and a galloping corruption.
20
 It seemed as if the ruling coalition had already 
exhausted its energy during its first governing term, and the second term was plagued by 
reform fatigue. Not only did the coalition government lack political will to further reform 
the judiciary, but it also inhibited any effort in this area.
21
 As a consequence, the Albanian 
judiciary, too, was corrupted, and recruiting judges involved in organized crime became 
routine.
22
 Moreover, higher courts, abusing the already established judicial independence, 
played a negative role in the progress of judicial reform by blocking reforms in judicial 
administration and careers of judicial employees, as well as regulation of the distribution 
of judicial cases.
23
  
The EU became aware of the Albanian government‘s lack of political will to carry 
out reforms.  As the European Commission‘s 2004 Stabilization and Association Report 
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noted, although the Albanian government has continued to state that the country‘s 
progress towards the Stabilization and Association Process is a top priority, ―its actions 
have not always supported this.‖ The report also pointed out that many of the reforms 
needed to guarantee the proper implementation of SAPs have not being carried out, 
including ―the fight against organized crime and corruption and the functioning of the 
judicial system.‖24  
Yet another indicator of the judiciary‘s condition in that period was the inability to 
adjudicate government officials. As Freedom House noted, ―[s]tatutes and courts granted 
[Albanian] government officials unacceptable privileges and special protections.‖25 In the 
same vein, Human Rights Watch‘s report compiled a list of cases of the judicial system‘s 
reluctance to indict police officers with records of human rights violations, and pointed 
that the Albanian Human Rights Group‘s legal actions in defense of victims has meet 
stonewalling by judicial authorities.
26
 The evaluation of the Council of Europe regarding 
Albanian judicial reform during this time noted that:  
The judicial system, which should play the most critical role 
in the fight against corruption and organised crime, is weak 
and ineffective. Its personnel is poorly paid and trained and 
seems to be at least partially corrupt. This also affects the 
enforcement of new laws, in particular with regard to 
serious crime.
27
 
These remarks show that, despite the interest of the EU and its continuous 
pressure throughout Stabilization and Association negotiations to position the Albanian 
judiciary in the path of thorough reform, these efforts clashed with those of the Albanian 
government.
28
 That brought a halt to many elements of the reform process, except for 
laws relating to the Serious Crimes Prosecutor‘s Office and the Court of Serious Crime 
for which EU pressure was especially firm.  
With the change of power in Albania after 2005 national elections, the EU 
reiterated the same conditions regarding the short-term key priorities for judicial reform 
as it did four years earlier. The Council of the European Union demanded that the PD-led 
center-right coalition: (1) increase the transparency of the criminal and civil justice 
process; (2) guarantee that judges and prosecutors are appointed through competitive 
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examination; (3) foster the status, independence and constitutional protection of judges; 
and (4) establish a transparent and merit-based system for the evaluation of prosecutors.
29
 
However, the Resolution 1538 of PACE in 2007 implies that the progress of the new 
Albanian government toward judicial reform had not gone far beyond what was inherited 
from its predecessor.
30
 Similarly, the EC‘s Albania 2005 Progress Report calls for caution 
when it notes that ―[d]espite some positive developments, the proper implementation of 
the existing legislative framework and the overall effective functioning of the judicial 
system remain a matter of concern.‖31  
The 2005-2007 period of PD rule was characterized by fervent efforts to depose 
the Prosecutor General and some of the members of the High Council of Justice. In both 
cases, the government considered the targeted officials to be linked with organized crime, 
while its opponents considered governments‘ efforts to remove them as an attempt to 
control the judiciary. In such a politicized atmosphere, the reform process stalled despite 
the intensive technical assistance offered by the European Assistance Mission to the 
Albanian Justice System (EURALIUS) to the Albanian Ministry of Justice starting in 
June 13, 2005.
32
 As a result of ruling elites‘ lack of willingness to progress with judicial 
reform, some presidential decrees related to some parts of the reform, namely the 
reduction of district courts from 29 to 19, were pending with the President of the 
Republic. Another Decree, namely Decision 200/1, dated 18. 10. 2006, has been turned 
back from the High Council of Justice under the comments that ―it should have been 
accompanied by a presentation of methodology and principles taken into consideration in 
drawing it up, as well as by a study and analysis of more concrete data collection.‖33 
Meanwhile, the Albanian press had been swift to criticize the Ministry of Justice for not 
having a strategy for its reorganization.
34
 
In spite of incremental progress in the quality and transparency of the judicial 
during 2006, Albania‘s judicial system remained weak and corrupt. The right of full 
access by all citizens to the courts continued to be circumvented. The government sent to 
Kuvend a new draft Law on the Judicial which provided for the creation of administrative 
courts, transparent assignment of cases, and improvements in the career structure of 
judges. The new draft required that appointed judges be graduates of the School of 
Magistrates in order to increase professionalism among judges.
35
 However, the draft 
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failed to address some other causes of the judiciary weaknesses, namely poor education 
and training of the judges, problematic pretrial detention systems, erratic implementation 
of court decisions, and perverted incentives for each actor in the judicial that undermine 
the rights of the defendant. For instance, the draft law failed to address the division of 
competences between the two inspectorates of the High Council of Justice and the 
Ministry of Justice. However, regarding disciplinary proceedings and the discharge of 
judges, the draft law has been considered an improvement over existing legislation. 
Specifically, it specified the criteria and procedures for appointing court chairmen and 
provided a list of their duties.
36
  
The year 2006 can be remembered for the efforts of the judiciary to fend off 
political interference. The Constitutional Court ruled as unconstitutional the 2006 
amendment to the Law on the High Court of Justice that required judges in the High 
Council of Justice to give up their judgeships in order to eliminate conflicts of interest.
37
 
The EC‘s Albania 2006 Progress Report referred to progress in transparency in judicial 
procedures through the publication of more judicial decisions and the results of checks on 
violation of the procedural code, as well as in the field of enforcement of final judicial 
decisions through the reorganization of the Bailiff Service and the upgrading of the level 
of its employees.
38
 However, in spite of changes aimed at improving the independence 
and accountability of judges, appointment procedures and performance evaluations, 
unclear division of competences, slow judicial proceedings, and lack of transparency 
continued.
39
 In addition, while the 2006 amendment to the Law on the High Council of 
Justice aimed to eliminate conflict of interest among members of the High Council of 
Justice, it failed to address other important issues facing the institution.
40
  
Government policies of 2007 produced mixed results for Albanian judicial 
reforms. The amendment to the Law on Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of 
Justice in March 2007 reshuffled names and responsibilities among the departments but 
left several issues unaddressed. However, the most significant events during 2007 were 
the reorganization of district courts and the dismissal of Prosecutor General Theodhori 
Sollaku.
41
  
The reorganization and reduction of district courts from a total of 29 to 21 was an 
effort to increase court efficiency and transparency. According to the National Strategy 
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for Development and Integration, reorganization of the courts should have increased both 
efficiency and transparency of trials and provided the necessary space and infrastructure 
within the courts. However, 24 judges, along with many administrative staff, lost their 
jobs during the reorganization process which raised serious constitutional problems due to 
the constitutional guarantees of the employment of judges.
42
 The European Assistance 
Mission to the Albanian Justice System (EURALIUS) made recommendations 
concerning a three-step strategy for the organization of courts, but these guidelines were 
ignored by the Ministry of Justice.
43
 Reportedly, in November 2007, just two months after 
the implementation of Albania's own reorganization project, workloads increased in 
central courts, efficiency was reduced, and costs increased owing to the frequent 
commuting of judges, secretaries, and case files.
44
 
In October 2007, at the request of 28 parliamentarians from the ruling PD, a 
Parliamentary Investigation Commission was established with the intention of removing 
the Prosecutor General Theodhori Sollaku under accusations for being under the 
influence of the organized crime.
45
 Then President Alfred Moisiu had fended off an 
earlier attempt to dismiss Sollaku, claiming that the Kuvend‘s decision lacked 
constitutional support. Asked by the Prosecutor General to rule on the constitutionality of 
the parliamentary investigation, the Constitutional Court ruled that ―the Parliament has no 
competence to check and evaluate the decision of the prosecutors in concrete cases.‖46 
However, PD‘s efforts to remove Sollaku revived after Bamir Topi, the previous leader of 
PD‘s parliamentary faction was elected president in July 2007. Although the opposition 
boycotted the Commission, on November 5
th
, Kuvend voted in favor of dismissing the 
Prosecutor General. Spartak Ngjela, a parliamentarian and former ally of Premier Berisha, 
stated that ―[th]e dismissal of the prosecutor general is an attempt of the prime minister to 
control independent institutions.‖47 On November 22nd, President Topi decreed that the 
Kuvend‘s decision to dismiss Sollaku was valid. Soon after, Kuvend approved Ina Rama 
as the new Prosecutor General at request of the president.
48
 
The 2008 American Bar Association‘s Judicial Reform Index (JRI) for Albania 
noted that ―that the pace of judicial reform, with the aim of encouraging the functioning 
of an independent, transparent, impartial, efficient, and professional judicial, is slow.‖49 
As the Report went on, ―certain actions by political and judicial bodies over the last two 
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years [were] perceived as political interference in the independence of the judicial and a 
dogged perception by the majority of citizens that the judicial is corrupt.‖50 Meanwhile 
the European Commission‘s Albania Progress Report 2007 noted that  
Overall, there have been some steps to improve the 
efficiency of the judicial. However, it has continued to 
function poorly due to due to shortfalls in independence, 
transparency and efficiency. Legislation planned to address 
these issues is delayed.
51
 
The approval by the Kuvend in February 2008 of the long pending revised Law on 
Organization and Functioning of the Judicial, which created the foundation for an 
objective, merit-driven appointment and evaluation system for judges, renewed hopes for 
change. The Law on Organization and Functioning of the Judicial and the Law on the 
Office of the General Prosecutor as well as the establishment of the parliamentary 
Subcommittee on Judicial Reform and the parliamentary Committee of Laws, Public 
Administration and Human Rights passed due to a surprising cross-party consensus in the 
Kuvend at the beginning of 2008.
52
 However, obviously, the Law opened a window for 
the executive branch to control some appointments in courts. Specifically, the Law leaves 
the appointment of the Court Chancellor in the hands of the Minster of Justice. Moreover, 
the Law gave the court chancellor an important role in the appointment and removal of 
the judicial administration.  Six months after the Law on Organization and Functioning of 
the Judicial entered into force, Shoqata Kombëtare e Gjyqtarëve të Shqipërisë (ShKGj) 
[National Association of Judges of Albania] challenged the Law in the Constitutional 
Court for violating the independence of the judiciary.
53
 In 2009, the Constitutional Court 
pronounced unconstitutional the duty of the Chancellor to appoint the judicial 
administration. However, the government‘s attempt to involve Court Chancellors in 
appointments and removals of judicial administration as well as the draft Law on Judicial 
Administration that the government sent during the same year to the Kuvend, 
strengthened executive control over the judiciary. Moreover, the Law on Organization 
and Functioning of the Judicial failed to address the division of responsibilities between 
the two inspectorates of the High Council of Justice and the Ministry of Justice.
54
 These 
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efforts clearly show that, in that period, the interest of the Albanian ruling elites toward 
an independent judiciary were negative, and the PD was interested in controlling the it.   
A new Law on Amendments to the Law on the Office of the General Prosecutor 
became another point of contention between the Office of the General Prosecutor and the 
government. The draft amendments completed in September 2008 by the Ministry of 
Justice were contested by the Association of Prosecutors as well as the General 
Prosecutor Ina Rama. They saw the amendments as a way to increase the executive‘s 
control over prosecutors, and allow the suspension of the General Prosecutor as well as 
the reduction of prosecutors‘ salaries. The amendments were perceived as measures for 
interfering in judiciary‘s independence. Criticism from international partners assisting the 
Albanian judicial reform compelled the Ministry of Justice to involve the Office of the 
General Prosecutor in consultations. As a result, a new Law on the Office of the General 
Prosecutor was adopted by the Kuvend on December 29, 2008.
55
 
The government‘s efforts to encroach upon the independence of the judiciary 
continued to be the most distinct feature of Albanian judicial reform in the 2007-2010 
period, clear evidence of government‘s negative interests in judicial reform. In 2009, the 
government tried again to target judges and prosecutors through a lustration law. Passed 
by Kuvend in December 2008, the new Law on Lustration foresaw the removal of judges 
and prosecutors who served during the communist regime. Although the implementation 
of the Law on Lustration was suspended by the Constitutional Court, the debate around it 
affected the judicial proceedings against former Minister of Defense and current Minister 
of Environment, Fatmir Mediu, and other high officials accused of involvement in the 
2008 explosion of the Gërdec ammunition plant in which 26 people died. The Chief 
Prosecutor of the case, Zamir Shtylla, was personally attacked in the media by Premier 
Berisha for alleged criminal involvement in the political persecution of citizens by the 
former communist regime. Shtylla resigned soon after the Law on Lustration was 
adopted. The case against Mediu was later dismissed by the High Court in September 
2009 on grounds that his immunity had been reinstated with his election to the 
Parliament.
56
 In another instance of judicial malfunctioning due to intrusions from 
politics, the Minister of Interior Lulzim Basha was accused by the Office of the General 
Prosecutor for abuse of office during his service as Minister of Public Transportation and 
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Telecommunication. The trial against Basha involved courts at three levels, and was 
adjudicated in two parallel lines before the District Court of Tirana. Both cases ended up 
before the High Court, which issued two different decisions by different criminal panels. 
According to the Constitution, criminal proceedings against persons with immunity must 
be dealt with by the High Court, which finally dismissed the case as a result of the 
contradictory decisions.
57
 In both cases, the government openly took stances in favor of 
its ministers with the Prime Minister himself personally attacking the prosecutors of the 
cases.  
As the European Commission‘s Albania 2008 Progress Report concluded,  
there has been limited progress in [the Albanian] judicial 
reform, mainly on the legal framework. However, the 
justice system continues to function poorly due to 
shortcomings in independence, accountability and 
transparency.
58
 
One of the major problems of the Albanian judicial system is the gap between 
court decisions and their implementation. Although the number of implemented decisions 
in Albania increased in 2009, the number of unimplemented decisions was much higher 
(5,806 to 8,057, respectively, according to the Annual Statistics Report of the Ministry of 
Justice). State institutions continue to fail to enforce court rulings. In many cases, state 
institutions blame their failure to execute court decisions on budget shortfalls. The 
Constitutional Court decided in January 2009 that the failure of the Bailiff‘s Office to 
enforce decisions is considered a violation of the Constitution. A new Law on Private 
Bailiffs, adopted in 2009, aimed to liberalize the enforcement services and thereby 
increase competitiveness while reducing corruption, but it has implementation has been 
slow. Other secondary legislation for the implementation of the law has yet to be adopted 
and enforcement fees are still under negotiation. In the meantime, an increasing number 
of complaints (up to 200 in 2009) over the state‘s failure to execute court decisions have 
been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. These unexecuted decisions are 
often related to property issues and illegal discharges from the civil service.
59
 
After almost two decades of transition to democracy, Albania still lacks a 
comprehensive strategy for judicial reform. As a result, the Kuvend could not adopt the 
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draft Law on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Dispute 
submitted by the government at the end of 2008, which would have established 
specialized administrative courts and faster judicial procedures for adjudication. The 
Administrative Courts Bill is expected to establish seven courts that would adjudicate 
disputes of citizens and businesses on matters such as employment, tax, customs, 
pensions, property registration, and compensation of property, as well as other important 
issues.  These courts would further align Albania's judicial system with required EU 
integration standards.
60
 The business community supported the adoption of the law, 
considering it an important step toward shortening judicial administrative processes. A 
draft law introduced in April 2009 on judicial administration was strongly opposed by 
judicial representatives as an attempt by the executive to exercise judicial power.
61
 The 
EC‘s Albania 2009 Progress Report considers the Albanian judicial reform to be ―at an 
early stage” and that it “continues to function poorly due to shortcomings in 
independence, transparency and efficiency.”62  
In a press release on September 27, 2010, the Embassy of the United States of 
America urged ―the passage of the draft law ‗On Adjudication of Administrative Disputes 
and the Organization of Administrative Justice,‘ known as the Administrative Courts 
Bill.‖ The Administrative Courts bill is one of six components of the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Threshold Program II - Albania, which was signed in September 
2008.  The press release warned that, ―[i]n order to complete planned activities with U.S. 
funding, the law must be passed by September 30, 2010.‖63 The adoption of the 
Administrative Courts Bill required a qualified majority of 2/3, and the PS had 
conditioned its vote for the bill with the opening of an investigation on the 2009 general 
elections.
64
 In addition, the PS‘ Chairman, Rama, has declared that Albania‘s 
international partners have objected to one-third of the draft.
65
 Rama‘s position did not 
change even when Director of Threshold Programs for the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, Bruce Kay, revealed that Albania could still qualify for the fund to assist 
with the establishment of the administrative courts if Kuvend passed the Administrative 
Courts Bill before January 2011.
66
 The conclusions of the EC‘s 2010 Progress Report 
recognized the lack of substantial progress in judicial reforms and emphasized the need 
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for a comprehensive reform strategy for the judiciary, reinstating that ―[a]ttempts by the 
executive to limit the independence of the judicial remain a serious concern.‖67    
Table 6-1 consists of the Freedom House‘s score in Albanian judicial framework and 
independence, and Table 6-2 comprises the ABA-CEELI judicial reform index.
68
 Ranging 
from 1 to 7, the Freedom House‘s score reflects the nation‘s level of judicial framework 
and independence with 1 denoting the highest possible level of independence and 7 
denoting its total absence.
69
 
 
TABLE 6.1 ALBANIAN JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK AND INDEPENDENCE 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
4.50 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 
Source: Freedom House 
Note: The years reflect the period of the Report, which is an assessment of the previous year‘s 
developments.  
 
The scores provided by the Freedom House reports in Table 6-1 are consistent 
with my account. It shows both the improvement of the score with the return of PD to 
power and the reform reversal of the last years. The interpretation of Table 6-2 offers a 
more optimistic view of the Albanian judicial reform: mapping out the trend from 2001 to 
2008 reveals that nine of the factors have experienced an increase, three factors have gone 
down, and eighteen factors have remained about the same. These results can be 
interpreted as a slight improvement in the state of the judiciary in the country. However, 
both reports bear incompatibilities with each other and my account. However, I think that 
reaching conclusion based on EC Progress Reports, at least for the most recent years, 
brings a better evaluation of the reforms progress which, arguable, is highly influenced by 
EU membership conditionality. The following subsections gives a more detailed account 
of the role that EU and Albanian leaders‘ interests in the judicial reform.    
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TABLE 6.2 ALBANIAN JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX: TABLE OF FACTOR CORRELATION 
 
I. Quality, Education, and Diversity 
 
2001 2004 Trend 2006 Trend 
 
2008 
 
Trend 
Factor 1 Judicial Qualification and Preparation Neutral Neutral ↔ Positive ↑ Positive ↔ 
Factor 2 Selection/Appointment Process Positive Positive ↔ Neutral ↓ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 3 Continuing Legal Education Negative Neutral ↑ Positive ↑ Positive ↔ 
Factor 4 Minority and Gender Representation Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
II. Judicial Powers 
      
  
Factor 5 Judicial Review of Legislation Positive Neutral ↓ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 6 Judicial Oversight of Administrative Practices Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 7 Judicial Jurisdiction over Civil Liberties Positive Positive ↔ Positive ↔ Positive ↔ 
Factor 8 System of Appellate Review Positive Positive ↔ Positive ↔ Positive ↔ 
Factor 9 Contempt/Subpoena/Enforcement Negative Negative ↔ Negative ↔ Negative ↔ 
III. Financial Resources 
      
  
Factor 10 Budgetary Input Positive Positive ↔ Positive ↔ Positive ↔ 
Factor 11 Adequacy of Judicial Salaries Negative Neutral ↑ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 12 Judicial Buildings Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 13 Judicial Security Negative Negative ↔ Neutral ↑ Neutral ↔ 
IV. Structural Safeguard 
      
  
Factor 14 Guaranteed Tenure Positive Positive ↔ Positive ↔ Neutral ↓ 
Factor 15 Objective Judicial Advancement Criteria Negative Negative ↔ Negative ↔ Neutral ↑ 
Factor 16 Judicial Immunity for Official Actions Positive Neutral ↓ Positive ↑ Positive ↔ 
Factor 17 Removal and Discipline of Judges Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 18 Case Assignment Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 19 Judicial Associations Neutral Negative ↓ Neutral ↑ Positive  
V. Accountability and Transparency 
     
  
Factor 20 Judicial Decisions and Improper Influence Negative Negative ↔ Negative ↔ Negative ↔ 
Factor 21 Code of Ethics Negative Negative ↔ Neutral ↑ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 22 Judicial Conduct Complaint Process Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 23 Public and Media Access to Proceedings Negative Negative ↔ Negative ↔ Negative ↔ 
Factor 24 Publication of Judicial Decisions Negative Negative ↔ Neutral ↑ Negative  
Factor 25 Maintenance of Trial Records Negative Neutral ↑ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
VI. Efficiency 
      
  
Factor 26 Court Support Staff Negative Neutral ↑ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 27 Judicial Positions Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 28 Case Filling and Tracking Systems Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 29 Computers and Office Equipment Negative Neutral ↑ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Factor 30 Distribution and Indexing of Current Law Neutral Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ Neutral ↔ 
Source: ABA-CEELI. Albanian Judicial Reform Index, Volume I (2001), Volume II (2004), Volume III (2006), Volume IV(2008). 
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A consociationalist interpretation of the Albanian judicial reform 
Hence, when it comes to EEC‘s judicial reforms, it is expected that EU carrot-and-stick 
policies will be more powerful and hence successful than in other policy sectors. In the 
case of Albania, carrots included €21 million from the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program for the judicial reform 
during the 2002-2004 period as well as the establishment of EURALIUS, June 13, 2005-
June 30, 2010.
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 In the European Commission‘s annual Country Progress Report, the 
Judicial Reform rubric within the Democracy and the Rule of Law subsection, Political 
Criteria Section, meticulously describes recent developments in judicial reforms, assesses 
progress, and provides recommendations on the expected directions of the reform for the 
near future. The goal remained the establishment of a judicial system in Albania 
compatible with the EU member countries‘ systems, hence a guarantee for the 
consociational practices that have created and ensured that the EU remained a stable 
democracy.            
 
A sectorial contextual interpretation of the Albanian judicial reform 
The previous section clarifies that throughout the entire period 1991-2010, the EC/EU 
gave high priority to the Albanian judicial reform. First, the consociationalist 
interpretation of Albanian judicial reform revealed the EU‘s positive interests in helping 
to establish a stable democracy in Albania that would emerge as a unified pillar in 
negotiations and absorption of EU consociational practices during the nation‘s accession 
process and after potential EU membership. Second, short of EU membership, the EU has 
seen the establishment and consolidation of independent, impartial, competent and 
efficient judicial systems in its neighboring countries from a security perspective. An 
independent and efficient judicial is able to fight organized crime even if such illegal 
activity has political support, as often is the case in the Balkans. Fighting organized 
crime, illegal immigration, gun and drugs smuggling, and human smuggling and 
trafficking from the Balkans to the territories of the EU member countries represent 
efforts to increase security and democratic stability within the existing EU, and these 
issues affects other areas beyond enlargement policies such as Justice and Home Affairs 
and EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
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 Third, as a human rights issue, a strong, 
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independent and efficient judicial system would help resolve domestic human rights 
issues, especially those related to economic rights and minority rights, thus reducing the 
potential of EU membership aspiring countries to become both economically and 
politically unstable. Indeed, the EU shares the latter perspective with the CoE, which also 
explains the willingness of the EU to heed the CoE comments and recommendation about 
judicial reform progress in the Balkans and also cooperate in joint programs.  
During the period of ―extraordinary politics,‖ 1991-1992, Albanian leaders‘ 
supported judicial reform. The judicial was utterly unfit to deal with the new political and 
economic conditions of the country, and was unable to guarantee and enforce trade 
contracts or settle disputes between individuals and between persons and the state. 
Presumably, any reform in other institutional and policy arenas including economic 
reform would have been impossible without some substantial changes in judicial 
practices. However, the Albanian leaders‘ interests to institute judicial reform tempered 
as ―ordinary politics‖ ensued. During that period, judicial reform stalled in this period, 
reflecting PD‘s growing authoritarianism. The failure of the referendum on the 
Constitution in November 1994, the growing international pressure on the government, 
and the need for the government to score some international achievements (mainly 
membership in the Council of Europe) resulted in government‘s positive interests in 
judicial reform during 1995. After the country‘s membership in the CE in June 1995, the 
PD was no longer interested in reforms that would erode its control of the judicial. 
Moreover, due to the rigged elections of May 1996 and the ensuing political crisis during 
1996-1997, Albanian leaders lost any immediate interests in judicial reform in favor of 
other emerging priorities.  
With the victory of the PS-led Center-Left coalition in July 1997, the new leaders 
showed positive interests for reforms in general and the judicial reform in particular, in 
order to show domestic and international audiences that they were different than their 
predecessors. Such a political spirit was reflected in decisive, fast, and comprehensive 
reforms, including judicial reform, in the period of 1997-2001. However, the same 
leaders, after the PS sunk into a deep political crisis due to an internal power struggle 
during 2002-2005 and entire segments of the PS leadership became embedded in occult 
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alliances with domestic and international organized crime, abandoned their positive 
interests toward judicial reform, thus once again causing a reform stalemate.  
In 2005, PD returned to power with a rehabilitated image. Such a spirit of change 
led the government toward improvements in the judicial sector as reflected by the 
Freedom House‘s Judicial Framework and Independence score improvement from 4.50 to 
4.25 in 2006 (reflecting developments during the previous year). As the Freedom House‘s 
Nations in the Transit Report notes, the drop of the score from 4.25 to 4.00 in 2006—
reflected in the Freedom House Report of 2007—owed to the judiciary‘s attempts to 
resist interference by the ruling majority.
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 However, the very fact that the judicial 
possessed means to resist government‘s intrusions shows progress in the judicial system. 
The American Bar Association‘s Judicial Reform Index for Albania, 2006, also leads to 
an interpretation of a small progress in judicial reform.
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 The continuous PD struggle against the Office of the General Prosecutor shows 
the PD‘s return to its original ruling style: control of the judicial to serve its political 
agenda. A small improvement in the Freedom House score during the period of 2006-
2007 (4.00 for Reports 2007 and 2008 each) mainly showed the judiciary‘s efforts to 
resist politics, not the progress of reform itself. Indeed, the very struggle of the judicial to 
resist politics showed that, by then, the Albanian judicial had built some independence as 
well as institutional tools to defend themselves. And finally, in the 2008-2010 period, 
government‘s interests toward judicial reform turned negative as the PD to date perceives 
its control over the judicial system as a means to retain power. 
Table 6-3 tabulates the reform results as correlated with EU‘s and Albanian ruling 
elites‘ interests over the last two decades.  
  
Macedonian Judicial Reform 
During the early years of its independence, Macedonia did not make any efforts to reform 
its judicial system. Sovereignty There is no evidence of serious attempt by any 
international partner of Macedonia to assist the country in reforming its judicial system 
during the early 1990s. Some efforts were made in 1995 by the OSCE and the American 
Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI) to invite 
lawyers to form a local NGO to represent criminal defendants pro bono, a responsibility         
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TABLE 6.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIAN JUDICIAL REFORM 
 
 
 
REFORM 
 
 
SITUATION 
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‘ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1991-1992 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The amendments to the Major Constitutional Provisions created an opportunity 
for successful continuation of the judicial reform       
 
1993-1994 
  
+ 
 
_ 
 
No reform. Government‘s interests shifted toward the control of the judicial. The most important 
―policy‖ of that period became the replacement of the judges who have served during the 
communist era with PD activists who have been trained in some 6-month courses.   
 
1995-1997 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
Slow progress. The implementation of the new Penal Code and Penal Procedure Code were good 
signs of progress. However, these successes were tarnished by government‘s attempts to control 
the courts, especially the High Court. The political instability of the 1996-1997 period brought the 
judicial reform to a total halt. 
 
1998-2001 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Excellent progress. The implementation of the Constitution and the establishment and/or 
reformation of several services represented a major breakthrough  for Albanian judicial reform.  
 
2002-2005 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
No reform. The crisis within the PS and ruling coalition shifted policy interest to other priorities. 
The only notable (rather political) judicial act of this period is the abolition of the death penalty by 
the Constitutional Court in 2002. 
 
2006 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The progress in judicial reform following the PD‘s return to power came as a 
combination of the EU‘s positive interests and the PD‘s need to show that it had abandoned it 
authoritarian style. 
 
2007-2010 
  
+ 
 
_ 
 
Reform halts/reverses. The PD‘s increasing interest in winning a second term and controlling the 
Office of the Prosecutor as well as the High Council of Justice brought the reforms to a standstill, 
and even reversed it in some aspects.  
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the Macedonian state itself had failed to fulfill. However, these efforts failed owing to 
skepticism and a lack of a culture of volunteerism in the country.
74
 Overall, during the 
1991-1995 period, Macedonian elites‘ interests in reforming the judicial system were 
neutral.   
The Dayton Agreement, November 1995, alleviated Macedonia‘s fears about its 
existence and offered the government an opportunity to focus on reforms that would 
deepen democratization and improve governance efficiency. As in the case of local 
decentralization, Macedonian ruling elites developed positive interests toward judicial 
reform. Thus, in 1995 Macedonia undertook its first steps toward reforming its judicial 
system with the Law on Courts, essentially eliminating specialized courts. Prior to 1996, 
there were courts in Bitola, Skopje, and Štip that handled commercial cases. There were 
also labor courts and courts that tried less serious criminal offenses, but the new law 
brought those cases in district courts.
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 Sobranie passed a brand new Criminal Code in 
1996, thus replacing the old Yugoslav code which had remained in use even after the 
country‘s independence in 1991. Sobranie also passed a brand new Code of Criminal 
Procedure in 1997.
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Some analyses of the current status of the Macedonian judiciary overestimate the 
role of the Ohrid Agreement in country‘s judicial reform.77 Indeed, the Agreement‘s 
signatories were concerned mainly with ethnic ratios as criteria for selecting the 
Constitutional Court, Ombudsman and the Judicial Council (Paragraph 4.3), and the right 
to translation at the state expense for all proceedings and documents for accused persons 
at any level in criminal and civil judicial proceedings (Paragraph 6.7). Albanian elites 
perceived the Macedonian judicial system as an instrument of the Macedonians, not of the 
state. In turn, Macedonian elites took advantage of Albanians‘ lack of attention to judicial 
reform and tried to retain as much power as possible over the judiciary. It is no 
coincidence then, that domestic and international were focused mostly on restoring 
stability in the country through the EU and other international partners. They thereby only 
emphasized issues contested by the Albanians in order not to jeopardize the negotiations. 
The period from the signing of the Ohrid Agreement until the September 2002 
elections was a difficult period for most reforms in Macedonia, including judicial reform, 
since the VMRO-DPMNE had been resisting the implementation of the Ohrid 
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Agreement. The entire pre-electoral and electoral rhetoric of its Chairman and country‘s 
Premier, Ljubče Georgievski, was rife with dissent and revulsion against ―Albanian 
terrorists‖ and the international actors who have brokered the Agreement. VMRO-
DPMNE needed to cling to its image as tough on issues of national security and 
protection of the Macedonianess of the state.  
During September 2001-September 2002, Macedonia‘s rule of law and its 
guarantor, the judicial system, continued to be sabotaged by politics and its preferred 
instrument, the police. The Macedonian Helsinki Committee reported the unprofessional 
behavior of the police force. Moreover, its elite units of Lions and Tigers were recorded 
assailing workers, ―opposition‖ journalists and media personnel, political activists, and 
random civilians as well as threatening opposition politicians.
78
 Police trespassing often 
went unpunished, and so have gone the criminal activities of the Minister of Interior, 
Ljube Boškovski.79 In fact, after Interior Minister Boškovski personally injured four 
spectators at a Lions' military exercise in May, Prime Minister Georgievski pronounced 
that, irrespective of what the interior minister might do, he would be amnestied ―for past 
merit in service of the state.‖ As summarized by the Macedonian Helsinki Committee, 
police behavior, especially during the pre-election period, undermined the reputation and 
role of the Ministry of the Interior and the professional cadre of the police... [making it] 
difficult to distinguish whether undertaken actions are part of legally defined functions of 
the police or are party orders.‖80 
The situation changed after Cervenkovski‘s SDSM victory in the September 2002 
elections. The SDSM-BDI coalition had strong incentives to institute reforms. First, the 
SDSM returned to power with the ambition to be a leading force for Macedonian 
democratization and a credible domestic partner for international actors. The task of BDI, 
the Albanian partner of the government, was also complex. First, being founded in spring 
2002 by people mainly related to the UÇK, and led by UÇK‘s political leader Ali Ahmeti, 
BDI needed to demonstrate its commitment to the stability of Macedonia. Second, its 
leader needed to demonstrate that the party was comprised of politicians and 
statespersons and not simply guerrilla fighters. Third, they needed to pay off much of 
their fighters who felt that they did not gain anything from the rebellion, and also protect 
them from harassment and/or persecution from the predominantly Macedonian security 
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forces and law enforcement. In sum, in the aftermath of the Ohrid Agreement, due to 
positive interests of both domestic elites and the EU, improvements occurred greater than 
those stipulated in Ohrid. Reportedly, changes during the period 2002-2004 (1) 
introduced a new political system at both national and local levels; (2) provided for an 
equitable legal representation of ethnic minorities; (3) provided for the use of minority 
languages; and (4) introduced the institution of the ombudsman.
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International influences on decision making have been able to help Macedonia to 
overcome its political fragmentation. In those cases, Macedonian politicians have 
demonstrated a willingness to surmount partisan and ethnic divisions by adopting key 
laws. Many legislative reforms regarding money laundering, drug enforcement, 
wiretapping, and citizenship have been mandated through Macedonia's commitment to 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement process with the EU. Additionally, national 
security pressures and the need to implement the Ohrid Agreement have dictated the 
smooth adoption of changes in the criminal code, including the voluntary handover of 
weapons. Likewise, deputies almost unanimously have ratified a number of international 
human rights agreements, such as the Convention for Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination of Women, the Convention on Children's Rights, and agreements banning 
child prostitution and pornography.
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However, the SDSM-BDI coalition had its own preferences related to the judicial 
reform, as illustrated by the power struggle in 2003 among the ruling SDSM, the 
opposition VMRO-DPMNE and President Trajkovski. SDSM‘s lack of an absolute 
majority during this period had hampered its efforts to build consensus for policies and 
reforms. In 2003, SDSM failed in its first attempt to garner support for amendments to the 
Law of Executive Procedure and the Law on Courts. In addition, the SDSM appointee to 
the Chair of the Republican Judicial Council, Lenče Sofronievska, was rejected by the 
VMRO-DPMNE parliamentarians claiming that she was an SDSM partisan appointment. 
At the same time, the parliamentary majority firmly turned down the two nominations of 
President Trajkovski.
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When in 2004 the Minister of Justice Ixhet Memeti acknowledged publicly that 
the judicial system required thorough restructuring, it reflected a growing awareness by 
the government that patchwork legislation would never result in thorough judicial review. 
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In April, Memeti announced that his team was working on a package of constitutional and 
legislative amendments. Those amendments aimed at redefining the position of judicial 
power within the country's political system, establishing a system for justice 
appointments, and reinforcing the independence of the judicial by setting up a separate 
judicial budget. Legislative changes aimed at increasing adjudication speed, defining 
certain provisions of the criminal code, and amending the entire judicial process.
84
 
Memeti also announced plans to abandon the practice of appointing judges through 
judicial exams and strengthening the administrative capacity of the judicial by 
introducing a new system of recruiting, training, evaluating, and promoting judges.
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In November 2004, the government adopted a strategy and Action Plan on 
Judicial Reform, outlining key changes to the country's legislation and constitution. The 
main principles were approved by the Sobranie on May 18, 2005 by a broad majority. 
Draft amendments were presented by the government in June, and in August the Sobranie 
adopted 15 amendments after public debate.  Meanwhile, a new Law on Enforcement of 
Civil Judgments was adopted in May 2005 to abolish the separate motion required for 
execution of judgments as well as to create a privatized bailiff system under the Ministry 
of Justice. A new Law on Civil Procedure was also adopted in September 2005 to 
introduce changes to make court procedures more efficient.
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 Also during the same year, 
the government discussed reforms to the Judicial Council's system for electing members 
in order to limit political interference. An expert committee has already been hired and 
later dismissed during that process.
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In a flurry of activity, on December 7, 2005, the Sobranie passed ten 
constitutional amendments related to judicial reform.  These concerned the Office of the 
Public Prosecutor (Amendment 30), the election of 15 members of the Judicial Council 
(Amendment 38), and the equitable and just representation of citizens of all ethnicities as 
judges, lay judges, and presidents of the courts (Amendment 29). The Sobranie also 
passed legislation on the enforcement of the amendments specifying that by July 30, 
2006, new laws on the Judicial Council, the courts, misdemeanors, the Council of Public 
Prosecutors, and the Public Prosecutor should be passed.
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In February 2006, a law was passed establishing the Academy for Training of 
Judges and Prosecutors, and in November the EU announced a €1.1 million (US$1.5 
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million) project to fuel the academy to enhance the professional skills of the country‘s 
judiciary. Candidates for the basic courts would have to complete a training course at the 
new academy. Also, the Law on Mediation was adopted in May with hopes to reduce the 
backlog of unsolved cases. Sixty mediators were appointed, and the law entered into force 
on November 2006. In May, new legislation on the courts, the Judicial Council, 
misdemeanors, and administrative disputes was passed, although the Law on the Judicial 
Council was the only one to enter into force in 2006.  
Despite these reform efforts, inefficiency problem persisted as hundreds of 
thousands of cases were untried. The courts were burdened with administrative work, a 
high number of misdemeanor cases, and decisions requiring execution. Out of five 
judgments against Macedonia by the European Court of Human Rights in 2006, four 
noted violations related to the length of judicial proceedings. While in March 2005 the 
total number of pending cases was 730,700, in 2006 the number was 937,756.
34
 In the 
Bitola Basic Court, there were 69,000 unsolved cases and only 40,000 solved in 2006. 
During the same time period, there were 44,000 unsolved cases in the Tetovo Basic Court 
and 43,649 in the Ohrid Basic Court. At the Kičevo Basic Court, there was no air 
conditioning, and work during the summer months was difficult. This court also lacked 
computers and courtrooms ; there were only five courtrooms for a total of 17 judges. The 
court in Kavadarci was heavily in debt, owing 1.2 million denars (€200,000 or 
US$273,280) to the newspaper Makedonski Poshti. The Gostivar Basic Court also had a 
debt of approximately1.5 million denars, while the Ohrid Basic Court lacked an archive.
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The elections of July 2006 resulted in a return of the VMRO-PDSh coalition to 
power. This time around, the coalition was interested in portraying its governing style in a 
positive manner. With the former Chairman and Premier Lubče Georgievski gone, the 
new coalition under the leadership of Nikola Gruevski renewed commitment to judicial 
reforms. The process began in October 2006 when the government abruptly dismissed the 
former public prosecutor, Aleksandar Prčevski, two years before his mandate ended, 
criticizing him for inefficiency and unprofessional behavior. With this move, the coalition 
exploited an institutional gap. The 2005 constitutional changes had placed the decision to 
dismiss prosecutors in the hands of a newly designed independent body, the Council of 
Public Prosecutors. However, by fall 2006, the Council has not yet been set up owing to 
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delays. The new government sacked Prčevski using the old laws and cited alleged 
―unprofessional work and poor results.‖ Yet, the legality of the dismissal was questioned, 
prompting experts to speculate that his removal was politically motivated and inconsistent 
with due procedures.
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An enthusiastic European Commission‘s Progress Report 2006 noted that ―[t]he 
legal framework for strengthening the independence and the efficiency of the judicial is 
largely in place,‖ supported by ―a broad political consensus.‖91 As the EC‘s Report 
assessed Macedonia‘s progress 
Overall, the constitutional and legal framework for an 
independent and efficient judicial is now largely in place. 
However, most of the reforms in the judicial have not yet 
entered into force. There are important challenges in this 
field, which require a sustained programme of reforms.
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Progress in judicial reform continued in 2007 with around 55 laws related to the 
judicial system reportedly adopted, in accord with recommendations of the Council of 
Europe and the EU. However, a loud public debate erupted among domestic experts over 
the interference of political parties in the composition of the Judicial Council as well as 
the nomination of judges. The new Judicial Council began operating in January 2007 and 
it began to recruit judges to the new Administrative Court and Court of Appeals in 
Gostivar. However, the new Administrative Court, which became legally able to 
adjudicate administrative cases in May 2007, was still not functional as of this date since 
its judges were not yet appointed. Other steps forward in Macedonian judicial reform 
within 2007 were the adoption in December 2007 of the Law on Public Prosecution and 
the Law on the Council of Public Prosecutors—the two final laws needed to complete the 
legislative frame-work set out in the constitutional amendments of December 2005. Also, 
the Academy of Judges and Prosecutors was established and became operational. The 
2006 Law on Mediation, which aimed to lower court workloads via alternative dispute 
resolution, was also enacted.  
2007 was the final year of the SDSM-BDI coalition. Apparently, the approaching 
general elections drove all parties to a politics of identity strategy. This rising tide of 
ethnic tensions during that year affected the judicial system as well. In October, the 
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Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutionality of the 2005 Law on the Use of Cultural 
Symbols by Ethnic Communities. The ruling found unconstitutional articles that regulated 
the public display of flags by ethnic communities. The ruling was strongly condemned by 
ethnic Albanian parties, with the governing PDSh accusing the opposition BDI of 
influencing members of the Court. Similar accusations were made by BDI. Three days 
later, the president of the Constitutional Court and another ethnic Albanian judge resigned 
in protest over the decision.
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 This shift of strategy from conducting reforms to promoting 
identity politics caused a reversal of the judicial reform process and was reflected by a 
worsening of the Freedom House‘s score of Judicial Framework and Independence from 
3.75 to 4.00. However, the EC‘s 2007 Progress Report neither praised any progress nor 
criticized the setback.
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Political and ethnic tensions rose again in the aftermath of the July 2008 elections 
when VMRO-DPMNE hesitated to invite BDI to serve as a governing partner, preferring 
its rival PDSh. However, the VMRO-DPMNE finally accepted to sit at the table in spring 
2008 and negotiate an agreement with BDI on a few issues which the Albanian party‘s 
leadership claimed to pertain to the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.
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 As Ragaru 
(2007) notes, Macedonia had once again lost several precious months in implementing 
much needed judicial reforms as well as those pertaining to state administration, 
education, and the economy.  
Once in power, Premier Gruevski‘s image changed from a technocrat to a 
Macedonian nationalist. He has tried to build his political success on a discourse that 
aptly combines promises to make Macedonia a prosperous country, with boosting of 
ethnic Macedonian self-confidence. It has worked thus far among Macedonians as they 
have felt themselves to be major losers in the Ohrid process (Ragaru 2008).  
Ethnic tensions continued to simmer for the rest of the VMRO-DPMNE rule, as 
Gruevski continued to focus on ethnic politics as a means of boosting political support. 
The small steps previously taken to advance judicial reform had proven insufficient to 
significantly improve the state of the nation‘s judiciary. However, the courts strengthened 
gradually due to the fact that reforms in this sector began earlier, in 2005, and because the 
Constitutional Court, with members appointed by the Sobranie using the ―double 
majority‖ rule, had the power to annul legislation and decrees that were found to violate 
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the Constitution. The Judicial Council, also appointed through a parliamentary double 
majority, oversees the court system and judges. In 2008, the new Administrative Court 
and the new Court of Appeals of Gostivar began operating. The Law on Courts was 
amended to provide for just one (instead of five) specialized court department to deal with 
cases of organized crime and corruption. The Judicial Council maintained its efforts to 
combat corruption in the judicial.
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The European Commission assessed Macedonian progress in judicial reform 
during the year 2008 as follows: 
Overall, good progress has been made in implementing the 
strategy on judicial reform, a key priority of the Accession 
Partnership. The judicial council functions smoothly and the 
New Council of Public Prosecutors has started to meet. The 
new Administrative Court and the new Court of Appeal in 
Gostivar were set up. However further strengthening of the 
judicial is required as regards its independence, efficiency, 
human resources and budgetary framework. A track record 
of implementation of the new legislative framework has still 
to be established. In the area of the judicial the country is 
moderately advanced.
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In 2009 there were allegations that the government had created a blacklist of 
judges, meddling in judiciary. In April, VMRO–DPMNE questioned the legitimacy of the 
Constitutional Court which had ruled against the introduction of religious education into 
state schools. The party described the decision of the court as politically motivated, 
claiming that the leader of the SDSM controls the court‘s work.98 The Constitutional 
Court responded with a press release denouncing ―unprecedented pressure‖ and ―attempts 
to harm its reputation‖.99 However, finally, the Speaker of the Sobranie, Trajko 
Veljanovski, a member of VMRO–DPMNE, announced that the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court were final and that the Sobranie should respect them. The 
Constitutional Court responded that Veljanovski simply sought to discredit and apply 
pressure to the court. In addition, Sterjo Zikov, a discharged Skopje Public Prosecutor, 
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claimed that his dismissal was a political decision. Similar complaints were voiced by two 
other prosecutors, Dragan Gaždov and Mitko Mitrevski, who were not reappointed.100  
A survey conducted in 2009 by the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission reflects 
those concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary. As the conclusions of the 
report noted: 
The results show that attempts to influence the decisions of 
judges are a common practice and occur frequently. 
Common violations of the law and of the principle of 
independence of the judicial remain to a large extent 
unnoticed and unpunished. A considerable portion of the 
judges think that these attempts do have an influence on the 
administration of justice. 
The mechanisms and instruments to protect 
their independence are perceived by judges as 
ineffective and therefore are very rarely used. The 
conducted survey reveals a large degree of distrust 
in judicial institutions and mechanisms of the 
judicial system on the part of the judges. An 
overwhelming majority of judges views the Judicial 
Council, probably the most important body for the 
independence of the judicial, as biased and the 
procedures it conducts as nontransparent and 
politically influenced. 
Many judges are dissatisfied with their 
working conditions, their salaries and their 
possibilities for professional development. The high 
response rate to the questionnaire demonstrates that 
judges believe it is time to engage into discussion of 
this issue and initiate improvements.
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 The EC Communication on Macedonia Progress Report, 2009, refers to the 
country‘s progress on judicial reform in almost neutral language. The report notes that 
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―further progress was made on reform of the judicial, which is a key priority of the 
Accession Partnership‖ and that ―[c]ontinued efforts are needed to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of the judicial, in particular through the implementation of 
the provisions regarding appointments and promotions.‖102 
The limited progress in Macedonian judicial reform has been noticed by the EU 
Commission which, in its Communication ―Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 
2010-2011‖ points to an improvement of the courts‘ efficiency, but displays concerns 
―about the independence and impartiality of the judicial.‖ According to the 
Communication, ―no further progress was made in ensuring that existing legal provisions 
were implemented in practice.‖103 The language of the Communication clearly showed 
that, after the reform reversal of 2007, no major steps forward had been taken. The slow 
progress of the Macedonian judicial reform has been noticed by foreign and domestic 
observers alike.
104
  
 Table 6-4 provides Freedom House‘s Judicial Framework and Independence score 
for the period 2000-2010, while Table 6-5 shows the more nuanced ABA-CEELI judicial 
reform index for 2002 and 2003. 
 
TABLE 6.4 MACEDONIAN JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK AND INDEPENDENCE 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
4.25 4.25 4.75 4.50 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Source: Freedom House 
Note: The years reflect the period of the Report, which reflects an assessment of the previous year‘s 
developments. 
 
Freedom House‘s score matches my historical account. In 2001 (as reported in 
2002), the index worsened from 4.25 to 4.75, but improved up to 3.75 until 2007 
(reported in 2008). Then it reversed to 4.00. Such a reversal occurred in several 
Macedonian sectorial reforms, and reflects the disillusionment of the Macedonian ruling 
elites with the EU delay to open accession negotiations even two years after the country 
became an EU candidate, mainly due to the potential Greek veto over the name of the  
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TABLE 6.5 MACEDONIAN JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX: TABLE OF FACTOR CORRELATION 
I. Quality, Education, and Diversity 
 
2002 2003 Trend 
Factor 1 Judicial Qualification and Preparation Negative Negative ↔ 
Factor 2 Selection/Appointment Process Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 3 Continuing Legal Education Positive Neutral ↓ 
Factor 4 Minority and Gender Representation Negative Negative ↔ 
II. Judicial Powers 
    
Factor 5 Judicial Review of Legislation Positive Positive ↔ 
Factor 6 Judicial Oversight of Administrative Practices Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 7 Judicial Jurisdiction over Civil Liberties Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 8 System of Appellate Review Positive Positive ↔ 
Factor 9 Contempt/Subpoena/Enforcement Negative Negative ↔ 
III. Financial Resources 
    
Factor 10 Budgetary Input Positive Neutral ↑ 
Factor 11 Adequacy of Judicial Salaries Negative Negative ↔ 
Factor 12 Judicial Buildings Negative Neutral ↑ 
Factor 13 Judicial Security Positive Neutral ↓ 
IV. Structural Safeguard 
    
Factor 14 Guaranteed Tenure Positive Positive ↔ 
Factor 15 Objective Judicial Advancement Criteria Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 16 Judicial Immunity for Official Actions Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 17 Removal and Discipline of Judges Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 18 Case Assignment Negative Neutral ↑ 
Factor 19 Judicial Associations Positive Positive ↔ 
V. Accountability and Transparency 
    
Factor 20 Judicial Decisions and Improper Influence Negative Negative ↔ 
Factor 21 Code of Ethics Negative Negative ↔ 
Factor 22 Judicial Conduct Complaint Process Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 23 Public and Media Access to Proceedings Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 24 Publication of Judicial Decisions Negative Neutral ↑ 
Factor 25 Maintenance of Trial Records Negative Neutral ↑ 
VI. Efficiency 
    
Factor 26 Court Support Staff Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 27 Judicial Positions Neutral Neutral ↔ 
Factor 28 Case Filling and Tracking Systems Negative Negative ↔ 
Factor 29 Computers and Office Equipment Negative Neutral ↑ 
Factor 30 Distribution and Indexing of Current Law Negative Neutral ↑ 
Source: ADA-CELLI. Macedonia Judicial Reform Index 2003, and Macedonia Judicial Reform Index, Volume II, 2004. 
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country.
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 Table 6-5 cannot tell much, except for confirming a slow improvement in the 
judiciary from 2002 to 2003 with seven factors that determine the state of the judiciary 
improved, two worsened, and twenty-one remaining about the same. I develop a further 
interpretation of the results in the following subsections. 
 
A consociational interpretation of Macedonian judicial reform 
The Albanian elites of Macedonia perceived the Macedonian judicial system as an 
instrument of the Macedonian people. In turn, Macedonian elites tried to retain as much 
control as possible over the judiciary. It is easily conceivable that such conflicts could be 
resolved through political arrangements rather than legal instruments. It is no coincidence 
that the focus of domestic and international actors lay in restoring the country‘s stability 
through a political arrangement, the Ohrid Agreement, rather than judicial practices. The 
EU and other international partners who negotiated the Agreement sought to reach an 
accord by emphasizing only issues contended by Albanians, hence focusing only on 
consociational practices needed to establish a stable democracy rather than the entire 
gamut of reforms needed for good governance. Judicial reform is not a consociational 
practice per se, even though it embodies some consociational practices such as ethnic 
ratios for the composition of courts and the use of languages of major ethnicities in the 
legal process. However, when it comes to the delivery of justice, it is the citizen before 
the law, and ethnicity should no longer play a role; delivering justice does not occur 
through consociational practices but through judicial practices. Thus, the relevance of 
judicial reform rests not in establishing a democracy through consociational practices, but 
in maintaining a stable democracy through the rule of law.  
However, it is evident that the EU‘s need for an independent, impartial, functional 
and professional judicial system in its member countries through the consociationalist 
perspective. The rule of law not only reinforces a stable democracy but also builds the 
consensual framework for its functioning. It assures the functioning of institutions 
established through elites pacts and may also serve as a reference for citizen‘s 
overarching loyalties. Such a stable democracy emerges as a unified pillar in negotiations 
for further EU integration. Moreover, although judicial systems of EU member countries 
are national systems, their independence from and impartiality toward domestic politics 
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may help to establish a supranational network of the judiciary. A number of likeminded 
judicial systems could assist with EU internal cohesion more than any national legislative, 
executive and political party. A network of judicial systems that would provide the same 
justice from Iceland to Cyprus and from Ireland to Turkey might be useful to address 
transnational issue of transnational crime. It can ultimately serve as a reference for 
overarching loyalties of the Union.  
 
A sectorial contextual interpretation of Macedonian judicial reform 
The previous subsection helped to assess the EU‘s interests in Macedonian judicial 
reform which has been mainly neutral between the period of 1991-2001. This interval 
coincided with the EU‘s fear that pressure for reforms might destabilize the fragile 
country.
106
 The EU ‗s interests toward judicial reform turned positive after the Zagreb 
Summit, November 2000, and was reinforced after the Copenhagen European Council, 
December 2002, which confirmed that countries in the Western Balkans were potential 
EU candidates. Ever since, the EU‘s interest in Macedonia‘s judicial reform has been 
always as positive. From this point on, the EU has used carrots, or incentives, in the form 
of financial assistance for judicial reform (€4 million from the CARDS Programme for 
the 2002-2004 period) as well as its signature on the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement of April 9, 2001, all in the midst of violent ethnic clashes.
107
 Meanwhile, 
―sticks,‖ or punishments for the unsteady performance of judicial reforms have been 
overshadowed by the high emphasis the EU has placed on the implementation of the 
Ohrid Agreement. As the historic process tracing demonstrated, the domestic ruling 
elites‘ preferences varied from negative to positive to neutral. The combination of these 
different preferences explains the variation in the results and pace of judicial reform. 
 From 1991 to 1995, both Macedonian ruling elites and the EU displayed no 
interest in Macedonian judicial reform which explains the lack progress. The Law of 
Courts was an initial step forward, but it dealt mainly with adaptations rather than deep 
structural and legislative improvements of the existing judicial system. The Dayton 
Accord, November 1995 relieved some of Macedonia‘s existential fears and, in 1996, the 
first steps to reform the judicial were undertaken with the revision of the Criminal Code 
followed by a new Code of Criminal Procedures in 1997.  
206 
  
 The VMRO-PDSh coalition which seized power after the October 1998 elections 
did almost nothing to reform the judicial. The coalition had no image problem and their 
priorities lay in sharing power rather than conducting reforms. 1998-2000 became a 
period of neutral interests in judicial reforms from both the EU and Macedonian ruling 
elites; this situation caused the reform process which had already begun to stall. The EU‘s 
interests in judicial reform throughout the region increased after the launching of the 
Stabilization and Association Programme, though, ethnic conflict in 2002 brought to the 
fore some more pressing issues. However, after the 2002 elections, both partners of the 
coalition, the Macedonian SDSM and the Albanian BDI, had strong incentives for reform; 
SDSM needed to clean up its tarnished image created during its ruling period between 
1990-1998 while BDI wanted to show that it was not just a ragtag group of former 
guerillas but a constructive political force. The combination of the EU support with the 
coalition‘s interests led to a major breakthrough in the country‘s judicial reform during 
2002-2006. However, one year before July 2008 elections, all parties returned to politics 
of identity, thus abandoning the path to reform.  
 The return to power of VMRO-DPMNE and its unlikely coalition with the BDI, 
the former guerrilla group that fought against the VMRO-DPMNE‘s government in 2001, 
brought to the fore some new dynamics. None of the parties had political image 
problems; VMRO-DPMNE returned to power without some of its most discredited 
politicians; its former Chairman and Premier Ljubče Georgievski had left the Party along 
with the majority of its parliamentary fraction to found the VMRO-NP in July 2004; and 
BDI had already established itself as a political force oriented toward political 
compromise. The coalition had little incentive to commit itself to judicial reform, hence 
the reform stalled.  
  Table 6-6 summarizes these findings. 
 
The role of human capital: eliminating alternative explanations 
Several accounts of the Albanian and Macedonian judicial reform process point to the 
lack of human capital as a causal factor in these countries‘ slow progress in institutional 
reforms. For instance, the EC‘s Communication on Albania 2010 Progress Report points 
out that ―[h]uman and financial resources, as well as infrastructure conditions, are not 
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 TABLE 6.6 DEVELOPMENTS IN MACEDONIAN JUDICIAL REFORM 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION 
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‘ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1991-1995 
  
0 
 
0 
 
No reform.  Both the EU and Macedonian ruling elites were interested in maintaining 
Macedonia‘s stability, not instituting reform. 
 
1996-1997 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The Dayton Accord alleviated some existential fears of Macedonian elites, 
and turned their attention to reforms. The EU had yet to decide their strategy for the region. 
 
1998-2001 
  
0 
 
0 
 
No reform. With the EU being engaged in helping to solve the Albanian and Kosovo crises 
and the VMRO-PDSh coalition involved on a silent power sharing deal, Macedonian judicial 
reform stalled. 
 
2001-2002 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
No reform. Armed conflict in the nation forced all parties to focus on forging a political deal 
rather than sectorial reforms. 
 
2002-2006 
 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. The SDSM-BDI coalition was interested in sectorial reforms out of 
concerns for its image.  
 
2007 
  
+ 
 
_ 
 
No reform/reform reversal. During the last year of its mandate, the SDSM-BDI coalition 
was interested in re-election, hence shifted to politics of identity.  
 
2008-2010 
 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
No reform. The VMRO-BDI coalition focused on other priorities. 
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adequate and need to be improved to ensure the efficient functioning of courts.‖108 In the 
case of Macedonia, the EC Communication on Macedonia 2010 Progress Report 
highlights that  
the absence of a human resource management system has 
slowed down the recruitment of graduates from the academy 
for training judges and prosecutors into the judicial. The 
judicial continues to face budgetary constraints. The Skopje 
2 basic court, which is the court with the largest number of 
cases, and the four courts of appeal along with the 
administrative court were unable to reduce their backlogs. 
The administrative court, the court of appeal in Gostivar and 
most of the Public Prosecutor‘s offices remained 
understaffed, which affected their performance.
109
 
 These are only two of the most recent observations related to the negative role that 
scarce human resources are playing in the reform of the Albanian and Macedonian 
judicial systems. The question is: how much do they count in our assessment of progress 
toward these reforms? Carothers (2006: 8) summarizes the issue as follows:       
A key step is achieving genuine judicial independence. 
Some of the above measures foster this goal, especially 
better salaries and revised selection procedures for judges. 
But the most crucial changes lie elsewhere. Above all, 
government officials must refrain from interfering with 
judicial decision making and accept the judicial as an 
independent authority. They must give up the habit of 
placing themselves above the law (Carothers 2006: 8). 
 A careful observation of the historical process tracing and the Freedom House‘s 
Judicial Framework and Independence score reveals that obstacles to judicial reform as 
well as breakthroughs are caused by top government actors. They ultimately reflect 
political actors‘ interests related to the judicial reform. An examination of the historical 
process tracing of the judicial reforms in Albania and Macedonia as well as the Freedom 
House‘s Judicial Framework and Independence score show that all the breakthroughs in 
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judicial reforms in both countries have resulted from leaders‘ political will to institute 
such reforms. Only once, in the case of Albania during 2006-2007, has the score 
improved due to the resistance of the judiciary to government‘s encroachments.  
The lack of human resources cannot be an alternative explanation. While purges 
in the Albanian judicial system during most of the 1990s and vacancies in the Macedonia 
judicial system during 2000 may have slowed down the pace of reforms, both phenomena 
have been caused by political agents: in the case of Albania, the ruling PD sought to 
control the judicial by replacing judicial personnel inherited from the past―hence 
deemed loyal to the PS―with its hurriedly trained partisans. In Macedonia, most of the 
vacancies were caused by prolonging difficult negotiations between political actors from 
different ethnic groups while some other vacancies were caused by the cumbersome 
process of double majority.  
If human capital were an important factor, we would have observed incremental 
improvements of the judiciary as new graduates enter the system. But that does not 
explain the reform uneven record. There is abundant evidence to show that the human 
capital―or the lack thereof―is not an explanatory variable of the Albanian and 
Macedonian progress in judicial reforms.    
 
Conclusions 
Although the judicial system does not fall within the traditional concept of consociational 
practices that help to establish and maintain a stable democracy, it remains an key player 
in assuring that the political and institutional arrangements of these practices survive 
centripetal forces. Some consociational practices such as ethnic and linguistic 
representation in judicial administration have been important elements of Macedonian 
judicial reform; yet, the reform has elements that go far beyond these consociational 
practices. Moreover, historical process tracing has provided more evidence to support my 
sectorial contextual model. The combination of EU and domestic leaders‘ political 
interests produces the policy outcomes theorized in Chapter 3.  
 However, the EU interest in the EE judicial reform stems from the need to equip 
EU membership aspiring countries with judicial systems and practices that would assure 
equal and likewise enforcement of contracted consociational practices throughout the EU 
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space. If the EU evolved a stable, democratic entity due to consociational practices, a 
social contract would exist among pillar-states. Of course, most cases related to breaches 
of such a contract go to the European Court of Justice, but procedures and practices of 
this court cannot be detached from EU member countries‘ procedures and practices. 
Indeed, they represents a European legal tradition reinforced by EU member countries‘ 
judicial systems. In the very end, as guarantors of the enforcement of consociational 
agreements among EU member countries, Eastern European independent, impartial, 
professional and efficient judicial systems become important components of 
consociational arrangements necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the EU 
as a stable democratic entity.    
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programmatically useful and justified. The categories incorporated 
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time. 
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commander Jovan Tarčulovski was sentenced to 12 years.  
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hinted that the office of the President is vacant next year. Incumbent 
Branko Crvenkovski has recently said he would not run again. Mr. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ASYLUM REFORMS 
 
 
The establishment of asylum systems in the EU membership aspiring Eastern Europe 
countries (EECs) represents a process guided by EU conditionality (Byrne 2003: 343). 
Until the 2005 Hague Programme Action Plan and the 2007 Green Paper on the Future 
of the European Asylum System (hereafter 2007 Green Paper), EU membership 
conditionality aimed at assisting EECs to set asylum systems compatible with the 1951 
Geneva Convention on the Refugee Status and its 1967 New York Protocol on the Status 
of Refugees (hereafter 1951 Geneva Convention).  However, with the 2007 Green Paper 
and its fundamental principle of “solidarity and burden sharing,” it became clearer that 
the EU expects from its aspirants the establishment of asylum systems that would 
contribute to solidarity and burden sharing. In order to be able to carry such a task, EE 
countries need asylum systems compatible with those of the EU countries as well as 
policies consistent with the common European asylum policy. However, in some of the 
EE countries, these institutions continue not to serve any domestic need.  
 The EU interests in the Balkans asylum systems have shifted from initial concern 
with regional peace and stability that would prevent masses of refugees to seek refuge in 
the EU member countries to the establishment of asylum systems that would prevent 
migration through the region to the EU member countries (Feijen 2007). Such policies 
have been associated with the conflicting dichotomy between principles of human rights 
and EU internal security (Peshkopia 2005a, 2005c). Apparently, the EU has tried to 
resolve this contradiction by establishing a common European asylum system 
(Thielemann 2008). It is easily conceivable that the EU membership aspiring countries 
need to establish asylum systems of international standards. That would make their 
asylum system easily adjustable to the EU‟s after their accession.  
Thus, the EU has increasingly linked the establishment of asylum systems in the 
Western Balkans with its accession strategies (Feijen 2007; Byrne 2003). In setting the 
criteria that EU aspirants should fulfill, in its Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider 
European Union (hereafter Agenda 2000) the European Commission foresaw an annual 
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opinion on the progress of candidate countries, including asylum and migration as part of 
justice and home affairs. For the Western Balkans, developing asylum systems became 
part of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) from the launch of the 
Stabilization and Association Programme (SAP), May 1999, and rests in the chapter on 
justice and home affairs. The annual progress reports assess countries‟ progress in asylum 
and migration, and the Commission releases recommendations on asylum and migration 
issues which national governments need to address.  
 The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, envisions the EU as an area of freedom and 
security. As such, the EU views its enlargement as expanding this area, and requires the 
EU membership aspiring countries to develop laws, institutions, and rules compatible 
with those that underpin and promote EU freedom and security. Although the EU acquis 
communitaire, as a cornerstone of the Treaty of Amsterdam, is only legally binding to EU 
member states, the 1995 European Council in Madrid stipulated that candidate countries 
should transpose the acquis to their national legislations. Such a requirement represents a 
shift from the initial requirement for potential candidate countries only to harmonize and 
align their legislation with the acquis, to simply copying the “minimum standards” of the 
emerging common European asylum system.
1
  
        The postsocialist Balkan countries are located on the Balkan Route, the transit 
route of illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Central and Eastern Asia to the EU 
territory (Peshkopia 2008b; Peshkopia and Voss 2011). The economic hardship of 
postsocialist reforms and the Yugoslav ethnic wars of the 1990s caused massive fluxes of 
refugees and economic migrants. In addition, the atrocities of the Yugoslav wars and the 
carefully crafted policies of ethnic cleansing produced large numbers of internally 
displaced persons (IDP), and many of them  continue to be potential refugees to the EU in 
attempts to escape poor living conditions in refugee camps and improvised shelters.in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia. Thus, the very same 
socioeconomic conditions made the Balkans both refugee and illegal migrant countries of 
origin and transit route. Countless illegal economic migrants, mainly from Eastern 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and China, have transited the Balkans toward EU countries 
during the last two decades (Morrison and Crosland 2001).  
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 Since few of the illegal migrants and refugees are interested in staying in the 
Balkans, but simply transit through its countries toward the EU, the governments in the 
region did not put serious efforts in thwarting this influx. Arguably, for the newly 
emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, institutional reforms in the area of asylum add 
unnecessary strain in their already weak economies and social welfare systems 
(Peshkopia 2005a,b,c; Byrne 2003; Nyiri, Toth and Fullerton 2001; Anagnost 2000; 
Lavenex 1998). Some authors have also argued that the EECs‟ resistance to build asylum 
system has been provoked by the fear that the EU asylum policies tend to turn these 
countries into a “buffer” zone for illegal migration flowing through them toward the EU 
territories (Byrne 2003; 2002; Byrne, Noll and Vedsten-Hansen 2002a,b; Stola 2001: 90-
94); however, I continue to argue as before (Peshkopia 2005a,b,c) that indifference rather 
than rational opposition has prevented Balkan leaders from conducting asylum-related 
reforms. In both cases, however, the EECs have yielded to the EU demands to establish 
asylum systems which serve no domestic needs. The Albanian asylum system has gone 
through dramatic developments. In the arch of three years, it went from the outstanding 
efforts to manage the massive refugee influx of Kosovars during the 1999 Kosovo War, 
to the collapse of the system in 2002 due to mismanagement and curbing government 
interest asylum policies. The Macedonian case shows a similar reluctance by the domestic 
leaders to advance with the asylum reform while the country faces more pressing issues. 
 However, most of the postcommunist Balkan countries have now established 
formal asylum systems (Feijen 2007). This chapter shows how EU membership 
conditionality has affected such outcomes. I describe the developments in asylum systems 
in Albania and Macedonia, and analyze how the effects that changes in domestic leaders‟ 
interests and EU policies have impacted the asylum reforms in both countries.          
 
Asylum in Albania: The Politics of Oblivion and Obedience                                                                                                         
Communist Albania never signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, thus refusing to become 
part of the international system of refugee protection. Indeed, as the country was 
becoming more isolated, it did not even need an asylum system. The last wave of 
refugees occurred in 1949 when the defeated Greek communist guerrilla entered Albania, 
only to be transferred quickly to other countries of the Soviet Bloc. For the rest of the 
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communist reign, the only refugees to enter the country were Albanians from the former 
Yugoslavia seeking to escape the Yugoslav anti-Albanian policies. The deeply suspicious 
regime of Tirana used to relocate those refugees in remote communities under permanent 
control of local authorities. Fearing refugee flows from Kosovo, especially during the 
violent riots in the Kosovo capital Prishtina in March-April 1981, the intention of the 
Albanian communist regime was to make Albania an unattractive country for refuge.   
 With the opening of the country in 1991, one of the obvious signs of the Albanian 
eagerness to break free from the communist self-imposed isolation was its adherence to 
international institutions and organizations. That popular mood was reflected in the rush 
of the newly elected Albanian authorities to acquire membership many international 
organizations. As a result, in December 1991, Albania signed the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. The signature remained a political gesture since it did not trigger immediate 
policy change on refugee protection. 
 Chaotic Albania of 1991-2001 was center of all types of trafficking and smuggling 
flowing from the geopolitical East (Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union, Turkey, the 
Middle East, and Central and Far Asia) to the geopolitical West. Streams of illegal 
immigrants entered every day from the Albanian-Greek and Albanian-Macedonian 
borders toward the Albanian coasts. From there, Albanian gangs smuggled them across 
the Adriatic Sea to Italy on powerful speedboats. Immigrants included Turkish and Iraqi 
Kurds, trafficked girls from Moldova and Ukraine, Pakistani countrymen, Iranian from all 
social classes, young Chinese, and a mixture of rural Albanians. With the Albanian 
authorities silent―perhaps encouraging human smuggling in order to diminish political 
pressure from unemployed masses during periods of difficult reforms―the efforts of the 
Italian coastguards during the 1990s proved to be insufficient to disrupt the Balkan route 
(Peshkopia 2008b; Peshkopia and Voss 2011). 
 The idea that foreign citizens could seek asylum in Albania while Albanian 
citizens were seeking asylum in other countries sounded strange to Albanian authorities 
and public alike.
2
 That‟s why United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees‟ 
(UNHCR) efforts during 1991-1997 to persuade the Albanian governments to establish an 
asylum system could not produce any results before the country‟s process of drafting a 
new constitution 1997-1998. After the rocky years of the Partia Demokratike (PD) rule 
225 
 
that ended with the turmoil of the 1997 and the Partia Socialiste (PS) victory in July 
1997, the new ruling elite wanted to demonstrate to country‟s international partners that 
they have abandoned their Leninist legacy and sought to fully integrate the country in the 
international community. Thus, for the first time, Albania recognized the right of foreign 
citizens to have asylum in its territory with its new Constitution that entered into force on 
November 28, 1998. Article 40 of the Constitution states that “foreigners have the right of 
asylum in the Republic of Albania according to law.”3 On December 14, 1998, Kuvendi 
approved the Law on Asylum. Several months after, on April 19, 2001, Kuvendi approved 
the Law on the Guard and Control of the State Border, and on May 27, it approved the 
Law for Foreigners, completing the legal foundations for a modern asylum and 
immigration system.  
The Law on Asylum was drafted with the close cooperation of UNHCR Bureau of 
Tirana (BoT). The law generally met the 1951 Geneva Convention‟s criteria of refugee 
definition, refugee status determination (RSD), and refugee protection. It recognized the 
1951 Geneva Convention‟s definition of refugee (Art. 4) and affirmed the concept of 
temporary protection for humanitarian reasons (Art. 5). The law also reflected the 1951 
Geneva Convention‟s principle of non-refoulement (Art.7 and Art.15/2/a). Articles 12/3 
and 15/2/b recognized the right of those who have been granted asylum status to acquire 
labor and residence permission and social rights at an equal level to Albanian citizens.  
The law designed Zyra për Refugjatë (ZpR) [Office for Refugees] as the 
institution that conducted asylum seekers‟ applications and interviews. The ZpR, was 
composed of five civil servants, also served as a collegial decision-making body (Art. 17). 
The rejected asylum seekers had the right to appeal to Komisioni Kombëtar për Refugjatë 
(KKR) [National Commission for Refugees], an eight member committee with the 
participation of the government asylum issues-related agencies, and two NGOs – Dhoma 
e Avokatëve [Albanian Bar Association], and Komiteti Shqiptar i Helsinkit [Albanian 
Helsinki Committee] (Art.19). Komisioneri Kombëtar për Refugjatë [The National 
Commissioner for Refugees] was the head of the entire asylum system. Komisioneri 
Kombëtar për Refugjatë chairs both ZpR and KKR, but could not vote in the KKR in 
cases of refugee appeals against ZpR‟s decisions (Art.19/8).       
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Although the Law on Asylum has been considered as one that fits the international 
criteria, loopholes still loomed. For instance, Article 23/3 of the law stipulated the 
obligation of the ZpR to accord a state-paid lawyer to asylum seekers. That was a major 
development compared to asylum laws of other Balkan countries. Yet it was unclear who 
would pay for lawyers, and the ZpR itself had no resources for such expenditures, 
especially during the period 1999-2002 when the ZpR was financed by annual UNHCR 
programs.
4
   
Even before the Law on Asylum was approved in June 1998, the ZpR was 
established as a small unit within the Ministria e Pushtetit Vendor dhe Decentralizimit 
(MPVD) [Ministry of Local Government and Decentralization], with the main purpose of 
tackling a minor refugee crisis triggered by ongoing skirmishes in Kosovo. The 
establishment of the ZpR represented a quick-fixed without any legal underpinning and 
an undefined status. In March 1999, soon after the Law on Asylum was approved, 
roughly 450,000 Albanian Kosovars entered Albania and Macedonia forced by a Serbian 
brutal policy of ethnic cleansing conducted mainly by Serbian paramilitaries, government 
security forces and military units. They methods included rapes of Albanian women, 
executions of civilians, looting of Albanian houses and properties, and forced expulsion. 
An NATO military air response ensued to stop Serbian massacres, and a large 
international effort began to help both countries dealing with the humanitarian crisis. The 
Albanian government granted to Kosovar refugees the status of temporary protection, the 
first Albanian legal action in refugee protection.  As the majority of Kosovar refugees 
returned to their homes along with NATO troops in June 1999, few the remaining became 
the major preoccupation of the ZpR during the rest of 1999 and most 2000. However, 
during 2000, the ZpR began to proceed with individual applications, and some 
rudimentary procedures of refugee status determination (RSD) have since been 
developed. However, in spring 2001, a minor refugee crisis from Macedonia caused by 
military clashes between the Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare [National 
Liberation Army] and the ethnic Macedonian dominated security forces interrupted again 
the development of the ZpR‟s normal functioning. 
During the year 2000, the activity of the ZpR declined and government interest 
switched to more pressing issues. Two sequent elections, the local elections in October 
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2000 and general elections in June 2001 turned the focus to domestic problems. The PS 
victory in the 2001 general elections was followed by a power struggle within the 
socialists themselves, and only by summer 2002 the country began to implement some 
reforms. Asylum reform was low in ruling elites‟ priorities during that period. With the 
consolidation of power within the PS, the newly re-elected Prime Minister Fatos Nano 
seized the cause of the EU membership for the country, and returned to reforms that 
would facilitate Albania„s road toward the EU. In November 2006, Albania and the EU 
signed the agreement for the readmission not only of its own citizens but also of the third 
country citizens who have been denied asylum or refugee status in the EU counties, and 
who have been proved to have entered the EU from Albania.
5
   
During the period October 2001-April 2002, the ZpR struggled for its survival and 
recover past administrative blunders.
6
 The work focused on both drafting and promoting 
legislation that would made the Albanian asylum compatible with requirements of the 
1951 Geneva Convention, and undertook such initiatives such as the prescreening 
process, a procedure of interviewing police detained illegal migrants to determine 
whether they were refugees or economic migrants.
7
 The ZpR also participated in Albania-
EU task force committees for assessing Albania‟s policy progress toward the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement. The ZpR‟s effort to reach refugee protection standards 
stipulated by the EU were guided by UNHCR, not the Albanian government. Finally, the 
awkward administrative situation of ZpR ended on April 30, 2002, when the Ministria e 
Pushtetit Vendor dhe Decentralizimit (MPVD) [Ministry of Local Government and 
Decentralization] ordered the suspension of the ZpR‟s activity. The UNHCR BoT took 
over some of ZpR‟s functions such as the reception of new asylum applications, and the 
assistance of those few individuals and families who were either under the RSD process 
or were leftovers from the Kosovar massive influx of 1998-1999.  
In October 2001, the delayed Albanian Task Force on Asylum was established 
with the participation of domestic and international actors. The Task Force was in charge 
of drafting by-laws to fill the remaining legal gaps in issues of refugee integration. Three 
by-laws on education, health care, and employment, drafted in spring 2002, were 
incorporated into the law on integration and family union for persons that have been 
granted asylum status in the Republic of Albania, approved by Kuvend in June 2003, and 
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entered into force on August 19, 2003. Similarly, the National Commission for Refugees 
was constituted in its first meeting only by early November 2001, almost two years after 
the Law on Asylum stipulated its activity. The RSD procedures were established 
according to the law, and a joint project between UNHCR, the ZpR and Paqe Përmes 
Drejtesisë (PPD) [Peace through Justice], a local NGO, was settled to make available 
legal assistance for refugees and asylum seekers. 
The ZpR enjoyed a wide range of autonomy since most of its decisions did not 
need to be endorsed by the respective minister, which also led to abuses by irresponsible 
or corrupted public servants. In an attempt to address administrative shortcuts, the 
minister of local government released a guideline for an internal reform of the ZpR that 
resulted in its suspension on April 30, 2002. But the reform went beyond the guideline, 
changing the location and the name of the institution as well. By April 2003, the ZpR was 
transferred to the Ministria e Rendit Publik (MRP) [Ministry of Public Order], now 
Ministria e Brendëshme (MB) [Ministry of Interior]. Indeed, that was a necessary step, 
since the RSD process more closely linked with police than with local governments. 
Finally, in October 2003, a decision of the Council of Ministers changed the name of the 
ZpR to Drejtoria për Refugjatë dhe Nacionalitete (DRN) [Directorate for Refugees and 
Nationalities], reflecting thus the new status of the institution within the MRP.   
Before summer 2003, Albania did not have any official refugee reception center, 
and detained asylum-seekers were accommodated in private mansions rented by several 
NGOs financed by the UNHCR protection program. The implementation of a project to 
establish Qëndra Kombëtare për Azilkërkues (QKA) [National Center for Asylum 
Seekers] the first asylum seekers‟ reception center in the country began in October 2001. 
The issue of refugee and asylum seeker accommodation had been a concern for both the 
Albanian authorities and UNHCR. Usually, the detained people who were caught by the 
police traveling illegally through Albania were kept in police stations without any legal 
case; even the police were confused about what their legal status. Although Albanian law 
punishes illegal border crossing, the fact that tens of thousands of Albanians were doing it 
on daily bases continued to perplex the Albanian authorities on the real meaning and 
application of such a law. There were no food or hygienic supplies provided by the MRP, 
thus, detained people often remained in the mercy of policemen. Because of the sluggish 
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cooperation between the ZpR and UNHCR with police, the detained people were 
frequently obliged to live under terrible conditions for several days. In order to relieve the 
detainees‟ conditions, UNHCR provided some local NGOs with funds to arrange the 
accommodation of asylum seekers in private-owned houses. However, UNHCR viewed 
the final solution of the problem with the establishment of a refugee reception center that 
would shelter asylum seekers from the moment that an asylum request is received until 
the final decision. The Albanian government offered an old military building in Babrru, 
outside of Tirana. The construction of the reception center was supervised by UNHCR, 
and the entire project was financed by the European Commission in implementation of 
the EU High Level Working Group‟s (HLWG) Action Plan on Asylum in Albania and the 
Neighboring Region. The total amount was 49, 616, 203 Albanian Lek (roughly €350, 
000), with the Albanian government covering only a small portion of costs for telephone 
and utilities. QKA opened in July 2003. In February 2010, there were 69 recognized 
refugees and 29 asylum applicants.
8
 Most of the recognized refugees are remnants of the 
Kosovar refugee wave of the spring 1999, indeed, the same that were under the ZpR 
protection in 2002.
9
 
However, the DRN remained volatile. It underwent another restructuring in 2006 
which left it with three officials instead of five, undermining its capacity to implement the 
action plan for asylum and to properly process asylum applications.
10
 From that 
reorganization, the DRN became Departamenti për Shtetësi dhe Refugjatë (DShR) 
[Department for Citizenship and Refugees]. On November 10, 2010, the European 
Commission (EC) noted that the institutional and legal framework has been put in place 
and a new law on asylum that was adopted in 2009 and is “generally in line with EU 
standards.” However, the Commission warned that consistency needs to be ensured 
between the Law on asylum, the Law on integration and the Law on foreigners.” As the 
Commission acknowledged, “[t]he asylum system has sufficient human resources and 
capacity to deal with its current low caseload. However, in case of a higher influx of 
asylum seekers, the DShR would need additional and more specialized staff.”11 One can 
easily conclude that the asylum institution in Albania stands formally as an institution that 
could treat asylum seekers and refugees, but there are very few asylum cases to proceed.   
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    Another example of the Albanian government‟s reluctance to implement asylum 
policies is the way it conducted the so-called “prescreening process” from its inception in 
2001 until it ultimately suspended its implementation in 2006. I explained in a following 
section, the concept of prescreening was offered by UNHCR as a compromise between 
the international obligations of EU member countries and their need to prevent migration 
influxes.
12
 Prescreening aimed at identifying asylum seekers, trafficked human beings, 
and illegal migrants among undocumented people detained by border police. The 
implementation of the prescreening policy aimed at keeping the EU member countries to 
continue to regularly process asylum-seekers while putting in a fast track of rejection 
cases that seemed openly abusive. Originally, prescreening was conceived as only an EU 
policy, thus implemented only by EU member countries.
13
 However, both the EU and 
UNHCR have agreed to implement such a policy also in Albania.
14
  
The process of prescreening began when the border police informed the asylum 
institution in the country of foreigners detained by police. In such cases, a join team of 
ZpR/DRN, UNHCR and International Organization of Migration (IOM) departed 
immediately to the site of detention. After the interview, those who sought asylum or 
refugee status were sent to the QKA Babrru; those qualified as trafficked women were 
sent in their reception center in Linza; while those who did not qualify and/or were not 
interested in seeking asylum were sent back to the country from where they entered 
Albania. Until 2004, the detained undocumented foreigners were kept in police station. 
Later, five reception centers were built in  such border crossing stations such as the Rinas 
airport; Bllatë; the port of Shëngjin, Lezhë; and Tre Urat and Sarandë, on the Albanian-
Greek border. Although those centers were to shelter detained persons, the police adopted 
most of these facilities for their own use, unrelated to detention.
15
  
The funding of the prescreening project came from the EU Community Assistance 
for Restructuration, Development and Stability (CARDS) Program. Originally, the 
process was implemented by the ZpR/DRN, UNHCR, and IOM. However, in May 2005, 
the process was transferred to the Drejtoria e Policisë Kufitare (DPK) [Directory of the 
Border Police]. From this moment, DRN lost access to detained people in the border 
crossing points. With that change, the DRN also lost its responsibility to transport the 
detained people to Babrru or Linza. Police was neither able nor sufficiently trained to 
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conduct pre-screening interviews with people undocumented foreigners. Nor was police 
interested to engage personnel and vehicles to transport asylum seekers and/or trafficked 
human beings to their reception centers in mainland Albania. Allegedly, most of the cases 
of people detained in the border were sent back to the country where they are trying to 
access the Albanian territory. Ever since, the number of detained people sent to the QKA, 
Babrru, and Qëndra Kombëtare për Pritjen e Viktimave të Trafikuara (QKPVT), Linzë 
[National Reception Center of Trafficking].  
The PD electoral victories of 2005 and 2009 did not contribute in changing the 
pace of the Albanian asylum reform. In its 2007 Progress Report, the European 
Commission emphasized that “[t]here has been limited progress on asylum issues,” that 
“no coherent single asylum strategy is yet in place,” and that “progress on the planned 
review and amendment of the legal framework for asylum has been slow.”16 On May 
2008, the EU Commission handed to the Albanian government the Roadmap on visa 
liberalization. The document contained four chapters: documents security; illegal 
migration; public order and security; and issues of foreign relations and fundamental 
rights.
17
 The Roadmap links the establishment of appropriate asylum procedures with visa 
liberalization. It asks the Albanian government to adopt and implement asylum legislation 
in line with international standards (1951 Geneva Convention with New York Protocol) 
and the EU legal framework. But given the short time period before the release of the 
2008 Progress Report, one cannot expect much.
18
 However, the revision of the Law on 
Asylum in January 2009 in order to incorporate European and international standards 
marked a major breakthrough in the Albanian asylum system. Although the European 
Commission noted in its 2009 Progress Report a range of implementing measures that 
still needs to be adopted to complete the legal framework, particularly in terms of health 
care, family reunion, social protection, education and housing, good progress was 
reported with regard to asylum. Albania‟s asylum system continues to only partially meet 
its policy objectives.
19
 
 In November 2009, Albania was excluded from the first round of the EU visa 
liberalization with the Western Balkans exactly because it had met its objectives only 
partially. That failure put the Albanian government under heavy criticism from the PS 
opposition since visa liberalization and the EU candidate status were central promises of 
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both Partia Demokratike (PD) and Partia Socialiste (PS) during the electoral campaign 
for general elections in summer 2009. Under the growing pressure of the opposition, the 
government felt the need to succeed both with visa liberalization and the EU candidate 
status, and undertook vigorous efforts to fulfill the EU conditions. Those efforts were 
recognized by the Commission which, in its Opinion on Albania 's application for 
membership of the European Union, November 2010, assessed that Albania has made 
progress in a number of key areas of this chapter in the framework of the visa 
liberalization dialogue with the EU, including asylum.
20
 
Table 7-1 traces the developments in the Albanian asylum system. 
 
Asylum in Macedonia 
During the 1990s, the asylum system in Macedonia had been followed the practices set in 
place during the Yugoslav period. However, similar to the Albanian case, Macedonia was 
mainly a country of origin and transit of refugee and illegal migrants. During that period, 
the main concern of Macedonian governments was to assure the consolidation of the 
country as the homeland of the Macedonian people, to acquire international recognition, 
and to escape the Yugoslav wars. These interests seem to perfectly overlap with the EU 
interest in a stable Macedonia. The same remained true also during the first years of the 
2000s. But in the aftermath of the 2001 conflict, the establishment of asylum capacities 
for foreigners was not a high priority, although the country became a refuge for refugees 
from the Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma communities from Kosovo.
21
  
 Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 
spring 2001 when the western part of the country was swept by an armed ethnic conflict. 
Some authors have commented that the Agreement seemed to be a reward for 
Macedonia‟s constructive role during the Kosovo crisis.22 However, it can also be 
interpreted as a guarantee by the EU to both the Macedonian government and Albanian 
guerrillas that EU interest rested in a united, democratically stable Macedonia.
23
 On the 
other hand, EU seemed to initially understand the difficult reconstruction period of the 
country, and, in the area of asylum, and asked for the achievement of only minimum 
standards such as a new asylum law including adoption of the secondary legislation and 
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TABLE 7.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIAN ASYLUM REFORM 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION 
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‟ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1991-1997 
  
0 
 
0 
 
No reform. The EU was interested in thwarting waves of undocumented people crossing its border 
and Albania was a main gateway for people from the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Asia being 
smuggled in the EU territory. Albania was not interested in building g any asylum system since no one 
from the undocumented people who were travelling through Albania toward the EU territories sought 
refuge in the country.  
 
1998 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. With drafting the new constitution, the Socialist-Centrist coalition wanted to 
demonstrate to international partners its  commitment to country‟s  international obligations. The real 
interest in the asylum reform was not a literal establishment of an asylum system, but only the 
establishment of a basic legislative framework that would be considered a progress in country‟s 
asylum policy. Meanwhile, the EU policy continued to focus on Albania protecting its border. 
 
1999 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. This period represents the only time when both the EU and Albanian government 
were interested in establishing asylum system. The EU interest came from its project to build a 
common European asylum, system with Albania as part of that system. The Albanian interest came 
from the need to handle the Kosovar refugee influx and potential refugee influx from Macedonia.    
 
2000 
 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
No reforms. Although the EU interests on the Albanian asylum system was as high as in the previous 
period, the local elections of October 2000 and general elections of July 2001 made the government 
focus on major reforms, thus leaving the asylum reform outside its attention.      
 
2001-2002 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
Slow progress/system fails: the crisis within the main partner of the ruling coalition, PS, reduced the 
interest of the government in some reform peripheral to both that domestic struggle and the 
containment of an increasingly aggressive opposition such as the PD. Ultimately, the government 
closed the ZpR. 
 
2003-2008 
 
 + 0 Insufficient/slow progress: The prevalence of Fatos Nano in the internal struggle of PS returned the 
government interest in reforms. The EU-Western Balkans Meeting in Zagreb, November 2000 and the 
European Council of Thessaloniki, June 2003,  renewed the Albanian hopes to join the Union, and the 
government began to follow the EU blueprint. The PD-led coalition that took over in 2005 followed 
the same path of reform, but the lack of domestic need for the asylum reform reduced government‟s 
attention to asylum related policies, and the Albanian asylum system remains weak.  
 
2009-2010 
 
 + + Good progress. Only when the EU linked the asylum reform with the more tangible visa liberalization 
policy rather than the more distant EU membership did the Albanian government become interested in 
fully implementing asylum policies.  
.  
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improvement of capacity to process asylum applications.
24
 In addition, in contrast to 
Albania which was conditioned to sign a readmission agreement with the EU for both its 
citizens and third country citizens who have been smuggled in the EU through Albania, 
Macedonia was obliged to readmit any of its nationals illegally present in the territory of 
any EU Member State.
25
 The stalemate in establishing an asylum system continued 
during the period 2002-early 2003, as demonstrated by the EC‟s Stabilization and 
Association Report released in March 2003.
26
  
  The first major development in the Macedonian asylum system was undertaken in 
July 2003 when Sobranie passed a new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection 
(LATP), and the law entered to force in August 2003. The European Commission 
considered the law to be largely in line with EU standards, secondary legislation was 
required for proper implementation.”27 LATP puts the asylum system within the authority 
of the Ministerstvo za Vnatresni Raboti (MVR) [Ministry of the Interior]. During the 
second half of 2003, the Macedonian authorities began to work with UNHCR and other 
implementing partners in a series of joint meetings, information campaigns, detailed 
technical review and training programs on the EU acquis, the status determination 
procedures and the drafting of regulations and procedures. However, as always, the main 
goal was to find long-term solutions for existing refugees. By the end of 2003, 93 per cent 
of people in temporary protection, a reference of the leftovers from the mass influx of 
1999 from Kosovo, had applied for asylum, a right conferred on them by the new law.  
However, the RSD process was slow, leading us to the conclusion that simply the 
establishment of asylum capacities in Macedonia does not imply that such effective 
functioning.
28
 As the EC‟s Analytical Report notes, the government commission which is 
the competent body for hearing appeals against first instance decisions on refugee status 
“remains untransparent [sic] and lacks independence.”29 Mainly, the Commission 
emphasizes the lack of asylum-seeker reception centers and the lack of resources from the 
Ministerstvo za Trud i Socijalna Politika (MTSP) [Ministry of Labor and Social Policy] 
which is in charge of providing advice to refugees and ensuring inter-ministerial and 
inter-agency coordination on implementation of the Law. Indeed, after the huge influx of 
refugees in 1999, the number of asylum-seekers has decreased. In the first six months of 
2005 only 11 persons applied for asylum. Yet further adjustment of legislation in order to 
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comply fully with the criteria and mechanisms for determining the responsible Member 
State (Dublin II) is needed.
30
 
In 2004, the Macedonian government established a national CARDS Steering 
Committee that would supervise and coordinate the national CARDS project. The 
Committee is chaired by the State Secretary of MTSP and consists of members from 
Ministerstvo za Vnatresni Raboti (MVR) [Ministry for Internal Affairs], MTSP, 
Ministerstvo za Pravda (MP) [Ministry of Justice], Vladiniot Sekretarijat za Evropski 
Prasanja (VSEP) [Government‟s Secretariat for European Affairs], and Ministerstvo za 
Nadvoersni Raboti (MNR) [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. The European Agency for 
Construction (EAR), the UNHCR, International Organization OF Migration (IOM) and 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) have observer status. 
The policy went to implementation through two projects. The goal of the first project was 
the establishment of asylum institutional capacities. The first phase of this project was 
completed in May 2004 and represented the legislative and procedural foundations of the 
asylum system, including a review of the existing legislation and proposal for upgrading 
the National Action Plan to meet standards of the European Union acquis.
31
 The second 
phase was funded by the EU agency EurAsylum, and had three objectives: (1) the 
implementation of the National Action Plan through continuous reviews; (2) 
recommendations and the efficient implementation of the agreed policies and procedures; 
(3) the revision of existing legislation, the identification of gaps, and recommendations 
for the adoption of primary and secondary legislation. The second project aimed at 
completing the Macedonian asylum system with a Reception Centre for Asylum 
Seekers.
32
  
The implementation of asylum procedures in Macedonia is administered by the 
Ministerstvo za Vnatresni Raboti (MVR) [Ministry for Internal Affairs] through its 
Section for Asylum, which processes claims as the first instance central asylum authority. 
The second instance in the asylum procedures consists of the Governmental Commission 
for deciding in an administrative procedure in the second instance in the field of the 
interior, judiciary, state administration, local self-government and issues of religious 
character, and it deals with cases of appeals from rejected asylum seekers. The 
Commission is composed of seven members, one from the Ministry of Justice, four from 
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the Ministry of the Interior, one from the Commission of Religious Communities, and a 
President who is a high-ranking official from the General Secretariat of the Government. 
Eight new asylum applications were registered in 2006 and no case was recognized under 
the 1951 Convention. However, since its creation, the Section for Asylum has almost 
exclusively dealt with claims from Kosovo minorities and, cumulatively, less than 2 % of 
these claims have been recognized under the 1951 Convention.
33
 In 2008, the 
Administrative Court replaced the Supreme Court as the last instance for asylum cases. It 
has not yet issued any decision on any asylum case. 
The European Commission‟s Analytical Report for the Opinion on the Application 
from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU Membership, November 2005, 
looked over the issue of asylum reform, and so did its Commission Opinion on the 
Application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Membership of the 
European Union, November 2005.
34
 However, the EU returned to the issue of asylum 
reform in 2006 when, in its Decision on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions 
Contained in the European Partnership with the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Repealing Decision, the European Council 
set as a mid-term priority “the operation of asylum procedures which are fully in line with 
international  
and European standards, including a reformed appeals system.”35 
The Commission‟s 2006 Progress Report on Macedonia explicitly mentioned the 
lack of significant progress in the area of asylum, yet considers the state of asylum system 
in Macedonia as “moderately advanced.”36 Earlier that year, the Government issued its 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communitaire in March 2006. For its 
short-term priorities on asylum, it undertook to earmark funds from the national budget to 
address the needs of asylum seekers in education, health, employment, juvenile reform, 
and professional training.
37
 By the same token, the 2007 Report continues to be critical of 
both the institutional functioning and the asylum policy implementation, concluding that 
Macedonia as “not yet sufficiently prepared.”38  
As in the case of other Western Balkan countries, the EU linked visa liberalization 
with Macedonia‟s performance in asylum reform. The Roadmap on EU visa liberalization 
for citizens of Macedonia, which was handed out to Macedonia on May 2008, stipulates 
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that Macedonia should “implement the legislation in the area of asylum in line with 
international standards (1951 Geneva Convention with New York Protocol) and the EU 
legal framework and standards;” and “provide adequate infrastructure and strengthen 
responsible bodies, in particular in the area of asylum procedures and reception of asylum 
seekers.”39 The opening on a new reception center for asylum seekers and the 
replacement of the Supreme Court by the Administrative Court as the last instance for 
asylum cases served the country an overall positive assessment in the European 
Commission‟s 2008 Progress Report. The Report concludes that, “[i]n this area, 
legislative alignment is advanced and development of the administrative capacity is well 
on track.”40 Furthermore, in the 2009 Progress Report, the Commission reported “good 
progress in the area of asylum,” even seeing Macedonia as “advanced” in the area of 
asylum. As steps that were undertaken over the last years, the Report mentions a new 
Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection the “brought national standards even closer to 
European ones.” The EC also praised the fact that the Government Commission hearing 
appeals against first instance decisions on refugee status was abolished, and the 
administrative court became the final instance body on refugee status.
41
 The same 
evaluation Macedonia received from the 2010 Report.
42
 Along with the progress in the 
other three policy areas stipulated for visa liberalization agreements with the EU, progress 
in asylum reform rewarded Macedonia with the visa liberalization agreement in 
November 2009.  
The tracing of the Macedonian developments in the area of asylum shows that, 
similar to Albania, the lack of tangible incentives created by the more distant EU 
membership plays less role that the more tangible and immediate visa liberalization. Yet, 
the country did make good progress in 2005, the year when an EU decision about its EU 
candidate status was expected. Then, the asylum reform stalled again until the 
introduction of the Roadmap in 2008. Then, Macedonia „scored” good progress in the 
very important year 2009 when both the visa liberalization agreement and a European 
Commission recommendation for opening accession negotiations with Macedonia were 
expected.    
 Table 7-2 summarizes the Macedonian developments in the area of asylum. 
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TABLE 7.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN MACEDONIAN ASYLUM REFORM 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
SITUATION 
 
EU 
INTERESTS 
DOMESTIC 
LEADERS‟ 
INTERESTS 
 
 
REFORM RESULTS 
 
1991-2003 
  
0 
 
0 
 
No reform. The main EU interest during the 1990s and early 2000s was the political stability of the 
country, so Macedonia doesn‟t turn from a predominantly country of transit in a refugee country of 
origin. By the same token, Macedonia‟s elites were focused in dealing with the simmering―and 
later erupting―ethnic tensions.  
 
2004-2005 
  
0 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. After Macedonia returned to normality, the EU grew interested in expanding its 
concept of the common European asylum system in this country. On the other hand, the 
Macedonian Government was interested in undertaking some steps toward the asylum reform in 
order to boost country‟s  chances for the EU candidacy status.  
 
2006-2008 
 
  
+ 
 
0 
 
Insufficient/slow progress. Although the EU interests on the Macedonian asylum system its delay 
in opening accession negotiations with Macedonia curved the Macedonian interest to implement 
reforms that did not interest it. Hence, the European Commission 2006, 2007, and 2008 Reports for 
Macedonia‟s progress in reform in the asylum sector was “insufficient.”      
 
2009 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Good progress. Apparently, the stipulation of progress in the asylum reform and the hopes that the 
EU would decide to open accession negotiations with Macedonia, shifted its leaders‟ interests 
toward progressing with the asylum reform, hence the European Commission‟s assertion that the 
country has made „good progress.”  
 
2010 
 
 + + Good progress. The process of accession negotiations has helped to maintain the interest of the 
Macedonian ruling elites in the asylum reform, hence the country has made “good progress.”     
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A Consociational Interpretation of the Albanian and Macedonian Asylum Reforms 
A consociational interpretation of Albanian and Macedonian asylum reforms is a tricky 
enterprise since the EU guidelines and principles relating to refugee status determination 
are clear, but decisions are taken at the national level. While the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) established in 2010 is the first institution at EU level working to 
strengthen and develop cooperation in the asylum field among the member countries, 
EASO is set to have no direct or indirect powers in refugee status determination.
43
 Of 
course, the EU‟s common European asylum system is being promoted by Council‟s 
decisions and European Parliament‟s regulations in an institutional setting established by 
and functioning through consociational practices. However, breaches of compliance by 
member countries to harmonize asylum legislation and procedures shows the relevance 
that asylum policies at national level.   
With the Treaty of Amsterdam, asylum policies of member countries, along with 
immigration and external border control, are becoming communitarized. These policies 
along with the Schengen acquis have been transferred to the Justice and Home Affairs 
pillar. However, it seems difficult to persuade member states to give up refugee 
protection prerogatives which, as part of population control, it has been argued to be the 
very raison d‟être of the state.44 Finally, it was agreed that the five year transition would 
occur under the conditions of unanimous decisions among the member states, and only 
after that period co-decisions and qualified majority voting would be practiced. The 
agreement came under the provision that the EC would previously adopt legislation 
defining the common rules and basic principles governing the asylum field. Denmark 
decided to opt out of this policy, while Great Britain and Ireland chose to only partially 
participate in the new EU asylum policy. 
The shift from the national asylum system to the common European asylum policy 
shows the EU intention to implement consociational practices in managing this policy 
sector. Through the new policy, the EU scrambles to resolve the contradiction between, 
on the one hand, the need of its member countries to curb uncontrolled refugee and 
migrant influxes in their territories, and, on the other, the need of its member countries to 
continue to respect their international commitments. The European Commission‟s 2007 
Green Paper almost exclusively puts the principle of solidarity and burden sharing at the 
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center of that system. However, since previous EU burden sharing efforts have failed, the 
Green Paper shows that a shift to policies that would emphasize proportional distribution 
of asylum seekers throughout the entire EU space would be impossible without 
emphasizing the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing. 
 Solidarity is a founding norm of the European Union and all its member countries 
have promulgated in one way or another such a principle in their national constitutions. 
From Schuman and Adenauer to Blair and Merkel, the EU politics have been 
characterized by the combination of the pursuit of national interests and the commitment 
to push forward toward a politically more integrated Community. Schieffer suggests that 
solidarity should be seen as one of EU‟s most accepted norms since it is shared by the 
domestic constitutions of its member countries (cf. Thielemann 2003). Burden-sharing is 
a form of solidarity and, in the case of the common European asylum system, burden-
sharing is understood as intrinsic to solidarity.         
 The core document of the common European asylum policy is the Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (OJ 050/2003 (hereafter Dublin II) which amended the 
1990 Dublin Convention. Along with the European Refugee Fund (ERF) which 
represents one of the three pillars of the common European asylum policy, and the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which represents the second pillar, the Dublin 
II constitutes the other pillar.
45
 Both these documents emphasize solidarity albeit in 
different ways. Thus, while EFR is more unambiguously dedicated to solidarity by 
tending to proportionally allocate funds to countries that face relatively more people who 
seek protection than other EU member countries, the Dublin Convention and Dublin II 
emphasize the fact that member state of the first entry ought to be responsible for an 
asylum claim, and that asylum seekers who have moved to seek asylum in another EU 
country should be sent back to the country where they entered the EU. Other EU 
documents have emphasized solidarity and burden-sharing of asylum seeker weight even 
more explicitly.
46
 As the Common Statement by Belgium, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and 
Cyprus on Immigration and Asylum of November 30, 2010 states, “[i]t is vital to ensure a 
common area of protection that is based on mutual trust between Member States.”47  
 However, there are major problems with compliance as EU member countries 
seem inclined toward refugee deflection policies (Byrne 2003; Noll 2003; Thielemann). 
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As an Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) notes, “[t]he 
CEAS [common European asylum system] is being undermined by the tendency of 
Member States to limit the harmonisation of legislation and national practices.”48 Indeed, 
as the Opinion points out, such a harmonization is not a problem of asylum policy but it is 
“the main instrument through which the benefits of the CEAS  will be made tangible.” It 
has been hoped that harmonization will decrease the administrative and financial pressure 
on some Member States and guarantee a higher level of protection for asylum seekers, at 
least in the initial phase. The so called Qualification Directive―which is one of the four 
legal instruments of the EU acquis in the asylum field, with European Dactyloscopy 
(Eurodac), Dublin Regulations and the Long Term Residents Directive being the other 
three instruments―laid the ground for standardized asylum procedures throughout the 
member states. 
49
  
 Noll (2000: 285-316) has considered the efforts for a common European asylum 
policy as a strategy to minimize protection and maximize deflection of asylum seekers in 
the condition of the lack of both control over migration and an effective regional refugee 
burden-sharing. Further critiques have come from within the EU. For instance, the 
Opinion of EESC pointed out that, “[i]f harmonisation is to yield the expected results, it 
must not be based on the lowest common denominator of protection.”50 In addition, it has 
been argued that some provisions in the April 2004 Qualification Directive could be used 
by the member states as a way of lowering their existing standards. Other observers have 
pointed out that, in some places, the Qualification Directive provides less in terms of 
protection than the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Lambert 2006).   
The EU acquis on asylum and migration represents the standardization of the 
asylum legislations and procedures throughout the EU member countries, and the EU 
conditionality on asylum and immigration consists on conditioning EU accession to 
candidate and potential candidate with meeting that acquis. The purpose of such an 
acquis transfer is to increase “the pool of states who meet common criteria to act as 
potential recipients for asylum applicants.”51 Thus, there are strong incentives for the EU 
to condition to its candidate and potential candidate countries the establishment of asylum 
systems compatible with the emerging common European asylum system. Not only 
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would the new entrants be able to quickly adjust with the solidarity and burden-sharing 
tasks once they are within the Union, but they will also be able to participate in advance 
in such burden-sharing efforts, especially after the signings of the readmission agreements 
of their own and, in the case of Albania, third country nationals. In sum, Byrne (2003: 
340) considers the acquis to be “a composite of piecemeal instruments which aim to 
establish minimum standards below which state practice should not fall.” 
 It is clear that the EU is strongly interested in the Albanian and Macedonian 
asylum reforms as extensions of the EU asylum reform.
52
 Establishing asylum institutions 
in Albania and Macedonia would help the EU in several aspects. First, the readmission 
agreements allow the acceptance “upon application by a Member State and without 
further formalities” of their citizens who have failed to be recognized as refugees in any 
of the EU country.
53
 Second, this strategy can be reinforced by declaring these countries 
as safe countries, thus making their citizens ineligible for asylum in the EU member 
countries. Third, if these countries develop modern asylum systems, they can serve to 
buffer critiques related to violations of the non-refoulement principle in cases of 
compulsory return of the rejected asylum applicants from these countries and third 
countries;
54
 with a modern asylum system in Albania, the EU would justify the returning 
of third country asylum applicants that entered the EU through Albania back to this 
country, on the grounds that they can already seek asylum in Albania.  
 
A Sectorial Interpretation of the Albanian and Macedonian Asylum Reforms   
The Albanian and Macedonian asylum reforms represent a unique case when the EU has 
to confront not the opposition, but the indifference, of its applicants to conduct that 
reform. It has been argued that the more geographically proximate states were to 
countries of origin the more probable that asylum seekers would succeed in entering their 
jurisdiction (Byrne 2003). Moreover, it has also been noticed that while asylum 
applications in western Europe declined by 40 percent between 1995 and 1999, for some 
countries in eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary) with extensive green borders along the 
EU, asylum application tripled by the end of the decade (Ibid). These data suggest that 
postcommunist Europe bears the potential risk of being inundated by waves of refugees 
and asylum seekers. In addition, arguably, the implementation of the asylum acquis in EU 
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aspirants from Eastern Europe would serve the deflection policies of the western states, 
and transfer uneven burden the eastern countries.  
 The data in Table 7-3 show that, except for Poland, none of the Eastern European 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 has experienced any increase in the number of 
asylum seekers. On the contrary, some of them like the Czech Republic and Romania 
have managed to curb their numbers to the rates of the year 1994. Also Slovenia and 
Slovakia have experience decreases in number of asylum seekers. The number of asylum 
seekers in Estonia and Latvia remain insignificant, but even the hike in asylum 
applications in Lithuania still leaves this country with a small number of them. Even 
Bulgaria and Hungary have received recently fewer applications than in some of the pre-
accession years. As for Albania and Macedonia, the number of asylum applications in 
these countries, especially in Albania, is insignificant. 
 These data show that simply the fact of establishing asylum systems according to 
international refugee protection standards does not immediately turn EECs to refugee 
countries of destination. The improvement of refugee protection standards in EU aspirants 
from Eastern Europe has not made their asylum systems more attractive to refugees and 
asylum seekers. Rather, they continue to prefer Western European countries with more 
developed social programs and job opportunities. In the light of such data, we can 
conclude that there is no reason for fear of large numbers of refugees in Albania and 
Macedonia. Their governments‟ delays in complying with the EU asylum acquis reflects 
leaders‟ low interest in conducting reforms in policy areas that do not directly affect their 
citizens. Refugee crises such as the Kosovar refugee flows of early 1999 in both Albania 
and Macedonia might spark interests in refugee protection policies and institutions, but 
now, with most of the Balkans pacified, any violent ethnic conflict seems unlikely. The 
EU perspective of the Balkans has compelled the acceleration of reforms, yet some 
sectors with more impact on people‟s lives acquire more attention. In addition, the 
reluctance of the EU to open accession negotiation with Macedonia for several years after 
the latter acquired the EU candidate status pushed the EU perspective of the country to an 
unknown future and turned both country‟s leaders and its public anxious over whether or 
not they were treated fairly.
55
 As for Albania, the country‟s government submitted the 
application for the candidate status in April 2009 under skepticism of some EU member 
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TABLE 7.3 ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1994-2009 
 
COUNTRY/YEAR 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Albania _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 36 30 20 30 10 _ 
Bosna & Herzegovina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 454 150 70 570 100 50 
Bulgaria 561 517 302 429 833 1,331 1,755 2,428 2,888 1,549 920 820 640 980* 750* 850* 
Croatia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 33 190 90 200 160 150 
Czech Rep. 1,187 1,417 2,211 2,109 4,085 7,220 8,788 18,094 8,484 11,396 1,119* 4,160* 3,020* 1,880* 1,710* 1,260* 
Estonia _ _ _ _ 23 21 3 12 9 14 6* 10* 10* 10* 10* 40* 
Hungary 207 130 152 209 7,097 11,499 7,801 9,554 6,412 2,401 354 1,620* 2,120* 3,430* 3,130* 4,670* 
Latvia _ _ _ _ 58 19 4 14 30 5 1 20* 10* 30* 50* 50* 
Lithuania _ _ _ 320 163 133 199 256 294 183 28 120* 140* 130* 220* 210* 
Macedonia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1,232 70 60 30 50 90 
Montenegro _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 20 _ 10 20 
Poland 598 843 3,211 3,533 3,373 2,955 4,589 4,506 5,153 6,921 3,743* 6,860* 4,430* 7,210* 7,200* 10,590
* 
Romania 647 634 588 1,425 1,236 1,670 1,366 2,431 1,151 1,077 210 590 460 660* 1,170* 830* 
Serbia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 90 20 40 80 280 
Serbia & Montenegro _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 40 _ _ _ _ _ 
Slovakia 140 359 415 645 506 1,320 1,556 8,151 9,700 10,358 2,916* 3,550* 2,870* 2,640* 910* 820* 
Slovenia _ _ 38 72 499 867 9,244 1,511 702 1,100 323* 1,600* 520* 430* 240* 180* 
Source: UNHCR. *Number of asylum seekers in years when the country was an EU member 
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countries and domestic critiques that such a move was only an electoral strategy in the 
eve of the summer 2009 elections with little chance to succeed.
56
 
 Therefore, only policies that would shift the immediate interests of the Albanian 
and Macedonian leaders toward the asylum reform could make these countries progress in 
establishing efficient asylum institutions and procedures. The EU found such an 
opportunity with the agreements on visa liberalization. As many citizens of these 
countries connect the abstract idea of the EU as an area of justice, freedom and wellbeing, 
with the more tangible idea of visa-free movement throughout the continent, conditioning 
the latter would be more efficient than conditioning the former. Ultimately, the EU 
conditioned progress in asylum reforms in the visa liberalization agreements with both 
countries, and its progress reports for both 2009 and 2010 show that it worked. Both 
countries have been reported to have made good progress in their asylum reforms.      
 
Conclusions 
The case of the asylum reforms in Albania and Macedonia brings evidence in support of 
the claim that, if an EU aspiring country is not interested in conducting a certain reform 
even when the EU conditions that particular reform, the progress in that policy area will 
be slow, and the institutions established through it will be weak and ineffective. The visa 
liberalization agreements implied that the beneficiary countries become safe third 
countries. Moreover, the EU officials have explicitly explained to governments and 
publics of these countries that, with the signing of the agreement, the chances for asylum 
recognition for the citizens of the beneficiary countries will no longer exist. Indeed, 
during the year 2010, authorities in several EU and other non-EU western European 
countries have faced waves of asylum seekers from Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, 
all of which met with negative response and expulsion.
57
 Thus, combined with domestic 
asylum systems, the visa liberalization agreements allow EU member countries to reject 
prima facia asylum applications from the Western Balkan countries. 
While we know that Albania‟s and Macedonia‟s progress in asylum reform as 
only one of the aspects of visa liberalization conditionality helped the country to reach the 
visa liberalization agreement, would it suffice for these countries to acquire EU candidate 
status? As a UNHCR protection officer writes, the EU acquis on asylum is the outcome 
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of a compromise regarding minimum standards reached by states which already had 
national asylum systems. For countries with embryonic asylum systems, the adoption of 
such complicated negotiated structures seems unnecessary. A simpler asylum system 
would be preferable. Basic asylum systems in line with international standards would be 
in accordance with the EU acquis, and would be less staff-intensive and more manageable 
for countries with limited resources (Feijen 2007). Therefore, it is expected that the 
current status of the asylum system, especially with the low number of applications in 
both Albania and Macedonia, is not a policy sector likely to determine the outcome of 
these countries‟ accession negotiations.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 As Byrne (2003: 334) referring to Anagnost (2000: 396) points out,  
For the CEEC and Baltic states, not only have their own ministry 
officials not had any influence in the creation of the acquis, that they 
now must implement, but with the notable exception of Lithuania, the 
asylum offices in applicant states are excluded from the formal asylum 
discussion under the accession process, which is tightly controlled by 
Ministry officials.  
However, this is not the case of Albania in the 2001-2002 period when I led the Albanian asylum system. 
The OfR that I led was in charge of leading asylum policies and I have participated in the Albania-EU 
negotiations/progress assessment on behalf of the OfR. 
2
 I was appointed National Commissioner for Refugees/Director of the Office for Refugees on October 4, 
2001. I still remember how amazed people were when I used to tell them that I was the person in charge to 
grant asylum to foreigners in Albania. It was difficult for Albanians to comprehend that anyone would 
chose Albania as his place to refuge.   
3
 The Constitution of Albania. Available from  www.kqz.org.al [Accessed December 2004]. 
4
 Only during 2003, the government barely took over some expenses, including employees‟ stipends, but 
funds for legal assistance continue to be out of the question. 
5
 Such agreements have been highlighted by then UNHCR Ruud Lubbers, when he proposed the EU 
“prong” of his three-pronged approach to a global solution of the refugee situation. Mr. Lubbers explained 
his proposal as follows: 
Under the "EU prong", the UNHCR proposes separating out groups that 
 are misusing the system, namely asylum seekers from countries that  
produce hardly any genuine refugees. These asylum seekers would be  
sent to one or more reception centres somewhere within the EU, where  
their claims would be rapidly examined by joint EU teams. Those judged  
not to have any sort of refugee claim would be sent straight home.  
The limited number of recognised refugees among them would  
be shared between the EU states. There should be a strict time limit for the  
entire process. Readmission agreements between the EU and the rejected  
asylum seekers' home countries must be reached in advance so that people  
are not detained for months or years simply because they cannot be deported. 
See Ruud Lubbers, “Put an End to Their Wandering.” Guardian.co.uk, June 20, 2003. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/jun/20/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices [Accessed 
March 2011].  
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Indeed, Lubbers‟ EU prong became the blueprint of EU efforts to build a common European 
asylum system. See for instance Thielemann (2008). Moreover, note Lubbers‟ remarks in the following 
quote: 
I am pleased that these proposals have found an echo in a recent 
communication published by the European Commission at the request of 
member states. The dialogue is continuing at the EU summit in 
Thessaloniki. We should not miss this opportunity to put in place a more 
balanced and equitable approach that safeguards the protection of 
refugees, promotes solutions and restores public confidence in asylum 
systems. This is one of the most urgent policy challenges confronting 
Europe today. 
Ruud Lubbers, “Put an End to Their Wandering.” Guardian.co.uk, June 20, 2003. 
6
 I was appointed Albania‟s Komisioner Kombëtar për Refugjatë and Director of the ZpR on October 4, 
2001, and arrived in the ZpR the same day. My superior, the minister of local government, told me flatly 
that the ZpR was the last thing in his priorities and that he wanted me to deal with it on my own. I 
discovered that my predecessor―who had left his job for another position with the Ministry of 
Justice―had withdrew $40,000.00 with no explanation, thus leaving the entire institution with no cash in its 
bank account. Indeed, the annual budget of the ZpR was a transferred fund from the UNHCR BoT, and 
represented a combination of UNHCR and EU contributions, while the Albanian government contributed 
only with the facility, an ugly workplace patched among the ruins of a rundown Chinese fair building of the 
early 1970s. It took three months for the MPVD to send an audit team only to reconfirm the embezzlement 
of the previous commissioner. ware of the embezzlement, the UNHCR BoT decided to include the ZpR 
personnel in its payroll and directly financing its daily operations rather than transferring additional funds to 
ZpR‟s bank account. It is easily perceivable the frustration of public servants who operated within the 
administrative framework of a government agency but were financially dependent from an international 
organization. 
The MLGD never pressed charges against the former commissioner Elton Nita, a member of the 
ruling Socialist Party. In February 2002, in a government organization, the minister of local government 
and decentralization Arben Imami from the Albanian Democratic Alliance who had initiated the OfR‟s 
audit was replaced with Et‟hem Ruka of the Socialist Party (SP). The affiliation of both Ruka and Lita with 
the SP and both their adherence with then embattled Prime Minister Fato Nano‟s entourage explain why the 
former Commissioner Lita was able to go away with the embezzlement. 
7
 Prescreening was a policy strongly supported by the UNCHR; it reflected the concern of then UNHCR 
Ruud Lubbers to engage in disentangling the mixed flows of refugees entering the EU territories. Such 
mixed flows are said to contain both refugees and economic migrants. Lubbers‟ approach reflected its 
awkward compromise with the government of some EU member countries who happened to be major 
donors of UNHCR, and were facing serious domestic challenges from both limited resources to deal with 
high numbers of asylum applications, and a growing tide of anti-immigration mood reflected both as public 
opinion and rise of anti-immigration parties and politicians. See for instance, Ruud Lubbers, “Tackling the 
Causes of Asylum.” The Guardian, June 23, 2002 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2002/jun/23/immigrationandpublicservices.immigration [Accessed 
March 2011]; Ruud Lubbers, “Make Asylum Fair, Not Fast.” The Guardian, 3 November, 2004 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/03/eu.immigrationandpublicservices [Accessed March 2011]. 
8
 European Commission. “Commission Opinion on Albania 's application for membership of the European 
Union,” COM (2010)680, Brussels, 09 November 2010, SEC(2010) 1335. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/al_opinion_2010_en.pdf  [Accessed 
February]. 
9
 Also, personal communication with Ali Rasha, former director of the Refugee Reception Center, 2010. 
According to Rasha, the asylum-seeker reception center in Babrru hosts few families from the Kosovar 
refugee wave of 1999 (a total of 12-13 persons). The staff of the Center counts 15 staffers and 6 policemen. 
10
 Commission of the European Communities (2006) “Albania2006 Progress Report,” COM 2006 649 final, 
November 8. http://www.delalb.ec.europa.eu/en/news/al_sec_1383_en.pdf  [Accessed February 2011].  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 See for instance Ruud Lubbers. “Tackling the Causes of Asylum”; and Ruud Lubbers. “Put an End to 
Their Wandering.”  
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13
 As Mr. Lubbers writes: 
It is essential that such an initiative takes place within the EU's borders. 
Reception centres then would be bound by EU legal standards. That is 
important not only to safeguard the human rights of people being 
assessed but also because it would reduce the legal obstacles states 
would face if the centres were located outside the EU. The accusation of 
burden-shifting would not arise. 
See Ruud Lubbers. “Put an End to Their Wandering.” 
14
 During our efforts to keep the ZpR alive in 2001-2002, we bowed to the UNHCR pressure to implement a 
prescreening policy and, given the time of the beginning of its implementation, it was a unique procedure in 
dealing with migration fluxes. During me meetings with Albanian officials of the MPO, including then 
Minister Ilir Gjoni, I learned that the Albanian government had neither knowledge nor opinion about this 
topic. It was perhaps my position in the politics of the country or minister‟s inclination to refugee 
topics―he worked for the UNHCR BoT before he became minister―that allowed us contacts with local, 
but he did not promise any institutional engagement from his ministry. From the entire government of 
Albania, only its vice prime minister, Skender Gjinushi, who was also minister of social affairs and 
assistance showed some interests on the asylum policies, mainly in issues that affect social aspects of 
refugee protection. 
15
 Personal communication with Ali Rasha, former director of the Refugee Reception Center, 2010. 
16
 Furthermore, the Commission emphasized that  
By-laws are required to implement the 2003 Law on local integration 
and family reunion, in particular to allow development of a system for 
local integration of refugees. Albania‟s protection regime for those 
granted asylum remains weak, especially its judicial aspects. Staff 
changes as a result of the restructuring of the directorate for nationality 
and refugees have continued to hinder its capacity and delay decision-
making. Reduced capacity led to shortcomings in implementation of the 
action plans for asylum and for management of asylum cases. Further 
training is required. Coordination with the national migration system is 
at an early stage. Improved coordination with the border police is 
required in order to implement the pre-screening system properly. The 
expertise of the staff running new asylum centres remains weak. The 
impact of readmission agreements on asylum system capacity has not 
yet been properly evaluated. In general, Albania has partially met its 
targets in the field of asylum. 
See Commission of the European Communities. “Commission Staff Working Document: Albania 2007 
Progress Report.” Brussels, November 6, 2007. SEC(2007) 1429. 
17
 See the website of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
http://www.mfa.gov.al/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5596%3Amlv-ja-dhe-
liberalizimi-i-vizave&catid=64%3Amlv-ja-dhe-liberalizimi-i-vizave&Itemid=65&lang=en [Accessed 
March 2011]; and also Visa Liberalization with Albania Roadmap 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/White%20List%20Project%20Paper%20-%20Roadmap%20Albania.pdf 
[Accessed March 2011].  
18
 Commission of the European Communities. “Commission Staff Working Document: Albania 2008 
Progress Report.” Brussels, 5.11.2008 SEC(2008) 2692. 
19
 Commission of the European Communities. “Commission Staff Working Document: Albania 2009 
Progress Report.” Brussels, 14.10.2009 SEC(2009) 1337. In addition the Report noted that 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Membership conditionality continues to be a powerful tool of international organizations 
(IOs) to improve the democratic standing of their membership aspiring countries. 
However, the results vary depending on the leverage those IOs have on the targeted 
country as well as on the intensity of conditionality. The EU has introduced membership 
conditionality with the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, and has used it ever 
since to affect policy changes in the EU membership aspiring countries with varying 
results. Previous research has analyzed EU membership conditionality as an overarching 
policy aimed at steering democratization rather than as a set of policies trying to affect 
specific reforms. My argument suggests a sectorial contextual approach to studying EU 
membership conditionality. The contextual sectorial approach is a framework for 
explaining the effects of EU membership conditionality on specific sectorial reforms 
through mid-level theories. These theories view the reform outcome as a result of the 
interplay between EU and domestic leaders’ interests in that specific reform. Arguably, 
the change of actors’ interests on a certain reform will alter the outcome. These interests 
are context specific, and often might not match the interests of the same actors in other 
reforms. 
 I assume two sets of major actors to affect Eastern European (EE) institutional 
reforms: the EU institutions and domestic leaders. Such an assumption fits the highly 
institutionalized EU political stage and the weak institutionalization in Eastern European 
countries. In contrast, highly institutionalized EU makes the role of individual leaders less 
relevant than the activity of its institutions. Furthermore, the recent EU internal reform 
aims at the strengthening the role of EU institutions, thus decreasing even further the role 
of national leaders in its decision making. Differently, in the poorly institutionalized 
Eastern Europe, the collapse of communism and its institutions created a large vacuum 
that was filled by power-driven leaders.     
 Reliance on a rational choice approach facilitates the mapping of Eastern 
European leaders’ interests in particular reforms. Their policy choices reflect their power 
254 
 
driven agendas. However, the process tracing might confound causes with effects. In 
order to escape this problem I have employed a combination of analytical tools. First, a 
division of the historical periods between “extraordinary politics” and “ordinary politics” 
as suggested by Balcerowicz (2002) would facilitate our assignment of leaders’ interests 
in certain reforms during the first revolutionary years of transformation (extraordinary 
politics) as positive. Assigning leaders’ interests in specific sectorial reforms during 
period when politics settles in its own routine (ordinary politics) requires a more careful 
analysis. As an initial guideline we can use the observation that governments work to 
enact reforms during their first half of tenure, while dedicating more time and resources 
to power politics in their second term. In addition, governments are interested in enacting 
reforms that would satisfy their constituents, but would not spend resources in reforms 
deemed less necessary for the country. Governments might also reverse reforms if that 
serves their power driven agenda.         
 Assessing the EU interest in Eastern European institutional reforms is a more 
complicated issue since individualism assumed in the case of Eastern European countries 
might be difficult to apply to EU institutions. EU interests rest primarily on democratic 
stability, and its interests in eastward enlargement rest on the need to expand that area of 
continental security without jeopardizing the internal integration of the Union. Earlier 
efforts have suggested that consociational theory can help to explain the nature of the EU 
as a stable democracy of the deeply divided society of its member states. I expand that 
argument by adding that also the EU interests toward the eastern enlargement can be 
explained by the consociational theory. If consociational practices have brought about the 
EU as a stable democracy, so can they help in transforming the EU membership aspiring 
countries to states receptive to consociational practices. Here we have two cases; first, in 
the case of EU membership aspiring countries with unified societies, the EU simply 
conditions institutions that would be receptive to the EU consociational practices once 
these countries join the EU; second, in EU membership aspiring countries with divided 
societies, the EU conditions consociational practices in order to politically homogenize 
the society as a single pillar. That divided society would become a member state of the 
democratically stable EU. Only then these countries’ institutions can become receptive to 
the EU consociational practices when that country joins the EU. 
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 A revisiting of the consociational theory reveals some shortcoming: the 
tautological relationship between the causal consociational practices and the 
consociational democracy as a dependent variable. The EU efforts focus on strengthening 
its democratic stability, and consociational practices are simply tools of achieving. 
Therefore, I no longer refer to the EU as a consociational democracy but as a stable 
democracy built on consociational practices, but not only on them.     
The sectorial contextual approach and the consociational approach to the EU 
eastward expansion are intrinsically linked. While the latter explains why the EU 
condition institutional reforms in the EU, the former explains why institutional reforms 
develop the way they do. Implicitly, the consociational approach to EE eastward 
enlargement explains the source of EU interest in EE institutional reforms as well as the 
intensity of EU conditions in different sectorial reforms, while the sectorial contextual 
approach explains the outcome of the reforms when both domestic and foreign variables 
are taken into account. The consociational approach helps us to understand the source of 
EU conditions and, by understanding the rationale behind these conditions, also to 
evaluate their intensity; the sectorial contextual approach expands our understanding and 
explanation of specific EE institutional reforms by adding to the consociational approach 
domestic leaders’ political preferences about these specific reforms and other independent 
structural variables that reflect the social context where a specific reform occurs. 
I built a series of hypotheses that explain varying reform outcomes contingent of 
the combination of EU’s and domestic leaders’ interests on that reform. Specifically, I 
argue that if the EU and domestic leaders’ interests in a sectorial approach are both 
positive, this is the best case scenario likely to result in swift and successful reform. If 
only the domestic leaders’ interests in a reform are positive but EU interests are neutral, 
we still can have a successful reform; if the EU interests in a certain sectorial reform are 
positive but domestic leaders’ interests in that reform are negative, the reform stalls until 
the EU membership conditionality manages to change domestic leaders’ interests in that 
reform; if the EU interests in certain sectorial reform are positive, but domestic leaders’ 
interests in that reform are neutral, we have slow reform progress until the EU 
membership conditionality manages to turn domestic leaders’ interests to positive. And 
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finally, if both the EU and domestic leaders are not interested in certain reforms, no 
progress happens in those sectors.  
The empirical analysis shows that those hypotheses are helpful to explain the 
effects of EU membership conditionality in specific Albanian and Macedonian 
institutional reforms. I chose these countries because they represent some overlooked 
cases in studying membership conditionality and because the findings can be instructive 
for both these countries, other Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia) as well as Turkey and some European 
countries newly created with the demise of the Soviet Union (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine 
and the Transcaucasia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia)). Indeed, even though the EU 
does not currently consider these countries as potential candidates, it has never ruled out 
their potential to become EU member countries. Their similarities help to simplify the 
empirical analysis, while their differences help elucidate both the case of EU membership 
conditionality to an aspirant country with a unified society and in a divided one. 
Moreover, the long road toward the EU provides more variations in both causal factors 
and reform outcomes. I was interested only in discussing the effects of EU membership 
conditionality in Eastern European institutional reforms, thus I only focused in pre-
accession cases. Arguably, the post-accession developments show different reform 
dynamics from the one that I exposed here due to changes in the configuration of new 
member country’s domestic political stage. In the long run, EU membership 
conditionality and the EU accession are expected to empower other domestic actors and 
interest groups aside the ruling elites (Hollyer 2010).  
From other possible explanations, only the factor of ethnic 
homogeneity/heterogeneity seems to play a key role. Ethnic composition of the country 
highly determines both EU and domestic leaders’ interests. It also defines the EU 
prevailing preferences for stability over democracy, such as the case of Macedonia of the 
1990s. Only when stability is not feasible without democracy, does the EU step in with 
conditioning consociational practices (but not only them) in order to assure country’s 
social cohesion. In countries with unified societies, EU does not condition consociational 
practices per se, but the institutional design it is offering is such as to facilitate country’s 
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institutional adaptation with the EU consociational practices once it acquires the EU 
membership. 
Communist legacies seem to play no role in the development of sectorial reforms. 
In less than two years, 1990-1991, Macedonia went from one of the most decentralized 
political entities in Eastern Europe (such it was within Yugoslavia) to one of the most 
centralized one. Even after 20 years, a violent ethnic conflict that targeted the existing 
centralized system, and after relentless pressure from the EU, Macedonia remains a more 
centralized country than Albania, although the latter comes from a totalitarian communist 
dictatorship. The same can be claimed for judicial reforms in both countries. By the same 
token, Macedonia inherited the Yugoslav adherence to the 1951 Geneva Convention and 
even some institutional legacy from the Yugoslav asylum system. Yet, it took the country 
13 years from its independence to pass its first Law on Asylum, while Albania approved 
it in 1998. The same can be said in the case of constitutional reforms: Albania’s 1991 
Major Constitutional Provisions provided a good stepping bloc for the reforms of the 
1990s, and finally the country acquired a brand new constitution in 1997, which has been 
highly praised as a liberal constitution. Macedonia, with the inherited Yugoslav tradition 
of federalism and recognition in paper and practice of a wide range of human and 
collective rights passed in 1991 a centralized and rigid constitution, and it took a violent 
ethnic conflict to amend it into a more acceptable document for all its citizens. 
The previous paragraph shows that institutional memories do not last long and 
leaders’ current preferences prevail over such memories. Both my case countries come 
from the Ottoman tradition as both were the last territories in the Balkans to escape the 
Ottoman grip. This fact prevents us from properly understanding the role of the Habsburg 
tradition in the particular reforms that we considered here. However, speculating from the 
inconsistent role that the Leninist legacy has played in these reforms both in Albania and 
Macedonia, one can argue that either Habsburg or Ottoman memories remain distant 
historical memories rather than vivid institutional memories imprinted in their societies’ 
political consciences.    
Other theories have pointed to the relevance of human capital in conducting 
efficient reforms in transition postsocialist countries. My historical analysis shows that 
such concerns are overrated, and what keeps these countries from performing in their 
258 
 
reform policies is the lack of political will rather than human capital. The Balkans have 
inherited from communism high levels of literacy, and their societies’ zeal for education 
is reflected in the large number of students being graduated abroad as well as a 
relentlessly growing number of public and private institutions in both countries. 
Moreover, the very concept of EU membership conditionality would have been 
undermined by the lack of human resources, and countries efforts should have been 
steered toward creating human capacities rather than conducting institutional reforms. 
However, the fact that reforms begin to progress immediately after domestic political will 
supports them shows that political will is a more efficient explanation for the outcomes of 
institutional reforms in EU membership aspiring countries from Eastern Europe. 
Reforms are often painful and often generate political costs for governments, hence their 
reluctance to undertake radical reform programs. EU membership conditionality has been 
a powerful tool both to spur Eastern European ruling elites toward reforms and shield 
them from domestic backlashes. Yet, while EU membership conditionality works through 
switching domestic leaders’ preferences over reforms from negative to positive, they 
cannot change their mindset. Evidence from previous EU enlargements in Eastern Europe 
show that governments slow down reforms, or stop them altogether, when membership is 
already acquired. Aware of this tendency, on December 13, 2006, only days before the 
Bulgarian and Romanian accession  scheduled for January 1, 2007, the EU establish the 
Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification for Bulgaria and Romania (MCVBR).  
When these countries joined, the EU was aware of their need for further progress in 
sectors of judicial reform, corruption and organized crime. In order both to facilitate their 
accession and safeguard the workings of its policies and institutions, the EU established 
MCVBR to help them address these outstanding shortcomings. 
 In June 2007, the EU released its first Report Progress on Bulgaria since the 
country joined the EU. The Report is critical; highlighting the Bulgarian Government’s 
commitment to judicial reform and cleansing the system of corruption and organized 
crime, the report noted “a clear weakness in translating these intentions into results” and 
that “much remains to be done.” The Report concluded that progress “is still 
insufficient.”1 An Interim Report on progress in Bulgaria with judiciary reform and the 
fight against corruption and organized crime released in February 2008 pointed to the 
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same problems.
2
 One year later, in July 2009, with no progress noticed in these sectors, 
the EU Commission decided to punish Bulgaria by cutting nearly half a billion Euros, 
which effectively stopped the payments of some €250 million ($394 million) earmarked 
for institutional reforms.
3
 
In July 2009, Romania got away without fund cuts in the judiciary, anti-corruption 
and anticrime sectors (although it suffered a suspension of agricultural payments worth 
€142 million, no linkage was made with such sectors).  In February 2009, the European 
Commission released its Interim Reports for Bulgaria and Romania. The report on 
Bulgaria acknowledges the “efforts” made by the authorities since July 2008, especially 
the setting up of joint investigation teams composed of prosecutors, intelligence officers 
and policemen to fight organized crime, but it required “convincing and tangible results.”4 
However, the Interim Report on Romania was very critical. It highlighted that “[t]he pace 
of progress noted in the Commission's report of July 2008 has not been maintained,” and 
that “[i]n most other areas, shortcomings identified by the Commission in July remain.”5  
Reportedly, several member states, namely Germany, France, UK, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Austria, threatened fund cuts if the 
Progress Report scheduled for June 2009 would not show progress in these sectors.
6
 It did 
not happen, but these developments show how volatile the progress in Eastern European 
institutional reforms continues to be even after they join the EU. With membership 
conditionality inapplicable to member countries, the Union tries to enforce compliance by 
using alternative coercive tools. But these developments also show how difficult and long 
the road toward reforms in Eastern Europe would have been without EU membership 
conditionality.   
My research reveals both strengths and weaknesses of membership conditionality. 
A better awareness of those strengths and weaknesses would help to apply it more 
effectively. As a concept, membership conditionality might be related to a number of 
policy areas, and different IOs focus on different policy areas. First, membership 
conditionality works only when it manages to shift domestic leaders’ policy preferences 
to compliance with policies prescribed by the IO where a country aspires to join. If the 
benefits of membership are higher than the domestic cost of a sectorial reform, then 
governments proceed with that reform. Second, conducting institutional reform under the 
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pressure of membership conditionality might not represent the perfect way to institute 
reforms, and often the tug-of-war between the IO’s and domestic leaders’ competing 
policy preference might increase the cost of reforms. The best way to reforms is domestic 
leaders’ willingness to undertake them. Membership conditionality emerges when such 
willingness does not exist. 
  Moreover, membership conditionality is contingent upon the character and scope 
of the IO. The more an IO has a stake in a membership aspiring country’s particular 
sectorial reform, the more it will pressure for reforms in that policy area. In turn, that 
character represents the single most important factor of membership conditionality’s 
strength. Membership conditionality’s rationale rests on its power to alter leaders’ policy 
preferences. Thus, for the EU, eastward enlargement brings the challenge of instability, 
and EU membership conditionality aims at assuring that stability, the primary goal of the 
EU. Therefore, EU membership conditionality is a tool in function of that democratic 
stability.    
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261 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Interim Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism.” Brussels, February 2, 2009 COM(2009) 70 final. At 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/docs/romania_report_20090212_en.pdf  [Accessed April 
2011]. 
6
 Valentina Pop. “Bulgaria, Romania Risk More EU Aid Cuts” EUobserver.com, February 2, 2009. At 
http://euobserver.com/9/27599 [Accessed April 2011].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Ridvan Peshkopia 2011 
 262 
 
APPENDIX A 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS OF MACEDONIA SINCE 1981
*
 
 
FIGURE 1  POPULATION IN MACEDONIA IN 1981 BY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 
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FIGURE 2  POPULATION IN MACEDONIA IN 2002 BY TERRITORY 
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FIGURE 3  POPULATION IN MACEDONIA IN 2002 BY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 
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FIGURE 4 POPULATION IN MACEDONIA IN 2002 BY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 266 
 
FIGURE 5  POPULATION IN MACEDONIA IN 2002 BY ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 
 
 
                                                          
*
 Source: Wikipedia. At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Republic_of_Macedonia. 
[Visited November 14, 2010] 
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APPENDIX B 
 
OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
 
 
The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's 
democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between 
the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will 
promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the 
ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens. 
 
1. Basic Principles 
1.1. The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely and 
unconditionally. Only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future 
for Macedonia. 
1.2. Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the State 
are inviolable and must be preserved. There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues. 
1.3. The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society must be preserved and reflected in 
public life. 
1.4. A modern democratic state in its natural course of development and maturation must 
continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens and comports 
with the highest international standards, which themselves continue to evolve. 
1.5. The development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation 
of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities. 
 
2. Cessation of Hostilities 
2.1. The parties underline the importance of the commitments of July 5, 2001. There shall 
be a complete cessation of hostilities, complete voluntary disarmament of the ethnic 
Albanian armed groups and their complete voluntary disbandment. They acknowledge that 
a decision by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a general, 
unconditional and open-ended cease-fire, agreement on a political solution to the problems 
of this country, a clear commitment by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and 
acceptance by all the parties of the conditions and limitations under which the NATO 
forces will operate. 
 
3. Development of Decentralized Government 
3.1. A revised Law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that reinforces the powers of 
elected local officials and enlarges substantially their competencies in conformity with the 
Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) and the European Charter on Local 
Self-Government, and reflecting the principle of subsidiarity in effect in the European 
Union. Enhanced competencies will relate principally to the areas of public services, urban 
and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local 
finances, education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-
government will be adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local 
governments to fulfill all of their responsibilities. 
3.2. Boundaries of municipalities will be revised within one year of the completion of a 
new census, which will be conducted under international supervision by the end of 2001. 
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The revision of the municipal boundaries will be effectuated by the local and national 
authorities with international participation. 
3.3. In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of 
the local population, local heads of police will be selected by municipal councils from lists 
of candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior, and will communicate regularly with the 
councils. The Ministry of Interior will retain the authority to remove local heads of police 
in accordance with the law. 
 
4. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation 
4.1. The principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the law will be 
respected completely. This principle will be applied in particular with respect to 
employment in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing 
for business development. 
4.2. Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure 
equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all 
levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning 
competence and integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take action 
to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular 
through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities. Particular attention 
will be given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect 
the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia, as specified in Annex C. 
4.3. For the Constitutional Court, one-third of the judges will be chosen by the Assembly 
by a majority of the total number of Representatives that includes a majority of the total 
number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia. This procedure also will apply to the election of the Ombudsman 
(Public Attorney) and the election of three of the members of the Judicial Council. 
 
5. Special Parliamentary Procedures 
5.1. On the central level, certain Constitutional amendments in accordance with Annex A 
and the Law on Local Self-Government cannot be approved without a qualified majority of 
two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of Representatives 
claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
5.2. Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, 
and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, 
and boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within which there must 
be a majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not 
in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
 
6. Education and Use of Languages 
6.1. With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction will be provided in the 
students' native languages, while at the same time uniform standards for academic 
programs will be applied throughout Macedonia. 
6.2. State funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at 
least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia, on the basis of specific agreements. 
6.3. The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State 
universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of 
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Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition of the population of 
Macedonia. 
6.4. The official language throughout Macedonia and in the international relations of 
Macedonia is the Macedonian language.  
6.5. Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official 
language, as set forth herein. In the organs of the Republic of Macedonia, any official 
language other than Macedonian may be used in accordance with the law, as further 
elaborated in Annex B. Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at 
least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian may 
use any official language to communicate with the regional office of the central 
government with responsibility for that municipality; such an office will reply in that 
language in addition to Macedonian. Any person may use any official language to 
communicate with a main office of the central government, which will reply in that 
language in addition to Macedonian. 
6.6. With respect to local self-government, in municipalities where a community comprises 
at least 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the language of that community 
will be used as an official language in addition to Macedonian. With respect to languages 
spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the local authorities 
will decide democratically on their use in public bodies.  
6.7. In criminal and civil judicial proceedings at any level, an accused person or any party 
will have the right to translation at State expense of all proceedings as well as documents in 
accordance with relevant Council of Europe documents. 
6.8. Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language other than 
Macedonian will also be issued in that language, in addition to the Macedonian language, 
in accordance with the law. 
 
7. Expression of Identity 
7.1. With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local 
authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the 
identity of the community in the majority in the municipality, respecting international rules 
and usages. 
 
8. Implementation 
8.1. The Constitutional amendments attached at Annex A will be presented to the Assembly 
immediately. The parties will take all measures to assure adoption of these amendments 
within 45 days of signature of this Framework Agreement. 
8.2. The legislative modifications identified in Annex B will be adopted in accordance with 
the timetables specified therein. 
8.3. The parties invite the international community to convene at the earliest possible time a 
meeting of international donors that would address in particular macro-financial assistance; 
support for the financing of measures to be undertaken for the purpose of implementing this 
Framework Agreement, including measures to strengthen local self-government; and 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas affected by the fighting. 
 
9. Annexes 
The following Annexes constitute integral parts of this Framework Agreement: 
A. Constitutional Amendments 
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B. Legislative Modifications 
C. Implementation and Confidence-Building Measures 
 
10. Final Provisions 
10.1. This Agreement takes effect upon signature. 
10.2. The English language version of this Agreement is the only authentic version. 
10.3. This Agreement was concluded under the auspices of President Boris Trajkovski. 
 
Done at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001, in the English language. 
 
 
ANNEX A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Preamble 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the present and 
future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and 
dedication in their endeavors and struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of 
Macedonia, and responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is 
valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in 
rights and obligations towards the common good -- the Republic of Macedonia, in 
accordance with the tradition of the Krushevo Republic and the decisions of the Antifascist 
People’s Liberation Assembly of Macedonia, and the Referendum of September 8, 1991, 
they have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign 
state, with the intention of establishing 
and consolidating rule of law, guaranteeing human rights and civil liberties, providing 
peace and 
coexistence, social justice, economic well-being and prosperity in the life of the individual 
and the community, and in this regard through their representatives in the Assembly of the 
Republic of Macedonia, elected in free and democratic elections, they adopt . . . . 
 
Article 7 
(1) The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language 
throughout the Republic of Macedonia and in the international relations of the Republic of 
Macedonia. 
(2) Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official 
language, written using its alphabet, as specified below. 
(3) Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language other than 
Macedonian shall also be issued in that language, in addition to the Macedonian language, 
in accordance with the law. 
(4) Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 percent of the 
population speaks an official language other than Macedonian may use any official 
language to communicate with the regional office of the central government with 
responsibility for that municipality; such an office shall reply in that language in addition to 
Macedonian. Any person may use any official language to communicate with a main office 
of the central government, which shall reply in that language in addition to Macedonian. 
(5) In the organs of the Republic of Macedonia, any official language other than 
Macedonian may be used in accordance with the law. 
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(6) In the units of local self-government where at least 20 percent of the population speaks 
a particular language, that language and its alphabet shall be used as an official language in 
addition to the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic alphabet. With respect to languages 
spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of a unit of local self-government, the 
local authorities shall decide on their use in public bodies. 
 
Article 8 
(1) The fundamental values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia are: 
- the basic freedoms and rights of the individual and citizen, recognized in international law 
and set down in the Constitution; 
- equitable representation of persons belonging to all communities in public bodies at all 
levels and in other areas of public life; 
 
Article 19 
(1) The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed. 
(2) The right to express one's faith freely and publicly, individually or with others is 
guaranteed. 
(3) The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, 
the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and groups are separate from the 
state and equal before the law. 
(4) The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, 
the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and groups are free to establish 
schools and other social and charitable institutions, by ways of a procedure regulated by 
law. 
 
Article 48 
(1) Members of communities have a right freely to express, foster and develop their identity 
and 
community attributes, and to use their community symbols. 
(2) The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of all communities. 
(3) Members of communities have the right to establish institutions for culture, art, science 
and education, as well as scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and 
development of their identity. 
(4) Members of communities have the right to instruction in their language in primary and 
secondary education, as determined by law. In schools where education is carried out in 
another language, the Macedonian language is also studied. 
 
Article 56 
(2) The Republic guarantees the protection, promotion and enhancement of the historical 
and artistic heritage of Macedonia and all communities in Macedonia and the treasures of 
which it is composed, regardless of their legal status. The law regulates the mode and 
conditions under which specific items of general interest for the Republic can be ceded for 
use. 
 
Article 69 
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(2) For laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal 
documentation, and use of symbols, the Assembly makes decisions by a majority vote of 
the Representatives attending, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the 
Representatives attending who claim to belong to the communities not in the majority in 
the population of Macedonia. In the event of a dispute within the Assembly regarding the 
application of this provision, the Committee on Inter-Community Relations shall resolve 
the dispute. 
 
Article 77 
(1) The Assembly elects the Public Attorney by a majority vote of the total number of 
Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the total number of 
Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population 
of Macedonia. 
(2) The Public Attorney protects the constitutional rights and legal rights of citizens when 
violated by bodies of state administration and by other bodies and organizations with public 
mandates. The Public Attorney shall give particular attention to safeguarding the principles 
of non-discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public bodies at all 
levels and in other areas of public life. 
 
Article 78 
(1) The Assembly shall establish a Committee for Inter-Community Relations. 
(2) The Committee consists of seven members each from the ranks of the Macedonians and 
Albanians within the Assembly, and five members from among the Turks, Vlachs, 
Romanies and two other communities. The five members each shall be from a different 
community; if fewer than five other communities are represented in the Assembly, the 
Public Attorney, after consultation with relevant community leaders, shall propose the 
remaining members from outside the Assembly. 
(3) The Assembly elects the members of the Committee. 
(4) The Committee considers issues of inter-community relations in the Republic and 
makes appraisals and proposals for their solution. 
(5) The Assembly is obliged to take into consideration the appraisals and proposals of the 
Committee and to make decisions regarding them. 
(6) In the event of a dispute among members of the Assembly regarding the application of 
the voting procedure specified in Article 69(2), the Committee shall decide by majority 
vote whether the procedure applies. 
 
Article 84 
The President of the Republic of Macedonia 
- proposes the members of the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations;(to be deleted) . . . . 
 
Article 86 
(1) The President of the Republic is President of the Security Council of the Republic of 
Macedonia. 
(2) The Security Council of the Republic is composed of the President of the Republic, the 
President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Ministers heading the bodies of state 
administration in the fields of security, defence [sic] and foreign affairs and three members 
appointed by the President of the Republic. In appointing the three members, the President 
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shall ensure that the Security Council as a whole equitably reflects the composition of the 
population of Macedonia. 
(3) The Council considers issues relating to the security and defence of the Republic and 
makes policy proposals to the Assembly and the Government. 
 
Article 104 
(1) The Republican Judicial Council is composed of seven members. 
(2) The Assembly elects the members of the Council. Three of the members shall be elected 
by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a 
majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
 
Article 109 
(1) The Constitutional Court of Macedonia is composed of nine judges. 
(2) The Assembly elects six of the judges to the Constitutional Court by a majority vote of 
the total number of Representatives. The Assembly elects three of the judges by a majority 
vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the 
votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in 
the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
 
Article 114 
(5) Local self-government is regulated by a law adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of 
the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a majority of the votes of 
the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the 
majority in the population of Macedonia. The laws on local finances, local elections, 
boundaries of municipalities, and the city of Skopje shall be adopted by a majority vote of 
the Representatives attending, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the 
Representatives attending who claim to belong to the communities not in the majority in 
the population of Macedonia. 
 
Article 115 
(1) In units of local self-government, citizens directly and through representatives 
participate in decisionmaking on issues of local relevance particularly in the fields of public 
services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, 
local finances, communal activities, culture, sport, social security and child care, education, 
health care and other fields determined by law. 
 
Article 131 
(1) The decision to initiate a change in the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-
thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives. 
(2) The draft amendment to the Constitution is confirmed by the Assembly by a majority 
vote of the total number of Representatives and then submitted to public debate. 
(3) The decision to change the Constitution is made by the Assembly by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the total number of Representatives. 
(4) A decision to amend the Preamble, the articles on local self-government, Article 131, 
any provision relating to the rights of members of communities, including in particular 
Articles 7, 8, 9, 19, 48, 56, 69, 77, 78, 86, 104 and 109, as well as a decision to add any 
274 
 
new provision relating to the subject matter of such provisions and articles, shall require a 
two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be 
a majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives claiming to belong to the 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
(5) The change in the Constitution is declared by the Assembly. 
 
 
ANNEX B 
LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS 
The parties will take all necessary measures to ensure the adoption of the legislative 
changes set forth hereafter within the time limits specified. 
 
1. Law on Local Self-Government 
The Assembly shall adopt within 45 days from the signing of the Framework Agreement a 
revised Law on Local Self-Government. This revised Law shall in no respect be less 
favorable to the units of local selfgovernment and their autonomy than the draft Law 
proposed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in March 2001. The Law shall 
include competencies relating to the subject matters set forth in Section 3.1 of the 
Framework Agreement as additional independent competencies of the units of local 
selfgovernment, and shall conform to Section 6.6 of the Framework Agreement. In 
addition, the Law shall provide that any State standards or procedures established in any 
laws concerning areas in which municipalities have independent competencies shall be 
limited to those which cannot be established as effectively at the local level; such laws shall 
further promote the municipalities’ independent exercise of their competencies. 
 
2. Law on Local Finance 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly a law on local 
self-government finance to ensure that the units of local self-government have sufficient 
resources to carry out their tasks under the revised Law on Local Self-Government. In 
particular, the law shall: 
- Enable and make responsible units of local self-government for raising a substantial 
amount of tax revenue; 
- Provide for the transfer to the units of local self-government of a part of centrally raised 
taxes that corresponds to the functions of the units of local self-government and that takes 
account of the collection of taxes on their territories; and 
- Ensure the budgetary autonomy and responsibility of the units of local self-government 
within their areas of competence. 
 
3. Law on Municipal Boundaries 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised law on municipal boundaries, 
taking into account the results of the census and the relevant guidelines set forth in the Law 
on Local Self-Government. 
 
4. Laws Pertaining to Police Located in the Municipalities 
The Assembly shall adopt before the end of the term of the present Assembly provisions 
ensuring: 
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- That each local head of the police is selected by the council of the municipality concerned 
from a list of not fewer than three candidates proposed by the Ministry of the Interior, 
among whom at least one candidate shall belong to the community in the majority in the 
municipality. In the event the municipal council fails to select any of the candidates 
proposed within 15 days, the Ministry of the Interior shall propose a second list of not 
fewer than three new candidates, among whom at least one candidate shall belong to the 
community in the majority in the municipality. If the municipal council again fails to select 
any of the candidates proposed within 15 days, the Minister of the Interior, after 
consultation with the Government, shall select the local head of police from among the two 
lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of the Interior as well as three additional 
candidates proposed by the municipal council; 
- That each local head of the police informs regularly and upon request the council of the 
municipality concerned; 
- That a municipal council may make recommendations to the local head of police in areas 
including public security and traffic safety; and 
- That a municipal council may adopt annually a report regarding matters of public safety, 
which shall be addressed to the Minister of the Interior and the Public Attorney 
(Ombudsman). 
 
5. Laws on the Civil Service and Public Administration 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly amendments to 
the laws on the civil service and public administration to ensure equitable representation of 
communities in accordance with Section 4.2 of the Framework Agreement. 
 
6. Law on Electoral Districts 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised Law on Electoral Districts, taking 
into account the results of the census and the principles set forth in the Law on the Election 
of Members for the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia. 
 
7. Rules of the Assembly 
The Assembly shall amend by the end of the term of the present Assembly its Rules of 
Procedure to enable the use of the Albanian language in accordance with Section 6.5 of the 
Framework Agreement, paragraph 8 below, and the relevant amendments to the 
Constitution set forth in  
 
Annex A. 
8. Laws Pertinent to the Use of Languages 
The Assembly shall adopt by the end of the term of the present Assembly new legislation 
regulating the use of languages in the organs of the Republic of Macedonia. This legislation 
shall provide that: 
- Representatives may address plenary sessions and working bodies of the Assembly in 
languages referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution (as amended in 
accordance with Annex A); 
- Laws shall be published in the languages referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the 
Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A); and 
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- All public officials may write their names in the alphabet of any language referred to in 
Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) 
on any official documents. The Assembly also shall adopt by the end of the term of the 
present Assembly new legislation on the issuance of personal documents. The Assembly 
shall amend by the end of the term of the present Assembly all relevant laws to make their 
provisions on the use of languages fully compatible with Section 6 of the Framework 
Agreement. 
 
9. Law on the Public Attorney 
The Assembly shall amend by the end of 2002 the Law on the Public Attorney as well as 
the other relevant laws to ensure: 
- That the Public Attorney shall undertake actions to safeguard the principles of non-
discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public bodies at all levels 
and in other areas of public life, and that there are adequate resources and personnel within 
his office to enable him to carry out this function; 
- That the Public Attorney establishes decentralized offices; 
- That the budget of the Public Attorney is voted separately by the Assembly; 
- That the Public Attorney shall present an annual report to the Assembly and, where 
appropriate, may upon request present reports to the councils of municipalities in which 
decentralized offices are established; and 
- That the powers of the Public Attorney are enlarged: 
- To grant to him access to and the opportunity to examine all official documents, it being 
understood that the Public Attorney and his staff will not disclose confidential information; 
- To enable the Public Attorney to suspend, pending a decision of the competent court, the 
execution of an administrative act, if he determines that the act may result in an irreparable 
prejudice to the rights of the interested person; and 
- To give to the Public Attorney the right to contest the conformity of laws with the 
Constitution before the Constitutional Court. 
 
10. Other Laws 
The Assembly shall enact all legislative provisions that may be necessary to give full effect 
to the Framework Agreement and amend or abrogate all provisions incompatible with the 
Framework Agreement. 
 
 
ANNEX C 
IMPLEMENTATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
 
1. International Support 
1.1. The parties invite the international community to facilitate, monitor and assist in the 
implementation of the provisions of the Framework Agreement and its Annexes, and 
request such efforts to be coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the Stabilization and 
Association Council. 
2. Census and Elections 
2.1. The parties confirm the request for international supervision by the Council of Europe 
and the European Commission of a census to be conducted in October 2001. 
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2.2. Parliamentary elections will be held by 27 January 2002. International organizations, 
including the OSCE, will be invited to observe these elections. 
3. Refugee Return, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
3.1. All parties will work to ensure the return of refugees who are citizens or legal residents 
of 
Macedonia and displaced persons to their homes within the shortest possible timeframe, 
and invite the international community and in particular UNHCR to assist in these efforts. 
3.2. The Government with the participation of the parties will complete an action plan 
within 30 days after the signature of the Framework Agreement for rehabilitation of and 
reconstruction in areas affected by the hostilities. The parties invite the international 
community to assist in the formulation and implementation of this plan. 
3.3. The parties invite the European Commission and the World Bank to rapidly convene a 
meeting of international donors after adoption in the Assembly of the Constitutional 
amendments in Annex A and the revised Law on Local Self-Government to support the 
financing of measures to be undertaken for the purpose of implementing the Framework 
Agreement and its Annexes, including measures to strengthen local self-government and 
reform the police services, to address macro-financial assistance to the Republic of 
Macedonia, and to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction measures identified in the 
action plan identified in paragraph 3.2. 
 
4. Development of Decentralized Government 
4.1. The parties invite the international community to assist in the process of strengthening 
local selfgovernment. The international community should in particular assist in preparing 
the necessary legal amendments related to financing mechanisms for strengthening the 
financial basis of municipalities and building their financial management capabilities, and 
in amending the law on the boundaries of municipalities. 
 
5. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation 
5.1. Taking into account i.a. the recommendations of the already established governmental 
commission, the parties will take concrete action to increase the representation of members 
of communities not in the majority in Macedonia in public administration, the military, and 
public enterprises, as well as to improve their access to public financing for business 
development. 
5.2. The parties commit themselves to ensuring that the police services will by 2004 
generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia. As initial 
steps toward this end, the parties commit to ensuring that 500 new police officers from 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia will be hired and trained 
by July 2002, and that these officers will be deployed to the areas where such communities 
live. The parties further commit that 500 additional such officers will be hired and trained 
by July 2003, and that these officers will be deployed on a priority basis to the areas 
throughout Macedonia where such communities live. The parties invite the international 
community to support and assist with the implementation of these commitments, in 
particular through screening and selection of candidates and their training. The parties 
invite the OSCE, the European Union, and the United States to send an expert team as 
quickly as possible in order to assess how best to achieve these objectives. 
5.3. The parties also invite the OSCE, the European Union, and the United States to 
increase training and assistance programs for police, including: 
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- professional, human rights, and other training; 
- technical assistance for police reform, including assistance in screening, selection and 
promotion processes; 
- development of a code of police conduct; 
- cooperation with respect to transition planning for hiring and deployment of police 
officers from communities not in the majority in Macedonia; and 
- deployment as soon as possible of international monitors and police advisors in sensitive 
areas, under appropriate arrangements with relevant authorities. 
5.4. The parties invite the international community to assist in the training of lawyers, 
judges and 
prosecutors from members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia in order to be 
able to increase their representation in the judicial system. 
 
6. Culture, Education and Use of Languages 
6.1. The parties invite the international community, including the OSCE, to increase its 
assistance for projects in the area of media in order to further strengthen radio, TV and print 
media, including Albanian language and multiethnic media. The parties also invite the 
international community to increase professional media training programs for members of 
communities not in the majority in Macedonia. The parties also invite the OSCE to 
continue its efforts on projects designed to improve inter-ethnic relations. 
6.2. The parties invite the international community to provide assistance for the 
implementation of the Framework Agreement in the area of higher education. 
 
August 13, 2001 
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